



# **External Evaluation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) (2014 – mid 2017)**

**Final Report**

**Volume 2: Evidence base on indicator level  
June 2017**



ECORYS



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## **External Evaluation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)**

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# External Evaluation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)

## *Final Report*

The report consists of three volumes and the executive summary.

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Executive summary

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## List of acronyms and abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AOSD	Authorising Officer by Sub-Delegation
AP	Action Plan
ATA	Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive
BS	Budget Support
CBC	Cross-Border Cooperation
CC	Climate Change
CH	Switzerland
ECB	European Central Bank
CIR	Common Implementing Regulation
COEST	Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia
COSCE	Council of Europe

CoTE	Centres of Thematic Expertise
CRIS	Common Relex Information System
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas
DCI	Development Co-operation Instrument
DG AGRI	Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development
DG BUDG	Directorate-General for Budget
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for International Co-operation and Development
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG ECFIN	Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG ECFIN	Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG ELARG	Former Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement
DG HOME	Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DG NEAR	Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DG TAXUD	Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union
DG TRADE	Directorate-General for Trade
EAMR	External Assistance Management Report
EAMRs	External Assistance Management Reports
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEA	European Economic Area
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EFI	External Financing Instrument
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EIA	Environmental impact assessment
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIF	European Investment Fund
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
EU	European Union
EUD	Delegation of the European Union

EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUR	Euro
EU MS	EU Member States
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EUTF	EU Trust Fund
FAQ	Frequently Asked Questions
FEMIP	Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FPI	Foreign Policy Instrument
FR	Financial Regulation
HoD	Head of Delegation
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human rights
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IFI	International Financial Institution
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organisation
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
JC	Judgement Criterion
KFW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German development bank)
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LAs	Local Authorities
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
LS	Local Stakeholders
MFA	Macro-Financial Assistance
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MICs	Middle-Income Countries
MIP	Multiannual Indicative Programme
MIS	Management information System
MS	Member State
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIF	Neighbourhood Investment Facility
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAR	Public Administration Reform
PFM	Public Finance Management
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PRAG	Practical Guide
RACER	Relevance, acceptability, clarity, easiness, robustness indicators
RF	Result Framework

ROM	Results-Oriented Monitoring
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SGUA	Support Group for Ukraine
SMEs	Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SSF	Single Support Framework
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TF	Trust Fund
TOR	Terms of Reference
UFM	Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UK	United Kingdom
UNFCCC	Climate Change Framework Convention on Climate Change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value-Added Tax
VET	Vocational Education and Training
WB	World Bank



## 1 EQ 1 on relevance

### 1.1 JC11: The ENI objectives and design were initially (2014) congruent with (i) EU priorities and (ii) partner country needs and priorities.

#### 1.1.1 I-111. Evidence of a clear link between the ENP framework and ENI regulation and strategy papers available as 2014 {[4]<sup>1</sup>.

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The ENP Policy Framework aims at the development of a special relationship with “*sixteen countries whose hopes and futures make a direct and significant difference to us*” (EC Com 2011, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood) and to the provision of a large and specific assistance, in order to build, and to benefit from, a stable and prosperous “*Ring of Friends*”, for which accession is not envisaged. From 2014, the initial instrument, the ENPI, has been replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which contains the same policy priorities that were established by the 2011 policy framework.

“*Union support under this Regulation shall focus on promoting enhanced political cooperation, deep and sustainable democracy, progressive economic integration and a strengthened partnership with societies between the Union and the partner countries (...)*” ENI regulation 2014 , Article 2.

“*The ENP is a policy of continuous engagement. The value of the policy does not lie only in the achievements of its individual components (e.g. political reform/democratisation, market integration, better mobility and people-to-people contacts, and sector cooperation). It also anchors countries/societies in transition, and even in crisis situations, to the EU, by proposing a set of values and standards to guide their reform efforts (...)*” (EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.17).

Programming as well as monitoring documents assessed show that cooperation objectives have been in line with the set of priorities stated by the ENI Regulation and with the objectives of the partner countries. They address priorities in the country and support national and EU policies and action plans.

At the global level, the distribution of funds per sector has been aligned with the objectives of the ENI Regulation. The sectors with the highest amount of funds allocated through bilateral cooperation are “sustainable and inclusive development” and “democracy, human rights and governance”.

Regional Cooperation programmes as well have responded to the ENI Regulation framework, according to the documents analysed. In a number of cases, especially in the South, they were instrumental in the continuous provision of activities in sectors for which bilateral implementation was challenging, such as the promotion of Human Rights and Democracy (see also I.2.3.1)

The list of priorities of the ENI Regulation is long. It may not facilitate the clarification of the hierarchy of objectives. The constant recommendation of programming instructions to focus on a limited number of sectors/priorities has not always been clearly translated in the programming documents.

#### Presentation of collected proof

The ENP Policy Framework was initially designed to create a special relationship (Com 2011): “*sixteen countries whose hopes and futures make a direct and significant difference to us*” and to provide a specific assistance to countries at the border of the EU for which no enlargement prospect could be politically envisaged, in order to build a stable and prosperous “*Ring of Friends*”.

“*European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed after the EU’s enlargement in 2004 with 10 new countries, in order to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. Through it, the EU offers its neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values -*

<sup>1</sup> NOTA: Figures in brackets “[ ]” refer to the preamble of the Regulation.

*democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development. The ENP offers a deeper political relationship and economic integration through reforms as a means of achieving peace, stability and economic prosperity.”* (EC (2013) Panorama of EU Regional Programmes and Projects Southern Mediterranean 2012-2014, p 84)

Following the Arab Spring and an extensive review, in 2011, the EU modified the ENP at two levels: A new focus on support to democratisation and political reforms in neighbouring countries; the development of an incentive scheme to reward progress in this field, through a ‘more for more’ approach – making more funding available, for countries more committed to reform.

*“But there is room for improvement on all sides of the relationship. Recent events and the results of the review have shown that EU support to political reforms in neighbouring countries has met with limited results. There is for example a need for greater flexibility and more tailored responses in dealing with rapidly evolving partners and reform needs – whether they are experiencing fast regime change or a prolonged process of reform and democratic consolidation. (...) A new approach is needed to strengthen the partnership between the EU and the countries and societies of the Neighbourhood: to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links.”* (EC COM(2011) 303, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood, p 1)

From 2014, the initial instrument, the ENPI, has been replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). 2011 Policy priorities were confirmed in the 2014 Regulation.

*“Union support under this Regulation shall focus on promoting enhanced political cooperation, deep and sustainable democracy, progressive economic integration and a strengthened partnership with societies between the Union and the partner countries and, in particular, the implementation of partnership and cooperation agreements, association agreements or other existing and future agreements, and jointly agreed action plans or equivalent documents. “ENI regulation 2014 , Article 2 , Specific objectives of Union support*

*“The ENP is a policy of continuous engagement. The value of the policy does not lie only in the achievements of its individual components (e.g. political reform/democratisation, market integration, better mobility and people-to-people contacts, and sector cooperation). It also anchors countries/societies in transition, and even in crisis situations, to the EU, by proposing a set of values and standards to guide their reform efforts, and generally through the creation of networks linking them to the EU and beyond to other partners. It is a framework — to work towards, and safeguard, democracy, freedom, prosperity and security for both the EU and its partners. While this may require continuous scrutiny of the appropriateness and suitability of the policy and its instruments, there are compelling reasons for it to remain the framework for the EU’s relations with its neighbours for the years to come.”* (EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.17)

Since the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011, an incentive-based approach has been introduced, including positive incentives and reward for progress in democratic reforms (‘more for more’).

*“Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU.”* (A new response to a changing Neighbourhood (COM(2011)303 of 25.05.2011).

*“It is intended to keep a certain proportion of the available funds out of the baseline allocations for bilateral programmes, in order to be allocated at a later time under the ‘More-for-More’ approach. The SPRING and EaPIC programmes under the current ENPI should provide valuable learning in this respect. Progress against ENP Action Plan priorities will be assessed in the annual ENP Progress Reports and fed back into the More for More approach. More details on the current implementation of the more-for-more approach can be found in the letter on incentive-based approach sent by Commissioner Stefan Füle and the HR/VP on 03 February 2012”* (DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI – 2014-2020, p.9)

*“A dedicated mechanism was set up for channelling additional assistance to selected countries, thus supplementing the financial allocations of their National Indicative Programmes (NIP): the SPRING (Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth) programme for the Southern Neighbourhood*

(EUR 540 million in 2011-2013) and the EaPIC (Eastern Partnership integration and Cooperation) programme for the East (EUR 152 million in 2012-2013)". (EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-13, p15).

The information collected at different levels shows that cooperation objectives have been well aligned with the priorities of the Policy framework.

Programming document at country level show for example:

Tunisia: "Following comprehensive consultation with the government, civil society and other donors, and taking into account the government's reform priorities and aid effectiveness principles, a consensus has been reached regarding three priority sectors of intervention to be financed through the national envelope 2014-2015:

- Socio-economic reforms for inclusive growth, competitiveness and integration

After last year upheavals there is a need to promote macro-economic stabilization and economic recovery, which are key elements for the transition process. This entails job creation and human capital development. There is a need to improve economic governance and transparent public finance management. There is also a need to strengthen the capacity of social partners to take part in policy making and implementation.

- Strengthening fundamental elements of democracy

2011 events paved the way for a democratic transition process. Projects will promote and support independent media and press, equal opportunities and better inclusion for youth and women. Improved democratic governance, reform of the justice sector and of the security sector are also key elements to be targeted in Tunisia.

- Sustainable regional and local development

Socio-economic inequality and divide between regions and within the strata of the population was one of the root-causes that led to the revolution."

(EC (2014) Single Support Framework Tunisia 2014-2015)

L'allocation indicative bilatérale pour la période 2014-2020 est de 221 000 000 EUR– 270 000 000 EUR. L'allocation indicative bilatérale pour la période 2014-2017 est de 121 000 000 EUR – 148 000 000 EUR.	
La répartition indicative par secteur est la suivante:	
Réforme de la justice et renforcement de la participation citoyenne	25 %
Marché du travail - Emploi	30 %
Appui à la gestion et à la diversification de l'économie	30 %
Appui complémentaire à la société civile et développement des capacités	15 %

(EC (2014) Programmation de l'Instrument Européen de Voisinage (IEV) Cadre Unique d'Appui pour l'appui de l'UE à l'Algérie (2014-2017)<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> There have been contradictions with regards to the Single Support Framework for Algeria. Although 15% of the budget had been foreseen for support to civil society, the main text of the SSF allocated them to the support of the Association Agreement (P3A). The allocation in the main text was eventually maintained and support to civil society was integrated as a component of bilateral projects only.

The indicative allocation for Egypt under the Single Support Framework for the period 2014-2015 is EUR 210,000,000 – EUR 257,000,000.

**Indicative budget breakdown of the Single Support Framework**

<b>SINGLE SUPPORT FRAMEWORK FOR EGYPT 2014-2015</b>	<b>Indicative allocation</b>
<b>SECTOR OF INTERVENTION I – Poverty Alleviation, Local Socio-Economic Development and Social Protection</b>	<b>40%</b>
<b>SECTOR OF INTERVENTION II – Governance, Transparency and Business Environment</b>	<b>20%</b>
<b>SECTOR OF INTERVENTION III – Quality of Life and Environment</b>	<b>40%</b>
<b>Total Commitments</b>	<b>100%</b>

(EC , Single Support Framework Egypt 2014-2015)

The indicative allocation for the period 2014-2020 will be EUR 567,000,000– EUR 693,000,000. The indicative bilateral allocation for the period 2014-2017 will be between EUR 312,000,000 and EUR 382,000,000.

The indicative breakdown by sector is the following:

(1) Reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery	<i>Indicatively 25% of total</i>
(2) Employment and private sector development	<i>Indicatively 30% of total</i>
(3) Renewable energies and energy efficiency	<i>Indicatively 30% of total</i>
<i>Other measures: 5% civil society 10% Support to the ENP Action Plan measures</i>	<i>Indicatively 15% of total</i>

(Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2020 Single Support Framework for EU support to Jordan (2014-2017) )

<i>Indicative allocation 2014-2020</i>	€610,000,000 – €746,000,000
<i>Indicative allocation for the 1<sup>st</sup> period (2014-2017)</i>	€335,000,000 – €410,000,000
<i>Breakdown for the 1st period</i>	
<i>Public Administration Reform</i>	25 %
<i>Agriculture and Rural Development</i>	30 %
<i>Justice Reform</i>	25 %
<i>Complementary Support for Capacity Development and Civil Society</i>	20 %

(European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 2014-2020 – Single Support Framework for EU Support to Georgia (2014-2017) )

Field reports available provide precisions on these statements and underlines the reluctance of certain PC to promote HR development:

#### *Egypt Field Report*

*“Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, (...)”*<sup>3</sup>: GoE after the Military Coup of 2013 does not respect HRs and fundamental freedoms in its fight against HR defenders (associated to the destabilization of the government in 2011) on one hand, and Salafist organizations on the other hand (Muslim brotherhood). ENI related key objective 22a is contradicting GoE security strategy.

#### *Tunisia Field Report:*


In the post-revolution context in Tunisia, the country’s priorities were quite obvious and there was a consensus, and the donors responded rather effectively to them. These responses have included increased budget support interventions. They have been mostly in line with ENI objectives.

#### *Ukraine Field Report*

The revolution and Maidan had their basic principles and endeavours the issues of human rights and democracy in all respects (i.e. promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, principles of equality and the fight against discrimination in all its forms, establishing deep and sustainable democracy, promoting good governance, fighting corruption, strengthening institutional capacity at all levels and developing a thriving civil society including social partners); therefore the biggest part of the needed efforts for change are focussed on these issues; thus the relevant ENI objective is congruent with both EU and Ukraine’s priorities.

At the global level, the Indicative distribution of funds per sector is in line with the set of priorities stated by the ENI Regulation. The sectors with the highest amount of funds allocated through bilateral cooperation are “sustainable and inclusive development” and “democracy, human rights and governance” (figure 1).

*Figure 1 Indicative allocations for the 1<sup>st</sup> period (2014-2017) per sector and cooperation type*



*Source: Own calculations based on an analysis of programming documents (MIPs, SSFs)*

<sup>3</sup> Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, principles of equality and the fight against discrimination in all its forms, establishing deep and sustainable democracy, promoting good governance, fighting corruption, strengthening institutional capacity at all levels and developing a thriving civil society including social partners.

This assessment has been confirmed in different reporting/monitoring documents analysed

Overall:

*“Thus, the Arab uprisings demanded a recalibration of EU relations with its southern neighbours, a renewed balance of dialogue between Europe, the southern authorities and civil society actors. Policies were renewed, instruments reinforced, new ones created and programmes adjusted with the objective to redirect EU support to the emerging new governments and transition processes and to engage with and support civil society actors as key stakeholders. This evolution of EU policies was articulated in the various EU Communications and policy reviews that followed from 2011 to 2015 (i.e. European Neighbourhood Policy – ENP Review in autumn 2015). Internally, EU institutions have improved their coordination to increase support to civil society in the Southern Neighbourhood,”* (Civil Society Forum Neighbourhood South, Summary and key recommendations, 26-27 May 2016, Brussels, p 3)

In the South:

The report on the Implementation of the ENP Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean (03/2015) shows that the sectoral distribution of the cooperation is in line with the priorities of the Policy framework. le p6: *“The new generation of ENP Action Plans included detailed provisions on democracy, human rights and good governance, setting concrete benchmarks for freedom of expression, of the media, of association and assembly, and of religion and belief, and for the rights of women and girls. In 2014, the EU held bilateral Sub-committee meetings on human rights with Israel, Lebanon and Morocco. A meeting with Algeria took place in February 2015. The human rights dialogue with Egypt has been on hold since the events of 2011. (...)”* (Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean Partners Report, SWD(2015) 75 final)

In the East

*“The projects reviewed respond, in an articulated and diversified way, to the needs of their target groups and are well aligned to EU priorities. With the exception of a small number of projects dealing with human rights issues, they also respond, to different degrees, to the priorities found in national strategies and plans.”* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL REPORT – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 37)

At sectoral level, for instance in the Social infrastructure and services sector:

*“The majority of project was assessed as highly relevant. Projects responded to the needs of the target groups and beneficiaries, and are aligned to EU policies. Six of the seven projects targeting Palestinians and the two projects supporting Arab groups in Israel were implemented by experienced CSOs with a historical presence in their fields of expertise showing a very good understanding of the context and needs. EU support is of fundamental importance for CSOs which often work in a difficult socio-political environment, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza strip and in Israel.”* Particip (2016), ROM ENI CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL REPORT – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 25

Jordan: *“The projects reviewed address priorities in the country and support national and EU policies and action plans. The subjects covered include core reform areas of administrative decentralisation, respect for human rights, preservation of freedom of expression, and security. The projects also dealt with rural development, improvement of health care, support to MSMEs and renewable energy production, all sectors which show weaknesses in Jordan, and with support to research, technological development and innovation (decision D-23204) which is a high EU 2020 priority”* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 51)

Armenia: *“The projects respond to the needs of their target groups and are in line with EU priorities and to priorities set by national strategies and plans, with a couple of exceptions, which are financed under the Civil Society Facility.”* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 71)

Georgia: *“The projects respond to the needs of their target groups in the different sectors and are in line with EU priorities and to priorities set by national strategies and plans.”*  
(Particip (2016), ROM ENI consolidated annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 78)

Moldova: *“The projects respond to the needs of their target groups, and are in line with EU and national strategies and plans”*

(Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 81)

Ukraine: *“All projects are well aligned to EU policies and priorities and show a high degree of responsiveness to the needs of the sector and of their target groups (though with some caveats in the justice project). The strength of local ownership and responsiveness to country needs is particularly high for the regional development project. Conversely the other two ROM reviews identify some weaknesses linked to the low degree of political will and of commitment to the justice reform process by the national authorities (D-21849)”*

(Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 85)

Regional Cooperation too has responded to the ENI Regulation framework, according to the documents analysed:

In the South: *“All (regional) projects are considered relevant to the needs of the countries in the Mediterranean region in terms of their problems, policies and strategies. They are also in line with EU priorities with an primary emphasis on strengthening democracy, respecting human rights, and the preservation of freedom of expression. The projects also addressed EU priorities in the areas of climate change adaptation, trade stimulation, urban development, and vocational training.”* (Particip (2016), ROM ENI consolidated annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 68)

However: *“at country level, priorities sometimes differed from those of regional cooperation, leading to weak support from some countries”* (EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, activities and results 2007-13. p 6).

In a number of cases, especially in the South, a division of labor has been implemented: Regional programs have been able to develop activities in the “democracy & human rights” sectors in countries where the government was reluctant to implement such kind of project at the bilateral level. *“Regional cooperation has been used as a way to promote EU values in the absence of specific bilateral programs”*. (Interviews at DG NEAR, double-checked, september 2016).

A similar conclusion was already reached by the specific evaluation on ENPI Regional cooperation (See: Strategic evaluation of the EU cooperation with East and South ENPI regions (2004-2010) , June 2013)

[On Regional cooperation objectives and achievements, see also Indicator 2.3.1]

The incentive component of the regulation has resulted in corresponding activities, such as the SPRING – in the South- and EaPIC –in the East- programs:

*“SPRING 2011-2012 was adopted by the Commission on 26 September 2011, in response to the events of the ‘Arab Spring’. It supports partner countries of the Southern Mediterranean region in addressing their socio-economic challenges and in their transition to democracy. SPRING has resulted in an intensification of policy dialogue around political and economic reform. SPRING funds support partner countries on their path towards democratic transition, address the needs arising from their economic recovery and support efforts undertaken to reduce inequality.*

*Country allocations have been determined in the light of progress made in each country. Beneficiaries are: Algeria (EUR 10 million), Egypt (EUR 90 million), Jordan (EUR 101 million), Lebanon (EUR 51 million), Libya (EUR 5 million), Morocco (EUR 128 million) and Tunisia (EUR 155 million). The total amount of SPRING Programmes is EUR 540 million.*

*It is difficult to assess on the efficacy of SPRING in fostering political and economic reforms in the region, as the evolution of the transition processes of the Southern Neighbourhood countries differs. Nonetheless, it is possible to affirm that SPRING has been a useful tool in trying to give incentives for reforms in partner countries, and that the EU has been coherent in rewarding democratization efforts. (...)”* EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-13, p81

*“The EaPIC ‘umbrella programme’ (a twin initiative to the SPRING programme implemented in the Neighbourhood South) contributed significantly to shaping the debate on the implementation of the incentive-based approach of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy, which is now laid down in the regulation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The mechanism of the umbrella pro-*

*gramme combines supplementary funding with a strong political message on progress – or lack of it – in building deep and sustainable democracy, which remains the key overall objective of cooperation in the Neighbourhood.” EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-13, p9.*

*“The Eastern Partnership integration and cooperation (EaPIC) programme provides additional financial assistance to Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries that deliver on reforms for deep democracy and respect of human rights.*

*EaPIC resources – which supplement the countries’ multi-annual allocations programmed in the National Indicative Programmes 2011-2013 – can be used for new projects or to expand the scope of existing projects. EaPIC additional funding contributes to democratic transformation and institution building, or to sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development. The total funding of EaPIC (2012-2013) amounts to EUR 152 million. The benefiting countries were: Moldova (EUR 63 million), Georgia (EUR 49 million) and Armenia (EUR 40 million) In 2012, EUR 65 million were granted to Moldova (EUR 28 million), Georgia (EUR 22 million) and Armenia (EUR 15 million). Additional EaPIC funding was channelled to increase support for reforms in the justice sector (Moldova, Georgia and Armenia); to expand the offer of vocational education and training (Armenia), access to health services (Moldova), and economic stimulation in rural areas (Moldova); to improve migration and border management in view of the visa liberalisation dialogue (Georgia).*

*In 2013, EUR 87 million were granted to Moldova (EUR 35 million), Georgia (EUR 27 million) and Armenia (EUR 25 million). (...) “.. The EaPIC programme was established with Commission implementing decision C(2012)4170 of 26.6.2012, as amended by Commission decisions C(2013)4453 of 18.7.2013 and C(2013)8140 of 27.00.2013. EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-13, 83 + Distribution fonds par pays en tableau.*

The large number of priorities listed does not clarify the hierarchy of policy objectives

The number / scope of the Policy priorities is quite substantial (see below). Consequently, the objectives presented in the countries strategic documents do always correspond with the priorities list of the ENI Policy framework.

*“To support the achievement of the specific objectives provided for in Article 2, also taking into account jointly agreed documents as set out in Article 3(2), Union funding may address the priorities set out in points 1, 2 and 3 of this Annex. (...)*

*1. Union support at bilateral level shall, as appropriate, address, inter alia, the following priorities:*

- *human rights, good governance and the rule of law, including reform of justice, of the public administration and of the security sector;*
- *institutional cooperation and capacity development, including for the implementation of Union agreements;*
- *support to civil society actors and to their role in reform processes and democratic transitions;*
- *sustainable and inclusive economic development, including at regional and local level, and territorial cohesion;*
- *development of the social sectors, in particular for the youth, with a focus on social justice and cohesion and employment;*
- *trade and private-sector development, including support to small and medium-sized enterprises, employment and implementation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas;*
- *agriculture and rural development, including food security;*
- *sustainable management of natural resources;*
- *the energy sector, with a focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy;*
- *transport and infrastructure;*
- *education and skills development, including vocational education and training;*
- *mobility and migration management, including the protection of migrants;*
- *confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts, including support to affected populations and reconstruction.*

*2. Union support at multi-country level shall, as appropriate, address, inter alia, the following priorities:*

- *human rights, good governance and the rule of law;*
- *institutional cooperation and capacity development;*
- *regional cooperation, in particular in the framework of the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity;*
- *higher education and skills development, students and staff mobility, youth and culture;*



- sustainable economic development, trade and private sector development and support to small and medium-sized enterprises;
- the energy sector, including energy networks;
- transport and infrastructure interconnections;
- sustainable management of natural resources, including water, green growth, the environment and climate change adaptation and mitigation;
- support to civil society;
- mobility and migration management;
- confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts.”

ENI Regulation 2014, ANNEX II, Priorities for Union support under this Regulation

The panel structure of the Eastern Partnership is quite diversified:



As well as, for instance, the extensive Action Plan for Tunisia:

« Ce plan d'action évolutif, établi conjointement pour la période 2013-2017, constitue le cadre de référence appelé à définir les axes prioritaires qui permettront de renforcer les relations entre les deux parties, à tous les niveaux (politique, économique, scientifique, social, culturel et humain). Le plan d'action propose 13 priorités qui sont les suivantes:

*État de droit et démocratie*

1. Mise en place d'un système électoral démocratique, notamment à travers la consolidation de l'indépendance et du fonctionnement de l'Instance Supérieure et Indépendante des Elections chargée de la gestion et de l'organisation des élections.
2. Assurer l'indépendance de la justice, augmenter son professionnalisme et son efficacité (accès à la justice, durée des procès), assurer le respect des droits de l'Homme, de la présomption d'innocence et du droit à un procès équitable.
3. Réaliser la réforme du secteur de la sécurité, dans le cadre d'une réforme globale et approfondie, en vue d'assurer le respect des standards internationaux en termes d'état de droit, des droits de l'Homme et du droit international.
4. Consolider la protection des droits de l'Homme, y compris les droits des femmes et des enfants.
5. Réaliser la réforme des médias et la professionnalisation du secteur.

6. Renforcer le rôle et les capacités de la société civile. Coopération dans le domaine de la migration, de la mobilité et de la sécurité
7. Dialogue sur la migration, la mobilité et la sécurité et conclusion d'un Partenariat pour la Mobilité. Intégration économique et sociale élargie
8. Réforme économique pour la croissance inclusive, la compétitivité et l'amélioration du cadre des affaires et des investissements.
9. Approfondissement de l'intégration économique et conclusion d'un accord de libre-échange complet et approfondi et rapprochement à l'acquis de l'UE.
10. Développement des compétences, accès au savoir et innovation.
11. Emploi, cohésion et intégration sociales et développement régional et local.
12. Développement agricole et rural. Développement durable
13. Développement et mise en œuvre des stratégies et programmes visant à assurer un développement durable, y compris l'amélioration de la protection de l'environnement conformément à l'intention manifestée dans la Communication de la Commission sur le Cadre financier pluriannuel de juin 2011, d'accroître la part du budget de l'Union allouée au climat à au moins 20%. »

EC (2014) Single Support Framework Tunisia 2014-2015, p4.

The continuous recommendation of programming instructions to focus on a limited number of sectors/priorities has not been clearly translated in the programming documents, except if a very large definition of sectors and priorities is used.

"Based on the revised Neighbourhood policy (ENP review of 2011 – Arab Spring, Eastern Partnership): Strengthened alignment between policy and assistance Concentration on fewer priorities, better thematic focus". (...)

"Structure of multi-annual programming documents (internal programming instructions): 3 priority sectors per country (development effectiveness), complementary support for capacity development activities linked to the implementation of agreements with the EU (15%) complementary support to civil society (5%)" (2014, THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD INSTRUMENT, presentation)

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – DG NEAR, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 1.1.2 I-112. Retrospective evidence of gaps in 2011-2014 ENP strategic analyses of global, regional and country evolutions

#### Global analysis of the indicator

One of the main outcomes of the 2015 ENP review has been the provision of a gap assessment of the Strategic assumptions of the 2011 Policy framework, i.e.: giving importance to dimensions and factors that were then not considered important, or not considered at all, for example: "At the same time, conflict, rising extremism and terrorism, human rights violations and other challenges to international law, and economic upheaval have resulted in major refugee flows." (...) "In the East, an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy has resulted in the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Protracted conflicts continue to hamper development in the region" p 1; "The consultation showed a very widespread wish to see security given a stronger place in the ENP, in order to make partner countries more resilient against threats they currently experience" (...) Given the specific security challenges partners are facing, p 12; "the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine" p 19.

When the ENI entered into force, on January, 1<sup>st</sup> 2014, it relied on the same 2011 Policy framework and priorities list, whereas, a number of critical changes had already occurred in the Neighbourhood. A critical consequence of these changes has been to deeply fragilize the Eastern Partnership (first Armenia announced that it would not move further with negotiations on its AA with the EU in September 2013, then followed the non-signature of the Ukraine Association Agreement in November 2013, while the progress on AA negotiations with Azerbai-

jan have been disappointing and had stalled and the recent economic failure and elections in Moldova created additional weaknesses.

As a consequence of the above mentioned changes, the gaps in the 2011 ENP framework became obvious (ex-post). Thus, the main question is not about their existence, but about the reasons and explanations behind them. It is true, that the degree and force of change could not have been predicted by anybody. However, it is surprising that none of the critical events (political unrest in the South and East) were analysed in the documentation made available to the evaluation team. Assessing this issue in detail goes nevertheless beyond the scope of the evaluation. We can only conclude that multiple strategic scenarios do not exist at the EUD level (planning stage), even in unstable-crisis countries such as Ukraine or Tunisia (based on field work).

### **Presentation of collected proof**

The 2011 Com was an answer to, and provided, an initial strategic gap assessment. Consequently, the 2011 policy framework developed new policy orientations.


Com 2011 p 1: *“Recent events have brought this into sharper relief, highlighting the challenges we face together.” (...)* *“The overthrow of long-standing repressive regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; the ongoing military conflict in Libya, the recent violent crackdown in Syria, continued repression in Belarus and the lingering protracted conflicts in the region, including in the Middle East, require us to look afresh at the EU’s relationship with our neighbours”. (...)* *“The EU needs to rise to the historical challenges in our Neighbourhood”.*

p 2: *“The new approach must be based on mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.”*

p 2: *“ The partnership will develop with each neighbour on the basis of its needs, capacities and reform objectives. Some partners may want to move further in their integration effort, which will entail a greater degree of alignment with EU policies and rules leading progressively to economic integration in the EU Internal Market”*

p 21, the last sentence of the text is optimistic: *“The challenges are many, and fully meeting them may take time. What we are aiming for together is a democratic, prosperous and stable region where more than 800 million people can live, work and shape their own country’s future, confident that their freedom, their dignity and their rights will be respected”.*

Figure 2 Major events and developments in the Eastern Neighbourhood (2007-2016)



Source: Own presentation

By the time the ENI entered into force, on January, 1<sup>st</sup> 2014, conflict, rising extremism and terrorism, human rights violations and other challenges to international law as well as a widespread economic upheaval left their marks across North Africa and the Middle East, with the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the rise of IS/Da'esh, mostly in Syria and Libya. In the East, an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy has resulted in the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

“However, in the light of the multiple crises and growing challenges in the Neighbourhood, awareness of the need to adapt the ENP and its approach has grown.” (...) “2014 has been a year of major challenges in the EU’s Neighbourhood. Events in Ukraine, as well as increasing Russian pressure on other eastern partners, put Europe’s political realities into focus. Inside and outside Syria, millions of people fled because of the actions of the Assad regime and Da’esh, and remain in dire need of assistance. Atrocities and human rights violations and abuses were perpetrated as well by Da’esh, Jabhat al-Nusra and other terrorist groups in the region. Renewed hostilities in Gaza shattered livelihoods and devastated already fragile infrastructures. Libya’s statehood remained at risk, and the absence of functioning public authorities, the increase of violence and the lack of control of migratory flows to and from the country created favourable conditions for criminal networks engaged in irregular migration and trafficking in human beings to Europe. Poverty in the Neighbourhood was on the rise, affecting children in particular and other vulnerable groups in society.”

