



This action is funded by the European Union

**ANNEX 5**

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 in favour of the ENI South countries

**Action Document for**

**Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) – EU Peacebuilding Initiative 2015 (EU PbI)**

**INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS**

**WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS**

This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 128(1) of the Financial Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012) in the following section concerning calls for proposals: 5.3.1 Grants – call for proposals "EU Peacebuilding Initiative" (direct management)

<b>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</b>	Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) – EU Peacebuilding Initiative 2015 (EU PbI) CRIS number: ENI/2015/038-321 financed under the European Neighbourhood Instrument
<b>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</b>	The action shall be carried out at the following locations: Israel and Palestine <sup>1</sup> and tentatively Jordan.
<b>3. Programming document</b>	Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-2020. Regional South Strategy Paper (2014-2020) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2017)
<b>4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area</b>	Building a partnership with people
<b>5. Amounts concerned</b>	Total estimated cost: EUR 6,225,000 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 5,000,000 Budget line: 21.03.01.03 This action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR 1,225,000
<b>6. Aid modality(ies)</b>	Project Modality

<sup>1</sup> This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

<b>and implementation modality(ies)</b>	Direct management – grants – call for proposals – procurement of services			
<b>7. DAC code(s)</b>	15220			
<b>8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality (including Women In Development)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Biological diversity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships</b>	Civil Society and Local Authorities Thematic Programme		

## SUMMARY

In alignment with the EU Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the overall objective of the programme is to support and promote the conditions for a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict through civil society and citizens' positive engagement.

The programme will be implemented through a Call for Proposals which will finance civil society initiatives in Israel, Palestine, and tentatively Europe and Jordan aiming at: 1) to promote conditions for a negotiated settlement of the conflict via participatory civil engagement; 2) to build mutual understanding, confidence and trust; 3) to contribute to peacebuilding through cross-border work supporting socio-economic development in and empowerment of most conflict-affected communities.

## 1 CONTEXT

### 1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area

Since 1998, following the recommendations of the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 that the EU actively supports civil society initiatives in the Middle East as an

essential means of reinforcing dialogue and restoring mutual confidence, the EU has consistently supported a large number of such initiatives. Initially such support was provided through the European Union's People to People (P2P) Programme (1998 - 2001) and subsequently from 2002 to the present, through its successor, the EU Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP). Based on the findings of an external consultation conducted in 2014 on the PfP Programme 2007-14, and in order to clarify and enhance the programme's relevance to the current regional political context, it has been decided to rename the programme as "EU Peacebuilding Initiative" (EU Pbl).

### *1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework*

A central objective of the EU in the Middle East is the achievement of peace by means of a just and lasting resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security and mutual recognition. This includes a negotiated solution to all final status issues, including borders, Jerusalem, security, water and refugees. The EU has reiterated its readiness to contribute substantially to post-conflict arrangements for ensuring the sustainability of a peace agreement.

At the regional level, the Arab Peace Initiative (API) remains the principal option for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict and normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab neighbours. However, though the Initiative has been welcomed by the international community including the EU and the United States, Israel has not formally responded to the API. The regional approach to the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict will have to take into account the fundamental changes across the Arab world taking place since 2011.

The positions of the EU on the MEPP are communicated on a regular basis through statements made by the EU Foreign Affairs Council. The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) Conclusions provide a solid basis for implementing EU policy on MEPP through direct support for actions on the ground by civil society and other actors.

In December 2013, during the latest round of the US led peace efforts, the EU Foreign Affairs Council offered both parties an unprecedented package of political, economic and security support, in the event of a final peace agreement. The EU will offer Israel and the future state of Palestine a Special Privileged Partnership including enhanced political dialogue, security co-operation, increased access to European markets, closer cultural and scientific links, facilitation of trade and investments as well as promotion of business to business relations.

