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<th>Recommendations, Final report</th>
<th>Responses, DG NEAR: (i) accepted or not, (ii) actions to be undertaken</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Enhancing the EU’s role as a strategic actor</td>
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Recommendation 1

EU should review the existing SSR portfolios and needs in each IPA and ENP beneficiary and on this basis develop an EU SSR strategic approach towards the beneficiary in question.

EU strategic approach to SSR for each beneficiary should:

1) provide a strategic vision for coupling technical and political aspects of reform so that the synergies between political dialogue and technical assistance are capitalised on, including the synergies between bilateral and regional support, between EU Delegations/Offices and CSDP missions/operations, and between EU support and Member State support;

2) draw on the principles of the 2016 Joint Communication on a EU-wide strategic framework for SSR as well as relevant IPA and ENI policy and programming documents;

3) define common SSR objectives to be achieved in each beneficiary and how EU support would help achieve those objectives;

4) be grounded in national ownership;

5) identify key challenges on the part of beneficiaries and the EU itself, including EU MS; and

6) indicate how such challenges to the achievement of the EU’s strategic objectives could be overcome.

The inter-service SSR task force should determine the most efficient and effective way forward of implementing this recommendation, such as utilising the new Security Sector Governance Facility.

i) Partially accepted

The joint SSR framework adopted in 2016 provides that the EU will gradually develop SSR coordination matrices (EU logic of engagement in the security sector), precisely to meet this objective in countries where significant EU intervention in the security sector is planned, or already happening. The EU has committed to develop a comprehensive EU logic of engagement in at least two countries in the two years following adoption of this Joint Communication. In the Enlargement and Neighbourhood area, such a coordination matrix has been finalised for Georgia, and is being prepared for Lebanon.

The recommendation is not relevant for countries where the EU is not supporting SSR, or is not planning to do so.

For candidate and potentially candidate countries (Enlargement countries), the EU entirely bases its cooperation and support on the EU acquis. It applies in particular to the justice and home affairs area that broadly corresponds to SSR. Dedicated cooperation mechanisms have been developed: they already cover all aspects of this recommendation.

The Security Sector Governance Facility (funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace) can be used to help EU Delegations (including DG NEAR Delegations) to devise better-informed and more strategic engagement in the field of SSR. Via the Facility, the Commission supports Delegations to undertake the so-called SSR coordination matrix exercise, among others.

For the 2021-2027 programming period, the Commission proposes in its draft IPA III regulation to organise its support to beneficiaries per sector and move away from country allocation. This will enable a more strategic approach to SSR.

ii) Actions to be undertaken

Complete SSR coordination matrix for Lebanon.

Monitor results of coordination matrix in Georgia.

Inter-service SSR Task Force to present by 2020 results from pilot country case studies chosen.

Inter-service SSR Task Force

The exercise in Lebanon was put on hold in May 2019. Due to the current situation on the ground, it would be difficult to resume the exercise.

The exercise in Georgia was finalised in July 2018. Due to an important turnover in the CoTE team and additional (more urgent) tasks, it was not possible for the team to ensure a proper monitoring of the coordination matrix.

With the new MFF, DG NEAR is considering launching a regional SSR project in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The SSR coordination matrix could be a useful tool to map ongoing activities and identify assistance gaps in the field. Its use will be considered in the months to come.

The IPA 3 programming framework does not define country allocations upfront but is designed on the basis of 5 thematic windows, including one dealing with security and rule of law. IPA III ensures continuity with the Sector Approach introduced under the previous instrument to help the beneficiaries with the design and implementation of sector reforms and to increase coherence between national strategies, sector policies, resource allocation and spending practices. IPA III builds upon the previous achievements, as all the actions designed in support of a specific sector will be financed under the same window. Programming will also be guided by the enlargement agenda and the priorities and recommendations in the annual enlargement reports.
### Recommendation 2