(EC (2015) Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014, p 1, 2.)

“Continuing crises in the Southern Neighbourhood, in particular the continuing civil war in Syria and its negative impact on the neighbouring countries, have also required sustained attention and engagement by the EU.” (...)

“Developments throughout the year in Egypt have shown the risks and pitfalls a democratic transition can run into when the process is conducted in a non-inclusive, partisan manner.”

(EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p 4, 7)

*“Human rights and democracy Individual countries’ transition processes towards democracy and the rule of law, and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms continued to become increasingly divergent.” (...)*

*“The EU had concerns regarding the Egyptian proposals for a new law on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the amendment to the Penal Code introducing more severe penalties for civil society organisations (CSOs) found to be in receipt of foreign funding for activities considered to be against the national interest or unity.”(...)*

*The EU welcomed trends towards a stronger role for civil society organisations (CSOs) and their networks and for social partners, and aimed to strengthen direct engagement with these parties. However, as a result of political and security developments in the region in the last two years, the conditions under which CSOs can operate changed, and significant differences developed between individual countries regarding the political and legal regulatory frameworks for CSOs and their implementation. In some countries (particularly in Egypt) the space for CSOs to operate shrank considerably, but in others, governments paid more attention to civil society (e.g. Tunisia).”*

*“At the same time the number of migrants increased dramatically. In 2014 more than 277 000 migrants entered the EU irregularly, which represents an increase of 155% compared to 2013.”*

(03/2015, Implementation of the ENP Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean Partners Report, p 5, 6, 8, 12).

#### A weak EaP

*“The Eastern Partnership Summit that took place on 28-29 November 2013 in Vilnius between the EU and six Eastern neighbouring states<sup>17</sup> was meant to be a turning point in the EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. The success of the EaP policy was seen by many as a yardstick for measuring the EU’s foreign policy impact and transformative powers in its eastern Neighbourhood, with an association beneath the threshold of enlargement.*

*The non-signature of the Ukraine Association Agreement was not the only setback that the Vilnius Summit had to face. In September 2013, just a few months prior to Vilnius, Armenia announced that it would not move further with negotiations on its AA with the EU. As a consequence, the planned initialing ceremony of three AAs in the end only included two: Georgia and Moldova. Moreover, the progress on AA negotiations with Azerbaijan was disappointing and had stalled, due to some conceptual and political differences between the two Parties already in early 2013.”*

In The EU and its Eastern Partnership: Political Association and Economic Integration in a Rough Neighbourhood ;Gunnar Wiegand and Evelina Schulz


However, the ENI entered into force, on January, 1<sup>st</sup> 2014, before the major ENP review in 2015:

*“(4) Since it was launched, the ENP has strengthened relations with partner countries and brought tangible benefits to both the Union and its partners, including the launch of regional initiatives and support to democratisation in the European Neighbourhood. A number of major developments in the European Neighbourhood prompted a comprehensive strategic review of the ENP in 2011. The review provides, inter alia, for greater support to partners committed to building democratic societies and undertaking reforms in line with the incentive-based approach (‘more for more’) and the principle of ‘mutual accountability’, partnership with societies and a more differentiated and tailor-made approach towards the individual partner countries. This Regulation should establish clear links between the ENP framework and the support to be provided under this Regulation.”* Préambule ENI Regulation 2014:

Table 1 Illustrations of differences between the 2011 Strategic perspective and the 2013-2014 Neighbourhood context

Com 2011 perspective	2013-2014 Regional context
<b>Promotion of Democratic process and institutions:</b>	
p 15, 16: 3.2. Building the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean: <i>“The three main directions along which the EU intends to further develop its relations with its Mediterranean partners are carried over into this communication: democratic transformation and institution-building; a stronger partnership with the people; and sustainable and inclusive</i>	In 2014, Tunisia is the only country still progressing towards deeper democracy. In Egypt, the elected president is ousted and jailed in July 2013. In Algeria, President Bouteflika was re-elected with 82% of the vote in 2014, in an election that was tainted by numerous accusations of fraud. In Syria, the civil war extended while the President Assad remains in power.

Com 2011 perspective	2013-2014 Regional context
economic development.”	In Jordan, Morocco, no significant progress towards more democracy. In Libya’s State’s institutions had already disappeared
<b>Support to economic growth:</b>	
Com 2011 p 7: “2.1. Sustainable economic growth and job creation”: <i>“Economic and social challenges in our Neighbourhood are immense. Poverty is rife, life expectancy is often low, youth unemployment is high and the participation of women in political and economic life is low in several countries of the region. Natural capital is being eroded and the rising food and energy prices have severe effects across the Neighbourhood. Most partner countries have weak and poorly diversified economies that remain vulnerable to external economic shocks. The immediate objectives are therefore creating jobs, boosting growth, improving social protection and revitalising sectors affected by recent crises (such as tourism).”</i>	The security aspects, the vulnerability of societies and of institutions, the fragility of political regimes, the contagion and diffusion effects have become the most important determinants of economic achievements and growth prospects in many of the Neighbourhood countries, mainly in the South.
<b>Identification of crisis and conflicts:</b>	
p 5: “1.3. Intensifying our political and security co-operation” <i>“The persistence of protracted conflicts affecting a number of partner countries is a serious security challenge to the whole region. EU geopolitical, economic and security interests are directly affected by continuing instability. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other conflicts in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, the Republic of Moldova and Western Sahara continue to affect sizeable populations, feed radicalisation, drain considerable local and international resources, and act as powerful impediments to reform. The EU is already active in seeking to resolve several of these conflicts. The EU is part of the Quartet on the Middle East. It co-chairs the Geneva talks directed at peace and security in Georgia. It participates as an observer in the “5+2” talks on the Transnistrian conflict in the Republic of Moldova. It would be ready to step up its involvement in formats where it is not yet represented, e.g. the OSCE Minsk Group on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The EU intends to enhance its support for confidencebuilding and outreach to breakaway territories, for international efforts and structures related to the conflicts, and, once that stage is reached, for the implementation of settlements.”</i>	The Ukrainian territory of Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014 Destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine 2014: Daesh extension in Iraq, Syria and the Middle-East In Syria millions of people fled. Jordan and Lebanon are particularly hit by the Syrian crisis consequences
<b>Identification of successes:</b>	
p 1: <i>“The encouraging progress made by other neighbours, for example by Republic of Moldova in its reform efforts, Ukraine in the negotiations of the Association Agreement (...)”</i>	2014: Destabilisation of Ukraine; Beginning of a deep Economic recession ( 2014 gdp -6,6 %; 2015 -9,9 %)  2013: <i>“However, the political crisis in Moldova at the beginning of 2013 highlighted the vulnerability of some of the state institutions to vested interests, the limits of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and the still fragile nature of the reform achievements.”</i> (EC 2014, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.5)

Com 2011 perspective	2013-2014 Regional context
	<p>2014: Moldova, bank fraud, up to \$1 billion, equivalent to more than one-eighth of the country's GDP, had been stolen from three banks. Economic recession started in 2015</p>  <p>“The National Integrity System assessment has discovered a high vulnerability to corruption in Moldova, and it has also discovered that corruption in the country is systematic in nature” (Transparency International, National Integrity System assessment, published 3 July 2014)</p>

One of the main outcomes of the 2015 ENP review has been the provision of a gap assessment of the 2011 Policy framework, for example:

p 1: “At the same time, conflict, rising extremism and terrorism, human rights violations and other challenges to international law, and economic upheaval have resulted in major refugee flows.”

(...) “In the East, an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy has resulted in the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Protracted conflicts continue to hamper development in the region”

p 12: “The consultation showed a very widespread wish to see security given a stronger place in the ENP, in order to make partner countries more resilient against threats they currently experience. The new focus on security will open up a wide range of new areas of cooperation under ENP. Cooperation could include security sector reform, border protection, tackling terrorism and radicalisation, and crisis management.

In June 2015, the European Council restated the need to empower and enable partners to prevent and manage crises, including through concrete projects of capacity building with a flexible geographic scope. Given the specific security challenges partners are facing, the EU should focus on enhancing cooperation on security sector reform. Building further on the European Agenda on Security, the new ENP will prioritise tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation; disrupting serious and organised cross-border crime and corruption; improving judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and fighting cybercrime, in full compliance with the rule of law and international law, including international human rights law.”

p 19: “The EU’s relations with the Russian Federation have deteriorated as a result of the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sebastopol and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. “

It is out of the scope of this work to provide explanations of these difficulties. Nevertheless, two assumptions can be made here.

- (i) A top-down, “EU-centered”, approach based on EC expectations, which gives less importance to the specific geo-political context of the partner countries, and notably does not take enough into account the strategic consequences of the ENP on the neighbours of the neighbours.

“ The partnership will develop with each neighbour on the basis of its needs, capacities and reform objectives. Some partners may want to move further in their integration effort, which will entail a greater degree of alignment with EU policies and rules leading progressively to economic integration in the EU Internal Market. » (EC Com 2011, p 2).

The 2015 ENP Review clearly acknowledges that, on integration issues, Partners wishes were not sufficiently considered:

*“Differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognising that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with the EU.” (...)*

*“The public consultation has demonstrated that while the offer of a closer relationship with the EU for those countries which have undertaken governance reforms has encouraged change in some countries, current practice and policy has been regarded by other partners as too prescriptive, and as not sufficiently reflecting their respective aspirations.” p 2, 3.*

Interviews at EEAS provide the same assessment: *“Now we realize that not all countries want to diffuse EU Acquis.”*

#### “The Russian Factor”

*The Vilnius Summit did suddenly catapult the Eastern Partnership to the forefront of attention with regard to the EU’s foreign policy. Although the EU’s policy towards Russia was not formally part of the Vilnius Summit agenda, German Chancellor Angela Merkel rightly underlined during the official dinner that “at the table, there is another invisible guest”. It became clear from this moment on that the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy would need to consider the Russian factor more explicitly, and cater for Russia’s sensitivities better to make the EaP successful.*

*The EU’s soft power, with its long-term impact leading to transformation of whole societies, promoting fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as well as functioning market economies, has been seriously challenged by Russia’s hard power with its short-term impact, using coercion and providing significant energy price incentives and financial support. But the reverse is also true. (...)*

In: *The EU and its Eastern Partnership: Political Association and Economic Integration in a Rough Neighbourhood* ;Gunnar Wiegand and Evelina Schulz

*“Prior to August 2013, when the Russian trade restricting customs measures suddenly started, Russia had not formally raised any particular concerns in relation to the AA. Concerns seemingly existed earlier, which is best reflected in a study issued by the Russian-financed Eurasian Development Bank. This study, which was made available to the EU only in summer 2013, concludes that Ukraine’s AA with the EU would have a severe negative impact on the Russian economy, notably “deterioration of the terms of trade throughout the post-Soviet area”.*

In *The EU and its Eastern Partnership: Political Association and Economic Integration in a Rough Neighbourhood* ;Gunnar Wiegand and Evelina Schulz

*“The European Union in turn has certainly underestimated the depth of feeling and force of power which Russia was willing to bring to the equation. This neglect was a common neglect of the EU-28.”*

In *The EU and its Eastern Partnership: Political Association and Economic Integration in a Rough Neighbourhood* ;Gunnar Wiegand and Evelina Schulz

- (ii) Shortcomings with regards to geopolitical analysis and risk assessment have been addressed by different sources:

*“Although the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has performed an important function in dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring countries, it has not always been able to offer adequate and comprehensive response to a changing environment, as the Paper has emphasised, in terms of both the way it is managed and the instruments with which it is equipped;*

*- Over the years, the ENP has considerably increased its “bureaucratic” dimension, focusing on pursuing stabilisation and creating free-trade areas, but it has not always been able to satisfy the specific expectations, sensitivities and aspirations of our Partners, or to adapt to the different demands and levels of socio-economic and political development of the countries concerned; (...)*

*Originally designed in 2003 and most recently amended at a time when the outcome of the so-called “Arab revolutions” was not clear, the ENP has considerably “aged” since then, and now appears to be an inadequate tool needing to be updated in order to respond effectively to this situation which is marked by instability and conflict both to the East and – above all – to the South of the Union;*

*- In particular, there is very little focus on the geopolitical situation in the Mediterranean, its development, its challenges and opportunities, partly because of different sensitivities within the EU, shown, amongst other things, by the lack of a new generation of bilateral agreements, and the continuing deadlock in the Union for the Mediterranean;”*



(Italian Senato (2015) RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON EU DOCUMENT NO. 59, RISOLUZIONE DELLA 3ª COMMISSIONE PERMANENTE, (Affari esteri, emigrazione), Approvata nella seduta del 16 giugno 2015.) (ENP review)

« *Considérant que les bouleversements politiques récents dans le Maghreb, au Proche-Orient, dans l'est de l'Europe et dans le Caucase, à l'origine de l'apparition ou de l'aggravation de plusieurs conflits violents, créent des zones de grande instabilité et que la Politique européenne de voisinage n'a pas été apte à répondre à ces nouveaux défis ; que le traitement politique des différentes crises concernant les pays du voisinage a dû être assuré par l'initiative d'États membres, en l'absence d'une capacité suffisante de l'Union européenne ; Considérant en particulier que la gestion bureaucratique, sans vision politique, de la Politique européenne de voisinage a une part de responsabilité dans le déclenchement de la crise politique en Ukraine ;* » (..)

*Considérant en particulier que la contribution de la Politique de voisinage au règlement des crises – syrienne, libyenne ou israélo-palestinienne – qui menacent la stabilité de son voisinage Sud et la sienne est insuffisante ; Considérant en particulier que le soutien politique et financier aux pays engagés sur la voie des réformes démocratiques depuis 2011 n'est pas à la hauteur des défis économiques, sociaux et sécuritaires auxquels ces pays sont aujourd'hui confrontés – notamment la Tunisie, dont le sort engage la crédibilité de la Politique européenne de voisinage ;* » p 3

(Assemblée nationale France, Annexe au rapport proposition de résolution européenne sur la révision de la Politique européenne de voisinage. Présidence de l'Assemblée nationale le 17 juin 2015.) (ENP Review)

“ *The shortcomings, as well as the lack of strategic vision of the ENP and EaP missions became especially obvious in the face of dramatic developments in the neighborhood, as it happened in the case of the Arab Spring and further deterioration of the security situation in the region – be it to the South, or to the East. Although both ENP dimensions are important as from the EU outlook, one cannot ignore the very fact of that each of those dimensions is different as different are the partners themselves. Take the dynamics of regional developments or the challenges, which the countries of those dimensions face, or the depth of approximation with the EU, it is quite obvious that the two wings of the ENP differ to extreme. The expediency of greater differentiation between the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean is indisputable*” p 1

(...) *The Russian aggression against independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of a European state brought new dynamics to the partnership, which one didn't envisage at when the EaP was established. And again Ukraine stands at avant-garde while the very concept of the Eastern Partnership is being seriously tested for dramatic change.*” p 1, (Review of the European Neighborhood Policy: Ukraine's Contribution.)

Field work has shown that multiple strategic scenario do not exist at the EUD level (planning stage), even in unstable-crisis countries such as Ukraine or Tunisia,  
(see Field Reports)

Within DG NEAR the above mentioned shortcomings are shared by some interviewees, but rejected by others.

Within the EUD visited, the lack of strategic analysis has been systematically confirmed

In addition, the design of the Umbrella program has been also discussed and criticised (see also indicator: 1.2.2), resulting in assessments such as:

*“Following the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011 and the introduction of the principle of ‘more for more’, the SPRING (for the South) and EaPIC (for the East) programmes set up an effective mechanism to introduce the incentive-based approach in the EU's cooperation with the Neighbourhood countries, with the aim of fostering deep and sustainable democracy by rewarding reforms in that direction.*

*The ‘umbrella programmes’ have significantly contributed to shaping the debate on the implementation of the incentive-based approach of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy, and are now fully integrated in the new European Neighbourhood Instrument for 2014-2020.*

*Some lessons can be drawn from the implementation of these umbrella programmes:*

- In order to match the performance rewarding principle with the predictability of EU aid, the assessment of a country's progress in deep and sustainable democracy – which triggers the al-

location of additional resources through the umbrella programmes – needs to be accurate and clearly linked to agreed reform objectives.

- Rewarding political performances of third countries (or not doing so) is always a sensitive issue. It is thus important that criteria determining whether or not a country will be rewarded are clear and transparent, and that partner countries are fully aware of them.
- More globally, the whole process of the definition and implementation of umbrella programmes needs to be underpinned by effective and coordinated political communication and clear messages.” (EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, activities and results 2007-13. P 67)



### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – DG NEAR, EEAS, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### 1.1.3 I-113. Evidence that preparing, implementing and monitoring EU support involved the external action partners, including civil society organisations and local authorities {[6]}, resulting in alignment with partner country and regional needs.

#### Global analysis of the indicator

I-113 and I-114 are linked as they both refer to consultation and alignment with cooperation partners. Here we focus on the evidences of consultation processes, mainly with local actors, i.e.: civil society and partner country governments. Alignment issues are analysed in I-114. Coordination and complementarity with MS activities are better covered in EQ4 and EQ5.

Programming documents and monitoring reports contain explicit references to a consultative process. The analysis of strategic documents points to the existence of general references to guiding principles for a consultative process, which are included in the strategies papers. At regional strategy level, clear references to a consultative process are identified for the Southern region as well as for the Eastern region. The programming documents clearly refer to processes aimed at involving the beneficiaries and all EU actors in order to discuss challenges and identify needs to be tackled under the regional framework.

At the bilateral level, there are multiple examples where the EU has ensured participation of national authorities in the programming and follow-up of ENI programmes. Furthermore, all countries systematically organise consultations with CSOs on development assistance at different stages of the programming cycle on both political and operational issues. Most countries attest that consultations were helpful and led to the establishment of a long-term partnership between the EU and CSOs/CSO networks. The EU conducts dialogue with stakeholders in most countries to identify needs and priorities so that any subsequent policy may be aligned accordingly. Most EAMRs refer to the involvement of national authorities and other donors at different phases of the programming cycle. Successful examples are multiple, while there are few exceptions such as Syria. Programme results vary greatly from country to country given their specific context and circumstances. Yet, overall, they all contribute somehow to EU objectives such as the rule of law and better governance, trade and mobility of people among others. In numerous cases, ENI programmes have served as a platform for raising EU concerns and taking policy dialogue to the next level, which in turn supports the launch and implementation of ENI programmes. EAMR Reports indicate that ENI programmes are able to influence policy and bring about reform. The areas more commonly mentioned in EAMRs are: gender equality (all countries but Belarus), environment (e.g. Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan), access to labour market (e.g. Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova) and fight against discrimination and right of minorities (e.g. Armenia, Moldova, Morocco).

Overall, the EU maintains strong ties with CSOs with regular consultations taking place main-

ly to discuss programming exercises, focal sectors, calls for proposals and topics of concerns (e.g.: good governance, human rights, gender, migration, justice, environment, among others). Most countries attest that these talks are extremely helpful and have led to the establishment of a long-term partnership between the EU and CSOs/CSO networks. According to EAMRs 2015, there are 387 on-going projects that promote structured dialogue between Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) / Local Authorities (LAs) and governments and EU institutions. The number of projects largely differs from one country to another: Lebanon, Tunisia and Belarus top the list with 140, 59 and 51 projects, respectively, while Syria, Armenia and Georgia are at the bottom of the list with zero or 2 projects implemented. Additionally, there are 523 ongoing projects whose objectives include the inclusion of CSOs/LAs in national policymaking.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*At the overall level, reporting document states for example that: “The programming exercise is based on a continuous dialogue between the EU and each of the partner countries. This spirit of co-ownership and partnership is essential to ensure that programmes are adapted to the needs of partner countries and contribute to their political, economic and social development, and ultimately to the well-being of their populations. The principles of differentiation and mutual accountability were reinforced in the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy, which implies a more open and interactive policy dialogue and more attentive listening by the EU to the needs of partner countries.” (EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-13, p16.)*

The policy framework of the EC intervention in the two ENP regions gives emphasis to the involvement of civil societies of the different countries with specific characteristics with respect to the South and East. Thus, the EU Delegations regularly engages directly with civil society on both political and operational issues. This happens both on an *ad hoc* basis and as part of formalised processes within a particular policy context: *“Consultations of civil society organisations have become a structural element of EU cooperation in Neighbourhood countries. Civil society is regularly consulted on policy elements as well as on operational issues in the preparation and programming of EU financial support. The Civil Society Forum National Platforms in EaP countries offer a unique opportunity for civil society organisations to debate EaP priorities, provide input on progress on the implementation of jointly agreed reforms in the areas of democracy, good governance and economic development. In the Southern Neighbourhood, civil society plays a key role in several countries in the implementation of social programmes funded by the EU (literacy programmes, care for children, gender equality, etc.). Efforts have also been made to establish a structured dialogue between civil society, the authorities and the EU at regional level. Throughout 2014, EU Delegations in ENP countries will develop country roadmaps for engagement with civil society. The purpose of the roadmaps will be to develop a common strategic framework for EU Delegations and Member states engagement with civil society at country level. The EU will also continue to strengthen its direct support to civil society and social partners, to empower citizens to express their concerns, contribute to policy making, and hold governments to account.”* EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.9

According to the Analysis EAMRs 2013-2014-2015, overall, most countries engage in policy dialogue with national governments along the programming cycle in order to ensure alignment with partner country priorities. LAs are also cited but are less frequent. In this section of EAMRs participation of civil society is also mentioned but to a much lesser extent. Examples of participation of CSOs can be found in e.g.: Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Libya and Palestine in 2013; Azerbaijan, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in 2014; and Azerbaijan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia in 2015.

(...) In 2015 there are more countries that refer to the difficult context in which CSOs operate, thus limiting the effectiveness of EU support and policy dialogue with regards to the participation of CSOs (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt and Palestine).

Most EAMRs refer to the involvement of national and local authorities and other donors in the programming, implementation and follow-up of EU programmes through exchanges and policy dialogue e.g.: *“Exchanges on the new ENP, which was presented in 2015, and on the latter’s importance for the new programming cycle for Egypt for the period 2017-2020 took place as well.”* (EAMR Egypt 2015, p. 4-5); *“Moreover, the Renewable Energy and Energy efficiency programme REEE II was formulated in intensive dialogue with key Government counterparts, donors and IFIs through technical stakeholder meetings and high level meetings.”* (EAMR Jordan 2015, 6-7); Ukraine *“A draft Concept for SME strat-*

egy was elaborated by the MEDT and is currently under consultation with the sector [...] Agriculture: After extensive consultation with all national and international stakeholders and donors and a formal endorsement by the National Reform Council, the Single and Comprehensive Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development 2015-2020 was formally launched by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food.” (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3-9).

A challenging social environment seems to be a major constraint to the consultation of civil society in several countries (e.g. Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, West Bank and Gaza Strip). The lack of regulation and sometimes restrictions imposed by governments on NGOs has led to the early termination and even suspension of programmes. This difficult context has limited EU capacity to involve CSOs in the preparing, implementation and monitoring work of the EU.

The complex context in which NGOs operate limit EU dialogue with CSOs leading to delays in EU aid delivery programmes. E.g.: Algeria *“Un thème de discussion récurrent pendant l'année a été la société civile et les difficultés auxquelles les associations se voient confrontées suite à l'entrée en vigueur de la loi de 2012 qui demande un agrément pour pouvoir opérer. Nos demandes n'ont pas eu de réponse de la part des autorités algériennes, et les associations doivent trouver des solutions pratiques qui leur permettent de surmonter les difficultés auxquelles elles sont confrontées du point de vue légal.”* (EAMR Algeria 2015, 4-6); Azerbaijan *“The continued hostile civil society environment in 2015, linked more specifically to the delays in the completion of the legislative framework regulating the functioning of NGOs (rules for registration of grants and rules for donors to obtain the right to give grants in Azerbaijan) impacted significantly the implementation of grants to civil society”* (EAMR Azerbaijan 2015, 4-6); Egypt *“Meanwhile, governmental authorization is required for NGOs both to remain operational and to receive funding for specific projects.”* (EAMR Egypt 2015, 4-5); West Bank and Gaza Strip *“Recently, the PA is considering to introduce changes in tax policies that will have direct impact on international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) working in Palestine (10% of salaries). This will have implications on the work of INGOs that are carrying out vital humanitarian and development work in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. INGOs might real challenges to comply, given their limited margin of budget. The NGOs might be obliged to compensate the loss by cutting the amount of money intended for activities on the ground.”* (EAMR West Bank & Gaza Strip 2015, 19-21).

Particularly challenging is the situation in Egypt where CSOs are limited by government control and restrictions: *“The law on associations (NGO law) has been hotly debated all year. The current law provides authorities with substantial discretionary power, allowing government to control civil society activities, and the different revisions proposed were still not in line with international benchmarks concerning freedom of association. Under the interim government, the situation did not substantially change. Authorization from the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs is required for NGOs to implement specific projects, and nearly all NGOs receiving EU grants incur delays The EU Delegation regularly follows up with the Minister of Insurance and Social Affairs on this issue, with limited results.”* (EAMR Egypt 2013, 3).

Nevertheless, remarkable examples regarding participation of CSOs in policymaking can be found in Georgia and Libya. Other examples include Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, West Bank and Gaza Strip.

in Georgia: *“Democratisation and Civil Society Development – The Parliament of Georgia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with more than 150 Georgian CSOs, which will oblige the parliament to work together with civil society on improving the enabling framework and to create spaces for greater involvement of CSOs in policy processes [...] The area of Public Finance Reform is another of the main areas of support of the Delegation. In this area also the preparation of a Sector Policy Reform Programme that will start in 2014 has provided for the opportunity for strong engagement with the government at policy level. The discussion over transparency and budget oversight have led to the active participation of the Georgian Parliament and the Civil Society in the implementation of this Budget Support programme and will provide the basis for a wider consultation and participation in the management of public finances in Georgia.”* (EAMR Georgia 2013, 3-4);

In Libya *“Regarding civil society, the EU funded “Support to civil society in Libya” programme has run a series of workshops which has served to foster dialogue between a national platform of CSOs and national authorities over key transitional matters relevant for the constitutional drafting process.”* (EAMR Libya 2013, 3-4); *« In addition, through the EU funded civil society centre in Tripoli, the EUD as well as high level EU officials on mission in Libya, have had the opportunity to meet and discuss with CSOs and LAs over issues such as womens' and people with disabilities' rights, youth unem-*

*ployment and political participation, access to sport facilities and cultural activities, constitutional process, local governance and the GNC elections.” (EAMR Libya 2013, 3-4)*

There are other examples where the EU has ensured participation of CSO in the programming and follow-up of ENI programmes. They include: Jordan *“For the sector of employment and technical and vocational education and training (ETVET), in the second half of 2013 the EU technical assistance provided assistance in revising the related strategy. A series of multi-stakeholder consultations took place in this context to ensure the ownership of the revised strategy and its action plan.”* (EAMR Jordan 2013, 3-4); Lebanon *“En 2013 cinq dialogues structurés ont été conduits avec des représentants de la société et les autorités locales sur la gouvernance locale, l'exercice de programmation (SSF 2014-2016) et la réponse de l'UE aux conséquences du conflit syrien. Il est également à noter que le gouvernement procéda en fin 2012, tout comme la Délégation à consulter la société civile sur une discussion des priorités retenues dans le nouvel Plan d'action UE-Liban 2013-2015.”* (EAMR Lebanon 2013, 3) ; Morocco *« La DUE a poursuivi son dialogue avec les acteurs non-étatiques. Les thèmes faisant l'objet du dialogue régulier avec ces acteurs comprennent la mise en œuvre du Plan d'action Voisinage, la promotion des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie, la lutte contre la pauvreté et la promotion de la condition sociale des groupes défavorisés, les questions environnementales, la migration, la programmation de l'appui à la société civile dans le cadre des programmes thématiques et des programmes géographiques (Genre, Justice, Forêts, Partenariat pour la mobilité, notamment). A noter que l'année 2013 s'est aussi caractérisée par l'ouverture d'un dialogue avec la société civile sur l'ALECA. En outre, les OSC et les associations d'autorités locales ont également été consultées sur le nouveau cadre stratégique d'appui 2014-2017 (bilatéral et régional), ainsi que sur les orientations du nouveau programme thématique Organisations de la société civile et Autorités Locales.”* (EAMR Morocco 2013, 4-6); West Bank and Gaza Strip: *“After adoption of the new ENP Joint Action Plan in early 2013, the Delegation launched an extensive remote consultation with civil society (CS) for contributions to the 2013 ENP report.”* (EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip 2013, 6-9).

The EU has been pro-active to develop the CSOs capacity and their involvement in Policy design. Overall, the EU maintains strong ties with CSOs with regular consultations taking place mainly to discuss programming exercises, focal sectors, calls for proposals and topics of concerns (e.g.: good governance, human rights, gender, migration, justice, environment, among others). Most countries attest that these talks are extremely helpful and have led to the establishment of a long-term partnership between the EU and CSOs/CSO networks.

According to EAMRs 2013 there are 279 on-going projects that promote structured dialogue between Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) / Local Authorities (LAs) and governments and EU institutions. The number of projects largely differs from one country to another: Morocco, Tunisia West Bank and Gaza Strip and Georgia top the list with 59, 56, 41 and 40 projects, respectively, while Syria, Armenia and Libya are at the bottom of the list with zero or 2 projects implemented.

According to EAMRs 2015, there are 387 on-going projects that promote structured dialogue between Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) / Local Authorities (LAs) and governments and EU institutions. The number of projects largely differs from one country to another: Lebanon, Tunisia and Belarus top the list with 140, 59 and 51 projects, respectively, while Syria, Armenia and Georgia are at the bottom of the list with zero or 2 projects implemented. Additionally, there are 523 ongoing projects whose objectives include the inclusion of CSOs/LAs in national policymaking. The differences are also significant here: Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia lead with 300, 55, and 49, respectively, while in Egypt and Syria this kind of intervention is non-existent and Armenia and Jordan have only 2 projects each.