The conflict took another turn for the worse in the summer of 2014, with another armed conflict in Gaza lasting 50 days and resulting in widespread destruction. At the same time, in the course of 2014 there was a significant increase in violence and tensions in the West Bank, including notably in East Jerusalem where the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has been the focus of particular friction. These resulted in an increase in deaths and injuries particularly in Jerusalem, including as a result of terror attacks. In November 2012, Palestine was accorded the status of non-member observer state at the United Nations, following a vote at the General Assembly. In 2014, President Abbas signed accession instruments for various international human rights, humanitarian and diplomatic treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Nevertheless, the EU has called on both sides to remain focussed on the negotiations and the mutual benefits which peace can bring, and to avoid any action that could undermine peace efforts and the viability of a two-state solution. As regards Palestinian reconciliation, the EU has reiterated its support for intra-Palestinian reconciliation behind President Abbas and also recalled that it expects any new Palestinian government to uphold the principle of non-violence, to remain committed to achieving a two-state solution and to a negotiated peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, accepting previous agreements and obligations, including Israel's legitimate right to exist. At the same time the EU has welcomed the opportunity provided by reconciliation for democratic renewal through genuine democratic elections.

The EU is remaining engaged politically in the MEPP via policies which aim to maintain the viability of the two-state solution<sup>2</sup> and encourages both Israeli and Palestinian parties to return to negotiations. It plays a key role within the Middle East Quartet, together with the US, Russia and the UN and constantly reaches out to Arab partners on the basis of the API. The EU has reinvigorated the position of Special Representative to the MEPP.

### *1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis*

An external evaluation and consultation of the EU Partnership for Peace (PfP) was conducted from December 2013 until January 2015. During the consultation phase, interviews, meetings and focus groups were held with a range of Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders, including journalists, politicians, youth, women and religious groups. European NGOs and EU officials were also consulted.

Palestinian attitudes to the MEPP, although by no means homogeneous, are overwhelmingly negative, with many believing that Israel has no intention of granting Palestinian statehood and that the MEPP only reinforces Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and resources. Israelis tend to have more diverse opinions, with a majority still (according to polls) favouring the two-state solution, with mainstream opinion attributing the main responsibility for the lack of peace to Palestinian intransigence and to a fundamental refusal to accept the legitimacy of the Israeli state.

Whilst Palestinians feel that the EU should be taking greater responsibility to end the conflict and establish a Palestinian state, in Israel, the EU is widely seen as being biased toward the Palestinians in the peace process, disconnected from the harsh realities of the Middle East and Israel's security concerns, as well as ineffectual in addressing anti-Semitism in Europe and the region.

In such a context, engagement in MEPP and peacebuilding in general, is often understood differently by Israelis and Palestinians. As the political situation has deteriorated further on the ground over recent years, despite attempts to revive peace talks, anti-normalisation movements in Palestine (and Jordan) have been increasingly vocal in advocating for a freeze of all joint activities between Palestinians and Israelis until the final settlement of the conflict.

---

<sup>2</sup> In 2013, the European Commission published Guidelines (Official Journal C 205/9 19.7.2013) on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards, clarifying EU policy with regard to the territorial applicability of EU legislation and bilateral EU-Israel agreements. The Guidelines make a specific exception (section 15) for activities which are carried out by Israeli entities over the Green Line which aim at promoting the Middle East peace process in line with EU policy.

Despite the negative atmosphere surrounding it, the external evaluation of the PfP programme found that "*results at project level were generally positive, often very much so. The **relevance** of the projects to the broader objectives of the programme was found to be high, even though this was not reflected in public perceptions of the programme. This remained true for projects with constituents generally seen as being unsympathetic to peacebuilding.*"

Similarly, despite certain disillusionment with the MEPP, the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations remains high on the agenda for both populations, and is reflected in the overwhelming attention paid to it in the media and political commentary. It is also noted that annual PfP calls for proposals generally involve over 150 applications from Israeli, Palestinian and European Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), thus indicating a consistently high level of interest in peacebuilding work despite the difficult circumstances.

### *1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis*

Taking into account the complex social and political environment in which it operates, the direction of the EU Peacebuilding Initiative (PbI) will be supportive of three mutually reinforcing and realistic specific objectives. The political environment has a direct impact on the work done by Israeli and Palestinian CSOs which are working towards an end to the conflict. During periods of direct peace talks, activities gain momentum and during the outbreak of conflict, such as the recent 2014 Gaza war, activities tend to come to a halt, albeit temporarily. Whilst the conflict itself remains long term and intractable, it is also unpredictable at times, requiring flexibility and rapid response to events which can either deteriorate quickly into violence, or alternatively, require encouragement of positive steps.