The inter-service SSR task force should ensure that regular monitoring and evaluation is conducted of the uptake/implementation of the EU SSR strategic approach in beneficiaries where SSR is a priority area of engagement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i) Accepted</th>
<th>Inter-service SSR Task Force</th>
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<tr>
<td>In line with the SSR joint framework, the EU has to monitor the impact of the SSR strategy (“Each year an inter-service team composed of EEAS and Commission representatives, with the support of external consultants where needed, will review the EU’s overall engagement in the security sector in at least one priority country”).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Between 2016 and 2018, the preparation of SSR coordination matrices served this purpose. In the second quarter of 2019, a separate and fully-fledged country review is expected to be conducted in Niger.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ii) Actions to be undertaken</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be decided in 2020 for what concerns the Neighbourhood and Enlargement area.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The review in Niger was finalized in October 2020 and published in Ares (2020)6064359.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and new emerging priorities, it was not possible to conduct a fully-fledged country review in a NEAR country in 2020.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Further considerations will be given to the conduct of such a review in 2021.</td>
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**Recommendation 3**

The inter-service SSR task force should develop guidelines and provide additional training to EU Delegations/Office about how to operationalise the 2016 Joint Communication on an EU-wide strategic framework for SSR in their SSR programming and implementation so as to ensure momentum and positive results, while taking into account the specificities of the accession process in the Enlargement region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i) Accepted</th>
<th>Inter-service SSR task force</th>
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<tr>
<td>Guidance note on security sector assessment prepared, based on experience gained from piloting the SSR coordination matrices. More SSR training opportunities are being offered to EU staff (be it at HQ or field level), through specialised training entities, in particular the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and CEPOL.</td>
<td>A guidance note for the analysis of the security sector was developed by the EU Inter-service SSR task force in 2020. This guidance note is designed as a tool for EU delegations and CSDP missions to analyse and report on the security sector by facilitating structured compilation of available information and the identification of relevant information deficits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use the relevant existing resources (e.g. Operational Guidelines on the preparation and implementation of EU financed actions specific to countering terrorism and violent extremism in third countries)¹</td>
<td>The idea to develop sub-sector annexes of the guidance was abandoned as excellent material is already offered by partnered organisations, such as DCAF. Moreover, the lack of sufficient human resource did not permit to dedicate sufficient time for drafting such documents.</td>
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<tr>
<th>ii) Actions to be undertaken</th>
<th>Due to the pandemic, only one SSR course, the ESDC Basic Course on SSR, was conducted in 2020. The course was conducted in an online format and hosted by the Post Conflict Operations and Study Centre (PCOSC), Turin, Italy. The course was conducted between 20th and 22nd of October with 18 participants.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Develop sub-sector annexes of the guidance note on security sector assessment (defence, border management)</td>
<td>As for SSR training offered to EU staff, all ESDC SSR Courses give, with slight variations depending on whether it is a Basic, Core or In-Mission course, priority to CSDP Mission staff, EU Delegation staff, staff involved in EU Commission projects relevant to SSR. Courses are also open to staff involved in programming, programme management, and/or in political/policy dialogue in the wider context of SSR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keep SSR training offer to EU staff</td>
<td>Furthermore, an updated and consolidated SSR course training calendar for 2021 will be available (April)</td>
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**Strengthening national ownership**

<table>
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<th>Recommendations 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU should identify ways of strengthening synergies between political dialogue intended to build commitment to reforms, on the one hand, and EU financial and technical assistance, on the other hand.</td>
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</table>

**EU Delegations/Offices, supported by operational units in DG NEAR and EEAS as well as CSDP missions/operations where relevant, to:**

- Identify the level of commitment or resistance to change among key beneficiary SSR actors, their connections, positions and interests through routine political assessments as well as context assessments of key beneficiary;
- Determine how best to engage with actors that the EU currently does not routinely engage with in the defence, security and intelligence spheres and how best to bolster the capacity and influence of governance and oversight actors;
- Develop clear but flexible pathways for employing all relevant EU tools and members of the EU family to foster greater commitment to reform processes on the part of these key SSR actors;
- Continuously assess key security and justice areas and actors to ensure that EU SSR support is grounded in political realities and emerging blockages to that support can be identified and possibly neutralised.

**i) Accepted**

1/ Dedicated expertise in EU DEL

The EU cooperates on counterterrorism with countries in the Western Balkans, North Africa, the Middle East, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa as well as in Asia.

Local task force gathering EU DEL and CSDP missions are also of importance to raise awareness and increase synergies of engagements in the field of SSR. Complementarity of actions shall be systematically looked for.