Overall, successful examples are multiple e.g.: Armenia *“In June 2013, the Delegation inaugurated a mechanism of regular consultative meetings with representatives of civil society, including National Platform members, at the level of Head of Delegation/Head of Cooperation [...] In August 2013, the consultative online tool for CSOs was launched to enhance dialogue and create a platform enabling civil society actors to exchange their views on issues relevant for the future development of EU-Armenia relations [...] Armenian civil society representatives are invited to contribute to ENP Progress Reports on an annual basis. In 2013, thematic consultations were held.”* (EAMR Armenia 2013, 14).

The only exception is found in Syria due to the national conflict but even in this case the EU has ensured CSO participation *“17 bilateral meetings were held with CSOs during 2013 which assisted with the programming.”* (EAMR Syria 2013, 9).

Additional challenging experiences are found in: Algeria *“Par contre, la situation actuelle des ONGs en général et des ONGs internationales en particulier est incertaine. La nouvelle loi des associations de janvier 2012 a institué l'obligation d'avoir l'autorisation des autorités pour l'existence et l'activité des ONGs [...] Au moment de la clôture, en janvier 2014, de la période transitoire de deux années donnée par la loi pour que les ONGs procèdent à leur régularisation, la situation de la plupart des ONGs financées par la DUE est incertaine et leur futur semble dépendre de l'évolution de cette situation dans les mois à venir.”* (EAMR Algeria 2013, 8-9); Azerbaijan *“In regards to Government strategies, getting the Government to see CSOs as partners is challenging, but progress has been made.”* (EAMR Azerbaijan 2013, 8); Libya *“[...] it is worth noting that the strict security and mobility regime applied to EUDEL continues hinder outreach to a greater number of CSOs and LAs from both within and outside the capital Tripoli. This was to some extent mitigated through the inputs obtained from EU implementing agencies, able to travel in the country, thus allowing the EUD to be informed and achieve a certain degree of consultation with local actors from various cities and regions.”* (EAMR Libya 2013, 8); Tunisia *“Cependant et malgré les consultations régulières avec la société civile ainsi que les efforts d'information de la DUE, les capacités de la société civile à participer efficacement aux débats restent limitées et les discussions souvent peu constructives, se heurtant au manque d'expérience de beaucoup d'organisations de la société civile, créées après 14 janvier 2011 [...] Dans ce contexte, la DUE a mis en place un mécanisme de dialogue structuré visant à améliorer l'implication de la société civile tunisienne dans la mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action du Partenariat Privilégié, ainsi que dans le processus de transition démocratique.”* (EAMR Tunisia 2013, 7).

In addition, EU support has played an important role in the promotion of CSO participation in public policy. Particularly remarkable are the cases of Azerbaijan, Georgia and West Bank and Gaza Strip:

In Azerbaijan: *“One of the underlying objectives common to all our CS projects is fostering dialogue between the Government and CSOs in regards to advocacy, public policy development and monitoring implementation of reforms, and there have been success stories in the areas of social inclusion and local economic development. In addition, in 2013, for the first time in a bilateral programme, the Government has agreed to earmark a specific allocation for projects to be implemented by civil society in the field of rural and regional development following a participatory and bottom-up approach.”* (EAMR Azerbaijan 2013, 8);

In Georgia *“Over the course of 2013, Georgian Government consultation with civil society in general has continued to be active. A number of ministries have set up public councils, where they consult with civil society. In the specific case of the local government reform, the responsible ministry set up a number of working groups on various aspects of the reform, all of the with the active participation of civil society representatives. The Electoral Reform was also a relatively open and inclusive process, with both civil society and extra-parliamentary parties free to participate in discussions. Civil society recommendations on a number of key areas, such as campaign financing, were accepted. In September, a Communication Strategy for the ENP was adopted by the government after it had been jointly developed with the National Platform of the Civil Society Forum. In December, more than 150 CSOs signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Parliament which sets out processes for parliamentary consultation of civil society on key policy processes.”* (EAMR Georgia 2013, 9); See also the: *“Georgia EU roadmap for engagement with Civil Society 2014–2017”* (21 July 2014).

In West Bank and Gaza Strip *“Civil Society participation in national policy-making was promoted in EU relations with the Ministry of Planning (MoPAD), especially regarding the development and monitoring of the new Palestinian National Development Plan 2014-2016. Four Joint EU HoCs meetings with the MoPAD and the MoF on the PNDP 2014-2016 and the need to include civil society not only in the consultations, but also on the follow-up of their feedbacks, were organised in 2013 [...] Support under the Civil Society Facility “Strengthening the Palestinian NGO Sector capacity and involvement in governance and democratic process” is enhancing the capacities of the main four national platforms to play an active role in domestic politics in order to meet the needs of marginalised groups during the next years.”* (EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 15).

Involvement of the private sector has been less systematic, according to the documents consulted:

In the South: *“Private sector involvement is positively assessed in approximately half of the projects reviewed, but the number of projects actively involving private sector stakeholders is more limited. The extent of private sector involvement is typically linked to the sectors, with positive examples of private sector participation in reforms dealing with food safety (use of private laboratories) and export promotion, in projects aiming at increasing employment where the private sector is contracted to implement public works thus providing employment opportunities created by government institutions. In other cases, the private sector is the target group (or one of the target groups) of the projects reviewed, e.g. promotion of micro, small and medium enterprises; or capacity building for small informal enterprises,*

*young entrepreneurs. In a small number of important cases, the private sector is involved to enhance the delivery or functioning of public services (e.g. operation of waste water treatment plants, or financing of technical centres/ research). Positive examples of mainstreaming the involvement of the private sector in local development activities also exist. In most instances, the lack of involvement of the private sector is seen as a given, and is not seen as a shortcoming or much less a weakness. This is linked both to the nature of projects and to the context within which they operate.* " (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 34).

In the East the involvement of the private sector is variable mainly because of its unequal development in the different countries. For instance in Belarus: *" As the private sector is little developed in Belarus, it hardly plays a role in project implementation. An important exception is represented by the regional development project (D-22824), where the private sector played an important role in the dialogue for the preparation of regional and local development strategies."* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 75)

While in Ukrain: *"Private sector involvement has been significant in the regional development project (D-22825) which has seen the involvement of private sector representatives as informants and stakeholders in the process leading to the elaboration of the Regional Strategies; and as direct or indirect beneficiaries of some of the grant project (e.g. grants aimed at improving business opportunities by supporting key sectors).* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 86)

Overall, the EU is fully committed to policy dialogue with every country in the framework of the programming of focal sectors and implementation of programmes. In general, relations with national governments are frequent and quite satisfactory. Overall, policy dialogue has supported the launch and implementation of programmes thus the reach of ENI objectives. Nevertheless, the EU has encountered challenges in specific countries/sectors.

In multiple occasions programming and implementation of ENI programmes have constituted means of entry to promoting an enhancing policy dialogue:

In Algeria *"La progression de l'appui budgétaire sectoriel en Algérie mène aussi à un dialogue plus intense, notamment dans le contexte des nouveaux programmes. Ceci a été le cas pour la préparation du nouveau programme ENVIRONNEMENT qui a poursuivi le dialogue sur les politiques sectorielles au plus haut niveau et aussi au niveau technique avec les discussions sur les indicateurs.* » (EAMR Algeria 2013, 4);

*« Les efforts pour renforcer le lien au niveau de l'Accord d'Association (AA) entre le dialogue politique et la coopération ont continué. Ces deux volets se renforcent mutuellement à chaque rencontre et travaillent ensemble vers les mêmes objectifs. Le format des sous- comités de l'AA incluent une session dédiée à la coopération sectorielle.*

*La consultation sur la nouvelle PEV a été fructueuse et les inquiétudes de l'Algérie (adaptation aux besoins des partenaires en vue d'assurer l'appropriation) ont été prises en compte dans la communication adoptée par la Commission et le SEAE. (...) Un partenariat Stratégique UE-Algérie dans le domaine de l'énergie a démarré suite à la visite du Commissaire Arias Cañete au mois de mai. Ainsi, un nouveau projet de coopération sur les "énergies renouvelables" sera formulé en 2016.*

*Le dialogue intense au niveau technique avec me Ministère des Finances a continué en vue de débloquent la progression de l'appui budgétaire sectoriel en Algérie avec les discussions sur les progrès en matière de gouvernance économique. Un projet de plan stratégique de réforme des Finances publiques a été fini en novembre 2015 et la conduite d'un exercice PEFA devrait avoir lieu en début 2016. (...)(EAMR Algeria 2015, p. 4-6)*

In Morocco: *« "La Délégation a suivi au travers d'un dialogue régulier avec le Gouvernement, la Société Civile ainsi que le Conseil National des Droits Humains (CNDH) les deux projets de loi organiques sur l'indépendance de la justice, qui ont fait l'objet de discussions approfondies au cours des négociations du programme justice. Ces deux lois organiques visent d'une part à renforcer l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire en établissant un Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire, indépendant du Ministère de la Justice, et d'autre part à élargir les garanties d'indépendance de la Magistrature. La Délégation a poursuivi son dialogue avec le Conseil National des Droits Humains sur les cas individuels, mais également sur la mise en oeuvre des conventions internationales ratifiées par le Maroc en matière d'interdiction de la torture, des droits de l'enfant, des droits des personnes handicapées et de la lutte contre les discriminations, notamment en lien avec le jumelage en cours. Certains échanges ont également*

eu lieu avec le CNDH sur le renforcement des capacités des organisations de la société civile en matière de droits de l'homme. Le CNDH participe activement au sous-comité droits de l'homme de l'Accord d'association UE-Maroc. Le Représentant Spécial pour les Droits de l'Homme de l'UE, M. Lambrinidis, s'est longuement entretenu avec Driss El Yazami, Président du CNDH, lors de sa visite au Maroc en janvier 2015. Finalement, la Délégation a entretenu un dialogue avec certaines commissions régionales du CNDH. La mise en place fin 2015 d'un Comité de Pilotage de Haut Niveau dans le contexte du processus de convergence réglementaire constitue un premier pas vers l'adoption d'une méthodologie pour la mise en oeuvre d'actions concrètes sectorielles de convergence réglementaire (...) La Délégation est également restée attentive aux informations de la Société Civile sur l'application effective de ces décisions de régularisation (dont la mise en oeuvre butte sur de nombreux obstacles administratifs). Le dialogue sur les réformes sociales a continué, en général, de s'enrichir et a permis d'aborder des questions sociétales. Ainsi les questions d'égalité de genre ont pu être régulièrement abordées avec les autorités dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre du programme « Egalité hommes/femmes » et de son dialogue politique. Ceci a ainsi permis de poursuivre les efforts d'intégration de la dimension « genre » dans l'ensemble des programmes en cours ou en formulation. Comme indiqué dans le rapport annuel sur les droits de l'homme remis à l'EEAS, la Délégation a maintenu un dialogue politique important sur ce volet (...) Par contre, dans le domaine de la Santé, le dialogue politique a permis d'aborder avec succès la question de l'extension de la couverture médicale à de nouvelles catégories de population telles les migrants, les étudiants et les indépendants. Le cas de la Santé est particulièrement probant. Il s'appuie sur une confiance réciproque construite au fil des programmes successifs (...). (EAMR Morocco, 2015, p. 5-9)

“L'instrument d'appui budgétaire, utilisé de manière privilégiée au Maroc, favorise cette intensité du dialogue qui reste bien encadré par des missions de suivi [...] Les négociations relatives à l'appui de l'UE à la phase II de l'INDH ont été l'occasion d'un dialogue soutenu avec les autorités marocaines (Ministères de l'Intérieur, de l'Education, de la Santé, de l'Economie et des Finances) [...] De même, les négociations relatives à l'appui de l'UE à la politique forestière ont permis un dialogue approfondi avec les autorités marocaines sur le secteur, en particulier concernant la gouvernance (participation de la société civile et du secteur privé) et l'inter-sectorialité.” (EAMR Morocco 2013, 4-6).

In Jordan: “The Policy dialogue has been closely maintained with the Jordanian authorities in the three focal sectors under the SSF but also largely under the various fields of EU assistance. Also, the Delegation has participated and supported actively in the Association sub committees that took place during the year: Energy/Environment, Human Rights and Trade. The monitoring and steering of our Budget Support Operations have been opportune occasions to maintain the policy dialogue with MoPIC and line ministries. Moreover, the Renewable Energy and Energy efficiency programme REEE II was formulated in intensive dialogue with key Government counterparts, donors and IFIs through technical stakeholder meetings and high level meetings. The first operational year of the sector budget support programme on public finance and public administration reforms under the SSF opened an avenue for dialogue and support on improving service delivery to citizens. Work is on-going with largely positive engagement noted as the Ministry of Finance reached all the agreed targets and is actively working with a technical assistance team. Government-EU dialogue on PFM (public finance management) issues continues to be constructive and open. The dialogue covered key PEFA areas and the government's performance in meeting the budget support performance criteria. Meetings with the main PFM stakeholders are held bilaterally at least quarterly between the EU Delegation and the Director Generals of the Ministry of Finance and other key departments or agencies including Audit Bureau to discuss progress on PFM reforms and other economic policy related issues, including pending laws in Parliament. The policy dialogue in the education sector is making good progress. The donor group with USAID, DfID, the Norwegian, the German and Dutch governments under leadership of USAID is regularly meeting between each other and with the Minister of Education. Under leadership of the World Bank a bi-annual monitoring mission takes place on the progress of the Support to the Second Phase of the Education reform Programme (EUSSPER). The next WB visit is foreseen between 1-7 February 2016 to pursue a very effective and conducive dialogue. In the framework of the justice budget support, the sector donor group has met with the Government to discuss the overall challenges in the sector with the participation of the Delegation. The policy dialogue on the response to the Syria Crisis continued with the authorities under the leadership of MoPIC through the Syria Crisis Response Platform. The Delegation has been closely involved in the preparation of JRP 2016-2018 but also in the meetings with the MoPIC Minister Fakhoury and other key donors to steer the Jordanian response to the Syria Crisis. One of the achievements of this dialogue is undoubtedly the opening by Jordan on the issue of Syrian participation to the labour market.” (EAMR Jordan, 2015, p. 6-7)

Even in Lebanon: “Lebanon was understandably pre-occupied with a multitude of crises (Presidential vacuum, postponed elections, attacks by militants, the huge influx of Syrian refugees, the waste crisis)



and thus achieving progress in the EU-Lebanon policy dialogue was challenging. While the review of the ENP was ongoing during 2015, the policy dialogue with Government remained strong. Security, Economics & Trade, Agriculture, Water & Energy, Health and Social Affairs Sectors stand out as particularly fruitful with key projects supporting the respective Authorities. The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform continued to implement a strategy to enhance public transparency, accountability and effectiveness. The bulk of the Delegation's ongoing programmes addressed the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, including Palestinian refugees from Syria. Education remained the main challenge. Almost 400.000 refugees are of school age between 5-17 years old. The Delegation had an intense and fruitful policy dialogue with Ministry of Education and Higher Education, which defined the terms of the back-to-school 2015-2016 campaign. In parallel, the Delegation worked with the Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of Social Affairs. The Delegation's Syrian response programme is strong, integrating the three main sectors of the response: education, health and child protection." (EAMR Lebanon, 2015, p. 2-3)

In Armenia: (...) The discussions on the future programme Better Qualifications for Better Jobs served as an opportunity for further engagement with the future beneficiaries seeking to improve the efficiency of Armenia's labour market and the employability of its workforce, with a particular emphasis on agricultural employment. (...) The run up to COP21 in December 2015 provided a significant opportunity for progress in policy dialogue relating to climate change with the Government, in particular with the Ministry for Nature Protection. From May to December the Delegation, supported by Member States, engaged in positive and ongoing dialogue, including two demarches. With the launch of the new set of projects in 2016, the Delegation is expected to play a greater role in the policy dialogue through the different structures to be put in place through these projects.

Priority area 2: Public Administration Reform Dialogue in the field of public finance was strong, as the EU was supporting the drafting of a revised PFM strategy, as well as several specific activities through ongoing programmes. In parallel, a further programme specifically targeting PFM was approved by a Commission Decision, which will allow further strengthening this dialogue. In parallel, in the context of an EaPIC contribution to an economic governance budget support, including targets on anti-corruption and civil service reform, a strong dialogue developed in the field of anti-corruption since spring 2015. This was prompted by the Delegation's concerns that the deliverables planned by the authorities in this regard could fall short of the EU's expectations, which triggered various discussions and exchanges of letters throughout the year.

The launch of a second twinning project strengthening the National Statistical System of Armenia also allowed the Delegation to reinstate policy dialogue with Armenian authorities on statistical dissemination, demographic statistics, poverty statistics as well as innovation statistics. Dialogue in the field of e-governance was also strong. Following the successful implementation of "Transactional e-Governance Development in Armenia" project the Delegation continued dialogue with the relevant interlocutors throughout the year, including supporting a conference in September to discuss the ideas on further development of e-governance in Armenia. Furthermore, the series of meetings with the Minister of Finance, Minister-Head of the Government, e-Gov implementation institution of Armenia EKENG, WB team and other interlocutors resulted in clear understanding on the Single Window system that needs to be developed for the whole government and not for each specific agency.

Priority area 3: Justice Sector Reform A strong dialogue continued in the field of justice sector reform, at the highest level, which resulted in a draft vision of the Ministry on the further development of Justice sector in Armenia. By mid-2015, both sides had agreed to develop a follow-on Justice Sector Reform Programme (Phase III) as part of AAP 2016. (...) Dialogue in the field of human rights was also stepped up, using various political fora, but more particularly, in the context of the Human Rights Budget support programme signed in December 2015 which will aim at improving the protection of human rights through enacting and implementing relevant legislation in the areas of right to free elections, torture prevention, anti-discrimination (including minorities, people with disabilities, refugees and other vulnerable groups), gender equality and child protection" (EAMR Armenia, 2015, p. 7-9)

In Azerbaijan: "Regional/Rural Development: In July 2015 a series of meetings were held in the context of the dialogue of the Rural Development Support Programme, in particular with the main departments of the Ministry of Finance, Chamber of Accounts, the Committee of Economic Policy of the Milli Majlis, the Anti-Corruption Committee and Anti-Corruption Directorate. In the area of regional development the policy dialogue is sustained having the ministry of Economy taking the lead role with multiple projects implemented under the Pilot Regional Development programme (AAP 2012) and the Support to Rural development Programme (AAP 2013) through a different mix of aid modalities (grants and services) which also includes dialogue with CSOs although the environment for their work has deteriorated since 2014. Partly through continuous policy dialogue with the government (through

projects or directly), the EU has achieved a strong convergence of views among key government interlocutors such as the Ministry of Economy and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture on the importance and urgency to support and transform the agricultural sector (and related (agri-food) industry) in the country as a way to sustainably diversify the economy and enhance its competitiveness. (...)

The Delegation has also provided key support in developing a reform strategy that is close to being adopted. For this reason, future policy dialogue accompanied by capacity development components for the Ministry of Agriculture will fall on fertile ground. Education The EUD has been in continuous dialogue with the Ministry of Education and the Government in order to finalise the Financing Agreement for the education support programme 2014 that eventually was signed on 18 December 2015.

In terms of donor coordination, the EU Heads of Mission agreed to the road map for EU+ Joint Programming (EU, D, UK, Switzerland, Norway) in the area of Vocational Education and Training (VET). The roadmap foresees a joint analysis of the country's strategy towards development of its VET system, division of labour in terms of sectors and regions to support through the respective assistance programmes and joint messaging towards the authorities. Justice/ Rule of Law In the area of justice, policy dialogue took place in the framework of an experts' mission initiated by the Delegation in June-September 2015 to better understand the dynamics of the justice sector in Azerbaijan as an input for future EU interventions in the sector (programming, policy dialogue, risk management). The experts conducted over 50 meetings with justice stakeholders, including with all the key government institutions, international donor organizations and NGOs. (...)

Public Financial Management In 2015 a dialogue was undertaken with the GoAz regarding PFM reforms, consisting of meetings and seminars with the Ministry of Finance, State Procurement Agency, Chamber of Accounts, Anti-Corruption Directorate and Presidential Administration. The main focus of the dialogue was the follow-up to the successful PEFA exercise (published December 2014): discussions and input on the subsequent PFM action plan (2015-2017) adopted in April 2015 as well as a dialogue on how to further support the government in this key governance area. This achievement builds on the joint advocacy work if the three key donors in this domain (EU, WB, SECO). Enhanced coordination is being explicitly requested by the Ministry of Finance and could amongst others be achieved by the on-going discussions with SECO to co-finance EU-funded PFM support actions through the AAP 2016.

In this context, comment specifically on the objectives in the Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2016-2020 that you chose to raise in the policy dialogue Policy dialogue was initiated also with the State Committee for Women, Family and Children to identify priorities for the next cycle 2016-2020. Initial discussions resulted in the prioritization for support in addressing the issue of domestic violence. This element will be further elaborated in the AAP 2016."

(EAMR Azerbaijan, 2015, p. 4-6)

In Georgia:

"As stated in the answers to questions 3 and 4 below, the policy dialogue is at satisfactory level (...) These developments lead to the perspective for 2016, that the EU Delegation will be actively involved in policy dialogue over the livelihood action plan (5th tranche to be monitored), (...) The policy dialogue in the field of Public finance policy and management was vital during the reporting period and thus able to account for the following main achievements: (i) amending the law on State Audit (Article 35), thus limiting the excessive oversight function of the temporary commission of the Parliament over the SAO, (ii) fiscal consolidation by integrating accounts of municipalities and Legal Entities of Public Law under the State Treasury System (iii) improved accountability by creating WG for follow up of SAO and Parliament recommendations and (iv) preparing Citizen's guide to the budget for 2015 and 2016 years. (...) In the sector of regional development, the policy dialogue yielded as main achievements for 2015 the following: (i) adoption of the law on mountainous regions that grants significant social and financial benefits for physical and legal persons living and operating in rural mountainous areas (1/3 of settlements of Georgia), (ii) approval of the guidelines for applying for financing from the Regional Development Fund for municipalities towards ensuring the alignment of municipal budget priorities with strategies of regions as well as (iii) MRDI Regional Development Plan for 2014-2017 years. (...)" (EAMR Georgia, 2015, p. 4-11)

"Justice sector remains one of the strongest points of policy interaction of the Delegation vis-à-vis the government. Not only for the level of financial support but also for its relevance. The finalisation of the current budget support operation and the preparation of a new one provided the opportunity to deepen the already existing policy dialogue. The area of Public Finance Reform is another of the main areas of support of the Delegation. In this area also the preparation of a Sector Policy Reform Programme that will start in 2014 has provided for the opportunity for strong engagement with the government at policy level." (EAMR Georgia 2013, 3-4);

In Moldova “*Policy Dialogue is continuing on in all the sectors where the EU Delegation is providing Budget Support or plans to provide it (Health, Environment, Energy, Rural Development, Justice, Education, Visa Dialogue).*” (EAMR Moldova 2013, 2);

The main exceptions have been found in:

- Syria due to the conflict situation “*Following the outbreak of the conflict and the subsequent suspension of bilateral aid to the Syrian Government in May 2011 there has been no policy dialogue with the GoS. Any contact with the government with regard to operations has been at a technical level in order to facilitate the closure of existing projects.*” (EAMR Syria 2013, 4). “*Following the outbreak of the conflict and the subsequent suspension of bilateral aid to the Syrian regime in May 2011 there has been no official policy dialogue with the Syrian regime (just regular visits from the Chargé d’affaires).* (EAMR Syria, 2015, p.4)
- Belarus: “*The Delegation does not have any structured and formalised policy dialogue with the authorities with regards to specific areas on development cooperation. Still, dialogue on policy matters is discussed with the line ministries that relate to the focal sectors of EU assistance. This does not only include discussions on ongoing reforms, but also about future interventions, e.g. discussions with Ministries of Environment, Education, Labour and Social Protection.*” (EAMR Belarus, 2015, p. 3)

The EU has also encountered challenges in specific countries/sectors that has hampered policy dialogue and cooperation. Main obstacles appear to be political changes and unrest, weak capacity, government’s reluctance and lack of political will:

In Egypt “*During the months of turmoil, forced change of government and violent confrontation, this dialogue had to be increasingly limited.*” (EAMR Egypt 2013, 3);

In Jordan “*One topic which was not accepted by the Government of Jordan to be subject of a dialogue was a strategic response to the presence of Syrian Refugees in the country as regards their participation in the labour market and TVET.*” (EAMR Jordan 2013, 3-4);

In Morocco « (...) *la Loi sur la violence à l’égard des femmes n’a pas encore fait l’objet d’un dépôt par le Gouvernement au Parlement, ni d’une publication par le Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement. En effet, est observé un certain retard dans les réformes législatives prévues dans le secteur (Loi concernant la violence à l’égard des femmes, réforme des Codes Pénal et de Procédure Pénale, etc.) et un certain raidissement dans les messages passés par la Présidence de gouvernement traduisant le renforcement d’un contexte sociétal défavorable à l’instauration de l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes dans le pays* » (EAMR Morocco, 2015, p. 5-9)

In Ukraine: “*The Ukrainian authorities proved rather reluctant partners in engaging in high-level sectoral policy dialogue. Ukrainian ministers seem to see sectoral policy dialogue as a favour to the EU and not really a priority for them personally. Despite repeated requests only two such meetings were held (transport and technical barriers to trade) prior to the Vilnius volte face; since then it has not been possible to organise any high-level sectoral policy dialogue.*” (EAMR Ukraine 2013, 2-4);

In West Bank and Gaza Strip “*Although policy dialogue in a formal sense including the various Sub-Committees established under the ENP increased, the quality of the day to day dialogue with the PA reduced in most sectors [...] Regarding East Jerusalem, dialogue continues to be framed within the joint committee between the EU and the office of the President of the PLO. Exchanges aim at focusing the priorities areas for intervention but dialogue remains politicise with a clear wish from the authorities to intervene in the selection of the beneficiaries.*” (EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip 2013, 6-9).

In some countries, crisis or weak institutional capacity of governments and CSOs as well as control and restrictions imposed by national authorities on NGOs have undermined the EU’s capacity to engage in policy dialogue and involve CSOs in the preparing, implementation and follow-up of ENI programmes:

In Algeria: « *Un thème de discussion récurrent pendant l’année a été la société civile et les difficultés auxquelles les associations se voient confrontées suite à l’entrée en vigueur de la loi de 2012 qui demande un agrément pour pouvoir opérer. Nos demandes n’ont pas eu de réponse de la part des autorités algériennes, et les associations doivent trouver des solutions pratiques qui leur permettent de surmonter les difficultés auxquelles elles sont confrontées du point de vue légal.*

(EAMR Algeria 2015, p. 4-6)

In Armenia: “*The second obstacle encountered is one already identified in previous EAMRs, i.e. the weak government capacity to oversee and coordinate EU assistance [...] This weakness has to be*

added to the also weak capacity of local civil society to implement EU projects with full respect to our operational and financial procedures.” (EAMR Armenia 2013, 8-10);

In Israel “Even though in the reporting period the draft legislation that would negatively affect NGO funding was not adopted, the climate towards the activities of NGOs and their donors in the field of human rights and conflict resolution remains hostile in significant sectors of the media and the political world. The EU is often singled out in this regard.” (EAMR Israel 2013, 4);

In Libya “Constraints on mobility resulting from the security context severely limited the possibilities to make visits and for the EUD to monitor project outside of Tripoli, and even movements within the city for meetings with national authorities and project partners were affected by the need to use armoured vehicles and move in convoy.” (EAMR Libya 2013, 4-5),

In West Bank and Gaza strip “The major obstacles 2013 were the weakening operational and dialogue Palestinian capacities due to the unstable political situation, the fiscal crisis and the continuing regime of restriction of movement and access imposed by the Government of Israel [...]. Denial of permits for West Bankers working on EU projects has also negatively affected the capacity of NGOs to implement EU projects in Jerusalem [...]” (EAMR West Bank and Gaza strip 2013, 9-10).

Cooperation with Local Authorities (LAs) are also mentioned but only in a few cases (Algeria, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia) and some of them are challenging.

For instance, in Algeria relations with LAs are restricted by the government “Compte tenu de la grande centralisation de la gouvernance en Algérie et des difficultés soulevés par le Ministère de l'Intérieur à ce sujet, les relations avec les autorités locales sont très réduites actuellement. La Délégation essaye depuis quelques mois d'intensifier les contacts avec des administrations communales et de démarrer quelques actions initiales.” (EAMR Algeria 2013, 8-9).

Most EAMRs refer to CSOs but the participation of LAs in EU-funded programmes is covered to a much lesser extent and with exceptions and difficulties e.g. “One Call for Proposals was organised which resulted in 5 grants (4 for CSO and one for LA). It is clear that LAs have major problems in applying in English, which is probably the explanation why the number of applications is limited.” (EAMR Belarus 2015, 4-5); “Due to the absence of an actual decentralization process in Egypt, LA Programme has not yet been implemented in Egypt.” (EAMR Egypt 2015, 9-11); “L'instrument thématique OSC-AL 2015 n'a concerné que les OSC en 2015, la Délégation ayant préféré ne pas faire d'appel à propositions pour les autorités locales en raison des échéances électorales de l'automne 2015” (EAMR Morocco 2015, 13); “Organisations de la Société Civile et Autorités Locales: en l'attente d'élections locales qui permettront d'élire et mettre en place des autorités locales légitimes et redevables (prévues fin 2016-début 2017), le choix a été fait par la Délégation de renoncer aux 600.000 euros prévus sur l'allocation 2014 pour lancer un AAP en faveur des AL.” (EAMR Tunisia 2015, 6-7); “Local Authorities have not been targeted by the call as they benefit from the Municipal Development Programme funded under the SSF framework.” (EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip 2015, 26-27). Yet, a good example of participation of LAs under the CSO/LA thematic programme can be found in Ukraine “The 2 mio euros LA 2014 country allocation was contracted in 2015 for 2 projects, to complement the regional development and decentralisation programmes in ensuring an active role of LA in the decentralisation process, in particular for the implementation of the reforms of local budget (with the association of Ukrainian cities) and of administrative services, building on the achievements of the 13 projects funded under NSA-LA 2012. (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 12-13).