Support is needed in a variety of areas, which are all necessary factors in the attempts by EU and international actors to move Israelis and Palestinians towards an agreed settlement to the conflict. Engagement of a wide range of stakeholders is necessary in order to broaden support and to build mutual confidence. Ensuring broadest levels of engagement in solving the conflict is not only important as a democratic principle, but also to encourage realistic and accepted solutions, while ensuring that all actions are coherent with and support the framework of overall EU policy on the MEPP. This means civil and political engagement of people at large and of communities who are not generally active or visible in conflict resolution but fundamental for conflict transformation. This is particularly necessary regarding grass-roots level initiatives engaging with women and youth.

The values of equity, sustainable peace, non-violence and tolerance need to be supported on both sides as well between parties in conflict in order to altering the discourse between Israeli and Palestinians. Understanding of these values, also through learning from successful settlement of conflicts in other countries, is a fundamental factor in reaching a sustainable resolution. In this regard, activities range from combatting incitement and misinformation to encouraging understanding of 'the Other'. Such activities can occur within educational institutional frameworks, in public spaces especially by diffusing positive Israeli-Palestinian partnerships and coexistences experiences through media and social networks, and through joint learning from European experiences.

Whilst cross-border cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians is subject to anti-normalisation pressure and misinformation, experience shows that this kind of actions can strongly contribute to build confidence between the sides. With the aim

of maintaining the conditions for the viability of the two-state solution, joint socio-economic development actions will be promoted in view of demonstrating the practical potential dividends of peace, Acknowledging the asymmetry between Israeli and Palestinians, actions shall directly empower and benefit the communities most affected by the conflict. By working together, violence can be prevented and hope can be instilled, hence contributing to building peace.

## 2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

<b>Risks</b>	<b>Risk level (H/M/L)</b>	<b>Mitigating measures</b>
Disruption of activities linked to instability of the political situation	M	Flexibility in implementation, for example using flexible procedures for crisis and emergency situations
Joint activities lack participation and/or threatened by anti-normalisation movement	M	Sensitivity to the confidentiality and visibility of beneficiaries, participants and/or activities has been shown to mitigate such a risk
<b>Assumptions</b>		
Local civil society organizations continue to seek the support of the programme, as evidenced by consistently high number of applications to calls for proposals.		

## 3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

### 3.1 Lessons learnt

The external evaluation and consultation undertaken in 2013-2015 made a number of specific recommendations. Firstly, given the low participation of Jordan in the programme, consideration should be given to the involvement of the EU Delegation in Amman in the management of the programme. Whilst Jordan should continue participating in the programme, the focus must remain on Israel and Palestine.

The evaluation further assessed that whilst projects funded under PfP were generally positive, most projects were not found to directly impact on peace negotiations. Given the disillusionment that Israelis and Palestinians have with the peace process, it was recommended that the programme reduce its direct linkage to MEPP. However, overall the EU policy on the MEPP remains a relevant factor in outlining a solution, acceptable to significant parts of both populations, and requires reinforcement to counteract influences which can pull in other directions. EU positions are also sometimes subject to misinformation when reported in the local media. To that end, the political and operational work of the EU in both Delegations is aligned.

The external evaluation and other consultations conducted by the EU, have pointed consistently to a high level of satisfaction of the complementarity of the three areas covered by the programme: promoting political resolution, peacebuilding education

and cross border cooperation. This was seen as important in outreach to a wide range of stakeholders, rather than being limited to only certain kinds of organizations or population groups.

On the basis of recommendations of previous consultations and evaluations, the PfP programme introduced specific service contracts aimed at enhancing skills of project beneficiaries (e.g. trainings on monitoring and evaluation, gender and environmental mainstreaming), as well as supporting communication and visibility activities which often require additional efforts in view of the sensitive context. In addition, with regular contacts between Israelis and Palestinians dwindling, joint support activities provide valuable and safe networking opportunities, adding to the coherence of the programme. All these actions have been well received by project partners and have added value to the programme, and its objectives, as a whole.

### **3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination**

The Programme will take into account, seek complementarities with and avoid duplication with bilateral and regional actions, in particular under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Civil Society Facility and the Civil Society and Local Authorities Thematic Programme, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), and the East Jerusalem Programme under the EU-PA bilateral cooperation.