2/ Increasing coherence with programming exercises

For countries and regions in crisis or post-crisis, as well as for fragile and vulnerable situations, a conflict analysis has to be conducted as part of the programming process. This is a new requirement under the NDICI regulation (art. 10 and 11).

Besides, EU DEL shall consult with CSDP missions when present on the ground, when drafting the Multiannual Indicative Program for subject related to security issues.

3/ Specific and thematic Facilities

In the area of counter terrorism, the EU already operates a number of facilities established exactly for that purpose.

**ii) Actions to be undertaken**

Current EU practice to be continued

**DG NEAR, FPI, EU Delegations/Offices and EEAS**

The cooperation is in many cases entrenched by CT Political Dialogues between the EU and the respective countries. Eight CT attachés are deployed in the NEAR Delegations.

58 countries were selected jointly by EEAS, DEVCO, NEAR for a conflict analysis to be conducted in the 2020-2022 period.

With the view to supporting and facilitating the implementation of the EU's political objectives, the EU has established a number of specific thematic CT Facilities under the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).

Each facility has a regional or trans-regional scope and offers access to a range of specific CT activities. The facilities are designed in a way that may allow for adjustments in activities in accordance with changing priorities within the respective facilities' geographic and thematic mandate.
**Recommendation 5**

EU should be sufficiently flexible so that the support provided addresses both the broader EU SSR agenda and alignment with Chapters 23, 24 and 31 of the acquis as well as to lay a strong foundation for sustainable change.

EU Delegations/Offices in IPA beneficiaries should:
- Identify the broad range of SSR needs in beneficiaries;
- Address on a priority basis the problems that could undermine the ability of beneficiaries to implement EU and international standards;
- Ensure that these foundational issues are included in EU SSR strategies (Recommendation 1);
- Consider whether there are lessons to be learned from engagement with Eastern Partnership partners concerning broadening the SSR agenda beyond the acquis.

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**i) Partially accepted**

Flexibility is a cornerstone of the EU approach, both for political dialogue and financial assistance (for the latter one, within the limits set for the management of EU funds).

For IPA beneficiaries, whilst our cooperation in the SSR field is mainly based on the adoption and implementation of the EU acquis, it also includes more elements, and starts with a solid problems and needs analysis.

**ii) Actions to be undertaken**

Continuation of current EU practice.

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DG NEAR, FPI and EU Delegations/Office

As indicated in the Joint Communication in a footnote on p 4: “While the principles outlined in this Joint Communication also apply to enlargement countries, the accession process involves different measures and procedures to ensure that the countries meet the accession criteria.”

The European Commission has continued to support SSR in the WB 6 through its enlargement policy. The accession and negotiation processes provide a solid framework for the partners to make further progress on a broad reform process that also includes security actors. It was therefore accepted that no separate SSR strategies are required on, top of the already multiple strategies and action plans in place, while IPA support to reform process continue.
### Recommendation 6

EU should acknowledge that there are multiple paths to achieving EU SSR objectives and should pursue an iterative approach to the provision of EU support to SSR that takes into account beneficiary political will and technical and financial absorption capacity.

- Dialogue with beneficiaries to identify the specific priorities in the SSR area(s) that the EU is ready to support and use those priorities as entry points for meeting broader reform objectives;
- Develop theories of change to identify the pathways for achieving broader reform objectives;
- Work with beneficiaries to identify a series of steps that would take the beneficiary along a path leading from addressing their concrete priorities to implementing the acquis and EU/international standards or meeting EU security objectives;
- Adjust own expectations on the pace of change. Where political will and absorption capacity are shown to be limited (for example by political and capacity assessments) EU to slowly build the foundation for change, whether in IPA or Neighbourhood contexts. This could be facilitated by the application of a limited ‘more for more’ approach, where meeting agreed benchmarks would be tied to modest incentives.

#### i) Accepted

This recommendation is already part and parcel of the EU practice.