At regional strategy level, the dialogue has usually been active with the Southern partners. “Consequently the programming work is more complicated, it needs more dialogue and consultation, but the approach is more consensual” (EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, activities and results 2007-13). Since the establishment of the Eastern Partnership, the organisation of the consultation process has improved in the East: “Flagship Initiatives in the Eastern Partnership: thematic platforms for dialogue and action. The EaP 'SME panel' is a policy forum grouping EU institutions, MS and partner countries to discuss regularly about SME policy, measure progress of implementation of the Small Business Act (according to EU benchmarks), agree on a SME flagship strategy which sets objectives for EU-partner countries cooperation and define indicators of achievement. EU-funded projects report progress in the panel, which meets 3-4 times a year. The EaP 'IBM panel' is an equivalent forum dedicated to integrated border management. A project led by FRONTEX, the EU agency, provides regional capacity building and reports to the panel, allowing good coordination between the policy and the different initiatives and projects.” ( Working Group on Financial Instruments – Summary of recommendations, Ref. Ares(2015)2364053 – 05/06/2015, p 3). However, in both regions, for reasons already indicated, “At country level, priorities sometimes differed from those of regional cooperation, leading to weak support from some countries” (EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, activities and results 2007-13. p 63)

Box 1 *Dialogue and consultation with the Civil Society and national authorities: The Case of Tunisia*

Policy Dialogue:

« Globalement, le dialogue avec le Coordonnateur national (Ministère du Développement, de l'Investissement et de la Coopération internationale – MDICI) sur l'ensemble des domaines de la coopération technique et financière est très régulier et satisfaisant. Des réglages sont à trouver avec le nouveau Directeur général de la Coopération euro-méditerranéenne qui peine à trouver sa place auprès du nouveau Ministre, issu du secteur privé et travaillant avec les collaborateurs de son cabinet uniquement, coupé de son administration. Les méthodes de travail nouvelles mises en place par le Ministre sont en partie responsables des retards importants pris dans la préparation du nouveau plan stratégique 2016-2020, qui n'est toujours pas chiffré à ce jour et comporte trop de priorités sans réel fil conducteur. L'ensemble des bailleurs actifs font le même constat (...) Un Comité d'Association a eu lieu le 16 décembre 2015 ainsi que 7 sous-comités. Le personnel opérationnel s'est fortement impliqué dans la préparation (briefings, organisation de réunions de consultation avec la société civile) et la tenue de ces sous-comités (rédaction de comptes rendus des réunions avec la société civile et conclusions opérationnelles des sous-comités). Un dialogue structuré s'est poursuivi tout au long de l'année avec la société civile, dans le cadre de la feuille de route pour l'engagement avec la société civile adoptée. » (EAMR Tunisia, 2015, p. 3-4)

« Globalement, le dialogue avec le Coordonnateur national (Ministère du Développement et de la Coopération internationale – MDICI) sur l'ensemble des domaines de la coopération technique et financière est très régulier et de bonne qualité. Les interactions avec les principaux ministères sectoriels sont très nombreuses, tant de manière formelle qu'informelle. Le dialogue sur les politiques sectorielles (qualité, intensité) est également satisfaisant. Concernant l'appui budgétaire, les progrès pour arriver aux objectifs fixés et résultats attendus ont été obtenus grâce à l'excellente coordination menée par le MDICI, notamment pour les aspects relatifs à la gouvernance démocratique contenus dans le programme PAR3. Un Comité d'Association a eu lieu en avril 2014. 2014 a également vu la relance du dialogue politique et technique dans le cadre des sous-comités, dont certains ne s'étaient pas réunis depuis la Révolution. Le personnel opérationnel s'est fortement impliqué dans la préparation (briefings, organisation de réunions de consultation avec la société civile) et la tenue de ces sous-comités (rédaction de comptes rendus des réunions avec la société civile et conclusions opérationnelles des sous-comités). Un dialogue structuré s'est poursuivi tout au long de l'année avec la société civile, qui a abouti notamment à l'adoption d'une feuille de route pour l'engagement avec la société civile.

Consultation of Civil Society:

« L'UE dialogue avec la société civile aux différentes étapes du cycle de programmation avec une augmentation du nombre et de la qualité des consultations en 2014. Lors de l'identification et de la formulation des projets, les gestionnaires de programmes et experts sont amenés à aller à la rencontre des bénéficiaires finaux pour identifier les besoins au niveau des régions. L'implication de la société civile dans la formulation et la mise en oeuvre de programmes de coopération bilatéraux est de plus en plus la règle, avec notamment l'insertion d'une composante appels à propositions en faveur de celle-ci. » (...)

« Les consultations avec la société civile se sont accélérées en 2014 et ont permis d'établir la feuille de route pour l'engagement avec la société civile de l'UE pour la période 2014-2017. Ce document, approuvé par les Ambassadeurs de l'UE en décembre 2014, est notamment basé sur les résultats de la « mission d'appui à l'amélioration de l'environnement institutionnel et légal des organisations de la société civile tunisienne » financée par l'Union européenne en 2013/2014. Il a été élaboré par la Délégation de l'Union européenne et les Etats membres, en consultation avec la société civile, les partenaires techniques et financiers et le gouvernement tunisien. Les priorités de la feuille de route sont les suivantes: renforcement des capacités techniques, de gestion et de structuration des organisations de la société civile; mise en place d'un environnement favorable à l'action de la société civile; renforcement de la participation effective des OSC au dialogue politique et aux politiques nationales et locales et renforcement de la coordination effective entre OSC et PTF. »

The following table provides the detail of this consultation process:

Q2.Dialogue avec les organisations de la société civile et les autorités locales	
Combien de projets promeuvent un dialogue structuré entre les organisations de la société civile/les autorités locales et le gouvernement ou les institutions européennes?	2
Combien de réunions la délégation a-t-elle organisées avec des représentants d'organisations de la société civile/d'autorités locales?	383
- Sessions informelles	331
- Consultations	24
- Dialogues politiques	17
- Sessions d'information	11
Combien de personnes ont assisté à ces réunions au total?	1,718
Combien de projets en cours ont pour objectif d'inclure les organisations de la société civile et les autorités locales dans la formulation des politiques nationales?	2

Source: EC (2015) *Rapport de gestion de l'aide extérieure: 01/01/2014 – 31/12/2014 Tunisie*, p 4,6, 11, 12, 14

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – DG NEAR, EEAS

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

#### 1.1.4 I-114. Degree of alignment required in the ENI strategy and programming guidelines with corresponding national or local strategies and measures of partner countries {[17]}

### Global analysis of the indicator

Indicator I-114 is linked with indicators I-111 and I-113 as they refer to consultation, agreement on joint objectives and alignment with cooperation partners. Here we analyse the available documents in order to provide an assessment on the degree of alignment of the ENI support to national strategies of the beneficiary countries

The preamble of the ENI Regulation states:“( 17) Union support under this Regulation should in principle be aligned to corresponding national or local strategies and measures of partner countries and, where relevant, also to those of the Russian Federation.” The available reporting documents make explicit and multiple references to a consultative process and to the correspondence and alignment with partner countries’ needs and strategies. According to these documents, the EU is fully engaged in policy dialogue based on country priorities and needs thus ensuring common objectives and ownership. On-going bilateral dialogue between the EU and national governments is held so that ENI programmes can be aligned with country priorities. Focal sectors selected in each country are usually the result of both formal and informal negotiations with national authorities. However, precise references on the alignment process to national strategies are rarely provided. In critical issues, available information indicates that, while ENI objectives have been relevant and aligned on target groups needs, European and partner country priorities may not converge (migration).

### Presentation of collected proof

*Egypt Field Report:Correspondence of the ENI objectives (Art.1 & 2) with partner country’s own priorities:* GoE after the Military Coup of 2013 does not respect HRs and fundamental freedoms in its fight against HR defenders (associated to the destabilization of the government in 2011) on one hand, and Salafist organizations on the other hand (Muslim brotherhood). ENI related key objective 22a is con-

tradicting GoE security strategy. 22b is mainly focused on sectoral reforms (energy and watsan), with limited progress in implementing trade aspects of the AA. GoE is facing currency shortage and is engaging protection measures rather than market integration and alignment on EU rules and standards.

#### Egypt Field Report

*Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, (...)*<sup>4</sup>: GoE after the Military Coup of 2013 does not respect HRs and fundamental freedoms in its fight against HR defenders (associated to the destabilization of the government in 2011) on one hand, and Salafist organizations on the other hand (Muslim brotherhood). ENI related key objective 22a is contradicting GoE security strategy.

#### Analysis EAMRs 2013-2014-2015:

Overall, most EUDs are involved in intense policy dialogue with governments in order to prioritise sectors and ensure alignment with national strategies. That said EAMRs 2014 and 2015 provide several/more cases where countries specifically refer to policy alignment to partner country priorities and needs. E.g.: Georgia, Morocco, Ukraine and Palestine in 2014; Azerbaijan, Georgia, Algeria, Morocco and Palestine in 2015.

Reporting documents made multiple references to the alignment on partner country needs, at overall and countries level. However specific or precise reference on the alignment process to National Strategies are very rarely provided. For instance:

Overall East: *“The projects reviewed respond, in an articulated and diversified way, to the needs of their target groups and are well aligned to EU priorities. With the exception of a small number of projects dealing with human rights issues, they also respond, to different degrees, to the priorities found in national strategies and plans.”*

Particip (2016) , ROM ENI CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL REPORT – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 37

In Azerbaijan *“Partly through continuous policy dialogue with the government (through projects or directly), the EU has achieved a strong convergence of views among key government interlocutors such as the Ministry of Economy and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture on the importance and urgency to support and transform the agricultural sector (and related (agri-food) industry) in the country as a way to sustainably diversify the economy and enhance its competitiveness.”* (EAMR Azerbaijan 2015, 4-6);

In Georgia *“Concerning DCFTA/SME Budget Support it has to be stated that this is the main programme in support of the EU-Georgia agreement-driven agenda [...] The programme is in line with relevant chapters of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement and Association Agenda for the next years. It also supports the Georgian National Socio-economic Development Strategy (Georgia 2020) and the newly elaborated SME Strategy 2016-2020.”* (EAMR Georgia 2015, 4-11). And: *“Georgia / Relevance. The projects respond to the needs of their target groups in the different sectors and are in line with EU priorities and to priorities set by national strategies and plans.”* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 78).

In Armenia: *“The projects respond to the needs of their target groups and are in line with EU priorities and to priorities set by national strategies and plans, with a couple of exceptions, which are financed under the Civil Society Facility.”* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 71)

In Belarus: *“All projects respond to the needs of their target groups and are aligned to the country’s policies and strategies.”* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 75)

In Moldova: *“The projects respond to the needs of their target groups, and are in line with EU and national strategies and plans”* (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 81)

In Algeria: *“Les secteurs prioritaire d’aide Financière sont: Gouvernance et Justice, Emploi et Diversification économique. Ces secteurs s’alignent sur les objectifs politiques de la nouvelle PEV (promotion de l’Etat de droit, développement économique et social inclusif et création de perspective d’emploi*

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<sup>4</sup> Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, principles of equality and the fight against discrimination in all its forms, establishing deep and sustainable democracy, promoting good governance, fighting corruption, strengthening institutional capacity at all levels and developing a thriving civil society including social partners.

*pour les jeunes*). (EAMR Algeria 2015, 4-6). And: “Algeria /Relevance: *Although the reviewed projects corresponded to the needs of target groups and institutions, the relevance of nearly half of them was affected by an inadequate degree of readiness of the beneficiaries to implement their projects.*” (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 42)

In Egypt: “*All programmes, except the rural development decision, are considered as highly relevant. They cover the much needed institutional reform (SAAP III), the upgrading and formalisation of poor periurban areas in Cairo, emergency employment to relieve the impact of the economic crisis on the poorest part of the population (even though it does not create sustainable employment), and the creation and sharing of regional knowledge on systemic approaches to water resources management. The rural development programme is not judged well on relevance as it is over-ambitious with unrealistically optimistic timeframes*” (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 44)

In Tunisia: “*The relevance of all four projects was positively assessed by ROM experts. Responsiveness to the needs of the target groups and alignment to in-country priorities are high as is the degree of ownership among involved stakeholders. The objectives of the three projects designed before the revolution remained unchanged, showing an effective continuity in the assessment of the country’s needs in the areas of intervention of the projects. The fourth project (D-23202: support to the development of disadvantaged areas) was designed specifically to respond to the needs of poorer southern regions where the revolution started. Overall, the four projects focus on two of the country’s major challenges, economic development as a means to reduce youth unemployment and urban infrastructure, overstretched by rapidly expanding cities. Minor design weaknesses are highlighted in some of the reviews (weak indicators of achievement and lack of sex-disaggregation), but this does not affect the overall validity and soundness of the applied intervention logic which remains high.*” (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 61)

In the case of Jordan, there is one specific mention of alignment “*At the Bilateral cooperation level, Policy Dialogue and alignment to National Strategies are conducted under the two ongoing projects on renewable energy and energy efficiency comprising a supply project of wind and solar facilities; and a sector budget support programme.*” (EAMR Jordan 2013, 3-4).

At the regional level South,, “*the SWIM-SM responded to the partner countries’ effective needs linked to their national priorities and/or constraints, and the project interventions focused on specific thematic issues corresponding to specific parts of the chapters of the Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean (SWM).* (B&S EUROPE (2015), Final Evaluation of the SWIM programme Framework contract No. 2014/345939/1 , Final Report, 19, February 2015, p5)

In critical sectors, monitoring reports confirm the alignment on target groups needs and indicate that they may differ from government priorities. Examples include:

Democratic Participation and Civil Society Sector: “*Relevance / Responsiveness to needs of target groups is high. Projects are particularly strong with respect to relevance and respond to the actual needs of their target groups in an articulated and diversified manner.*” (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 7)

Human Rights / Relevance: “*All projects reviewed address aspects of the highest relevance for beneficiaries, target groups and EU policy. Due to their nature, they often clash with National Policy priorities of the different countries despite formal declarations in favour of Human Rights (HRs) and signature of UN conventions.*” (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI consolidated annual report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 20)

In Ukraine: “*All projects are well aligned to EU policies and priorities and show a high degree of responsiveness to the needs of the sector and of their target groups (though with some caveats in the justice project). The strength of local ownership and responsiveness to country needs is particularly high for the regional development project. Conversely the other two ROM reviews identify some weaknesses linked to the low degree of political will and of commitment to the justice reform process by the national authorities (D-21849)” (Particip (2016) , ROM ENI CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL REPORT – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 85).*

In exceptional case, a divergence between European and partner country priorities is indicated:

Migrations: “*The identification of needs in a partner country also depends on the country’s prioritisation of and commitment to migration management. For many Neighbourhood countries, however, particularly in the south, it has not been a priority. Reluctance to engage constructively with the EU in this domain hinders the identification of needs, especially given the partner countries’ perception that some actions were primarily intended for the EU’s benefit. An example of this was the lack of success in signing up north African countries to the Seahorse Mediterranean border surveillance network. Simi-*



larly, the project of an 'interactive map on irregular migration routes and flows in Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean region' (I-Map) (0.7 million euro), aiming to support migration dialogue processes and facilitate the exchange of information, has been criticised by some partner countries for being of more benefit to the EU and its Member States than to non-EU countries. According to the data available in July 2014, only 6 % of a total of 668 system users were Neighbourhood countries, while the principal users were EU Member States (50 %), followed by the Commission and the EU agencies (30 %).” (European Court of Auditors (2016), EU external migration spending in Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbourhood countries until 2014, p 20)



However, as previously analysed in Indicator 1.1.1, the alignment issue has been partly “diluted” in the large number of priorities of the ENI strategy. For any country, it may be difficult not to find its own Development objectives within the huge list of ENI priorities.

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; Field Reports.

Interviews – DG NEAR, EEAS, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

Whereas information provided in the documentation indicates that the ENI programming has been aligned on partner countries' strategies and needs, specific mention on alignment have been sporadic and there may be some limitations that the evaluation team could not detect. More accurate/precise information have been collected during the Field visit and with the EUD interviews and are provided in the parallel indicator I-123.

### 1.1.5 I-115. Level of coherence of ENI strategy and implementation guidelines with the objectives and principles of the Union's external policies and, in particular, its development policy and the common foreign and security policy (Art. 1).

#### Global analysis of the indicator

Complementary information on this issue is provided in Indicators I-241 and I-523.

The programming instructions 2014-2020 do not provide a complete picture of the EU policy priorities listed in the preamble of the ENI regulation:

- Mitigation and adaptation to climate change {[19]}
- Gender equality {[21]}
- Rights of persons belonging to minorities {[21]}
- Fight against discrimination and inequalities {[21]}
- Promotion of decent work and social justice {[22]}
- Ratification and implementation of internationally recognised labour standards, including the eradication of child labour {[22]}
- Ratification and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements {[22]}.

The programming instructions express a limited understanding of cross-cutting issues, in particular gender and environment/climate change. Indications on how the EU policy priorities will be integrated into ENI programmes are not presented in bilateral programming documents.

The EAMR analysis 2013-2014-2015 shows that EU policy priorities have been poorly addressed in 2014, particularly in Moldova, Morocco, Georgia and Ukraine, compared to 2013 and 2015. In 2015 there has been a specific focus on gender issues (mainly because EAMRs contain a subheading within the policy dialogue section referring to “the objectives in the Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2016-2020”). In this regard, all countries seem to either mainstream gender equality through ENI interventions or implement specific programmes to deal with gender issues with the exception of Belarus. The environment policy priority received a wider coverage in 2013 (8 countries). Specific mentions of climate change are rare; only one example is found in Armenia in 2015. New priorities emerged in 2014 and 2015 that were not so formally identified in 2013: minority rights and fight against discrimination and inequalities.

Information provided by the EC Statistical Dashboard confirms that there has been a divide in the way EU objectives have been addressed. The cross-cutting issues belonging to the 2011/2014 ENP-ENI priorities such as Gender issues as well as the Democracy/Governance objectives have been significantly addressed; While the climate change/environment nexus, which is not at the core of the ENP-ENI objectives list, has not been addressed extensively. Even though Rio markers indicate that more than 20% of the overall amounts committed through ENI target environment and climate change as main or significant objectives, the level of priority given to this issues has not changed significantly between ENPI and ENI (interviews at HQ).

In addition, in all the four field visits, CSOs and, in most cases, national authorities, have acknowledged a strong EC commitment towards gender equality and minority rights, and overall on Human Rights promotion and fight against discrimination, whereas the environment/climate dimension is far less mentioned.

### Presentation of collected proof


*“EU policy priorities are poorly addressed in 2014, particularly in Moldova, Morocco, Georgia and Ukraine, compared to 2013 and 2015, where such priorities are the focus of more robust attention. In 2015 there is an increase of gender issues mainly because EAMRs contain a subheading within the policy dialogue section referring to “the objectives in the Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2016-2020”. In this regard, all countries seem to either mainstream gender equality through ENI interventions or implement specific programmes to deal with gender issues with the exception of Belarus. The environment policy priority received wider coverage in 2013 (8 countries) than in 2014 (2 countries) and 2015 (4 countries). It has to be noted specific mentions of climate change are rare; only one example is found in Armenia in 2015, though it could be indirectly referenced in the part concerning countries dealing with energy interventions. In 2014 and 2015 new priorities emerged that were not identified in 2013: right of persons belonging to minorities and fight against discrimination and inequalities.”* Analysis EAMRs 2013-2014-2015:

Table 2 Overview of ENI commitments and disbursements 2014-2015 per sector in mio EUR

Code	Sector	Commitments	%	Disbursements	%
110	Education	481,29	10,1%	499,14	15,0%
120	Health	107,00	2,3%	57,61	1,7%
140	Water And Sanitation	91,00	1,9%	121,74	3,7%
150	Government And Civil Society	906,72	19,1%	614,49	18,5%
160	Other Social Infrastructure And Services	459,54	9,7%	534,13	16,1%
210	Transport And Storage	9,01	0,2%	48,15	1,4%
220	Communication	13,00	0,3%	16,35	0,5%
230	Energy Generation And Supply	74,40	1,6%	94,60	2,8%
250	Business And Other Services	55,00	1,2%	15,94	0,5%
310	Agriculture, Forestry And Fishing	89,50	1,9%	114,64	3,4%
320	Industry, Mining And Construction	135,78	2,9%	101,13	3,0%
330	Trade And Tourism	181,68	3,8%	53,93	1,6%
410	General Environmental Protection	69,10	1,5%	48,63	1,5%
430	Other Multisector	1.294,57	27,2%	211,61	6,4%
	<i>Multisector aid</i>	<i>1.183,94</i>		<i>129,40</i>	
	<i>Urban development and management</i>	<i>60,63</i>		<i>54,23</i>	
	<i>Rural development</i>	<i>50,00</i>		<i>15,93</i>	
	<i>Research/scientific institutions</i>	<i>0,00</i>		<i>9,78</i>	
510	General Budget Support	412,00	8,7%	447,53	13,4%
720	Emergency Response	189,01	4,0%	191,96	5,8%
730	Reconstruction Relief And Rehabilitation	44,02	0,9%	21,62	0,6%
910	Administrative Costs Of Donors	107,32	2,3%	108,92	3,3%
998	Unallocated/ Unspecified	31,60	0,7%	27,90	0,8%


Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

Figure 3 Climate Change Mitigation Marker for ENI commitments (2014-2015)




Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

Figure 4 Combat Desertification Marker for ENI commitments (2014-2015)




Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

Figure 5 Participatory Democracy Marker for ENI commitments (2014-2015)




Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

Figure 6 Gender Equality Marker for ENI commitments (2014-2015)




Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

Figure 7 Aid to Environment Marker for ENI commitments (2014-2015)




Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

Figure 8 Biological Diversity Marker for ENI commitments (2014-2015)



Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

Figure 9 Climate Change Adaptation Marker for ENI commitments (2014-2015)





Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EC Statistical Dashboard ; EAMRs

Interviews – Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Satisfactory
Degree of confidence		Satisfactory

## 1.2 JC12: The ENI objectives and design are still congruent with (i) EU priorities emerging from the 2015 ENP Review such as stabilisation and (ii) partner country priorities resulting from the evolving global and regional challenges (2016-2017)

### 1.2.1 I-121. Degree of consistency of ENI programming documents and related interventions with the ENP policy framework, agreements signed with partner countries and jointly agreed objectives, including under the Action Plans or equivalent documents such as Association Agendas, and with conclusions/recommendations of ENP Progress Reports {Art. 3}

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The indicator is related to the implementation of the priorities of the 2015 (18 November) ENP Review at the programming and intervention levels. The approach has changed: “*The EU proposes to start a new phase of engagement with partners in 2016*” (p. 4); “*There will no longer be a single set of progress reports on all countries simultaneously. Instead the EU will seek to develop a new style of assessment, focusing specifically on meeting the goals agreed with partners*” (p. 5). Since then little programming documents have been produced. Methodological and priority changes could be illustrated by the Jordan and Lebanon Partnership Priorities Compacts and the update on Instructions for the Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)- 2014-2020. As 2016 is a year of transition (“*Over the course of 2016, we intend to discuss the proposals contained in this Joint Communication, as well as subsequent positions taken by the EU, with partner countries, with a view to jointly determine the shape of our future relations, based on the recommendations outlined in this Joint Communication*”, p. 21), information provided below concerns mainly the internal consistency of the new policy guidelines.

Available evidence and inputs from the interviews of EUD and from the field phase show that New Priorities Papers (the compacts) are coherent with the renewed ENP priorities, as well

as with the focus approach. However they are still at the approval stage.

Multiple interviews at DG NEAR and EEAS confirm that priorities on Security, Stabilization, Differentiation and Ownership have been fully internalized by EC officials at the HQ. Nevertheless, information collected at the field level, through EUD interviews and Field work, indicates that EUDs have not always internalized the new set of priorities and the new approach. For many EUD staff, ENI is a continuation of ENPI. In addition, a difficulty often indicated at field level is the focus on three sectors, which limits the scope of cooperation with the PC. In the case of Tunisia for example, the EUD has not really modified its approach since the 2015 ENP Review. The priorities in the country have remained the same since 2011 and they have been confirmed at various discussions/assessments.

Overall, in the less cooperative partner countries, certain objectives seem to be difficult to target openly, while in the more cooperative countries, where AAs and DCFTA have been signed, implementation of these agreements provides their own “feuille de route” and they represent a superior legal framework. Both cases weaken the consistency with the new ENP priorities.

### Presentation of collected proof

New Priorities Papers are coherent with the renewed ENP priorities, as well as with the focus approach. The “Jordan compact”, EU-Jordan "Partnership Priorities proposal dated 19/9/16, presents its priorities as follow:

*(...) i) The EU and Jordan are solid partners in foreign and security policy. Strategic and operational cooperation will be pursued bilaterally as well as in multilateral fora, regionally including through the co-presidencies of the UfM. (;;;)*

*ii) The second priority focuses on sustaining Jordan’s macro-economic stability and enhancing Jordan’s social and economic development in line with "Jordan 2025 – National Vision and Strategy", in addition to enhancing Jordan’s resilience to deal with the impact of the Syrian crisis and regional instability. (...)*

*(iii) “Strongly linked to these two priorities, the third partnership priority focuses on supporting efforts by Jordan to strengthen governance, the rule of law, democratic reform and human rights.”*

*The list of sector/field of intervention is as follow:*

14. EU-Jordan trade facilitation in view of enhancing investments, export, job opportunities including for Syrian refugees
15. Promoting macro-economic stability, smart and sustainable growth
16. Improving an environment conducive to private sector development, innovation and job creation
17. Quality Education for Social Inclusion and Development
18. Sustainable use and management of natural resources
19. Stability and Security, including Countering Terrorism, Preventing Radicalisation and Violent Extremism
20. Mobility and Migration
21. Justice and political reform, democratic elections and human rights”

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The proposal EU-Lebanon "Partnership Priorities" list has been as well aligned on the new orientation:

*“The main political priorities identified in EU-Lebanon relations for the coming years are:*

- *Security and Countering Terrorism*
- *Governance and Rule of Law*
- *Fostering Growth and Job Opportunities*
- *Migration and mobility.”*

EU-Lebanon Partnership Priority List

The 2015 ENP Review had been necessary because of *“(...) the need for a new approach, a re-prioritisation and an introduction of new ways of working.”* (3<sup>rd</sup> line, page 1). However, while emphasis may differ for certain sectors (such as security and migration), the comparison of priorities listed by ENP 2011 and 2015 finds more or less the same activities. In both cases the number of priorities is very substantial and these long lists do not provide a clear hierarchy of expectations (see table below; and Indicator 1.1.1.

Table 3 Comparison of priorities listed in the 2011 and 2015 Communications

Priorities of the 2011 Policy framework	Priorities listed in the 2015 ENP Review
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To Support Progress Towards Deep Democracy:</li> <li>• Adapt support to partners according to progress on political reforms;</li> <li>• Partnering with the civil society;</li> <li>• Intensify political and security co-operation</li> <li>• To Support Sustainable Economic and Social Development:</li> <li>• Sustainable economic growth and job creation;</li> <li>• Strengthening trade ties;</li> <li>• Enhancing sector cooperation;</li> <li>• Migration and mobility.</li> <li>• To build Effective Regional Partnerships within the ENP:</li> <li>• Strengthening the Eastern Partnership;</li> <li>• Building the Partnership in the Southern Mediterranean</li> <li>• A Simplified and Coherent Policy and Programme Framework:</li> <li>• Clearer priorities/stronger political steering</li> <li>• Further funding;</li> <li>• Involving the EIB and EBRD;</li> <li>• Planning for 2013 and beyond</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promotion of Universal values</li> <li>• Differentiation and greater ownership</li> <li>• Stabilisation</li> <li>• Reflect partners' different aspirations and interests</li> <li>• Partnerships focused on fewer priorities</li> <li>• Greater involvement of MS</li> <li>• Commitment to promoting good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights</li> <li>• More effectively promote reforms</li> <li>• More support to civil society</li> <li>• Continuing strong interest in mobility</li> <li>• Focus on Market Access</li> <li>• Support business and investor environment, SMEs, modernisation of existing sectors and diversification</li> <li>• Research, Science and innovation</li> <li>• Agriculture</li> <li>• Focus on Youth</li> <li>• Step up support for Erasmus +</li> <li>• New emphasis on TVET</li> <li>• Develop partnerships to support investment and economic modernisation</li> <li>• Transport and connectivity</li> <li>• Greater involvement of the private sector to boost investment and reform</li> <li>• Aggregate private sector, EU, MS and IFIs to support strategies for growth, jobs or youth</li> <li>• Extension of TNT to the Neighbours</li> <li>• Support energy independence</li> <li>• Increase focus and regional cooperation on security</li> <li>• Increase cooperation beyond the ENP area</li> <li>• Increase support for those receiving and assisting refugees</li> <li>• Facilitate mutually beneficial legal migration, support for circular migration</li> <li>• Flexibility for financial instruments</li> <li>• Better communication and promotion of EU actions in the ENP area</li> </ul>

While an extensive list of “priorities” may offer flexibility in the negotiations with cooperation partners, it may as well be considered as providing imprecise policy guidelines. Our understanding is that what is really key in those policy frameworks are not the actions or outputs but the goal and the approach. In the 2011 framework, the approach focused on Political change for stability and prosperity; Now it focused on Stability and prosperity to support long term progress (including political progress).

Multiple interviews at DG NEAR and EEAS clearly confirm that priorities on Security, Stabilization, Differentiation and Ownership have been fully internalized by EC officials at HQ.

However information collected at the field level, through EUD interviews and Field work, does indicate that EUDs have not always internalized the new set of priorities and the new approach. For many EUD staff, ENI is a continuation of ENPI. In addition, a difficulty often evocated is the focus on three sectors, which limits the scope of cooperation with the PC. Illustrations follow.

*Egypt Field Report: Correspondence of the ENI objectives (Art. 1 & 2) with partner country's own priorities:* GoE after the Military Coup of 2013 does not respect HRs and fundamental freedoms in its fight against HR defenders (associated to the destabilization of the government in 2011) on one hand, and Salafist organizations on the other hand (Muslim brotherhood). ENI related key objective 22a is contradicting GoE security strategy. 22b is mainly focused on sectoral reforms (energy and watsan), with limited progress in implementing trade aspects of the AA. GoE is facing currency shortage and is engaging protection measures rather than market integration and alignment on EU rules and standards.  
(...)

*Promoting confidence-building, good neighbourly relations and other measures contributing to security in all its forms and the prevention and settlement of conflicts, including protracted conflicts:* No correspondence with GoE priorities, no ENPI/ENI related initiative

*Creating conditions for the better organisation of legal migration (...)*<sup>5</sup>: Legal migration and mobility are shared concerns between EU and GoE; they are not high in the share agenda. Illegal migration was not an issue in 2014 (but is on the rise since early 2016).

#### *Tunisia Field Report*

In the post-revolution context in Tunisia, the country's priorities were quite obvious and there was a consensus, and the donors responded rather effectively to them. These responses have included increased budget support interventions. They have been mostly in line with ENI objectives.

#### *Tunisia Field Report*

*The EUD has not fully internalized the new priorities highlighted in the 2015 ENP Review because:*

The EUD has not really modified its approach since the 2015 ENP Review. The priorities in Tunisia have roughly remained the same since 2011 and they have been confirmed at various discussions/assessments:

Economic support, including regional development

Education

Gouvernance (Justice reform, Security, Gender Issues, Support to CSO,..)