In general, donor co-ordination as regards peace-building initiatives has been limited, reflecting diverse strategies, sensitivities and funding mechanisms for this type of activities. Notwithstanding, informal co-ordination efforts amongst donors stepped up in 2014 under the leadership of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the support of the EU with the aim to share information on ongoing actions and partners on a more regular basis. Up until now, four meetings have taken place with the participation of 8 donors.

### **3.3 Cross-cutting issues**

The EU PbI will seek coherence with the EU Comprehensive Approach to the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security by encouraging initiatives directly tackling women and the involvement of women in the actions.

Cross-cutting issues such as environmental sustainability and disability rights will be given due consideration in the context of the programme by respectively encouraging applicants to adopt a mainstreamed approach and raising their awareness on environmentally friendly approaches.

## **4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION**

### **4.1 Objectives/results**

In line with the EU Council Conclusion on the MEPP, the **overall objective** of the programme is to support and promote the conditions for a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict through civil society and citizens' positive engagement.

The programme will set out three **specific objectives**:

- 1. To promote conditions for a negotiated settlement of the conflict via participatory civil engagement.*

Expected results:

- Citizens support and advocacy for political efforts to the resolution of the conflict is reinforced.
  - Constituencies have an improved sense of ownership over the political processes which can lead to an agreed settlement.
2. *To build mutual understanding, confidence and trust.*

Expected results:

- Commitment to the values of peace, tolerance and non-violence and understanding of how they have contributed to resolution of conflicts in Europe, is strengthened within diverse communities.
  - Better understanding of barriers to conflict resolution caused by misinformation, incitement and biased narratives amongst Israelis and Palestinians.
3. *To contribute to peacebuilding through cross-border work supporting socio-economic development in and empowerment of most conflict-affected communities.*

Expected results:

- Confidence between both sides and better understanding on the benefits of two-state solution is increased.
- Reduction of fear and mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians working together.
- Increased grass-roots relationships between communities of both sides.

## **4.2 Main activities**

The activities under the programme include:

(1) measures to promote conditions for a negotiated resolution of the conflict via participatory civil engagement such as advocacy and awareness-raising of political processes and peace initiatives, including at grass-root level, involvement of universities and research centers, dissemination of peace-related information, capacity-building support to peace activists and mediators.

(2) initiatives to build mutual understanding, confidence and trust such as the promotion of non-violent approaches to conflict resolution; non-violent culture and peace programmes within national curricula; joint learning processes on European experiences; media and social campaigns on positive examples of Israeli-Palestinian partnerships and mutual benefits; dissemination of information and promotion of knowledge on barriers to conflict resolution and peace.

(3) Peacebuilding actions through cross-border work supporting socio-economic development and empowerment of the most conflict-affected communities such as joint activities promoting education and training, trade and business, technology, environmental protection, access to services, etc.



### **4.3 Intervention logic**

The difficulties of expecting linear results in a programme which operates in a highly sensitive and volatile political situation are well known. In this scenario, the programme must consider its intervention logic in best case and worst case scenarios.

As a strategic programme, the EU PbI aims to generate and support actions which can lead to an improved atmosphere in which peace negotiations can operate and progress, or at the other end, to prevent escalation of violence. This means addressing short-term needs such as immediate engagement of the Israeli/Palestinian societies for peace negotiations, as well as long-term needs to prepare local populations for a sustainable peace agreement and the practicalities of 'the day after'.

The three specific objectives of the programme contribute towards the overall objective by promoting peacebuilding amongst both societies in three different dimensions: political, cultural and relation-building.

Diverse and mutual reinforcing objectives allow the programme to reach a wider range of stakeholders and beneficiaries, rather than being limited to only certain kinds of organizations or population groups.

## **5 IMPLEMENTATION**

### **5.1 Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

### **5.2 Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.2 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

### **5.3 Implementation modalities**

#### **5.3.1 Grants: call for proposals EU Peacebuilding Initiative (direct management)**

*(a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results*

Each action grant has its own objectives and expected results deriving from the specific situation the action intends to address, within the scope of the objectives and results describe in section 4.1: (1) promoting conditions for a negotiated settlement of the conflict via participatory civil engagement; (2) building mutual understanding, confidence and trust; (3) peacebuilding through cross-border work supporting socio-economic development in and empowerment of most conflict-affected communities.