#### ii) Actions to be undertaken

Continuation of EU practice

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**DG NEAR, EU Delegations/Offices and EEAS**

In the past years, many other security priorities had to be addressed with limited available human resources. However, the EU SSG Facility (funded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)), continued to play a key role in providing a unique service in the form of responsive, flexible and effective expertise for emerging needs in countries undergoing security sector reform and transformation. This included also NEAR countries, upon request. The EU SSG Facility is available to all EU actors and instruments, including political/diplomatic, external action instruments, crisis response, and CSDP civilian and military actors at all levels.
Recommendation 7
EU should increase its support for the involvement of the wider citizenry in security sector reform in IPA beneficiaries and Neighbourhood partners.

EU Delegations/Offices should:
- Clearly express the EU’s support for the ability of the broadest range of societal actors to express their views on areas related to SSR.
- Systematically and frequently consult with independent actors who can articulate the diverse views of different social groups to prepare for the EU’s political/policy dialogue with governments and seek ways to enable these actors to engage in that dialogue as well, for example through meaningful consultations on the development and implementation of the government’s SSR-relevant strategies.
- Actively encourage the involvement of these actors throughout the entire management cycle of interventions, including at the early stages of project design.
- Give more attention to working with public intellectuals, academics, journalists and other civil society actors to generate innovative proposals and foster momentum for promoting change and to maintain pressure on governments to create better, more humane societies and to adhere to their commitments to comply with EU and other international standards and practices.
- Work closely with other members of the international community, including EU Member States, to help capacitate parliamentarians to oversee the security sector.

DG NEAR, EU Delegations/Offices and EEAS
In the frame of programming, the EU consulted in November 2020 the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) on the NDICI thematic Programme: ‘Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention’.

Support to civil society in SSR programming and EU political/policy dialogue should not be limited to providing NGOs with grants, which can lead to their professionalization, but also weaken their relationship with the population at large.

PRISM unit in EEA, NEAR CoTE Security, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Response and CoTE Civil Society Support could identify and disseminate lessons from DG NEAR contexts where this has worked well.

A large variety of areas relevant for SSR have been subject to discussions between EU Delegations, stakeholders and beneficiaries and ultimately been supported in the context of ENI or IPA projects.

The CoTE Crisis Reaction and Security Sector Reform in the meantime changed name and became CoTE Security, Conflict prevention and Crisis response, in line with the broad variety of policies it has been called to take on while the staff has not increased. This and the fact that a lot of funding had been provided in the past to key SSR areas individually, explains why the CoTE has not been in a position to “drive” a comprehensive “SSR” policy within DG NEAR.

i) Accepted
- The EU is well aware of the importance of genuinely involving civil society and parliamentarians in SSR processes.
- The EU is a strong advocate of this vis-à-vis partner governments, and seize every good opportunity of engaging with civil society, taking into account the possibilities in each partner country.
- Military Missions and Operations quite often already engage with a wide sector of civil society

ii) Actions to be undertaken
- Foster dialogue and engagement with civil society and parliamentarians (promotion of the role of the oversight function, conduct of reform in the field of security sector). Establishing connection with the reform of the justice sector and EU engagement in the field.
Improving the effectiveness of funding modalities

**Recommendation 8**

In order to maximise the effectiveness of EU financial assistance for SSR, EU Delegations/Offices should base their choice of funding modality and management mode on the nature of the intervention and on beneficiary capacity and context.

- Consider recent experience with different funding modalities in different beneficiary institutions to assist their decision-making process.
- Consider how best to combine different funding modalities into a package that provides the most appropriate assistance to SSR in a given beneficiary capacity and context.

Developing a strategic approach to SSR in each beneficiary (Recommendation 1) would facilitate the process of choosing the funding modality and management mode for EU Delegations/Offices. It would do so by providing the detail on beneficiary context and capacity in the addressed SSR area, including political will, that is necessary to determine which funding modality and management mode are likely to be most effective.

**i) Accepted**

This recommendation is already applied by the EU. The funding modality is chosen depending on the context and the objectives to be achieved.

**ii) Actions to be undertaken**

Continue on-going work.

COM, EU Delegations/Offices

The EU continues to choose the funding modality and the management mode based on the context, the nature of the intervention and the absorption capacity of the beneficiary.