#### *Ukraine Field Report*

*EUD has internalized the new priorities highlighted in the 2015 ENP Review and has been able to implement them: The situation in Ukraine is still very critical; nothing has been so far secured, in terms of the wanted radical changes of the State and the Economy; therefore the EU interventions in Ukraine are determined on the basis of responding to the existing acute needs on an ad hoc basis, through Special Measures (the old multi-annual programme 2007-2013 collapsed after the revolution, but the ENPI projects/ programmes which had started before the revolution continue to be implemented today); therefore the new ENP logic is not officially (not even practically) implemented; however, it has been decided that for the period 2018-2020 the ENI assistance will be provided on the basis of a new long term programming, which is now under elaboration; in this new programming the ENP priorities/ logic will be incorporated.*

*ENI programming (as well as ENPI leftovers) has been based on the new needs of the country following the change of the regime; in practice up to now there is no long-term programming in place, but an ad hoc determination and elaboration of ENI funded actions/ programmes on the basis of the existing needs, through Special Measures; these Special Measures address the new strategies and needs of the country.*

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<sup>5</sup> Creating conditions for the better organisation of legal migration and the fostering of well-managed mobility of people, for the implementation of existing or future agreements concluded in line with the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, and for the promotion of people-to- people contacts, in particular in relation to cultural, educational, professional and sporting activities



### Georgia Field Report

2(2)a – *Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, (...)*<sup>6</sup>: GoG is engaged in these areas and has adopted related legislative framework. Justice is supported by a BS.

2(2)b – *Achieving progressive integration into the Union internal market and enhanced sectoral and cross-sectoral cooperation(...)*<sup>7</sup>: Georgia is one of the few Neighbourhood country that negotiated and signed a DCFTA.

2(2)c – *Creating conditions for the better organisation of legal migration (...)*<sup>8</sup>: Visas liberalization was negotiated (but was not finalised).

2(2)d – *Supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive development in all aspects(...)*<sup>9</sup>: ENI programmes have a strong focus on agriculture (BS).

2(2)e – *Promoting confidence-building, good neighbourly relations and other measures contributing to security in all its forms and the prevention and settlement of conflicts, including protracted conflicts*: NA within ENI; however the EU is engaged through a Monitoring Mission for the two secessionist provinces supported by Russia.

2(2)f – *Enhancing sub-regional, regional and European Neighbourhood-wide collaboration as well as cross-border cooperation*: GoG is providing momentum to the EaP and is involved in CBC.

*EUD adjusted the action documents (eg programmes) to ENI objectives*: ENI objectives were superseded by the priorities of the Association Agreement, then more recently to the signature of the DCFTA. ENI framework of priorities is increasingly a remote reference, as AAs and DCFTA are superior legal framework. SSF and action documents are adjusting to AA/DCFTA rather than ENI regulation.

### EUD interview analysis:

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?

Only 4 out of 12 countries (Jordan, Georgia, Egypt and Azerbaijan) see an improvement compared to ENPI before 2014. All highlight that the ENI is more focused on key areas, though on the one hand, according to Jordan, the EU could do better by being more focused and on the other, Azerbaijan points out that this change implies less flexibility in other areas that might need to be covered. Other improvements relate to the existence of specific funding for CSOs (Jordan), better mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues (Georgia) and better relations with PC (Egypt). Ukraine, Belarus and Armenia did not provide any answer due to the lack of experience in the region in previous years and in the early stages of ENI national programmes. The remaining countries of Algeria, Moldova, Morocco, Lebanon and Palestine do not see any difference other than a continuation of ENPI. They see some improvements in gender and climate change (Algeria), migration (Morocco) and PCD and joint programming (Palestine) but did not link this progress to the new instrument.

### EUD interview analysis:

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<sup>6</sup> Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, principles of equality and the fight against discrimination in all its forms, establishing deep and sustainable democracy, promoting good governance, fighting corruption, strengthening institutional capacity at all levels and developing a thriving civil society including social partners.

<sup>7</sup> Achieving progressive integration into the Union internal market and enhanced sectoral and cross-sectoral cooperation, including through legislative approximation and regulatory convergence towards Union and other relevant international standards, and improved market access including through deep and comprehensive free trade areas, related institution-building and investment, particularly in interconnections

<sup>8</sup> Creating conditions for the better organisation of legal migration and the fostering of well-managed mobility of people, for the implementation of existing or future agreements concluded in line with the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, and for the promotion of people-to- people contacts, in particular in relation to cultural, educational, professional and sporting activities

<sup>9</sup> Supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive development in all aspects; reducing poverty, including through private sector development, and reducing social exclusion; promoting capacity-building in science, education and in particular higher education, technology, research and innovation; promoting internal economic, social and territorial cohesion; fostering rural development; promoting public health; and supporting environmental protection, climate action and disaster resilience.

Ten out of 12 countries attest that introducing new EU priorities focusing on migration and security is an additional ENI contribution, although Morocco, Jordan and Egypt only refer to migration-related issues and Moldova states that there were migration programmes before ENI.

Jordan EUD interview: ENP continuity:

*“The EU ensures coherence and look for synergies with the following policies: The first policy and strategy in the country is the ENP. Other policies/EU objectives include: 1. Development policy, for instance one of the focal sectors is energy efficiency; 2. Common foreign and security policy, especially the security dimension is becoming very important (we are looking for more stability); 3. Fight against climate change (one objective is to reduce Jordan import bill (more than 75%) and carbon based-energy as well as to develop natural resources such as wind and solar energy. This is still a challenge for this country; 4. Cross-cutting priorities, mainly gender (political participation of women and participation in the labour market) and youth; 5. International commitments mainly related to human rights issues (e.g. death penalty, CEDAW agreement). Child labour is starting to appear because of the Syrian crisis.”*

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?

1. Aligning on PC priorities and needs; 2. Establishing a balanced relationship with PCs in programming ENI. 3. Including meaningfully the CS into ENI programming. 4. Introducing new EU priorities set on migration and security: especially migration from the refugee crisis point of view the ENI has proven to be very relevant and powerful (e.g. education programmes with Syrian kids) but security is a struggle.

Improvement: we were allowed to have fewer and bigger programmes in the focal sectors which reduce transaction costs and they are more visible and impactful. This is one of the outcomes of the reflection on how to make the instrument more flexible from HQ. We can have for one big action a multi-year budget commitment. 2 examples: 1. energy efficiency and 2. support to solid waste management

EUD Ukraine interview

In what areas the EU delegation was most able to ensure the coherence of ENI strategy with the objectives and principles of the Union's?	We are fully driven by the Association Agreement (DCFTA) and it is fully coherent with the ENI strategy but we are less active in other areas. There is also coherence: 1. Common foreign and security policy; very relevant in Ukraine (we are seeking to complement what we did in terms of stabilisation in the East of the country). 2. Development Policy: in terms of state reforms and institutional enforcement. 3. Fight against climate change: especially related to the energy efficiency sector 3. Cross-cutting priorities. 4. International commitments. 5. Policy coherence for development: I've never been in a situation where there was so much PCD (many line DGs in the country to deal with various topics)	Ukraine does not have a multi-annual programme so as such they do not have focal sectors but main focus is on: governance, rule of law, state reforms (including PFM), economic development, territorial development and energy
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EUD Morocco interview

In what areas the EU delegation was most able to ensure the coherence of ENI strategy with the objectives and principles of the Union's?	1. Common foreign and security policy. 2. Fight against climate change. 3. Cross-cutting priorities: gender and human rights. 4. Policy coherence for development: ENI supports the external dimension of EU external policies. Migration is particularly relevant because Morocco is the only country that has policy to integrate sub-saharan migrants into society. The development policy and the ENI have different objectives so they are not coherent in that sense. The objective of Morocco is not poverty eradication but reduction of inequality
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Lebanon EUD interview

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?	Overall, no. It's a continuation.
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Egypt EUD interview

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	The EU is funding a lot of programmes and making a significant contributions (largest donor) in many areas such as: 1. Rule of law and better governance, 2. Human rights 3. Economic development. 4. Mobility of people and legal migration. 5. Management of irregular migration. But overall progress is not noticeable because of the situation of the country. For instance the human rights situations has worsened. Some progress in: 1. Enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation. 2. Inclusive growth.
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#### Azerbaijan EUD interview

“ENI is more focused compared to ENPI thus it brings better coherence and you can go more in depth. ENPI was more flexible because it could covered almost every request. But in terms of programming, the process (identification, formulation, preparation of the AAP) is more or less the same in both instruments and takes a long time.”

#### Moldova EUD interview

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?	No
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#### European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development in Georgia, phase III (ENPARD Georgia III):

CONCLUSIONS OF THE QUALITY REVIEW MEETING OF 11 MAY 2016	In line with the 2015 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the programme will contribute to developing Georgia's economic resilience, modernisation and diversification, and is coherent with the EU agriculture and rural development sector policy, which is one of the 3 pillars under the Single Support Framework for EU Support to Georgia (SSF 2014-2016). The purpose of ENPARD III is to promote inclusive and sustainable growth and development, creating employment and livelihoods for the poor and excluded. Special measures will help build the resilience of vulnerable people in remote regions, and to promote the economic and social empowerment of rural women. ENPARD III will contribute to the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (AA) for improved competitiveness of agriculture under the DCFTA, the support to agriculture and rural development, the harmonisation of environmental legislation and the improved management of natural resources.
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#### Analysis of Quality Review Documents

Overall, programmes' objectives are aligned with ENI goals to which they will contribute through different means and strategies. Nonetheless, exceptions are scarce but they do exist and in some cases QSG questions how some projects or components are going to be implemented or results achieved. This is the case with the 'north Lebanon local development programme for deprived urban areas' and the 'advancing juvenile and criminal justice' programme in Lebanon. This is also true in Tunisia regarding the 'support programme for education, mobility, research and innovation (EMORI)'. In this case QSG comments from different services refer to the wide range of issues dealt with under this initiative and the subsequent lack of coherence or fragmentation of different components. Still, despite multiple remarks, the programme was finally approved based on the "fewer and bigger" principle. Also, in the case of the 'supporting the strengthening of Tunisia's cultural programme', a request was put in to clarify how the programme is to contribute to freedom of expression, which is certainly a complex and sensitive issue. Expected results in Georgia from the, "The Civil Society Complementary Support Facility" programme are also intangible and general even though the programme plans to support the Georgian National Platform (GNP), results expected are quite vague and general: i) CSO financial sustainability enhanced; ii) CSO accountability improved and iii) CSO capacities strengthened and involvement in policy dialogue. Thus it is difficult to say how they are going to translate into concrete actions to achieve results.

#### Analysis of Quality Review Documents

All programmes refer to a wide range of EU priorities covered under COM 2011 and the ENP Review 2015. In general, EU priorities for both years are quite similar – though in 2015 some issues are covered more broadly and with more individual attention. This is for example the case with 'security' that in the review it is reinforced and given more prominence thus creating new areas of cooperation. This also seems to be the case with migration and mobility.

In Egypt the six projects approved by QSGs in 2015 and 2016 refer mainly to human rights ('citizen rights project', 'advancing women's rights') and economic development ('citizen rights project', 'promoting inclusive economic growth in Egypt', 'upgrading informal areas infrastructures', 'fostering reforms in the Egyptian renewable energy and water sectors through developing capacity-building' and the 'national drainage programme III in the framework of the joint integrated sector approach').

In Georgia, projects reviewed in 2015 and 2016 relate mainly to economic development involving trade, modernisation of the economy, employment and climate change; good governance, democracy and rule of law; and migration and mobility. One of these programmes ('technical cooperation facility II') also includes some security components analysed in more in-depth basis in the ENP 2015 review.

The sample in Lebanon includes seven EU-funded programmes related to economic and inclusive development, employment, trade, modernisation of the public administration, civil society, political stability, good governance, rule of law and security.

In the case of Tunisia actions reviewed involve nine programmes mainly related to economic and social development, good governance, democracy and rule of law, as well as security all in line with main EU policy priorities. Five<sup>10</sup> out of nine projects deal with the economic dimension of development chiefly related to the integration of the country into the EU market, the decentralisation/deconcentration process, the modernisation of the Administration and public enterprises and regional and local territorial development. Three<sup>11</sup> out of nine programmes relate to social development, mainly education, culture and health sectors.

In Ukraine, seven projects reviewed under QSG mainly relate to good governance, rule of law and economic development as well as growth and energy.

### Analysis of Quality Review Documents

Egypt:

Overall, all six<sup>12</sup> projects approved by QSGs in 2015 and 2016 are in line with EU policy priorities, mainly human rights ('citizen rights project', 'advancing women's rights') and inclusive economic development ('citizen rights project', 'promoting inclusive economic growth in Egypt', 'upgrading informal areas infrastructures', 'fostering reforms in the Egyptian renewable energy and water sectors through developing capacity-building' and 'national drainage programme III in the framework of the joint integrated sector approach').

Two programmes contribute to ENI objectives set out in article 2.2.a), specifically to those related to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and equality through the institutional and operational reinforcement of the National Council of Human Rights (NCHR), the implementation of the National Action Plan for Female Genital Mutilation abandonment and the increase of women's access to justice. In addition, five programmes also contribute to ENI objectives covered under article 2.2.d) inclusive and rural development and environmental protection. To achieve these goals, programmes involve actions aimed at enhancing the private sector with a particular focus on cultural tourism; providing a conducive environment for enterprise creation; fostering cultural heritage as a real driver of local socio-economic development; upgrading basic infrastructure in informal and poorest areas; supporting institutional and legislative reforms as well as capacity development in two key sectors of the Egyptian economy: the water and renewable energy sectors; providing adequate drainage infrastructure and enhancing the capacities of different stakeholders to rehabilitate and extend subsurface drainage networks thus increasing crop productivity and improving the economic status of the local communities.

Georgia:

Four out of six programmes (ENPARD II&III and TCF I&II) clearly contribute to ENI objectives set out in articles 2.2.a), b), c) and d) mainly by supporting the implementation of national strategies and through capacity building to public institutions. Overall, they are aligned with national policies and pri-

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<sup>10</sup> Programme in Support to the Association Agreement and the Integration Process (P3AI); Decentralisation and Integrated Territorial Development programme (CAP 2D); Regional Initiative for support of sustainable economic development; The Support Programme to the Modernisation of the Administration and Public Enterprises; "Initiative pilote de développement local intégré"

<sup>11</sup> Supporting the Strengthening of Tunisia's Cultural Sector programme; Support programme for education, mobility, research and innovation (EMORI) and Programme in support of the health sector

<sup>12</sup> Citizen Rights Project; Promoting inclusive Economic Growth in Egypt; Upgrading Informal Areas Infrastructures; Fostering reforms in the Egyptian Renewable Energy and Water sectors through Developing capacity-building; Advancing Women's Rights in Egypt; National Drainage Programme III in the framework of the Joint Integrated Sector Approach

orties though, in the case of TCF II, the QSG asks for further analysis of certain components of the intervention mainly related to AA/DCFT areas selected and VLAP and migration. As regards the ‘civil society complementary support facility’ and the ‘PAR programme’, their relevance and coherence are questioned by QSGs thus ensuring alignment and ownership beyond technical formalities.

#### Lebanon:

The sample in Lebanon includes seven EU-funded programmes<sup>13</sup> at first sight in line with a wide range of EU priorities: economic and inclusive development, employment, trade, modernisation of the public administration, civil society, political stability, good governance, rule of law and security. Overall, programmes contribute to ENI objectives by: supporting Micro and SMEs; providing technical assistance to public institutions; supporting the implementation of the EU Roadmap to Lebanon; improving the urban environment and promoting job opportunities for youth; providing better and more inclusive education and career guidance to Palestine refugee children; strengthening juvenile justice and a protective environment for children in line with international standards; enhancing the capacity of law enforcement services to address terrorist-related cases with a rights-based approach; supporting the Lebanese administration in the implementation of the EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities and fostering harmonisation of the domestic legislative and regulatory framework with the EU and/or international frameworks.

#### Tunisia:

The sample for Tunisia includes nine programmes mainly related to economic and social development, good governance, democracy and rule of law, as well as security all in line with main EU policy priorities. Five<sup>14</sup> out of nine projects deal with the economic dimension of development chiefly related to the integration of the country into the EU market, the decentralisation/deconcentration process, the modernisation of the administration and public enterprises and regional and local territorial development. Thus, they all contribute to ENI objectives set in articles 2.2.a), b) and d) though through different means/strategies: negotiations towards a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, legal approximation with EU legislation, formulation of integrated regional development strategies, capacity development of public institutions and local actors, the rationalisation of investment and financial instruments, integration of the private sector in the elaboration of development strategies and improving the accessibility to public services, among others.

Three<sup>15</sup> out of nine programmes relate to social development, mainly education and the culture and health sectors, hence in line with ENP policy priorities. These projects aim at contributing to ENI objectives by building the institutional capacity of public institutions, promoting cultural diversity and access to culture, encouraging freedom of expression and creation and improving the access and the quality of basic health and education services

#### Ukraine:

Seven projects<sup>16</sup> reviewed under QSG, mainly related to good governance, rule of law and economic development and growth and energy. They are aligned with ENI objectives covered under articles 2.2.a) rule of law, good governance and fighting against corruption and institutional capacity; 2.2.b) integration into the EU market and improve market access; and 2.2.d) smart, sustainable and inclusive development and environmental protection. Main strategies to contribute to these goals include: providing capacity building to national, regional and local institutions to implement reforms in several areas such as economic governance, trade, media freedom, justice, transport, fight against corruption,

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<sup>13</sup> Supporting the private sector development in Lebanon; Technical Assistance for the Government of Lebanon; Civil Society Partnership to Promote Reform in Lebanon; North Lebanon Local Development Programme for Deprived Urban Areas; Programme in Support to the inclusive Education, Training and Career Guidance of Palestine refugees in Lebanon; Advancing Juvenile and Criminal Justice in Lebanon and Support to the implementation of the EU Lebanon Action Plan (SIAPP)

<sup>14</sup> Programme in Support to the Association Agreement and the Integration Process (P3AI); Decentralisation and Integrated Territorial Development programme (CAP 2D); Regional Initiative for support of sustainable economic development; The Support Programme to the Modernisation of the Administration and Public Enterprises; “Initiative pilote de développement local intégré”

<sup>15</sup> Supporting the Strengthening of Tunisia’s Cultural Sector programme; Support programme for education, mobility, research and innovation (EMORI) and Programme in support of the health sector

<sup>16</sup> EU Support to Ukraine to Re-launch the Economy (EU SURE!); Technical Cooperation Facility 2015; Support to a Comprehensive Reform of Public Administration in Ukraine; European Anti-Corruption Support Office; Technical Cooperation Facility 2016; Energy Efficiency Support Programme for Ukraine; Support to Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO).

environment and energy; offering targeted policy advice and assistance in legal approximation process; promoting the development of the SME sector; supporting the implementation of Ukraine's PAR Strategy for the period of 2016-2020; delivering capacity building to civil society and media to address corruption issues and oversight reform implementation; establishing a sustainable energy efficiency mechanism for the residential sector including incentives to social subsidy; promoting the implementation of energy saving measures; and delivering the necessary support to the National Police and other authorities in charge of law enforcement.

The programming instructions derived from the “new policy framework” are clearer than in the 2015 Review:

*“The new policy framework:*

*The Joint Communication on the ENP review proposes to build a more effective partnership between the EU and its neighbours. In particular it states that stabilisation of the Neighbourhood will be the EU's main political priority. This priority will be advanced through:*

- *A continued focus on good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights. The ENP should continue to promote good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which are important for long-term stabilisation. Partnerships under the ENP should focus on people as well as governments, whereby the creation of strong, independent, accountable and resilient institutions is a key element of building trust between states and citizens. The EU will continue to defend and advocate for full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Support for civil society will be enhanced and efforts should be made to support civil society in its broadest possible sense. Particular attention will be paid to implementing the EU Gender Action Plan, which should inform ENI programming;*
- *Enhancing economic governance, strengthening fiscal stability and supporting structural reforms for improved competitiveness and inclusive growth and social development are keys to developing a country's economic resilience. New and existing EU instruments can be better deployed to improve conditions for jobs and growth. The EU should step up cooperation with the international financial institutions and the private sector institutions to promote inclusive growth and employment and improve living conditions. Innovative approaches such as blending grants and loans can help to leverage additional resources and increase the impact of EU aid;*
- *Stronger cooperation on security, including security sector reform, border protection, tackling terrorism and radicalisation, and improving crisis management. The ENP's security dimension aims at fostering human security, which is also dependent on the development of effective security institutions within the framework of democratic governance, transparency and accountability. Stronger cooperation on security, including security sector reform, border protection, cyber-security, tackling terrorism and radicalisation, and improving crisis management are important elements of this approach. The new joint communication "Elements for an EU-Wide Strategic Framework for Security Sector Reform Support" provides a policy and operational framework for engaging in the security sector as well as guidance on analysis and conflict sensitivity while the Commission Communication on "Strengthening Europe's Cyber Resilience System" sets out the threats posed by cyberattacks and possible responses. Colleagues should also be aware of Human Rights guidance for EU actions addressing terrorism, organised crime and cybersecurity and the EEAS work on mediation and conflict resolution. The ENP security dimension is being closely coordinated as part of the broader work on the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy as illustrated in the EEAS- COM joint note on further cooperation in the security area under the ENP;*
- *Cooperation with partner countries on regular and irregular migration and mobility have become a central issue in our relations with neighbouring countries with a potentially crucial impact on stabilisation in parts of the Neighbourhood. The communication on the European Agenda on Migration confirms the new political impetus for deeper cooperation with ENP partners on both regular and irregular migration;*
- *When relevant and feasible, an analysis of the possible linkages with the security and migration dimensions should be carried out for each sector of EU planned support (migration-sensitive and security-sensitive analyses).”*

The ENP review also indicates new ways of working. Those most relevant for programming are the following:

- *“Strengthened ownership by partner country government and other stakeholders, as emphasised in the ENP review. Programming shall be an inclusive process, involving national, re-*

gional and local authorities as well as civil society organisations (CSOs) and social partners, in order to strengthen mutual accountability. The Council/Member States will also have a greater role in identifying priorities and supporting their implementation, including through joint programming;

- *The EU will pursue more differentiated partnerships with partner countries that reflect the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with the EU. In effect, different patterns of relations will emerge, allowing a greater sense of ownership by both sides. The new Partnership Priorities or Association Agendas will focus each relationship more clearly on commonly identified shared interests.*

(Instructions for the Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2020, Update for the period 2017-2020, 17/08/2016, p 4-5)

Reporting documents design has been modified: *“There will no longer be a single set of progress reports on all countries simultaneously. Instead the EU will seek to develop a new style of assessment, focusing specifically on meeting the goals agreed with partners”* (2015 ENP Review p 5);

Progress Reports, which were considered as too formalized, are suppressed. EEAS will produce more specific country reports. The Policy Document is the “Partnership Priorities”, which is negotiated with the partner country. Then, the programming document, the Single Support Framework, will follow. It details the EC commitment and it is not co-signed by the partner country (as the CSP/NIP were).

The Centres of thematic expertise (CoTE) at DG NEAR has been another innovation, which is widely appreciated at HQ. It is now mandatory for all projects to be screened and approved by CoTE experts. They check the projects consistency and the coherence with the policy framework, and they may request modifications. However, they mostly intervene late in the process and due to lack of time or resources are not always consulted. Additional expertise capacity may allow the Centre to provide guidance at the beginning of the project design process, thus facilitating a better alignment of the policy framework.

Several Partner Countries still cherish the hope that there could be a continuity from ENP to Enlargement, through the process of economic integration and convergence with the EU. (See also Indicator 1.1.1) Explicit examples include:

Georgia:

*“Therefore, we believe that the ENP review should contribute to eventual establishment of special relationship with the Eastern European States that have established Association with the EU. Such relationship should gradually evolve from their association to their full integration into the EU, based on the progress in domestic reforms and upholding common European values, such as the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights and ensure the rule of law.”*

Georgia, Considerations on the future of the ENP based on the Commission’s green paper published on March 4, 2015, p2

Ukraine:

*“ This gap is inevitable given that the core concept of the ENP remains unchanged: this policy is based on the EU enlargement experience, logic and ambitions, but doesn’t provide the perspective of accession for those interested States to the Union. As such, the ENP works weak-mindedly both for the countries, which are not interested in deeper engagement with the EU, as for those, who see its membership in the EU as the final goal of relations with the EU.”*

*(...) In spite of certain upgrade as compared to the ENP framework, the Eastern Partnership remains a policy without a clear vision of an “ultimate goal”. The issue of the European perspective for Partner States with clear European aspirations remains on the table without a clear and definite answer.*

*The perspective of accession is the most significant and powerful transformative incentive for partners and a tool that the EU has ever had. The Commission Communication on Enlargement of October 2012 reads: “Within a framework of strict but fair conditionality where the principle of own merits is key, the prospect of accession drives political and economic reforms, transforming societies, consolidating the rule of law and creating new opportunities for citizens and business. At a time of economic stagnation, it mitigates the risk of resistance to essential reforms.”*

(...) “Thereby we propose already now to launch a strategic discussion on the matter of EP membership perspective for Ukraine, as well as for Moldova and Georgia – the European States, which signed Association Agreements with the EU, and by the next EaP Summit in 2017 give a clear answer on it in terms of calendar and conditions.” Review of the European Neighborhood Policy: Ukraine’s Contribution p. 1-2

Finally, the alignment on objectives of partner countries is not obvious in several of the “new” priority sectors, notably migration. For example: “The EU will work with to return in a dignified and sustainable manner those who do not, or no longer, have the right to stay in the EU, including through the conclusion and full implementation of readmission agreements and voluntary return and readmission schemes, in line with the Commission’s Action Plan on return. The EU will also assist ENP countries to develop their own return policy allowing them to return persons to third countries of origin. Appropriate mechanisms should be further developed to ensure that those returning to their countries of origin can reintegrate and contribute, to the local economy and society. All tools will be mobilised to increase co-operation on return and readmission, thus giving readmission a central place in all dialogues with countries of origin and transit of irregular migrants”. ENP Review 2015, p 17.

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – DG NEAR, EEAS, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 1.2.2 I-122. Evidence that the ENI Regulation can address in a flexible way emerging challenges identified by ENP Review 2015 and subsequent policy documents (migration, security etc.)

### Global analysis of the indicator

ENI has mobilised different tools and resources to react and adapt its activities to new difficulties and crises in the Neighbourhood. It has demonstrated a capacity to address new challenges and flexibility in mobilising resources, at overall level and in several of the most vulnerable countries (notably Ukraine, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon). Flexibility and quick response to crisis were one of the major features justifying the ENP Review and the (on-going) modification of the intervention approach. Yet, ENI demonstrated (since 2014) and in relation in particular to Ukraine a strong capacity to provide within a coordinated policy framework unprecedented volume of resources.

One of the strategic answers to crises was the establishment of Trust Funds that can pool resources from different donors and instruments and deliver faster than the usual programming process. While they broaden the EU reaction capacity and shorten intervention delays, they are also short-term oriented and do not last long. ENI regional programmes are mostly about soft power and network-building, long-term oriented, with limited amounts and no legitimacy to act upon crisis situations. Thus, while new measures and tools do provide flexibility to the EU interventions, they cannot cope with the growing instability in the Neighbourhood partner countries, especially those that have to cope with deep economic and political crises, armed conflicts, enormous influx of refugee, etc.

However the need for flexibility is likely to increase, because of the unstable Neighbourhood context as well as because of the DG Near and ENI objectives, notably in the field of migration and refugees. The cursor should thus probably move towards more flexibility. A proposal of a new regulation has already been announced to cope with the growing need for flexibility: “Consequently, it is proposed to amend the MFF Regulation to further increase the capacity of the Flexibility Instrument and the Emergency Aid Reserve and to remove a number of restrictions which limit the effectiveness of instruments allowing for the reuse of margins<sup>3</sup> left available from previous financial years. Furthermore, it is proposed to create a European Union Crisis Reserve to finance the response to crises, such as the current migration crisis, as well as events with serious humanitarian and security implications. This Reserve would be



*funded by de-committed appropriations from all MFF headings<sup>4</sup>. It would not increase the overall ceilings for commitments and payments of the agreed multi-annual financial framework.” (EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results, COM(2016) 603 final}, p.3)*

However, the trade-off between flexibility and programming should be carefully – coldly – discussed and set up. ENI should not be transformed into an Emergency Assistance instrument. This is ECHO mission. The ENP should continue to focus on the support to long term progress of institutions, political systems and economic level in the partner countries. It is its *raison d’être*.

Finally, there is a contrast between the demonstrated capacity of the EC, through ENI and other tools, to cope with unexpected crisis and to provide a heavy financial support to fragile countries and the absence of multiple strategic scenarios at the programming stage. In a such unstable environment as the Neighbourhood, the provision of ex-ante alternative strategic scenarios would allow to better anticipate future challenges and shocks, and to pre-design the appropriate response, first at the EUD level. Field visits have confirmed that no geopolitical analysis is available to provide scenarios on which the assistance programming could rely.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

ENI has mobilised different tools and resources to react and adapt to new challenges in the Neighbourhood.

While the “More for More” scheme was introduced, early, as an incentive scheme, it has also been used as an instrument for more flexible intervention.

*“As a consequence of the MFF negotiations, allocations within the ENI are not yet known. In addition, negotiations on the ENI include the issue of differentiation (“More for More”) in the Neighbourhood. Therefore, no firm commitments should be taken with country partners. Please remain in close contact with your counterparts in the EEAS and DEVCO on this issue.”* Note to the attention of Heads of Delegation in the European Neighbourhood Policy countries and Russia, 9 July 2012.

Most of the interviewees at HQ complain that this scheme has been very difficult to manage for strategic and operational reasons. It does not facilitate cooperation with countries which are “judged” by the EC while being simultaneously policy partners. *“For example: the financial programming for Morocco for the years 2014-2017 amounts to an average of 809 million; hence the SSF Morocco 2014-2017 indicates an allocation between 728 million and 890 million. Any adjustment within or beyond this range would be read as the application of the incentive-based approach of the ENI”* (In: Working Group on Financial Instruments – Summary of recommendations, Ref. Ares(2015)2364053 – 05/06/2015, p 1)

The Umbrella envelops amounts to 10 % of the global allocation, to be equally divided between the South and the East regions. In the latter region, if there would be no allocation to Ukraine, the small countries (Moldova, Georgia, etc.) could thus benefit from a 100 % increase of their allocation, which would be extremely difficult to manage (absorption capacity, late planning, etc.). So far, the necessity to react in a flexible way to the major challenge in the East has resulted in a large concentration of this additional resource on Ukraine. For similar reasons, in the South, Tunisia has been by far the largest beneficiary of this scheme.

To sum up, the “more for more” system has moved the cursor in the direction of more flexibility, rather than planning.

Furthermore, the growing instability and the multiplication of crises in the Neighbourhood have led to the use of innovative practices and instruments.