As per the type of actions eligible for financing, they must be in line with the activities described in section 4.2. Actions will cover a range of civil society

initiatives, and where relevant may involve governmental, international organisations and private sector stakeholders. Priority will be given to: actions expanding the peace camp outreach by reaching widespread and diverse audiences in a substantial manner through the use of media and social networks; actions involving marginalised groups and/or targeting sceptical groups that are not committed to conflict resolution or to the values and policies which the EU PBI supports; actions fostering local leadership and grass-roots initiatives able of producing multilevel and long term relationship-building impact.

Proposals should build on a clear local dimension, take into account past experiences and consider sub-granting mechanism for actions when relevant. The role of international organisations and partners within the partnerships should focus on the transfer of knowledge, mediation and/or innovation, helping the local organisations to strengthen their relationship with their constituency.

All actions, regardless of the objective, must be implemented in Palestine and/or Israel, or in Jordan and/or Europe if directly involving Israeli and Palestinians. Specific activities, within the scope of the action and if duly justified, can be implemented in the region and/or abroad.

*(b) Eligibility conditions*

In order to be eligible for a grant, the applicant must:

- be a legal person **and**
- be non-profit-making **and**
- be a specific type of organisation such as: non-governmental organisation, public sector operator, local authority, international (inter-governmental) organisation as defined by Article 43 of the Rules of application of the EU Financial Regulation<sup>3</sup> **and**
- be established<sup>4</sup> in a Member State of the European Union or one of the ENI Countries<sup>5</sup> or a country that is beneficiary of Pre-Accession Assistance<sup>6</sup> or a

---

<sup>3</sup> International organisations are international public-sector organisations set up by intergovernmental agreements as well as specialised agencies set up by them; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are also recognised as international organisations.

<sup>4</sup> To be determined on the basis of the organisation's statutes which should demonstrate that it has been established by an instrument governed by the national law of the country concerned. In this respect, any legal entity whose statutes have been established in another country cannot be considered an eligible local organisation, even if the statutes are registered locally or a "Memorandum of Understanding" has been concluded.

<sup>5</sup> ENI South countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia. The eligibility criteria formulated in Commission Notice Nr. 2013/C-205/05 (OJEU C-205 of 19.07.2013) shall apply to this call for proposals. This notice, entitled "Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards", can be consulted at: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C\\_.2013.205.01.0009.01.ENG](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2013.205.01.0009.01.ENG).

<sup>6</sup> Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey.

Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA)<sup>7</sup> (this obligation does not apply to international organisations) **and**

- be directly responsible for the preparation and management of the action with the co-applicant(s) and affiliated entity(ies), not acting as an intermediary.

Subject to information to be published in the call for proposals, the indicative amount of the EU contribution per grant is EUR 250,000–500,000 and the grants may be awarded to sole beneficiaries and to consortia of beneficiaries (coordinator and co-beneficiaries). The indicative duration of the grant (its implementation period) is 24-36 months.

*(c) Essential selection and award criteria*

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call: design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

*(d) Maximum rate of co-financing*

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 80% of the eligible costs of the action.

In accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100%. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

*(e) Indicative timing to launch the call*

4<sup>rd</sup> trimester 2015.

5.3.2 *Procurement (direct management)*

Subject in generic terms	Type	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
Support measures: advocacy and aware raising, communication	Services	3	4 <sup>rd</sup> 2015

**5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provision.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the

<sup>7</sup> Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway.

basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

## 5.5 Indicative budget

	<b>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</b>	<b>Indicative third party contribution, in currency identified</b>
5.3.1 – Call for proposals - EU Peacebuilding Initiative (direct management)	4,900,000	1,225,000
5.3.2 – Procurement – support measures (direct management)	100,000	
Totals	5,000,000	1,225,000

## 5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

The programme will be co-managed by EU Delegations to Palestine (EUREP) and Israel (DELTA). The Call for Proposals will be administered by EUREP as the Contracting Authority.