The provisionally agreed text of the regulation for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) includes the requirement to conduct conflict analyses and ensure conflict-sensitive programming in fragile and conflict-affected states or areas. Through a conflict analysis screening, further consideration will be given to the conflict parameters and “do no harm” principle when developing SSR initiatives.
**Recommendation 9**

In order to maximise the effectiveness of sector budget support programmes, which disburse large amounts of funding and have significant expectations in terms of policy reform, DG NEAR and EU Delegations/Offices should:

- Assess beneficiaries’ understanding of the sector budget support modality (how it functions, the tight linkage to policy reform, what constitutes sound indicators) and its readiness to implement budget support programmes in order to provide technical assistance as required in a timely fashion before the design and during the implementation of budget support programmes.

- Ensure that they have the staff capacity to help design and manage budget support programmes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i) Accepted</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation already applied by the Commission. Where budget support is used to support SSR (few instances in the Enlargement and Neighbourhood area), it goes with a close policy dialogue and flanking measures (i.e. technical assistance).</td>
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As stated in the EU guidelines on Budget Support from September 2017, policy dialogue between beneficiaries and cooperation partners is an essential activity under budget support. It constitutes one of the main inputs of budget support contracts, alongside the transfer of funds and capacity strengthening.

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<th>ii) Actions to be undertaken</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU practice to be continued</td>
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**Commission, EU Delegations/Offices**

Policy dialogue continues to be an essential activity under budget support.

In addition, the risk management framework (RMF) exercises remain an important management information and decision tool during the establishment as well as the implementation of Budget Support contracts that can be also used for risk mitigation purposes.

The RMF contains specific indicators on SSR.
Recommendation 10

EU should seek opportunities to mobilise complementary funding for interventions from EU Member States in order to maximise a coherent approach within the EU family to agreed EU SSR objectives and priorities.

- EU at the senior political level should reach agreement with its Member States as a matter of priority on the use of on-going joint mapping, analysis and programming processes, including coordination matrices, to promote closer coordination on financing, including joint financing of EU interventions to the extent possible.
- EU Delegations/Offices should work closely with EU Member States to identify opportunities for complementary funding from EU Member States.

i) Accepted

One of the purposes of developing country-specific SSR coordination matrices is precisely to have a joint analysis of the security sector and a joint mapping of the respective interventions. The objective is to foster complementarities among these interventions, which could include joint financing, if relevant and feasible.

ii) Actions to be undertaken

More SSR coordination matrices to be developed in countries where the EU provides substantial SSR support, or is envisaging to do so.

DG NEAR, EEAS

In addition to the possibilities to provide expertise and assistance under the SSG Facility, the European Peace Facility (EPF) might offer new opportunities to mobilise complementary funding from EU MS.

New assistance measures could be financed under the EPF to strengthen "the capacities relating to military and defence matters and resilience of third States", contributing "effectively and efficiently to conflict prevention, stabilization and peace consolidation, including in the context of military CSDP missions with tasks of training, advice and mentoring in the security sector, as well as in other pre-conflict or post-conflict situations".

In line with the EU’s Integrated Approach, consistency will be ensured between the actions financed under the EPF, and other actions undertaken within the CFSP or other instruments of the Union’s external action, including relevant Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) mechanisms.

To ensure complementary, the EEAS will conduct internal needs-assessment exercises. In that context, SSR coordination matrices could be considered as very useful tools.

Achieving greater results
### Recommendation 11

**EU should recruit more personnel with appropriate SSR backgrounds, bring in more external expertise, run more staff courses and provide additional SSR training, and, where possible, utilise more expertise from EU Member States.**

**EU and its Member States should address human resource constraints at the HQ level and in EUDs by implementation of some/all of the following solutions:**

- Increased Member State national secondments (i.e. military advisers, CT/CVE advisers, IBM advisers, prosecutors, etc.) to EUDs that require enhanced SSR expertise because there is a large SSR portfolio and/or a thematic area of targeted importance in that beneficiary setting;

- Additional personnel allocated to DG NEAR’s Centre of Thematic Expertise Crisis Reaction and Security Sector Reform so that it can better support the 23 EU Delegations/Offices in the Enlargement and Neighbourhood regions as well as effectively cooperate with relevant EEAS counterparts;

- Enhanced cooperation and pooling of resources among relevant DG NEAR CoTEs that have a link to SSR (i.e. Rule of Law/Fundamental Rights and Democracy, Civil Society Support, Migration, Public Administration Reform);

- Augmented co-financing by the European Commission and Member States for the placement of seconded national SSR experts in EUDs and/or DG NEAR;

- Secondments of CSDP personnel to the European Commission (e.g. EULEX or Operation Althea could recruit a MS expert to work in DG NEAR or DEVCO) to increase synergies between EC and CSDP SSR support;

- Expanded use of EUROPOL, EUROJUST, and FRONTEX liaison officers to more beneficiaries in order to enhance EUD expertise and increase bilateral engagement.