Interviews indicate that now (after discussion during the 2015 ENP review) only 90 % of the prospective allocation is programmed at the design stage. The remaining 10 % of the allocation is kept as a genuine flexibility element. A choice not forbidden by the existing regulation, thus considered as allowed.

An official approval of this scheme, which includes a carry-over possibility, has been requested in the latest Communication on MFF:

“Like heading 3, heading 4 has been under particular pressure due to the multiplication of crises in the European Neighbourhood and beyond. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), Humanitarian Aid, and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) were mobilised for responding to the new challenges and emergencies. Some important reinforcements had to be made through redeployments and the use of margins and flexibility instruments, whilst funding had also to be redirected and leveraged by means of new tools such as Trust Funds and facilities.

In view of the need to react to unforeseen needs, each geographical external instrument (the Instrument for Pre-Accession, the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the Development Cooperation Instrument) should be able to keep a reserve (a “flexibility cushion”) of up to 10 % of the annual commitment appropriations available unallocated, with the possibility to carry-over to the following year remaining funds of that reserve not used in a given financial year.” EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results {COM(2016) 603 final}, SWD(2016) 299 final, p.14

“Flexibility: the introduction of new instruments allows for shifting available margins between headings and years, which represents a major step forward in terms of flexibility within the total MFF ceilings to accommodate evolving needs.”

(EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results {COM(2016) 603 final}, SWD(2016) 299 final, p.3)

Consequently, it is proposed to amend the MFF Regulation to further increase the capacity of the Flexibility Instrument and the Emergency Aid Reserve and to remove a number of restrictions which limit the effectiveness of instruments allowing for the reuse of margins<sup>3</sup> left available from previous financial years. Furthermore, it is proposed to create a European Union Crisis Reserve to finance the response to crises, such as the current migration crisis, as well as events with serious humanitarian and security implications. This Reserve would be funded by de-committed appropriations from all MFF headings<sup>4</sup>. It would not increase the overall ceilings for commitments and payments of the agreed multi-annual financial framework.”

(EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results, COM(2016) 603 final}, p.3)

The EU has also established regional Trust Funds, with two aims

- Include funds from other EFIs
- Pooling resources from different donors, firstly MS
- Increase its capacity reaction and its flexibility

The Madad fund was established to cope with the Syrian refugees crisis in the region. A similar initiative was taken on migration in Africa, with the creation of an Emergency Trust fund. EU Trust Funds are subject to the EU financial management but they can use simplified procedures. Once established, their intervention delays are short, according to interviews at HQ.

[See also Indicators 3.2.4 and 4.1.1 as well as JC3.2, for complementary information on resources and implementation issues.]

“EU Trust Funds (EUTFs): pooling resources from different donors and instruments

If the necessary conditions are met (i.e. at least one external donor), use EUTFs with a thematic/regional scope, for example on such issues as migration, crisis management, etc.

Use EUTFs to pool funds from other EC instruments (IPA2, DCI, EDF) to address issues with a clear cross-regional dimension, such as migration and security or connectivity.

This option is feasible within the existing legal and budgetary framework.

EU regional Trust Fund for Syrian crisis: In December 2014, the Commission and Italy signed the constitutive agreement to launch the EU Trust Fund, the first ever regional EUTF. The start-up funding amounts to 20 million from the EU budget and 3 million from Italy. Significant additional funding is foreseen for 2015. The EUTF will address the resilience and stabilisation needs in Syria's neighbouring countries, in particular Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, as well as inside Syria. While other Trust Funds operate only at a national or subnational scale, EUTF provides a regional response to a regional crisis, so that the EU response can pull from different financial instruments and it can flexibly and quickly react to shifting needs during the crisis. The EUTF brings also strong efficiency gains on the financial side: it can operate with overhead costs of significantly less than 5% (depending

on the size of overall contributions). EUTF could also become a funding vehicle for future post-conflict reconstruction effort.)”

( Working Group on Financial Instruments – Summary of recommendations, Ref. Ares(2015)2364053 – 05/06/2015, p 2,3)

*“In line with the Council Conclusions on the EU approach to resilience, activities financed by the Trust Fund shall pursue conflict-sensitive approaches, taking into account the wider root causes of conflict and chronic insecurity and the impact of these factors on the vulnerability of populations, and recognise the complementary roles of development cooperation, humanitarian action and political dialogue and engagement as essential components of building resilience and ensure that efforts to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) remain integral to such activities.”*

(EC 2016, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to The Syrian Crisis, 'The Madad Fund', And Its Internal Rules, p.6)

*“Definition: The European Commission has launched an “Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa”, made up of € 1.8 billion from the EU budget and European Development Fund, combined with contributions from EU Member States and other donors. The EU Trust Fund for Africa was signed by the President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker, along with 25 EU member states, as well as Norway and Switzerland, and was launched at the Valletta Summit on Migration on November 12th 2015 by European and African partners*

*The Trust Fund benefits a coherent group of countries across Africa crossed by the major migration routes. These countries are part of three regional operational windows: the Sahel region and Lake Chad area, the Horn of Africa and the North of Africa.*

*DG NEAR is in charge of managing the North of Africa window, comprised of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.*

*The North of Africa window will be focused at improving migration management in all its aspects, including contributing to the development of national and regional strategies on migration management, containing and preventing irregular migration and fight against trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants and other related crimes, effective return and readmission, international protection and asylum, legal migration and mobility, enhancing synergies between migration and development. The first operational committee of the North of Africa window will take place around mid 2016 to examine a first pipeline of projects. The preparation of projects for 2017 will start in parallel and it is expected that the following operational committees will be able to achieve a higher level of commitments.”*

EC (2016) 2016, near\_sp\_2016-2020\_en, p 44

*“The European Commission Decision on the establishment of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (the ‘Trust Fund’) was adopted on 20 October 2015. (...) More specifically, it will help address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience of vulnerable people, security and development.”*

(EC 2015, The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa – Strategic Orientation Document, p.2)

ENI demonstrated a capacity to adapt to new challenges and flexibility in mobilising resources, at overall level:

*“Our response to the Ukrainian and Syrian crises in 2013 and 2014 has shown that financial instruments in the Neighbourhood can already react today with a degree of flexibility to evolving situations on the ground. This requires however the mobilisation of strong political will and a sense of urgency in every single case and is not always facilitated by the set of applicable rules and practices which has become ever more stringent over the years.*

*There is therefore clearly scope for introducing further flexibility into the system, beyond the scope of crisis reaction, and there are means to accelerate the delivery of assistance.”*

(Christian Danielsson 2015,NOTE TO COMMISSIONER JOHANNES HAHN, Ref. Ares(2015)2364053 – 05/06/2015)

The 2014 and 2015 commitment and especially disbursement distributions show a real capacity to concentrate resources on fragile and crisis countries. Of the 15.4 billion EUR foreseen for ENI in the 2014-2020 period, roughly 4.8 billion EUR have already been committed in 2014 and 2015.

Table 1 ENI commitments/disbursements in 2014-2015 by beneficiary (in mio EUR)

	Commitments	%	Disbursements	%
Palestine	634.82	13.2%	620.40	18.3%
Syria	470.25	9.8%	39.33	1.2%
Ukraine	402.01	8.4%	387.59	11.5%
Tunisia	355.80	7.4%	332.83	9.8%
Morocco	350.00	7.3%	229.40	6.8%
Jordan	274.50	5.7%	162.79	4.8%
Georgia	231.00	4.8%	133.01	3.9%
Moldova	221.05	4.6%	146.41	4.3%
Lebanon	186.09	3.9%	141.42	4.2%
Egypt	89.01	1.9%	169.89	5.0%
Algeria	51.50	1.1%	68.73	2.0%
Armenia	49.00	1.0%	84.12	2.5%
Azerbaijan	35.50	0.7%	31.62	0.9%
Belarus	33.50	0.7%	33.37	1.0%
Libya	11.00	0.2%	19.56	0.6%
Israel	2.00	0.0%	17.20	0.5%
<b>Total country-specific</b>	<b>3,397.04</b>	<b>70.9%</b>	<b>2,617.67</b>	<b>77.3%</b>
CBC	88.34	1.8%	83.66	2.5%
Erasmus	116.30	2.4%	68.13	2.0%
ENI South	632.48	13.2%	202.31	6.0%
ENI East	329.16	6.9%	148.90	4.4%
Regional/Unspecified	228.22	4.8%	264.35	7.8%
<b>Total non-country specific</b>	<b>1,394.49</b>	<b>29.1%</b>	<b>767.34</b>	<b>22.7%</b>
<b>Overall total</b>	<b>4,791.53</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3,385.02</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

Interviews with NEAR B2 (Regional Programmes Neighbourhood South) and C2 (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus & Eastern Partnership) indicate that in the ENI regional programs, differentiation and flexibility are already embedded in activities: “We design and implement the activities on a case by case basis, depending on the countries commitment and capacity; “we advance more or less far with PC ; depending on their commitment “.

Orientation confirmed by available evaluations: “In view of the regional tense situation and other political considerations, the SWIM-SM was careful to adjust its implemented activities to the partner countries’ needs and priorities, where these are in line with EC policies, by creating and maintaining a dialogue with and among partner countries’ representatives” (B&S EUROPE (2015), Final Evaluation of the SWIM programme Framework contract No. 2014/345939/1, Final Report, 19, February 2015, p 5)

“The EU Policy Cycle for serious and organised crime has succeeded in delivering a more coordinated strategic direction and joint operations on the ground. Neighbourhood countries are already associated to the Policy Cycle, and their involvement in operational activities of the Policy Cycle should be intensified. One of the priorities of the Policy Cycle is to disrupt organised criminal networks involved in smuggling of migrants by stepping up cross-border investigations with the support of EU agencies.” (EC 2015, The European Agenda for Security, COM(2015) 185 final, p.16)

“Supplementing action under the existing programmes, the Commission has proposed a Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration in order to ensure a coherent approach vis a vis partner countries and a more efficient and coordinated deployment of the different programmes and funding sources at the Union's disposal, i.e. MFF programmes, the European Development Fund (EDF), European Union Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The partnership framework aims at a coherent and tailored engagement where the Union and its Member States act in a coordinated manner putting together instruments, tools and leverage, to reach compre-

*hensive Partnership frameworks (compacts) with third countries to better manage migration in full respect of the Union's humanitarian and human rights obligations.*

*The following main financial sources from the EU and its Member States should be available to vitalise the partnerships:*

- *Money for financing the immediate actions of the compacts: EUR 1 billion to be added to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, consisting of EUR 0.5 billion from the EDF reserve and EUR 0.5 billion from the Member States.*
- *Money from the existing trust funds: EUR 3.6 billion from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and EUR 1 billion from the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis.*
- *Nearly EUR 2.4 billion in total pledged contributions from the EU and its Member States as additional funds for Lebanon, Jordan (and Syria) at the London conference.*
- *Macro-financial assistance to avoid economic instability of up to EUR 1 billion in loans to Tunisia (EUR 0.3 billion being implemented and EUR 0.5 billion proposed by the Commission in February 2016) and Jordan (EUR 0.2 billion million under consideration).*
- *Total aid flows from the EU and its Member States to the key priority countries which recently averaged EUR 4.4 billion per year.*

*This would mean, provided that all Member States participate, that nearly EUR 8 billion are made available over 2016-2020 for the delivery of the compacts to be complemented by the annual Official Development Aid flows from the EU and Member States.*

*In the long term, the EU should continue to increase its efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and to provide capacity building to the host communities and relevant institutions. This will require fundamentally reconsidering the scale and nature of traditional development co-operation models. A much greater role must be given to private investors looking for new investment opportunities in emerging markets. This is the purpose of the proposed External Investment Plan that aims at supporting investments in regions outside the EU as a means to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development goals, thus addressing the root causes of migration and support partners to manage its consequences.”*

*(EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results {COM(2016) 603 final}, SWD(2016) 299 final, p.16)*

ENI demonstrated a capacity to adapt to new challenges and flexibility in mobilising resources, at country specific level, both through own measures and with the help of MFA:

In Ukraine:

*“(…) The EU is acting decisively in cooperation with its international partners to support the country's new authorities to stabilise the situation, preserve the country's unity while fully respecting all communities and groups of population and address the people's aspirations. To this effect the European Commission announced on 5 March 2014 a Support Package for Ukraine, frontloading and reinforcing many of the EaP policies and instruments. The proposed measures could bring overall support of at least EUR 11 billion over the coming years from the EU budget and EU-based international financial institutions in addition to the significant funding being provided by the IMF and the World Bank. Underpinning this approach is the ambition to help Ukraine fulfil the aspirations, which have been clearly demonstrated by citizens and civil society in the unprecedented events in Kiev and throughout the country.” (EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.3)*

*“In 2014 the EU made a total of EUR 1.36 billion available in loans under its macro-financial assistance (MFA)1 instrument. This entire amount went to Ukraine under two MFA programmes to stabilise its economy and complement financial assistance provided by other international donors, chiefly the IMF. The first MFA programme, worth EUR 610 million, was based on two legislative decisions, one dating from 2002 and the other from 2010. In addition, the EU reacted immediately to the economic crisis in Ukraine with a new MFA programme of up to EUR 1 billion in loans. The programme was approved by emergency procedure in April and entered into force in May. In 2014 the EU disbursed EUR 360 million under the first MFA programme (EUR 100 million in May and EUR 260 million in November) and disbursed the full amount under the second MFA programme in two equal tranches of EUR 500 million in July and December. The final tranche of the first programme is tentatively scheduled for the first quarter of 2015. It will depend on Ukraine successfully implementing the policy conditions attached to the programme and having a satisfactory track record on its IMF programme. As the economic crisis in Ukraine”*

“Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) is a form of financial aid extended by the EU to partner countries experiencing a balance of payments crisis. It takes the form of medium/long-term loans or grants, or a combination of these, and is only available to countries benefiting from a disbursing IMF programme. All Eastern Neighbourhood countries are in principle eligible for MFA” (03/2015, p4, Implementation of the ENP Eastern Partnership Implementation Report)

“In 2014, the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the marked deterioration of the country’s economic and financial situation triggered MFA support at an unprecedented level. Between 2014 and 2015, EUR 3.4 billion, all in the form of loans, were made available to Ukraine under three MFA operations, of which EUR 2.21 billion had been disbursed by December 2015. This represents the largest financial assistance ever granted to a non-EU country in such a short period of time.” (EC 2016, The implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015, COM(2016)376 final, p.4)

“[Ukraine] Overall, the Commission thus extended MFA for EUR 850 million to Ukraine in 2015, bringing total MFA disbursements to EUR 2.21 billion. Ukraine can still access two tranches of EUR 600 million from MFA III. This assistance is conditional on successful implementation of the policy measures specified in the MoU and continuous progress with the IMF programme for Ukraine — a four-year extended fund facility of around USD 17.5 billion, which the IMF Board approved in March 2015. The first USD 4.9 billion was disbursed in March and a further USD 1.7 billion in August, following the successful first review of the programme.” (EC 2016, implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015; Background Analysis per beneficiary country, SWD(2016) 192 final, p.24)

In the framework of the fragile situation in Ukraine it was not possible to finalise the multi-annual programming exercise. In order to face the urgent needs related to the transition process in the country the Commission opted for implementing special measure in 2014 .The objective pursued by the special measure to be financed under the European Neighbourhood Instrument is to contribute to the EU support package of short and medium term measures to help stabilise the economic and financial situation in Ukraine, assist with the transition and encourage political and economic reforms, with participation of the civil society. The special measure contains two actions. One action entitled “*State building contract for Ukraine*” provides direct financial support to Ukraine in the short-term and supports the transition process with a focus on the fight against corruption, public administration reform and constitutional and electoral law reform. The action will be implemented through budget support. The second action entitled “*Ukraine civil society support programme*” promotes civil society engagement and democratic oversight of national reforms. The action will be implemented through grants and service contracts. (Special measure 2014 in favour of Ukraine). (EUD Interviews Analysis)

In the framework of the fragile situation in Ukraine it was not possible to finalise the multi-annual programming exercise. In order to face the urgent needs related to the transition process in the country the Commission opted for implementing a Special Measure in 2015 (Special measure 2015 in favour of Ukraine).

## Ukraine EUD interview

Do you witness improvements since 2014 in ENI budget allocation and execution, in particular to support the incentive-based approach, responses to crises and prevention of crisis?	We've benefited from the incentive-based-approach but I think it is rather about better management of the programme: if we are capable of putting away the money ensuring the absorption then it's good to get more. It's different from the "more for more" principle. The country doesn't see it because the rewarding process is too complex. But it's an important instrument in the sense that if the reform process is not advancing then you would not want to have all that money because you're going to accumulate too much funding. I see it more from a review budget management perspective.
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In Tunisia:

« *Bien que les orientations proposées ci-après du cadre unique d'appui soient alignées, dans leur contenu, sur les priorités du plan d'action dont la validité est quinquennale, il n'en demeure pas moins que la Tunisie reste dans une phase de transition politique, au moins jusqu'aux prochaines élections. (...) Dans ces conditions, il est proposé que la durée de la première période de programmation financière s'étale sur deux années, à savoir 2014-2015* ». EC (2014) Single Support Framework Tunisia 2014-2015, p 4

« *Le déficit budgétaire (estimé à 6,4% du PIB) et la balance des paiements (le déficit du compte courant est estimé à 7,9% du PIB) continuaient à des niveaux critiques. Cette situation générerait des besoins de financement extérieur importants mais la Tunisie a obtenu, entre autres, 500 millions de dollars des États-Unis et 350 millions de dollars du Japon sous forme de garanties d'emprunt. En mai 2014, l'UE a approuvé une opération d'assistance macroéconomique de 300 millions d'euros, à dé-*

boursier à la Tunisie en 2015. » C (2015) 03/2015, Mise en œuvre de la politique européenne de voisinage en Tunisie Progrès réalisés en 2014 et actions à mettre en œuvre, p 9)

« L'Union européenne a adopté aujourd'hui la communication conjointe intitulée «Renforcer le soutien de l'UE à la Tunisie», qui réaffirme son engagement en faveur de la transition démocratique en Tunisie. La communication conjointe expose une série de mesures que l'UE pourrait prendre collectivement pour renforcer son soutien aux efforts déployés par la Tunisie pour relever les défis cruciaux auxquels elle est confrontée et promouvoir la stabilité à long terme, la résilience, la bonne gouvernance, le développement socio-économique et la sécurité dans le pays. Ces mesures viennent s'ajouter à une enveloppe financière pouvant atteindre 300 million d'euros pour 2017, ce qui représente une augmentation substantielle de l'aide de l'UE à la Tunisie des deux dernières années, notamment dans les domaines de la coopération, le commerce, l'industrie, l'éducation, la recherche et la lutte contre le terrorisme. (...) Actions proposées Outre une augmentation de l'aide financière en faveur de la Tunisie, avec une enveloppe de 300 millions d'euros prévue pour 2017 et un engagement à consentir un effort financier similaire par la suite, une aide supplémentaire devrait être obtenue auprès des institutions financières européennes, qui pourraient mobiliser environ 800 millions d'euros par an d'ici 2020. L'UE soutiendra le plan en faveur des infrastructures et les mesures de développement du secteur privé des autorités tunisiennes en mobilisant des ressources supplémentaires provenant de la plateforme d'investissement pour le voisinage. Ces mesures financières seront appuyées par des mesures commerciales spécifiques visant à favoriser le décollage économique de la Tunisie. Des mesures exceptionnelles sont également envisagées pour faire face à la situation critique dans laquelle se trouve la Tunisie. » (Bruxelles, le 29 septembre 2016 Commission européenne – Communiqué de presse)

In Syria:

*“This includes the response to the Syrian crisis, the resources provided under the SPRING programme, which translates the ‘incentive-based approach’ for the Neighbourhood South into operational terms (see Annex III), and under the Southern Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility, which, with more than EUR 11 million per year since 2011, provides support to civil society organisations in particular to enhance their role in advocacy and monitoring reforms. Altogether, the EU and its Member States have provided close to EUR 2 billion so far to the Syrian crisis, making the EU the largest donor. In 2013, the EU prepared a response to the crisis, which is causing a humanitarian catastrophe with severe consequences for the stability of neighbouring countries, in particular Lebanon and Jordan.*

*The joint communication ‘Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis’<sup>3</sup> outlines this response and announces a special assistance package to address the consequences of the crisis in Syria and in the neighbouring countries, notably in Jordan and Lebanon. The assistance package includes both humanitarian aid and development assistance programmes benefitting Syrian refugees and host communities in Lebanon and Jordan.*

*The road to peace in Syria is expected to be long and thorny, and is likely to require continued EU involvement in the coming years.” (EC (2014) Overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, activities and results 2007-13, p18)*

*“The EU has also taken immediate and substantial measures to address the consequences of the Syrian civil war and its growing regional implications, e.g. for refugee flows and the risk of strife in Syria's neighbouring countries. The Joint Communication 'Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis'<sup>5</sup> was accompanied by additional financial assistance of EUR 400 million in 2013 to deal with the consequences of the crisis. Mindful of the unprecedented effects the crisis has on the Syrian people as well as on the stability of neighbouring countries, the EU has been the largest donor to the victims of the Syria crisis, providing massive humanitarian and non-humanitarian support.*

*While in several cases it was able to rise to the challenge and react rapidly, the EU should continue to reflect on how the policy and its instruments can better respond to the very diverse contexts in partner countries, and how some components may need to be adjusted, including through the use of additional policy instruments. The need to act rapidly in different kind of situations, with different kind of decision making procedures, has to be taken into account when developing the legislation of EU's policy and financial instruments, such as the framework legislation for Macro-Financial Assistance, simplified procedures in the area of trade policy, or efforts to use more rapid decision making procedures for the use of CSDP instruments. This is an area the EU institutions and Member States should focus on, to enable the EU to react better and quicker to developments in its Neighbourhood, and to respond to partners' changing needs.” (EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.4)*

In Jordan:

“[Jordan] Macroeconomic stability was underpinned by a USD 2 billion SBA which was agreed with the IMF in August 2012 and satisfactorily completed in August 2015. Since then, the Jordanian authorities have been in talks with the IMF on a new programme. In 2015, the Commission implemented an MFA programme of EUR 180 million in the form of medium-term loans. The first tranche (EUR 100 million) was disbursed on 10 February and the second (EUR 80 million) on 15 October 2015. This operation helped Jordan to address the negative macroeconomic impact of the Syrian conflict as well as of exogenous economic shocks. At the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference (London, 4 February 2016), the international community pledged around USD 10 billion to countries affected by the refugee crisis. This included a EUR 2.4 billion pledge by the European Commission, which in turn entailed a new MFA operation to Jordan subject to the relevant pre-conditions.” (EC 2016, implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015; Background Analysis per beneficiary country, SWD(2016) 192 final, p.9)

In Lebanon:

“L'UE a essayé de mobiliser une partie des fonds destinés à la réponse à la crise à travers le Gouvernement ce qui malheureusement n'a pas été possible (jusqu'à la mobilisation des fonds SPRING 2013). Face à cette situation, d'absence des institutions, de détérioration sensible de la sécurité (incidents à Tripoli de plus en plus fréquents, Saïda, Aarsal, frontière...) et l'arrivée incessante et croissante de réfugiés, l'UE a décidé de déclarer la situation de crise pour le pays et la possibilité d'utilisation de procédures flexibles pour la réponse à la crise. Par ailleurs, une partie des fonds de l'enveloppe bilatérale qui ne répondait plus aux besoins réels sur le terrain ont été réorientés et le SSF2014-2016 a été revu pour adapter notre coopération à la réalité que vit le Liban suite au débordement du conflit syrien dans le pays.” (EAMR Lebanon 2013, 3-4).

Lebanon EUD interview:

“Adjusting ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events: e.g. because of the Syrian crisis we were able to get extra resources from ENI in the form of special measures.”

In Egypt:

Egypt EUD interview:

“Adjusting ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events: crisis is getting worse and the EU has been able to respond, ENI programming is more flexible.”

In Armenia

Armenia EUD interview:

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?	1. Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming. 2 Adjusting ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events.
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In some cases more flexibility or additional capabilities has been requested:

EUD interview analysis:

More specifically, Morocco and Jordan highlight the lack of expertise and capability for dealing with security issues. In contrast, Lebanon is playing host to much-needed EU security projects. Partner country ownership of ENI programmes is the third highest ranked contribution reported by EUDs (8 out of 12 countries) followed by aligning on PC priorities and needs and establishing a balanced relationship with PCs in ENI programming (6 out of 12 countries each). Ukraine, Lebanon, Moldova and Azerbaijan also report alignment with PC priorities and needs but only when circumstances permit owing to the lack of country strategy or priorities

Regarding the adjustment of ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events, only 5 countries consider it an ENI input (Ukraine, Lebanon, Georgia, Egypt and Armenia). Conversely, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Georgia and Azerbaijan specifically state that ENI capability is limited in this regard or has a negative impact in funds programmed for other countries

### Jordan EUD interview

Needs improvement: 1. Adjusting ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events (inflexibility of the ENI instrument, we are tied to consuming everything and we can't leave any space/reserve (funds



uncommitted) to respond to needs/crises that might appear at the end of the year. 2. Security: it is a struggle, this is an area we need to invest in the future, we'll need capacity and expertise to design proper security projects and gain the credibility that the EU can do something beyond the usual "wish list" we receive from authorities.

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?	Yes
If yes, please identify 2-3 key areas of improvement below	1. More ability to respond to emergencies and prevent crises (e.g. The EU Trust Fund). 2. Improved strategic framework: in the programming cycle we are trying to identify key areas where we can make a difference. 3. More involvement of PC and CS in implementation.

#### EUD Morocco interview

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?	No. There are some issues that are more prominent such as migration but I don't see changes in the priorities or the programming.
Can you please identify below key areas of improvement or worsening?	There are problems with security: where do you fit security in our cooperation framework? We don't have the framework, competence, partner.

In terms of adjusting ENI resources to unexpected events is not applicable in Morocco but we have been negatively impacted (a decrease on our support in favour of other countries). Sometime ago DG Budget had a flexibility cushion that was not programmed and was used according to needs. For example, the funds for the food security crisis in Cuba (under DCI) came from that security cushion. It would be good to have something similar with ENI. If you need to use your instrument to cover emergencies you are taking away money that have been programmed for other countries or you reduce the incentive that the country can take from umbrella funds.

#### Moldova EUD interview:

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?	No
Can you please identify below key areas of improvement or worsening?	Could be improved: flexibility (financial regulation). More focus on results and less focus on procedures. Our major constraints are financial regulation and procurement rules which are not specific to the ENI.

However the need for more flexibility is already considerable and is increasing / will increase, because of the Neighbourhood context as well as because of the DG Near and ENI objectives.

DG Near objectives include:

*“General objective 1 – A Stronger Global Actor*

*Specific objective 1: Increased stability in the Neighbourhood in political, economic, and security related terms (...) Particular attention will be given to Neighbourhood countries affected by the refugee crisis. (...)*

*DG NEAR will continue implementing the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis and will launch activities under the Northern Africa window of the Africa Trust Fund to address the root causes of irregular migration.”*

(EC (2016) Management Plan 2016 DG NEAR, p4 )

*“Specific objective 5: Stem the influx of irregular migrants to the EU, by addressing the rootcauses of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration in Enlargement and Neighbourhood countries. Promote mobility and mutually beneficial migration.*

*The current refugee crisis is a challenge of global dimensions. DG NEAR will work hand in hand in 2016 with partners and neighbouring countries which are most affected combining short term measures, for example helping governments cope with migration and refugee flows and boosting long term prospects including education for refugees and improving livelihoods.*

*DG NEAR will focus especially on Turkey to stop the flow of irregular migration to the EU coming from that country. DG NEAR will also work on the Jordan/Lebanon compacts. (...)*

*DG NEAR will make sure that the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and the Trust Fund Africa are implemented and added value ensured.”*

(EC (2016) Management Plan 2016 DG NEAR, p13)

ENP review 2015 p 3: « *The new ENP will seek to deploy the available instruments and resources in a more coherent and flexible manner. Additionally, it will be important to seek a deeper involvement of EU Member States in re-energising work with our neighbours.*»

P 4: *“As in other areas, the revised ENP will offer a tailor-made approach to cooperating on security-related matters, and will actively ensure that our overall engagement is conflict-sensitive, and fully compliant with international law, including international human rights law.”*

ENP Review 2015 P 15: *“Cooperation with partners on migration and mobility has deepened over the last years through several far-reaching visa dialogues and a number of Mobility Partnerships. Dialogues have also been established with other partners both in the East and in the South. The EU is committed to reinforcing cooperation with neighbours and beyond – not least with the Western Balkans, Turkey, countries of the wider Middle East, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. In order to foster reforms and reinforce the commitment of our partner countries to work in closer partnership, differentiation between partner countries will be developed, working more closely on visa and mobility issues with those that are willing to engage with the EU, including visa liberalisation and facilitation dialogues with partners.*

*There are already ongoing regional dialogues such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes in the South and the Budapest and Prague processes in the East as well as on the Eastern Partnership panel on Migration and Asylum for intra-regional cooperation and programming. A Thematic Framework could be developed to enable more effective cooperation on migration with countries outside the Neighbourhood.”*

ENP review 2015 p17, *“Ensuring protection for those in need:*

*The EU’s wider Neighbourhood contains several major protracted crises and hosts close to 40% of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons. Therefore, the EU needs a more integrated and more comprehensive response promoting close linkages between short-term humanitarian needs and longer-term development and security responses.*

*The EU should assist partner countries in developing their asylum and protection systems by supporting those displaced by conflicts, with particular consideration to unaccompanied refugee children, to ensure that their basic needs are guaranteed, their human rights are protected and their socio-economic and human potential is not wasted and is made available to host societies and communities. The new Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPPs) in North Africa and the Horn of Africa which will become operational in 2016, as well as the already existing RDPP in the Middle East (Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq) will be crucial to that end. Their aim is to support partner countries hosting large numbers of displaced people through capacity building and assistance, primarily in the area of international protection and asylum, partly by increasing the resilience of forcibly-displaced populations and their host communities.”*

ENP review 2015 p20

*“the level of their ambitions, and commitment to and implementation of reform will continue to guide the allocation of funds under the ENP umbrella programme.*

*Developments in the Neighbourhood countries have indicated a growing need for international financial and economic support to underpin necessary transition and stability. The European Union’s existing toolbox provides for resources that are targeted to a variety of issues, but in many cases limited in size when compared to the needs that have and can be identified. The Commission will therefore conduct an in-depth assessment over the coming months with a view to developing options, including an instrument, that could better and more efficiently address the financial needs of Neighbourhood countries, at the same time supporting their on-going necessary reform efforts. This work could build on the experience of existing instruments, including those created over the past years to support EU Member States.*

*The response to the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine and the use of Trust Funds are examples of how the EU’s financial instruments can react quickly and flexibly. However, more needs to be done to accelerate assistance and to ensure it is better adapted to rapidly evolving political circumstances and priorities.”*

All interviewees at HQ indicate that: *“Flexibility should increase. It is a critical issue, under discussion. But possible implications and procedures are not yet clear for us now.”*

*“But the ENI is not suitable or sufficient for all needs, especially where a crisis response requires substantial additional funding at short notice. ENI funding is therefore complemented by support from other instruments, such as the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), EU humanitarian funding (ECHO) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Additional funds may need to be mobilised, through these or other instruments, as required by the evolving situation in the region — the responses in Syria and Ukraine are examples of this.”*

(EC (2015) Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014, p 14)

*“In situations of fragility, conflict and crisis, particular attention needs to be paid to peace building and state building, including confidence building measures. An in-depth analysis of the root causes of the crisis is a prerequisite in this process. Reference is to be made to the New Deal endorsed at the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid effectiveness in Busan in 2011. A comprehensive approach is particularly important in the case of crisis (including conflict), post crisis and fragile areas. All instruments should be used in a way that ensures the EU can deliver as one at country level. This requires involving specific expertise of these instruments in the programming exercise (including CSDP missions). In states affected by conflict or fragility, programming must remain flexible and adjustments made to reflect unforeseen/emerging needs and to ensure a better transition between short and long term commitments.”* (DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI – 2014-2020, p.8)

*“The unprecedented migration flows experienced in 2015 and the repeated terrorist attacks in Europe and throughout the world called for a strong and swift European response, combining new legislative, operational and financial means. As a central element of that toolbox, the EU budget has shown considerable flexibility in reorienting and making available additional means within the budget itself and in mobilising additional contributions from Member States and other donors. However this flexibility is reaching the limits of the current framework.*

*As the challenges of migration and security are rooted in geopolitical and societal developments which need to be addressed in the longer-term, the EU budget must further develop its capacity to support the management of migration flows as well as the protection and integration of refugees and to address the root causes of migration. This is one of the main purposes of the package of legislative proposals which accompanies this review and which aims at both providing additional financial means for migration and security within the current MFF and at further strengthening the flexibility of the latter in dealing with unforeseen circumstances.*

(EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results, COM(2016) 603 final}, p.3)

Even in unstable/in crisis countries, there are no multiple strategic scenarios available at EUD level, as it has been confirmed during the field visits.