EUREP and DELTA services will work jointly for the preparation of the Call for Proposals and for the evaluation process as well for the organisation of joint events, if any. They will also attend events, meetings and monitoring visits together when relevant and keep each other regularly informed on the projects progress. Where, applications include actions implemented in Jordan or Jordanian applicants, the EU Delegation in Amman will be consulted.

As a general principle, the distribution between the different Delegations in terms of contract/project management is made on the grounds of the nationality of the applicant: Palestinian and European applicants are processed by EUREP whereas Israeli ones are processed by DELTA (this includes contracting, monitoring and follow-up of the projects). In case of a Jordanian applicant, the management of the action may be delegated to the EU Delegation to Jordan.

## 5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of projects resulting from a call for proposals will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

## **5.8 Evaluation**

Having regard to the nature of the action, an evaluation will not be carried out for this action or its components.

The Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

## **5.9 Audit**

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

## **5.10 Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

The programme will benefit from the communication and networking contracts funded under previous financing decisions of the PfP programme. It will as well use the support measures as means to communicate on the programme and the EU values.

## APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action without an amendment to the financing decision. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for listing the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) when it is relevant and for reporting purpose on the achievement of results as measured by indicators.

	<b>Intervention logic</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Baselines (incl. reference year)</b>	<b>Targets (incl. reference year)</b>	<b>Sources and means of verification</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
<b>Overall objective: Impact</b>	To support and promote the conditions for a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict through civil society and citizens' positive engagement.	Enhanced public support and enlarged positive attitudes both in Palestine and Israel to peace negotiation and conflict resolution	Highly negative environment and attitudes to peace negotiations	Enlarged public support and openness to peace camp initiatives both in Palestine and Israel	Media, social and political pro-peace campaigns	
<b>Specific objective(s): Outcome(s)</b>	<p>1. To promote conditions for a negotiated settlement of the conflict via participatory civil engagement.</p> <p>2. To build mutual understanding, confidence and trust.</p> <p>3. To contribute to peacebuilding through cross-border work supporting socio-economic development in and empowerment of most</p>	<p>SO1: -Citizens support and advocacy for political efforts to the resolution of the conflict is reinforced. - Constituencies have an improved sense of ownership over the political processes which can lead to an agreed settlement.</p> <p>SO2: - Commitment to the values of peace, tolerance and non-violence and understanding of how they have contributed to resolution of conflicts in Europe is strengthened within diverse communities</p>	<p>No ongoing peace negotiations</p> <p>Evaluation of the Partnership for Peace Programme 2007-2013</p> <p>Baseline information, and data provided by beneficiaries</p>	<p>higher numbers of groups (women, youth, grass-roots organisations) informing and involved in the political sphere, and in support of the negotiations</p> <p>informed and involved in political processes; widespread number of people adhering to non – violent/peace</p>	<p>Beneficiary reports, project evaluation reports, media reports and public pools, programme multi-annual evaluation</p>	<p>Escalation of violence can disrupt activities and reverse positive effects of projects</p> <p>Anti-normalisation can affect willingness to participate in joint activities</p>

	<p>conflict-affected communities.</p>	<p>- Better understanding of barriers to conflict resolution caused by misinformation, incitement and biased narratives amongst Palestinians and Israelis.</p> <p>SO3</p> <p>- Confidence between both sides and better understanding on the benefits of two-state solution is increased.</p> <p>- Reduction of fear and mistrust between Israeli and Palestinians working together.</p>		<p>education</p> <p>increased number of strategic/long-term partnerships between Palestinian and Israeli, both at community and CSOs</p>		
<p>Outputs</p>	<p>Expected outputs from projects: lobbying and political advocacy, social/media campaigns, research reports, training workshops, conferences, joint socio-economic activities.</p>	<p>number of events; number of participants in conferences; quantifiable media exposure and reach; number of joint socio-economic partnerships and activities</p>	<p>baseline information, and data provided by beneficiaries</p>	<p>Projects outputs reach wide range of potential stakeholders</p>	<p>Beneficiary reports , project evaluation reports and media reports and public pools, programme multi-annual evaluation</p>	<p>Escalation of violence can disrupt activities and reverse positive effects of projects</p> <p>Anti-normalisation can affect willingness to participate in activities</p>