**i) Partially accepted**

The EU is aware of the importance of increasing its internal security expertise to match its ambitions. Hiring additional staff with the required security expertise comes with budgetary limitations. In the short-term, the most feasible approach, and the one which is actually followed, is a combination of:

- relying on Member States’ experts (as SNEs and to implement SSR projects),

- tapping into the expertise that exists across EU institutions in the Commission (external relations DGs, home affairs DG), the EEAS and CSDP structures, specialised EU agencies.

- Enhanced training efforts.

**ii) Actions to be undertaken**

Current trend to be continued.

**Commission, EEAS**

Staff turnover in HQs and EU Delegations continues to affect the coordination and capacity building in this thematic area.

Hiring additional staff with the required security expertise comes with budgetary limitations.

The EU continues with the same approach, namely relying on MS’ expertise and to tap into the expertise that exist across EU institutions in the Commission, the EEAS, CSDP structures and specialised agencies.

When appropriate, the EU also consult (e.g. UN, OSCE, NATO) or contract external experts, e.g. the Security Sector Governance Facility.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Recommendation 12</th>
<th>i) Accepted</th>
<th>Inter-service SSR task force</th>
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<tr>
<td>In rolling out the use of coordination matrices identified in the 2016 Joint Communication on a EU-wide strategic framework for SSR, <strong>priority should be accorded to those beneficiaries where there are CSDP missions/operations and evidence of a need for improved sequencing, coordination and coherence.</strong></td>
<td>The presence of an active CSDP mission was one of the criteria for selecting the countries where the development of a SSR coordination matrix was piloted.</td>
<td>Further considerations will be given to the launch of new SSR coordination matrix [in the context of the regional SSR] in the Eastern Neighbourhood.</td>
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</table>
| ii) Actions to be undertaken none | }
Recommendation 13
The design of EU SSR support should provide increased attention on defining indicators with baselines and targets.

- Additional training for HQ and EUD staff on 1) the differences among outputs, outcomes and impact; 2) qualitative and quantitative methodologies in SSR; 3) differentiating between types of impact (e.g. strategic, functional, societal, political); and 4) utilising formal conflict sensitive assessments to ‘Do No Harm’ as well as the use of structured context analysis to avoid unintended negative impacts.

- EUDs should increase their collaboration with beneficiary partners to ensure that there is an agreed approach for benchmarking progress, including regular review of both political and policy dialogue and technical assistance, as well as attention on the involvement of civil society in programme design.

i) Accepted
The “Do No Harm” principle inspires EU actions in the field of security and the importance of the adoption of a conflict sensitive approach is widely recognised in several UE policy documents.

The Commission has developed SSR-indicator guidance, which is available on-line.

For the military non-executive missions, it is difficult to define valid indicators since their mandates do not allow the EU military forces to perform monitoring, what would allow to check the outputs, outcomes and impact

ii) Actions to be undertaken
Include an operational module focused on project design in the existing/available EU SSR trainings

Increase the thematic support in the SSR area by sharing good/bad practices from relevant projects among DEL colleagues and promote available guidance material (SSR indicator guidance, EU joint Staff Working Document on conflict Early Warning System: Objectives, Process and Guidance for Implementation - 2017).

Commission, EU Delegations/Offices, EEAS
The EEAS together with INPTA organised in September 2020 a first 3-day training on “conflict analysis”. The objectives of the training were the following:

- Recognize the added value of joint, timely, and evidence-based conflict analysis to inform conflict prevention initiatives;
- Identify and monitor structural risks and triggers of violent conflict in different fragile and conflict-affected environments;
- Support the design and implementation of an EU-led conflict analysis;
- Apply various conflict analysis methodological tools;
- Integrate a gender perspective into conflict analysis; and
- Set the basis for conflict sensitive EU engagement, including programming

This training is particularly relevant to comply with the requirement under the NDICI regulation (art. 10 and 11), which stipulates that a conflict analysis has to be conducted as part of the programming process for countries and regions in crisis or post-crisis, as well as for fragile and vulnerable situations.