#### *Ukraine Field Report*

*Existence of multiple strategic scenarios at the EUD level (planning stage): It seems that no-one (including the EU) could have anticipated the big changes of the regime in Ukraine. However Ukraine status has changed and it has become a strategic partner for the EU. Though, no strategic scenarios about the future of this country are available at the EUD. EUD interventions have not, and are not, driven by any strategic vision relative to the Ukraine context. The implicit scenario/guideline seems to be that the “pro-reform” process will continue. Major risks are present, including the risk of “Europ fatigue” in the country, recently strengthened by the rejection by Dutch voters of the ratification of the Association Agreement (AA) between the EU and Ukraine.*

*There is a paradox so far: Huge amount of EC assistance to Ukraine; No geopolitical analysis providing scenarios on which the programming of this assistance could rely.*

*Nevertheless it has been decided (and now it is being elaborated) that a new multi-annual programme will be developed for the period 2018-2020; this should logically mean that it will be based on specific decision on the policy lines and the focus of ENI during this period. Though relevant information has not been provided to the Evaluators.*

#### *Georgia Field Report*

The team did not collect evidences that a risk assessment exercise was undertaken to prevent unanticipated social unrest linked to reforms' social costs or operated from outside. Georgia is somehow seen as an island of stability in a troubled region, which is likely wrong given i) instrumented seces-

sionist provinces, ii) Russia destabilization tactics, and iii) extent of poverty in rural areas. In brief, the renewed hierarchy of priorities is not integrated or even tested.

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews: DG NEAR, EEAS, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 1.2.3 I-123. Evidence that preparing, implementing and monitoring EU support involved the external action partners, including civil society organisations and local authorities {[6]}, resulting in alignment with partner country and regional priorities.

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The indicator is related to change in the involvement process of cooperation partners at the different stages and on the alignment between ENI objectives and PC priorities.

2016 is a year of transition (“Over the course of 2016, we intend to discuss the proposals contained in this Joint Communication, as well as subsequent positions taken by the EU, with partner countries, with a view to jointly determine the shape of our future relations, based on the recommendations outlined in this Joint Communication”, p. 21), and evidence already produced is very limited.

Facts and inputs collected during EUD interviews and field visits show that, overall, the PC and the other partners do not feel a considerable change in terms of priorities of the EC so far. However it is obviously too early to provide a robust conclusion on this issue. Difficulties on specific sector/objective remain similar, such as the support to CSO in Egypt for example. Available information indicates that there has been more involvement of civil society. There are multiple examples of the participation of CSOs in programming and implementation stages.

One point has led to frequent comments, negative (Tunisia, Ukraine, Algeria) or doubtful (Jordan): the concentration on three sectors. Clearly, this change has not been appreciated by the PC.

#### Presentation of collected proof

##### EUD interview analysis:

##### Is the partner seizing the opportunities offered by the changes that occurred since 2014 in managing ENP/ENI resources?

According to EUDs interviewed, 5 out of 12 countries (Jordan, Ukraine, Lebanon, Egypt and Armenia) answered yes to this question though only 3 illustrate their answers with examples which were mainly aid modality-related: Budget Support (Jordan), Trust Funds (Lebanon) and Blending (Egypt). According to Belarus, the PC is seizing opportunities albeit for reasons besides the 2014 changes.

Algeria, Moldova, Morocco and Azerbaijan do not see big changes and Georgia and Palestine do not provide any answer.

##### Analysis EAMRs 2013-2014-2015

In 2015 there are more countries that explicitly refer to the difficult context in which CSOs operate, thus limiting EU support and policy dialogue with regards to CSO participation: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt and Palestine. The lack of regulation and sometimes restrictions imposed by governments on NGOs has led to the early termination and even suspension of programmes. This compares to two cases in 2013 and 2014: Egypt and Palestine. Nonetheless, in 2013 political crisis, insecurity and weak institutional capacity of governments and CSOs have also undermined the EU's capacity to engage in policy dialogue and involve CSOs in the preparing, implementation and follow-up of ENI programmes. This is true in Armenia, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Palestine.

*Egypt Field Report: ENI programming has been aligned on partner countries' strategies and needs:* The Partnership agreement is 99.9% drafted, fully aligned with GoE sector policies targeted by the EU. Alignment was easy because sector of concentration are kept over time, thus corresponding already for a large part to the EU reforms agenda. The obstacle faced for months that blocks the programming of ENI actions relates to the control implemented by GoE on CSOs funded by foreign countries (at registration stage, at project level and likely soon for each financial transfer).

Former Moldova desk HQ, now in Tunisia, consider that the Eastern Partnership is no longer active. (From Sept 2013 – Armenia out of the AA- things have started to degenerate...)

#### *Tunisia Field Report*

- GoTn has not been satisfied by the principle of concentration on 3 sectors, because it considers that Tunisia needs are very diversified and can not be limited to 3 sectors.
- GoTn has expressed no specific disagreement with the new list of priorities, but it has not demonstrated any particular enthusiasm either

#### *Tunisia Field Report*

*The capacity of policy dialogue of the EU is weakened by issues in capitalising experience and technical expertise, relative "isolation" of EUDs staff, and quality of services provided by framework contractors:*

These limitations were not confirmed by the EUD and its partners. GovT indicated that the EUD expertise was appreciated, particularly during strategic and programming exercises. The MS Development agencies had the same judgment, while they sometimes complain that EUD has too limited resources and time to lead the coordination process between European Donors.

In Tunisia, where the EC has considerably increased its volume of intervention, there is clearly an issue of "absorption capacity" at the EUD level. The EUD will soon benefit from 2 additional staff members; a late acknowledgment of an expanding workload.

#### *Georgia Field Report*

*Correspondence of the ENI objectives (Art.1 & 2) with partner country's own priorities:* Georgia overarching priority is EU integration, thus EU harmonisation and approximation. This priority was well adjusted to ENPI priorities but less so to ENI ones, more geared on development policy. The principle of differentiation authorizes however the EU to carry on an approximation process, even if prospects for Georgia to ever become a candidate country for accession is remote and acknowledged so by both parties. The underlying contradiction is rationalized by GoG by considering EU model as the most relevant to show the path for development; another reason evoked is that EU integration is a vision and a project that contribute to mobilise to population and help changes to happen – against their social costs.

(...) GoG and the EU have overwhelming geostrategic reasons (vis-à-vis Russia destabilization tactics) to carry on an approximation policy framework.

Overall, EU in Georgia is still implementing ENPI priorities, with no update of the strategy with regards to renewed priorities of the ENP Review. The team did not find evidence that a risk assessment exercise was undertaken to anticipate social unrest linked to reforms' social costs or operated from outside.

*A divergence emerged since 2015 between renewed ENP priorities and partner's ones:* Yes, and even with ENI compared to ENPI agenda. EU partnership with Georgia, and the East more generally, is developed on a specific path using the differentiation principle and the large array of priorities embedded into ENI regulation. It might be said that GoG is resisting to some extent renewed ENP priorities, seen as more relevant to the South.

Ukraine "A draft Concept for SME strategy was elaborated by the MEDT and is currently under consultation with the sector [...] Agriculture: After extensive consultation with all national and international stakeholders and donors and a formal endorsement by the National Reform Council, the Single and

Comprehensive Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development 2015-2020 was formally launched by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food.” (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3-9).

Leadership in coordinating division of labour with EU MS (Algeria, Ukraine, Morocco, Palestine and Egypt). was highlighted by the EUD as an area in which the EUD has established its added-value. (EUD Interviews analysis)

EUD interview analysis:

All countries except Ukraine agree that ENI programming has helped integrate meaningful civil society, though in some cases (Algeria, Egypt and Azerbaijan) impact is limited owing to difficult situations on the ground (government control and restrictions).

EUD interview analysis:

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?

Seven out of 12 countries (Jordan, Palestine, Belarus, Georgia, Egypt, Armenia and Azerbaijan) attest to seeing an improvement compared to ENPI pre-2014. Areas of improvement most commonly mentioned are:

- i. More involvement of PC and civil society in implementation with 6 out of 7 countries (Jordan, Palestine, Belarus, Georgia, Egypt and Azerbaijan).
- ii. Strengthened policy dialogue with 5 out of 7 countries (Palestine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan).
- iii. Improved strategic framework with 4 out of 7 countries (Algeria, Jordan, Palestine, Georgia).

Other areas of improvement highlighted by countries are:

- Improved involvement of / coordination with EU MS (Palestine, Belarus, Georgia and Egypt).

According to Morocco and Lebanon, there is good progress in some areas, such as policy dialogue, involvement of civil society, and coordination with EU MS, but these are seen as a continuation of the ENPI.

Algeria EUD interview:

Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming: we do our best, CSOs capacity is weak and they are under government control and face a lot of restrictions

Jordan EUD interview: Focus difficult:

“we have chosen to be more flexible which is good but it doesn't allow you to have the necessary expertise and resources because you have to respond to many needs and different areas (e.g.: justice, human rights, trade, private sector, etc). Though our primary objective was to try to focus in a few sectors, we somehow are in the middle of that. For instance, the Syrian crisis has added new areas that we have withdrawn from e.g. we are back in the water sector because of the impact of the crisis.”

“Improvement: specific funding for CSOs under ENI and measures to get them more involved in the programming and implementation of the programmes. “

Morocco EUD interview:

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?

1. Aligning on PC priorities and needs: we had it before ENI. 2. Establishing a balanced relationship with PCs in programming ENI. 3. Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming: but only bilaterally from our side not at macro level with the government.

ease specify below other key areas of improvement or orsening:	Need improve: 1. More flexibility in the use of resources: in terms of administration the situation is worse. 2. Coordination with MSs: Joint programming is a complex issue and it's not working very well in Morocco.
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Lebanon EUD interview:

The government is dysfunctional at many levels. The parliament is not working, the government cabinet hardly meets and there's no President. There's no development policy with which we can align.

Aligning on PC priorities and needs: they don't have much priorities, only in some areas/Ministries e.g. Agriculture and in the response to the Syrian crisis. But in many other areas there are no particular priorities expressed by the country. 2. Establishing a balanced relationship with PCs in programming ENI: the EU consults PC and takes their opinion into account. We were able to coordinate with PC during programming of ENI. 3. Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming: structured dialogue with CS in many areas.

#### Palestine EUD interview:

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?	1. Aligning on PC priorities and needs. 2. Including meaningfully the CS into ENI programming: consultations and support to CS. 4. Ownership of ENI programmes by PC.
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#### Belarus EUD interview:

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?	1. Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming. 2. Introducing new EU priorities set on migration and security: in 2016 we are planning a new programme for irregular migration. 3. Ownership of ENI programmes by the PC (before there was not so much) since 2016 Belarus is much more interested and responsible.
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#### Georgia EUD interview

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?	1. Aligning on PC priorities and needs: and the EU contributes to developing/improving them. 2. Establishing balanced relationship with PC in programming ENI: deep dialogue and strong donor coordination by the government. 3. Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming: in many different ways e.g. by mainstreaming CS in programmes. 4. Adjusting ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events: e.g. floods, in AAP 2016 with an integrated approach to economic development in rural areas but the strict definition of focal sectors limits the capacity to adjust resources to unexpected events. 5. Introducing new EU priorities set on migration and security: to some extent. 6. Ownership of ENI programmes by the PC (strong)
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More involvement of PC and CS in implementation. 4. Improved involvement of / coordination with EU MS: effects more visible for 2017-2020

#### Egypt EUD interview:

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?	1. Aligning on PC priorities and needs: except in human rights and fundamental freedoms. 2. Including meaningfully the CS into ENI programming: despite government restrictions and hostile environment the EU has made a significant contribution and it's being recognized for it. 3. Adjusting ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events: crisis is getting worse and the EU has been able to respond, ENI programming is
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#### Armenia EUD interview:

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?	1. Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming. 2. Adjusting ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events.
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#### Azerbaijan EUD interview:

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?

1. Aligning on PC priorities and needs: whenever possible because there are no strategic framework or sector strategies in the country and it's more difficult with the ENI because there is less flexibility. It was easier with the ENPI in a context where there is not a clear direction. Particularly the Twinning instrument has been very much appreciated and it is a very good tool to get Azerbaijan closer to EU standards (though they are less strategic). Azerbaijan is using more Twinning than other countries that have signed an Association Agreements (Azerbaijan has not signed an AA). 2. Establishing a balanced relationship with PCs in programming ENI (orientations and expertise). 3. Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming: consultations and discussions to the extent that is possible (following the crackdown in 2014 CS is getting smaller and expertise is getting lost, many INGOs working in focal sectors have left the country so it's becoming more difficult but we try to get them involved as much as we can).

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?	Yes
If yes, please identify 2-3 key areas of improvement below	1. Strengthened policy dialogue (education, regional and rural development). 2. More involvement of PC and CS in implementation. 3. Improved involvement of /coordination with EUMSSs: not an issue because only 1 MS has cooperation programmes in the country (Germany).

#### Moldova EUD interview:

What are the key ENI contributions in your country?	1. Aligning on PC priorities and needs: though priorities are not well defined in the country our programmes are aligned with sectoral strategies. 2. Including meaningfully the civil society into ENI programming. 3. Introducing new EU priorities set on migration and security: we had programme in migration before, they are not new. Ownership is limited although we try very hard, there's ownership only in some areas. E.g.: although Moldova has signed the PAR it is not moving forward so it's difficult to implement projects in this area.
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#### Georgia EUD interview:

Adjusting ENI resources and programmes to unexpected events: e.g. floods, in AAP 2016 with an integrated approach to economic development in rural areas but the strict definition of focal sectors limits the capacity to adjust resources to unexpected events

#### Analysis of Quality Review Documents

According to DEVCO B2 (Civil Society, Local Authorities) the programme in support of the health sector in Tunisia is an example of good practice in mainstreaming civil society in a sectoral programme, another EU priority reinforced under the ENP review 2015 "The ENP will do more to support civil society".

#### Egypt:

In general, projects are aligned with national priorities e.g. 'the promoting inclusive economic growth in Egypt' programme is in line with the 'sustainable development strategy Egypt vision 2030'; the 'advancing women's rights programme' contributes to the 'national action plan for FGM abandonment'; and the 'fostering reforms in the Egyptian renewable energy and water sectors through developing capacity-building project' addresses two key sectors for the country's economy: energy and water. In the case of the 'developing capacity-building and national drainage programme III' which falls under the framework of the 'joint integrated sector approach', the intervention is built on past experiences thus further developing ongoing reforms. Regarding the 'upgrading informal areas infrastructures programme', it is not among the government's priorities though the project pays special attention to the involvement of local communities through participatory approaches and it is conducted in close collaboration with LAs. In the case of programmes dealing with sensitive issues such as human rights and fundamental freedoms, the EU targets national public institutions such as the National Council of Human Rights as an entry point and strategic approach to improve human rights records in the country.

#### Tunisia

All the projects of the sample, with the exception of SECER – for the reasons mentioned above – systematically refer to national policies, mainly the Constitutional Chart and the National Development Plan 2016-2020, which go to ensuring alignment with country priorities.

#### Ukraine

Overall, all projects are relevant and aligned with country priorities and the partner's policy is in line with the EU. The only exception is the 'European anti-corruption support office programme', which according to the QSG checklist needs further analysis with regard to the relevance and credibility of the partner's policies and their alignment with EU priorities.

#### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – EAMR; EUDs, Field missions

#### Level of information and confidence



<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

#### 1.2.4 I-124. Evidence of amendments to existing action programmes and measures {Art. 7(5), 7(10)} and/or adoption of individual or special measures {CIR art. 2.5} linked to crises or immediate threats to democracy, the rule of law or human rights and fundamental freedoms, or of natural or man-made disasters;

##### Global analysis of the indicator

Since ENI is being implemented, i.e. since 2014, amendments to action programmes and special measures have mostly been adopted in relation to two major crises: the political instability/armed conflict in Ukraine and the civil war in Syria and its repercussions on the region.

In Ukraine, two actions have been cancelled (one on the advancement of the country's environmental policy, the other on the removal of trade barriers between the EU and Ukraine) and the freed funds (EUR 123 million) have been used to create a new budget support programme in the form of a State Building Contract for Ukraine. This State building contract provides direct financial support to Ukraine in the short-term and supports the transition process with a focus on the fight against corruption, public administration reform and constitutional and electoral law reform. The action will be implemented with budget support.

While the Commission has suspended its cooperation with the Syrian Government since 2011, direct support to the affected population in Syria and in the neighbouring countries affected has been maintained through various special measures (in addition to humanitarian assistance). These measures have mainly focused on early recovery and education, as well as support to humanitarian efforts and joint cross-border operations from Turkey. In 2014, EUR 41.25 million have been allocated to this special measure, followed by another allocation of EUR 40 million in 2015. Lebanon and Jordan, being the main recipient countries of refugees from Syria, have both been subject to special measures targeting the living conditions (education and health) and the (economic) integration of refugees. For that purpose, EUR 73.33 million have been allocated in Lebanon and EUR 66 million to Jordan.

Since 2014, a few other amendments/decisions on special measures have been made for reasons not related to one of the two crises mentioned above.

An amendment for Palestine increased the EU 2015 contribution to UNRWA's general fund by EUR 10 million (to a total of EUR 102 million). The increase was deemed necessary to allow UNRWA to bridge its financial gap and thus keep schools open for Palestine refugees in all its areas of operation. At the same time, the amendment also authorised the receipt of a contribution of EUR 25,000 from Portugal and of EUR 1.5 million from Austria to the Vulnerable Palestinian Families component of the PEGASE programme. The following year, a second amendment authorised another EUR 1 million from France and GBP 900,000 from the UK (equivalent to EUR 1,280,410) to the action "Access to Essential Social and Public Infrastructure in Area C".

A special measure in favour of Israel was decided in 2015 and aimed at supporting the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan with a contribution of EUR 2 million.

In Morocco, additional funds to support the implementation of policies in the health and justice sectors were made available in order to reinforce the measures foreseen in the 2014 action plan and to reward the country's progress and ambition in these two sectors. In total, EUR 15.5 million were allocated.

Following the incentive-based approach set forth in the ENI, Georgia and Moldova were granted EUR 30 million each through the channels of multi-country umbrella programmes as a reward for continuous progress towards deep and sustainable democracy. The funds were allocated to one action in Moldova and three actions in Georgia.

In short, while the majority of reallocations/adoption of special measures in terms of volume took place in relation to major crises (roughly EUR 343.6 million), a considerable amount was also made available as incentives in a positive and encouraging context (EUR 75.5 million). Only a comparatively small amount was used in reallocations or for the establishment of

special measures within the context of “normal” development cooperation (EUR 15.8 million).

### Presentation of collected proof

To facilitate the implementation of the incentive-based approach set forth in the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Commission establishes multi-country umbrella programmes that supplement the indicative financial allocations for country programmes. In 2014, Georgia was granted EUR 30 million, and the Republic of Moldova was granted EUR 30 million through this mechanism that offers incentives to countries that make progress towards deep and sustainable democracy; these allocations provide funding for the present special measure. (C(2014) 2988 final of 2.5.2014)

The following “Special measure 2014 in favour of Georgia and Moldova”, constituted by the actions identified in the second paragraph and as set out in Annexes 1 to 4 is approved:

The actions constituting this measure are:

- – Annex 1: “Support to the implementation of DCFTA process in Moldova”;
- – Annex 2: “Framework Programme in support of EU-Georgia Agreements (top-up)”;
- – Annex 3: “European Neighbourhood programme for agriculture and rural development (ENPARD) Georgia (top-up)”;
- – Annex 4: “Human rights for all in Georgia”.

(C(2014) 2988 final of 2.5.2014)

*“L'état d'avancement et les ambitions de la politique sectorielle marocaine en matière de santé et de justice sont considérés comme suffisamment pertinents et crédibles pour l'octroi de contributions additionnelles afin de renforcer des mesures appuyées dans le cadre du programme d'action 2014.*

*Il y a lieu d'octroyer une contribution additionnelle de l'Union de 10 000 000 EUR dans le domaine de la santé afin de renforcer les mesures favorisant i) l'accès équitable aux soins de santé primaire; ii) l'amélioration de la gestion et renforcement des compétences du personnel de santé et; iii) l'amélioration de la gouvernance.*

*Il y a lieu d'octroyer une contribution additionnelle de l'Union de 5 500 000 EUR dans le domaine de la justice afin de renforcer les mesures favorisant i) l'amélioration de l'accès au droit et à la justice; ii) le renforcement de la protection judiciaire des droits et des libertés et; iii) l'augmentation de l'efficacité et de l'efficience de la justice.”*

(C(2015) 7347 final of 20.10.2015)

*“La contribution maximale de l'Union autorisée par la présente décision pour la mise en œuvre du présent programme est fixée à 175 500 000 EUR se répartissant comme suit:*

- – 70 000 000 EUR à financer sur la ligne budgétaire 21.03.01.01 du budget général de l'Union pour 2014 ;
- – 5 500 000 EUR à financer sur la ligne budgétaire 21.03.03.03 du budget général de l'Union pour 2015 ;
- – 90 000 000 EUR à financer sur la ligne budgétaire 21.03.01.02 du budget général de l'Union pour 2014 ;
- – 10 000 000 EUR à financer sur la ligne budgétaire 21.03.03.03 du budget général de l'Union pour 2015. “

(C(2015) 7347 final of 20.10.2015)

*“La contribution maximale de l'Union européenne autorisée par la présente Décision pour la mise en œuvre du présent programme est fixée à 160 millions EUR:*

- – 70 millions d'EUR à financer sur la ligne budgétaire 21.03.01.01 et
- – 90 millions d'EUR à financer sur la ligne budgétaire 21.03.01.02

*du budget général de l'Union européenne pour 2014.”*

(C(2014) 7204 final)

*“The special measure 2015 in favour of Israel, "as set out in the attached Annex, is approved. The measure shall include the following action: Support to the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan.*

*The maximum contribution of the European Union for the implementation of the measure referred to in Article 1 is set at EUR 2 million and shall be financed from budget line 21 03 01 02 of the general budget of the European Union for 2015.*

*The financial contribution provided for in the first paragraph may also cover interest due for late payment.”*

(C(2015) 8536 final of 10.12.2015)

*“The Commission adopted on 20 November 2013 Decision C(2013)8059 approving the ENPI Annual Action Programme 2013 in favour of Ukraine, comprising four actions with a budget estimate of up to EUR 186 million to be financed from budget line 19 08 01 03 of the general budget of the European Union for 2013.*

*The four actions mentioned above are the following: Sector Policy Support Programme – Support to Ukraine’s Regional Policy (EUR 55 million); Further support to the implementation of the National Environmental Policy of Ukraine (EUR 55 million); Second Phase of the Sector Policy Support Programme – Promoting mutual trade by removing technical barriers to trade between Ukraine and the European Union (EUR 55 million); Framework programme in support of EU-Ukraine agreements (EUR 21 million).*

*Pursuant to Article 4 of that Decision, the maximum contribution has been subsequently increased by EUR 13 million to a total of EUR 199 million. This amount has been allocated to the action “Further support to the implementation of the National Environmental Policy of Ukraine”, increasing the amount allocated to the action to EUR 68 million.*

*Given the political developments in February 2014 and the urgent need to provide a quick response to the Ukrainian authorities’ need in restabilising the overall stability and governance as recalled by the European Council Conclusions of 20 March 2014, it is considered appropriate to modify Decision C(2013) 8059 to reallocate part of the funds (EUR 123 million) to a new budget support programme in the form of a State Building Contract for Ukraine. This State building contract provides direct financial support to Ukraine in the short-term and supports the transition process with a focus on the fight against corruption, public administration reform and constitutional and electoral law reform. The action will be implemented with budget support.*

[...]

*Annexes 2 and 3 of Decision C (2013)8059, entitled “Further support to the implementation of the National Environmental Policy of Ukraine” and “Second Phase of the Sector Policy Support Programme – Promoting mutual trade by removing technical barriers to trade between Ukraine and the European Union” respectively, are deleted, and the annex to this decision is added.”*

(C(2014) 2906 final)

*“Commission Decision C (2015) 690 final adopted on 10 February 2015 approved the programmes entitled “PEGASE Direct Financial Support to Recurrent Expenditures of the Palestinian Authority 2015 – part 1” and “Contribution to UNRWA’s 2015 Regular Budget”. This Decision was financed under Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument.*

*The Commission should take note that EUR 10 million was added to Decision C(2015) 690 final by the responsible authorising officer as a non-substantial change under the flexibility provision of Article 4 of Decision C (2015) 690 final.*

*The first purpose of this modifying Decision is to increase the contribution to UNRWA by EUR 10 million, bringing the total contribution to UNRWA’s general fund to EUR 102 million for 2015. This additional funding, together with contributions from other donors, will allow UNRWA to bridge its financial gap and thus keep schools open for Palestine refugees in all its fields of operation.*

*The second purpose of this modifying Decision is to authorise the receipt of a contribution of EUR 25,000 from Portugal and of EUR 1.5 million from Austria to the Vulnerable Palestinian Families component of the PEGASE programme.”*

[...]

*“The Annexes of Decision C (2015) 690 final are replaced by the following:*

*Annex 1: PEGASE Direct Financial Support to Recurrent Expenditures of the Palestinian Authority 2015 – part 1;*

*Annex 2: Contribution to UNRWA’s 2015 Regular Budget.*

*The maximum contribution of the European Union for the implementation of the programme referred to in Article 1 is set at EUR 233,525,000 and shall be financed from budget line 21 03 01 04 of the gen-*

eral budget of the European Union for 2015. The financial contribution provided for in the first paragraph may also cover interest due for late payment.”

(C(2015) 7928 final of 10.11.2015)

“Commission Decision C (2014) 5986 final adopted on 26 August 2014 approved five actions in support of Palestine. This Decision was financed under Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument.

The purpose of this modifying Decision is to authorise the receipt of a contribution of EUR 1 million from France and of GBP 900,000 (equivalent to 1,280,410 EUR by applying the Inforeuro December 2015 exchange rate) from the United Kingdom to the action "Access to Essential Social and Public Infrastructure in Area C".

The maximum contribution of the European Union for the implementation of the programme referred to in Article 1 is set at EUR 54,280,410 and shall be financed from budget line 21 03 01 04 of the general budget of the European Union for 2014 for an amount of EUR 52 million and from budget line 22 04 01 04 of the general budget of the European Union for 2016 for an amount of EUR 2,280,410. The amount referred to in the first paragraph includes contributions from other donors to the general budget of the European Union as external assigned revenue as provided for in the attached Annex.

The financial contribution provided for in the first paragraph may also cover interest due for late payment.”

(C(2016) 1128 final of 19.2.2016)

“In light of the ongoing repression and restrictive measures taken by the Council of the European Union, the Commission has suspended its cooperation with the Syrian Government since May 2011. Since then, normal programming for Syria has not been possible due to the ongoing conflict but direct support to the affected population in Syria and in the neighbouring countries affected has been maintained under the European Neighbourhood Instrument through various special measures in complementarity to humanitarian assistance in sectors such as education and early recovery. This will be revised should the situation evolve towards a post-crisis statebuilding and reconstruction scenario.

The objective pursued by this measure to be financed under Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument is to help the Syrian population to cope with the effects of the crisis and prepare for recovery. This special measure is made necessary by the dramatic worsening of the Syrian crisis.

Action entitled “Support to people in Syria affected by the crisis – Phase II” will contribute to help people in Syria cope with effects of the crisis and facilitate a peaceful and democratic transition. It will be implemented through grants to Civil Society Organisations.

Action entitled “Urban information and analysis to help plan and target humanitarian and recovery interventions in Syria” will contribute to improve the humanitarian and recovery responses to the Syria crisis through better urban information and analysis. It will be implemented jointly by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and the EU Joint Research Center (JRC).

Action entitled “Education for vulnerable and displaced children in Syria” will contribute to improve access to education and to psychosocial support for school-age children in Syria. It will be implemented jointly by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

Action entitled “Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations” will contribute to strengthening the resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the protracted crisis and enable those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives. It will be implemented with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Action entitled “Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey” will contribute to provide basic services to the Syrian population and to strengthen local governance through the implementation of flexible and shortterm delivery projects in Syria with local civil partners. It will also contribute to decrease community tensions by addressing the needs of Syrian refugees in Turkey. It will be implemented with Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).“

[...]