As for SSR training offered to EU staff more generally, all ESDC SSR Courses give, with slight variations, priority to CSDP Mission staff, EU Delegation staff, staff involved in EU Commission projects relevant to SSR. Courses are also open to staff involved in programming, programme management, and/or in political/policy dialogue in the wider context of SSR. Historically courses have been tailored to certain groups depending on their specific training needs; and a resumption of this practice would be welcomed. The Basic course is particularly adjustable.
**Recommendation 14**

EU should introduce a gender lens into SSR programming that moves beyond a mere focus on achieving numerical increases of women in justice and security sector institutions.

- Develop an operational capacity for enhancing its gender-based approach to SSR in HQ and EUDs.
- Provide training on gender mainstreaming in SSR to operational programme staff and SSR project managers.

**i) Accepted**

In 2019, the EU adopted a new Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS).

One of its objectives is to systematically mainstream a gender perspective, as an integral part, in all EU policies as well as internal and external actions. To achieve that objective, 1) the EU intends to develop tools and methods, including for integrating a gender perspective, and for conducting gender analysis to help assess and better streamline the planning, conduct and review of CSDP operations and missions; 2) conduct gender analysis as a precondition for the initial planning and review of CSDP missions and operations, as well as keeping a regularly updated gender analysis during all phases of the conduct of missions and operations; 3) improve dedicated gender advisory capacities and subject-matter expertise in EU HQ, with EUSRs, EU Delegations and CSDP structures; 4) training on WPS for all EU staff including Management in HQs, Heads of Delegations and Chairs of Council Preparatory Bodies, as well as Heads of Missions and Operation Commanders.

**ii) Actions to be undertaken**

There are some training initiatives on gender mainstreaming from HQ and also from some EUD but more efforts are required to provide specific training in SSR to targeted staff responsible of those programs/projects.

To include a specific module on gender in existing EU training on SSR through the existing EU gender facility, consider the possibility to organise a webinar on Gender and SSR.

**Commission, EU Delegations/Offices, EEAS**

Gender is integrated in all ESDC SSR courses and trainings – as a cross cutting issue through all modules. Furthermore, in addition to this mainstreamed approach, the ESDC Autonomous Knowledge Unit (AKU) 11A, “Gender and UNSCR1325”, is mandatory in all ESDC SSR curricula.

Under the draft NDICI thematic pillar “Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention”, the Women Peace and Security agenda has been identified as a cross-cutting issue and will be addressed horizontally by the programme. Moreover, the EC sets a 85% target of actions to have gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective under the new multi-annual financial framework.
Recommendation 15

**EU** should increase its engagement with defence, security and intelligence agencies, as well as counter-terrorism police branches. Relatedly, the **EU** should give special attention to the quality of design and implementation of CT/CVE programming, defence and intelligence reform, areas in which the **EU** is a relative newcomer and in which there have been comparatively few **EU** SSR interventions.

- The pooling of resources and expertise among the **EU**, Member States and CSDP should be explored in these sectors, as well as possible synergies with NATO on the basis of the 2016 **EU**-NATO declaration to strengthen their security cooperation in the Western Balkans and the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods.

- **EU** support to these sectors should be accompanied by a human-rights risk management mechanism at the level of implementation. Although this is a niche expertise, it can be found, for example, among staff of ombudsmen’s institutions, INGOs, and contracted experts.

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<th>i) Accepted</th>
<th>Commission, EEAS, SSR TF</th>
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<td>The <strong>EU</strong> is gradually increasing its engagement with defence, intelligence and counter-terrorism stakeholders in partner countries. For the Commission, this is mostly happening through regional and trans-regional projects. For the military CSDP missions and operations this is mostly happening with NATO. The <strong>EU</strong> seeks to leverage on its closer cooperation with NATO to engage more with the military. In 2015, the EC developed an Operational Human Rights Guidance for EU external cooperation actions addressing Terrorism, Organised Crime and Cybersecurity to ensure that <strong>EU</strong> actions in this field do not only respect human rights but also actively promote them. The Risk Assessment Framework was designed specifically to assess risks and define mitigation strategies in relation to the actions implemented in the new area of intervention of the IcSP: the Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD). This tool is still being piloted and is meant to be further improved, so it is not ready yet for outside use. However, the SSR task force is also looking into assessment Security Sector methodologies that could probably be used or tailored to assess risks when engaging in the security sector.</td>
<td>The Commission adopted a financing decision in 2018 to support (EUR 2 million, ENI) NATO’s Building Integrity programme (BI), which seeks to strengthen the integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector. The BI programme is currently the sole NATO programme in which the <strong>EU</strong> participates financially. This contribution is earmarked for Neighbourhood countries that are also NATO’s partners. The NATO Building Integrity programme is fully in line with the EU Strategic Framework on Security Sector Reform adopted in 2016, which stresses the importance for all security bodies and institutions to fully comply with good governance principles and fundamental values. The new European Peace Facility will enable the <strong>EU</strong> to contribute to the resilience of partner countries in the neighbourhood thanks to the funding of external action having military or defence implications. In 2020, the SSR task force launched initial work on human rights and risk management. Support to CT/CVE has continued to be subject to multiple projects and programmes (see Mapping Study on EU Counter-Terrorism and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism Activities 1 January 2021). In addition, in December 2020 the Commission is presenting a new Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the <strong>EU</strong> to step up the fight against terrorism and violent extremism and boost the <strong>EU</strong>’s resilience to terrorist threats. The agenda has a strong focus on the internal/external security nexus and will further boost capacity building in third countries</td>
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<th>ii) Actions to be undertaken</th>
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| Seek coherence with the actions engaged on NDICI and the European Peace Facility. Continue the work to establish a policy on Human Rights – Due Diligence (SSR TF). | }
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<th>Recommendation 16</th>
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<td><strong>In order to enhance the visibility and knowledge of EU SSR support among beneficiary populations, EU Delegations/Offices should give increased attention to SSR in their strategic communications and public relations strategies.</strong></td>
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<td>- Adopt a stronger focus on the benefits that security sector reforms will bring to beneficiary populations, including how such reforms will improve individual security and fundamental human rights.</td>
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<td>- Outreach campaigns - conducted in partnership with civil society – could be a useful tool for improving the public perception for EU support to SSR.</td>
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<td><strong>i) Accepted</strong></td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform has not been identified as a horizontal communication priority topic and not as a communication priority for many of the countries. Security Sector Reform actions should only receive increased attention in communication if identified as a priority area – but not in general terms. In addition, the topic – especially in terms of communication - is sensitive, potentially controversial and complex. Therefore, whether or not to communicate about Security Sector Reform, how to communicate about it at Delegation/country level, and whether increased attention should be given to Security Sector Reform should be decided on a case-by-case basis - in line with where the EU would have concrete projects in this area, taking into account the sensitivity at local level. For example, for Lebanon, security has already been flagged as one out of four priority communication themes for 2019 in the Delegation’s annual strategic communication planning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ii) Actions to be undertaken</td>
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<td>Identify countries in which the EU could promote its actions on SSR through strategic communications and public diplomacy.</td>
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| Commission, EU Delegations/Offices, EEAS |
| DK NEAR presented in September 2019 the Security Sector Reform Evaluation at a training event on Justice, Security and Migration (JAI-NET). EU Colleagues working on Justice, Security and migration-issues at DG NEAR or in NEAR Delegations were informed about the findings of the evaluation and the intended follow up to be given to recommendations. |
| In November 2020, the EU published a factsheet entitled: “The EU and its Neighbours : Tackling Security Challenges Together”. This factsheet offers useful information concerning the type of assistance provided by the EU in the security domain, including on SSR. |
| Throughout 2020, DG NEAR participate in a series of exchanges with the civil society in the Southern Neighbourhood, through the consortium “Majalat”. Through these exchanges, DG NEAR explained the EU approach towards security and the benefits of security sector reforms for the beneficiary populations and participating states. |
| In December 2020, Maciej Popowski, Acting Director General for DG NEAR, addressed the importance of good governance and integrity in the defence and related security sector in a video prepared by NATO on the occasion of the International Day against Corruption. |