“The 2014 special measure for the Syrian population, as set out in the Annexes, is approved. The measure shall include the following actions:

- Annex 1: Support to people in Syria affected by the crisis – Phase II;
- Annex 2: Urban information and analysis to help plan and target humanitarian and recovery interventions in Syria;
- Annex 3: Education for vulnerable and displaced children in Syria;

- *Annex 4: Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations;*
- *Annex 5: Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey.*

*The maximum contribution of the European Union for the implementation of the measure referred to in Article 1 is set at EUR 41,250,000 and shall be financed from budget line 21 03 01 02 of the general budget of the European Union for 2014.*

*The financial contribution provided for in the first paragraph may also cover interest due for late payment. “*

*(C(2014) 9146 final of 4.12.2014)*

*“The objective pursued by this measure to be financed under the ENI is to help the Syrian population to cope with the effects of the crisis and prepare for recovery. This special measure is made necessary by the dramatic worsening of the Syrian crisis and its spill-over effects in the region.*

*The action entitled “Restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations inside Syria” will contribute to help people in Syria cope with effects of the crisis, support their livelihoods inside Syria and avoid inflating the millions of refugees that have fled to the neighbouring countries. It will be implemented through grants to consortia of Non Governmental Organisations.*

*The action entitled “Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey” will contribute to provide basic services to the Syrian population and to strengthen local governance through the implementation of flexible and shortterm delivery projects in Syria with local civil partners, notably in the health sector. It will be implemented by Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).*

*The action entitled “Strengthening the resilience of Palestine refugees communities in Syria” will contribute to improve the resilience of Palestine refugees in Syria through supporting access to basic services (Education, Health) and to livelihoods opportunities. It will be implemented through UNRWA.*

*The Commission has adopted a These actions fall under the joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat”.*

*[...]*

*“The Commission Decision on the 2015 special measure for the Syrian population, as set out in the annexes, is approved.*

*The measure shall include the following actions:*

- *Annex 1: Restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations inside Syria;*
- *Annex 2: Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey ;*
- *Annex 3: Strengthening the resilience of Palestine refugees communities in Syria.*

*The maximum contribution of the European Union for the implementation of the measure referred to in Article 1 is set at EUR 40,000,000 and shall be financed from budget line 21 03 01 03 of the general budget of the European Union for 2015.*

*The financial contribution provided for in the first paragraph may also cover interest due for late payment.”*

*(C(2015) 8541 final of 4.12.2015)*

*“Lebanon has so far been the main recipient country of refugees from Syria with 1,176,971 Syrian refugees registered or awaiting registration with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (29 August 2014) in addition to approximately 42,000 Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) recorded with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Lebanon.*

*The objectives pursued by the measure to be financed under Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument are to support the Lebanese authorities in coping with the pressure on the basic services delivery and to alleviate the burden on the host communities.*

*The protracted crisis with the steady increase of refugees is requesting an additional and urgent effort to address the recent developments and especially the growing tensions in the social fabric.*

*Action entitled "Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon – Education & Health" will contribute to supporting the most vulnerable population in Lebanon through education and*

protection services for children and vulnerable groups and improvement of the provision of public healthcare services. It will be implemented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Action entitled "Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon – Palestine Refugees from Syria Education" will contribute to supporting the most vulnerable population in Lebanon through education and protection services for children and vulnerable groups and improvement of the provision of public healthcare services. It will be implemented by United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

Action entitled "Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon – Economic recovery and basic infrastructures" will contribute to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of basic services provided to the Lebanese host communities affected by the influx of Syrian refugees by enhancing basic public infrastructure and of income generating opportunities. It will be implemented through grants by non-governmental organisations and local authorities."

[...]

"The 2014 special measure in favour of Lebanon for the Syria crisis, as set out in the Annexes, is approved.

The measure shall include the following actions:

- Annex 1: Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon – Education & Health;
- Annex 2: Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon – Palestine Refugees from Syria Education;
- Annex 3: Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon – Economic recovery and basic infrastructures.

The maximum contribution of the European Union for the implementation of the measure referred to in Article 1 is set at EUR 73,325,452 and shall be financed from the budget line 21 03 01 02 of the general budget of the European Union for 2014.

The financial contribution provided for in the first paragraph may also cover interest due for late payment."

(C(2014) 9115 final of 4.12.2014)

"Jordan is at the moment hosting more than 600,000 refugees from Syria, around half of whom are children of school-age, in addition to approximately 14,500 Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) recorded with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Jordan.

The objectives pursued by the measure to be financed under Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument are to support the Jordanian authorities in coping with the pressure on the basic services delivery, in particular in education, and to alleviate the burden on the host communities.

The protracted crisis with the steady increase of refugees requires an additional and urgent effort to address the recent developments and especially the growing tensions in the social fabric.

The Action entitled "Support to the Response to the Syria Crisis in Jordan" will contribute to supporting the co-ordination framework established by the Government of Jordan, in response to the Syria crisis; support recovery opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities and strengthen the resilience of Palestine Refugees from Syria in Jordan. It will be implemented by a call for proposals for nongovernmental organisations; the United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP); and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).

The Action entitled "Support to the Ministry of Education to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis" will contribute to allowing up to 140,000 Syrian refugee children to attend Jordanian government schools, training of teachers for this purpose and psychosocial support. It will be implemented primarily by budget support, supplemented by technical assistance and a call for proposal for civil society organisations.

The Action entitled "Provision of Higher Education to Syrian Youth affected by the Crisis, in Jordan" will contribute to providing services to allow Syrian Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to undertake higher education studies. It will be implemented through by direct management through the provision of services and grants for all three components.

[...]

The 2014 special measure in favour of Jordan for the Syria crisis, as set out in the Annexes, is approved.

The measure shall include the following actions:

- Annex 1: Support to the Response to the Syria Crisis in Jordan;
- Annex 2: Support to the Ministry of Education to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis;
- Annex 3: Provision of Higher Education to Syrian Youth affected by the crisis, in Jordan.

The maximum contribution of the European Union for the implementation of the measure referred to in Article 1 is set at EUR 66 million and shall be financed from the budget line 21 03 01 02 of the general budget of the European Union for 2014.


The financial contribution provided for in the first paragraph may also cover interest due for late payment.”

(C(2014) 9136 final of 4.12.2014)

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 1.2.5 I-125. %age of ENI budget reallocated as a result of amendments of programming documents and/or adoption of individual or special measures

### Global analysis of the indicator

For ENI, decisions on amendments or special measures were mostly made at the beginning of the new MFF. In total, 12.5% of the total value of ENI commitments were either reallocated or added after the initial allocations had been made in 2014.

Table 4 ENI amendments or special measures in the EU General Budget 2014

Budget lines	Commitments	Amendments or special measures	%
21 03 01 02	680,400,000	180,575,452	26.5%
21 03 03 03	163,277,000	75,500,000	46.2%
<b>Total ENI</b>	<b>2,050,510,133</b>	<b>256,075,452</b>	<b>12.5%</b>

Source: EU General Budget 2014, various decisions see presentation of collected proof

The modifications made to budget line 21 03 01 02 (“Mediterranean countries – Poverty reduction and sustainable development”) are related to the efforts made to mitigate the effects of the Syrian crisis on the population of Syria and on Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries Jordan and Lebanon. The modifications for budget line 21 03 03 03 (“Support to other multi-country cooperation in the Neighbourhood”) were made to provide a further incentive to Georgia, Moldova and Morocco in continuing their encouraging progress.

In addition to the modifications reflected in the above table, funds originally allocated to budget line 19 08 01 03 (“European Neighbourhood and Partnership financial cooperation with eastern Europe”) in the EU General Budget of 2013 were used in early 2014 to compose the SBC for Ukraine (total reallocation of EUR 123 million).

Table 5 ENI amendments or special measures in the EU General Budget 2015

Budget lines	Commitments	Amendments or special measures	%
21 03 01 02	553,545,237	2,000,000	0.4%
21 03 01 03	44,500,000	40,000,000	89.9%
21 03 01 04	264,500,000	11,525,000	4.4%
<b>Total ENI</b>	<b>1,966,403,376</b>	<b>53,525,000</b>	<b>2.7%</b>

Source: EU General Budget 2015, various decisions see presentation of collected proof

In 2015, the only major modification was the extension of the special measures for Syria, which added up to almost 90% of budget line 21 03 01 03 (Mediterranean countries – Confi-

dence building, security and the prevention and settlement of conflicts). Other modifications included a special measure for Israel (budget line 21 03 01 02) and amendment essentially increasing funds available for UNRWA in Palestine (budget line 21 03 01 04: Support to peace process and financial assistance to Palestine and to UNRWA).

The total amount of modifications merely reached a fifth of the 2014 amount.

**Table 6** ENI amendments or special measures in the EU General Budget 2016

Budget lines	Commitments	Amendments or special measures	%
22 04 01 04	272,100,000	2,280,410	0.8%
<b>Total ENI</b>	<b>2,151,495,550</b>	<b>2,280,410</b>	<b>0.1%</b>

Source: EU General Budget 2016, various decisions see presentation of collected proof

For 2016, the Evaluation Team could only identify evidence of one single amendment (budget line 22 04 01 04: Support to peace process and financial assistance to Palestine and to UNRWA) so far, the amount of which can be considered negligible. The budget year still being ongoing, additional modifications might still be made, especially considering that most of the modifications in previous years seem to have been made in either November or December.

To sum up, it is evident that the majority of budget modifications have been made at the very start of ENI. This may be related to the fact that the ongoing crises – which are the main reason for reallocations and the adoption of special measures – were already apparent at the start of ENI and the global situation did not evolve significantly.

### Presentation of collected proof

See Indicator 1.2.4 for individual decisions on amendments and special measures.

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Limited
Degree of confidence		Limited

Aggregated (budget) statistics on amendments/special measures would increase the level of confidence.

### 1.2.6 I-126. Evidence of smooth transition process from MDGs to SDGs (Including SDG 17 on partnerships) in ENI programme architecture and content (review of Consensus to be taken into account)

#### Global analysis of the indicator

Direct references to the SDGs or the 2030 Agenda are rare in the recent ENI programming documents, and only a few of the 2016 programming documents are available. Indirect references to the SDGs can be found in the description of the objectives and the contents of the different actions envisaged for the year. Available programming documents for 2016 for Egypt, Ukraine and Tunisia highlight recurrent references to the SDGs. However not all of the 17 SDGs are covered, mostly because many actions are sector specific.

Thus, the overall finding is that the transition towards SDGs framework in ENI programming is well on going. However, this evaluation is implemented too soon after the change of framework to be able to provide a better evidence-based judgment.

### Presentation of collected proof

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted as a part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development on the 25 September 2015, to replace the previous Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a global political framework for international cooperation. There are in total 17 SDGs and 169 indicators, covering more and more specific topics compared to the previous eight MDGs. The MDGs and the SDGs share the same goal, which is the end of poverty, but there are significant differ-



ences between them, reflecting the evolution of the global situation as well as the change in the approach towards development. The MDGs were 8 targets, easy to communicate and simple to track. The SDGs are more than twice as numerous, they are more detailed and more complex to communicate (which explains the choice for a very strong visual identity). The SDGs were designed to reflect the broader meaning of sustainability and to reach a statistical “zero” on hunger, poverty, preventable child deaths and other targets. An overview of the two sets of goals is presented in table below.

This change in the political framework for international cooperation is acknowledged in the “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy” of November 2015, also stressing the strong Union support to the adoption and implementation of the Agenda. The Review further mentions the EU adherence to the new framework whilst stating that the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, which is in line with the Agenda, should also inform ENI programming.

Table 7 MDGs and SDGs

<i>Millennium Development Goals</i>	<i>Sustainable Development Goals</i>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</li> <li>2. Achieve universal primary education</li> <li>3. Promote gender equality and empower women</li> <li>4. Reduce child mortality</li> <li>5. Improve maternal health</li> <li>6. Combating HIV/AIDs, malaria, and other diseases</li> <li>7. Ensure environmental sustainability</li> <li>8. Develop a global partnership for development</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere</li> <li>2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture</li> <li>3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages</li> <li>4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all</li> <li>5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</li> <li>6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all</li> <li>7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all</li> <li>8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all</li> <li>9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation</li> <li>10. Reduce inequality within and among countries</li> <li>11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable</li> <li>12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns</li> <li>13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts</li> <li>14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development</li> <li>15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss</li> <li>16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels</li> <li>17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development</li> </ol>

Direct references to the SDGs or the 2030 Agenda are rare in the recent ENI programming documents. The Annual Action Plans for 2015 were all approved after September 2015, but no reference is directly made to the Agenda. Only a few of the 2016 AAPs are currently published on the relevant EU websites. Of these, direct links with the SDGs are made in the APP for Egypt, concerning a particular project, and in the one for Palestine concerning the priority area of Human Rights.

Table 8 *Direct references to the SDGs in the programming documents*

<i>ENI South</i>	<i>Annual Action Plan / Special Measures</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Specific SDG</i>
<b>ENI South</b>			
Algeria	2015	NA	NA
Egypt	2016	National Drainage Programme III in the framework of the Joint Integrated Sector Approach in the irrigation sector (NDP III – JISA)	SDGs 2 and 6
Israel	2015	NA	NA
Jordan	2016	NA	NA
Lebanon	2015	NA	NA
Libya	2015-2016	NA	NA
Morocco	2015-2016	NA	NA
Palestine	2016	Component 1 and Component 3 of the priority area on Human Rights	Palestine will also be required to demonstrate progress with regard to the sustainable development goals (SDGs).
Syria	2015	NA	NA
Tunisia	2016	NA	NA
<b>ENI East</b>			
Armenia	2015	NA	NA
Azerbaijan	2015	NA	NA
Belarus	2015	NA	NA
Georgia	2015	NA	NA
Moldova	2015	NA	NA
Ukraine	2015/2016	NA	NA

It is possible to look for indirect references to the SDGs by mapping the wording used to describe the objectives and the contributions of the different actions envisaged for the year. Applying this method to some of the available programming documents for 2016 for Egypt, Ukraine and Tunisia highlighted recurrent references to the SDGs. Not all of the 17 SDGs are covered, mostly because some actions are sector specific (health, regional development, public administration reform). Yet, most of the SDGs concerning the areas of direct intervention of the actions as well as the cross cutting issues (ending poverty, strengthen cooperation, achieve gender equality) are indirectly referred to through the wording. The presence of indirect references to the SDGs is highlighted by the table below.

Table 9 *Indirect references to the SDGs*


<i>Country</i>	<i>Egypt</i>	<i>Tunisia</i>	<i>Ukraine</i>
<i>Goal</i>	<i>Project/Reference</i>		
1	ENPARD	Initiative pilote de développement local intégré	Support to a Comprehensive Public Administration Reform in Ukraine
2	ENPARD	NA	NA

Country	Egypt	Tunisia	Ukraine
Goal	Project/Reference		
3	NA	Initiative pilote de développement local intégré	NA
4	Advancing Women's Rights in Egypt	Initiative pilote de développement local intégré	NA
5	Advancing Women's Rights in Egypt	Programme d'appui au secteur de la santé en Tunisie	Support to a Comprehensive Public Administration Reform in Ukraine
6	ENPARD	Initiative pilote de développement local intégré	NA
7	ENPARD	NA	NA
8	Foreword	NA	NA
9	ENPARD	NA	NA
10	NA	Programme d'appui au secteur de la santé en Tunisie	NA
11	NA	Initiative pilote de développement local intégré	NA
12	NA	NA	NA
13	ENPARD	Programme d'appui au secteur de la santé en Tunisie	Support to a Comprehensive Public Administration Reform in Ukraine
14	NA	NA	NA
15	ENPARD	Initiative pilote de développement local intégré	NA
16	Foreword	Initiative pilote de développement local intégré	Support to a Comprehensive Public Administration Reform in Ukraine
17	ENPARD	Programme d'appui au secteur de la santé en Tunisie	NA

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### 1.2.7 I-127. Evidence (nature and scope) of ownership of ENI programmes by partner countries.

#### Global analysis of the indicator

Evidence of ownership in the post-ENP Review period (i.e.: 2016) are very limited in the reporting documents available. A possible proxy to assess the level of ownership by partner countries is to identify the presence and extent of co-financing as well as the modalities of management chosen to implement the actions.

At this stage, the results show that the levels of co-financing are very low. Of over 31 projects in the ENI South, only four were co-financed by the partner country (two in Algeria, one in Egypt and one in Lebanon) and of these only one was indirectly managed by the country's authorities. In the East, the available sample did not yield conclusive information on co-financing or indirect management. The evidence of ownership by partner countries is there-

fore weak when using these proxies and ownership appears to be rather encouraged through management than through extensive financial participation in the projects.

Information collected from the field and from EUD interviews shows that the degree of coordination at the government level and the existence of a national strategic plan are critical in terms of ownership.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

The new policy approach puts insistence on ownership

*“The public consultation has demonstrated that while the offer of a closer relationship with the EU for those countries which have undertaken governance reforms has encouraged change in some countries, current practice and policy has been regarded by other partners as too prescriptive, and as not sufficiently reflecting their respective aspirations. The consultation has further indicated that ownership by both partners and EU Member States needs to be stepped up; that cooperation should be given a tighter, more relevant focus; and that greater flexibility must be sought to enable the EU and its partners to respond to ever changing needs and circumstances.”* (ENP Review 2015 p 2 )

*“Ownership by partner country government and other stakeholders. Programming shall be an inclusive process, involving in particular and as appropriate, national, regional and local authorities as well as civil society organisations and social partners, in order to strengthen mutual accountability. In the case of civil society, consultations will need to be strategically focused and may usefully take place ahead of ENP sub-Committees.”* DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI – 2014-2020, p.6

*“In either case, EEAS and DEVCO will examine the proposal and organise Country Team Meetings (CTMs) to gather and discuss the initial comments of all relevant services. On this basis, the EEAS and DEVCO will transmit joint instructions to the Delegation within 2 months from the date of reception of the Delegation’s proposals. The Delegation will then launch the consultation process in the partner country, with the government, local authorities if relevant, civil society organisations, social partners and all relevant stakeholders, in coordination with EU Member States and, other donors in the country. Programming missions involving headquarters staff (EEAS and relevant Commission services), if required, should be foreseen during this period.”* DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI – 2014-2020, p.11

*“In partnership with the main refugee host governments, all Trust Fund-financed actions shall be aligned and implemented in accordance with the refugee crisis response plans of the affected countries, in particular the Jordan Response Plan 2016-2018, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, and the national plans in Turkey and Iraq, as part of the regional UN refugee and resilience response framework in this regard, as well as supporting relevant areas of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan.”* EC 2016, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to The Syrian Crisis, 'The Madad Fund', and its Internal Rules, annexe

Evidences from reporting documents are limited for the evaluation period, and they do not provide an overall positive assessment.

Overall East/ Private Sector Involvement: *“Roughly one third of the projects have a significant involvement of the private sector (PS). This largely depends on the sector and type of project. Positive examples of private sector involvement have been recorded in regional or local development projects where the private sector actors participated as informants and stakeholders in the activities leading to the development of regional or local development strategies; or as direct or indirect beneficiaries of training and sub-grants aimed at improving business opportunities.*

*In the majority of projects there is no involvement of the private sector foreseen or promoted. This is not seen as a weakness or shortcoming either as the projects support the provision of goods/ services of a ‘public nature’ or because country regulations hinder access to private sector funding by NGOs.”* Particip (2016) , ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, 26 Jun 2016, p 39

Algeria: Lack of ownership

*“It seems that in many cases the capacity of the implementing partners to mobilise resources was overestimated by project designers. This weakness in project design is due to an over optimistic assessment of the capacities of beneficiaries or of the political and/or administrative context. This is particularly true of the three small projects supporting civil society organisations, which have a weak structure and whose activities require authorisations from various administrations or official political bodies.”* Particip (2016) , ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, 26 Jun 2016, p 42

Egypt; Lack of ownership:

*“Moreover, there is a certain lack of ownership and an improper analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the participating institutions, also caused by changes arising from the 2011 revolution. The project did not make any attempt to correct for this.”*

Particip (2016) , ROM ENI ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 44

*Tunisia: The relevance of all four projects was positively assessed by ROM experts. Responsiveness to the needs of the target groups and alignment to in-country priorities are high as is the degree of ownership among involved stakeholders. The objectives of the three projects designed before the revolution remained unchanged, showing an effective continuity in the assessment of the country’s needs in the areas of intervention of the projects. The fourth project (D-23202: support to the development of disadvantaged areas) was designed specifically to respond to the needs of poorer southern regions where the revolution started. Overall, the four projects focus on two of the country’s major challenges, economic development as a means to reduce youth unemployment and urban infrastructure, overstretched by rapidly expanding cities. Minor design weaknesses are highlighted in some of the reviews (weak indicators of achievement and lack of sex-disaggregation), but this does not affect the overall validity and soundness of the applied intervention logic which remains high. “ Particip (2016) , ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 61*

*Tunisia / Private Sector Involvement: “Private sector involvement is explicitly foreseen in all projects reviewed with primarily good results. The involvement of the private sector in local development activities is a cross-cutting feature of project D-23202; its involvement in the operation of WWT plants will help ensuring the sustainability of the investments financed (C-131551). Private sector involvement is also expected to contribute to the financing of technical centres supported by project D-20216, and similarly, it is expected that Tunisian enterprises will contribute to the funding of innovation and research promoted by project D-20512.” Particip (2016) , ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 62*

*Palestinian T: “All projects are highly relevant with a pertinent choice of targets and end beneficiaries. In general, the local partners involved have enough experience and the capacity to implement what has been foreseen. The stakeholders involved are committed and actively engaged.” Particip (2016) , ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, 26 Juin 2016, p 65*

*The year 2015 saw positive achievements in a series of areas, including the strengthening of the Palestinian ownership and of the EU-PA policy dialogue [...] In the framework of PEGASE agriculture programmes, the structured and regular dialogue between EUREP and MoA allowed an increased ownership and strategical planning of the Ministry of Agriculture. This is also reflected in the PA Cabinet decision to support the implementation of the two programmes by securing fresh money to cover their operational needs.” (EAMR West Bank & Gaza Strip 2015, 12-19).*

*Azerbaijan: “Rural Development: The strong reform commitment of the Ministry of Agriculture, its determination to reach out to the farmers by establishing a system of 52 regional offices and 8 regional advisory centres, the availability of funds for agricultural subsidies (about 180 million AZN in 2015) that could serve as the nucleus for the country’s WTO compatible rural development programming and the Entrepreneurship Fund (more than 1 billion AZN project portfolio) are strong guarantors for the sustainability of the envisaged reforms. The human resources within the structures of the MoA have been significantly improved, with new skilled managers working in tandem with younger professionals with project management background.” (EAMR Azerbaijan 2015, 4-6);*

*Georgia: “The sector policy dialogue for the Public Administration Reform (PAR) focal sector was initiated from 2014 and since then has very much intensified throughout 2015. Given the strong ownership by the Government and the intensity of the dialogue as well as the support provided by OECD/SIGMA it has resulted in the following outcomes: (i) Finalisation and adoption by the Government of two major strategic documents for the improvement of the organisation and performance of the administration: (a) the PAR Roadmap, the first overarching, coherent strategy for reforms of PAR; and very much inspired from the EU Principles for Public administration. Elaborated with support from Sigma, with close involvement of the Delegation, (b) The Policy strategy, aiming at unifying streamlining the policy making and evaluation mechanisms throughout all sectors.” (EAMR Georgia 2015, 4-11);*

*Jordan: “The first operational year of the sector budget support programme on public finance and public administration reforms under the SSF opened an avenue for dialogue and support on improving service delivery to citizens. Work is on-going with largely positive engagement noted as the Ministry of Finance reached all the agreed targets and is actively working with a technical assistance team.” (EAMR Jordan 2015, 6-7). “[...]”*

*Ukraine: “Despite a strong political engagement and substantial technical advice, the government was unable to present a credible strategy and plan for the implementation of PAR required for an EU funded sector reform programme.” (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3)*

Field-based assessments are more positive:

#### *Tunisia Field Report*

There has been a continuity of commitments, decisions and priorities among the GoT, despite frequent ministerial changes and restructuring of ministries, however the coordination function of the Ministry of Cooperation has been stable and rather effective.

The GoT will present its new plan 2016-20 to investors and donors end of Nov (Plan de Développement 2016 – 2020; Manifestation Tunisia 2020 29-30/11/16). It includes up to 80 priority projects.

#### *Ukraine Field Report*

The ownership of the ENI by Ukraine is high, due to both the new political orientation of the country towards the EU and the desperate need for support and funds for the restructuring of the State/ Economy.

#### *Georgia Field Report*

Ownership by partner country: The continuation of the EU approximation is strongly demand-led, thus the government owns AA, DCFTA (2014) and SSF priorities and is fully committed to them

#### *Jordan EUD interview:*

Ownership of ENI programmes by the PC: overall it's good but sometimes it could be better. It has to be noted that the aid provided by other donors is significant and we are not the first partner of this country. Needs improvement

#### *Belarus EUD interview:*

Since 2016 there's better ownership. ENI programmes provide incentive for the PC to introduce reforms. There's a more intensive policy dialogue (e.g. Economic development and trade) and the government is taking these opportunities and the EU has doubled its assistance. But it's too early to see results.

#### *Analysis EAMRs 2013-2014-2015*

Overall, it seems that ownership is improving or at least countries are attaching greater importance to it. EAMRs 2015 provide more examples of ownership (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Jordan, Ukraine and Palestine) than in 2014 (Azerbaijan and Ukraine) and 2013 where these examples are non-existent.

#### Alternative research of evidence:

In the absence of sufficient evidence, a possible proxy to estimate the level of ownership by partner countries in the ENI programmes is to see the presence and extent of co-financing as well as the modalities of management chosen to implement the actions. Higher levels of co-financing by the partner country and indirect management modalities involving the local authorities are signals of a higher ownership level as opposed to directly managed programmes where the totality of the funding is provided by the Union.

We considered the actions listed in the last available or complete AAP and we extracted where possible the level of total financing by the EU, by possible other donors and by the partner countries as well as the management modalities. The majority of the complete documents are available for the ENI South region, this is not the case for the ENI East region. The levels of co-financing appear to be very low. Over 31 projects in the ENI South, only four were co-financed by the partner country (2 in Algeria, 1 in Egypt and 1 in Lebanon) and of these only one was indirectly managed by the country's authorities. Twelve actions over 31 are indirectly managed by the local authorities, seven are directly managed by the Union and twenty-two are managed jointly with other organisations or agencies. Overall the co-financing rate ranges between 8% and 35%. In the ENI East sample, of the three actions for which the financing is described, none is co-financed by the partner countries and no indirect management provision is foreseen.

The evidence of ownership by partner countries is therefore weak when indirect management is used and ownership appears to be rather encouraged through management than through extensive financial participation in the projects. In some cases a high level of local ownership is theoretically embedded in the very nature of the action, like in the case of budget support or contribution to the expenses of the administration.

## Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – Field mission

## Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 2 EQ 2 on effectiveness, impact and sustainability

### 2.1 JC21: ENI programmes contribute towards the objectives listed in the ENI Regulation, Article 1 and 2

#### 2.1.1 I-211. Evidence of improved rule of the law and better governance

#### Global analysis of the indicator

In most Neighbourhood countries, the difficult political and security context in the past years has not been favourable towards reform efforts in the field of democracy and good governance. While the South is facing difficulties stemming from the turmoil in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” (internal power struggles, terrorism, civil war), the East is stirred by several frozen or active territorial conflicts. Therefore, it is not surprising that measures in the field of good governance and rule of law have not shown significant improvement in recent years, despite EU’s efforts to promote reforms. The European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries provides an assessment of these countries’ progress in various fields, including rule of law and governance quality. Along with other indicators, these fields are aggregated to a score representing the country’s performance in deep and sustainable democracy, as shown in the table below.

Table 10 Overview of the EaP Index Category “Deep and sustainable development” over time<sup>17</sup>

Country	2012	2013	2014
Armenia	0.59	0.59	0.61
Azerbaijan	0.34	0.31	0.30
Belarus	0.25	0.27	0.27
Georgia	0.59	0.64	0.73
Moldova	0.75	0.75	0.77
Ukraine	0.61	0.60	0.61

Source: EaP Index Reports 2012, 2013 and 2014

The table clearly shows that there has been very limited progress in this area with the exception of Georgia. Indeed, Georgia has made some progress on deep and sustainable democracy, as is also recorded in the country’s progress reports. The presidential elections of 2013 were widely assessed as the best in Georgia’s post-independence history by the election observation mission of the OSCE/ODIHR. Nevertheless, a number of issues highlighted by the mission remain to be addressed in view of the 2016 parliamentary elections and the promised discussions on a new electoral law have not started yet. However, field work has confirmed that, in Ukraine as well, efforts towards better governance and anticorruption have remained a priority of local political actors, as well as of the EC cooperation, and that significant achievements have been produced, such as the recent e-declaration process.

Overall, the aggregated nature of the score and the relatively large and complex topic “deep democracy” however hide the fact that there have been improvements in some relevant sub-

<sup>17</sup> The EaP Index exists since 2011, however, the first report followed a slightly different methodology and is therefore not comparable.

categories. For instance, all six countries have made significant efforts in increasing the institutional independence of the judiciary by introducing special measures to ensure guaranteed tenure of judges and to protect them from threats. Moldova and Armenia improved the criteria for evaluating and promoting judges and made the procedure for appointing them more transparent, even though Armenia also endorsed the role of the President in the final appointment of judges. In this context, Belarus and Azerbaijan still face systemic problems: in both countries, the executive branch is directly involved in the appointment and disciplining of judges; in Ukraine, the Parliament has the same authority. The EaP Index reports also showed minor developments in the quality of public administration, most notably in Armenia and Moldova. With regards to fighting corruption however, there seems to have been little palpable change in the Eastern partner countries. There was even a very slight worsening in perceived levels of corruption, according to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (see I-212). Georgia has had some success in eradicating petty corruption, however important measures to prevent elite corruption (such as the adoption of the revised anti-corruption strategy or the reform of the political party financing legislation) are still pending.

In the South, the observations made are quite similar. The Worldwide Governance Indicators show very few improvements, and in most cases even a worsening of the situation, with regards to the control of corruption, government effectiveness and rule of law between 2007 and 2014.

*Table 11 Overview of selected WGI-Indicators (estimates) over time*

Countries	Control of corruption		Government effectiveness		Rule of Law	
	2007	2014	2007	2014	2007	2014
Algeria	-0.516	-0.614	-0.603	-0.512	-0.712	-0.733
Egypt	-0.674	-0.593	-0.375	-0.819	-0.185	-0.602
Israel	0.812	0.825	1.242	1.159	0.810	1.105
Jordan	0.308	0.155	0.222	0.135	0.450	0.482
Lebanon	-0.892	-1.063	-0.344	-0.375	-0.707	-0.759
Libya	-0.960	-1.610	-1.196	-1.643	-0.812	-1.523
Morocco	-0.323	-0.260	-0.163	-0.138	-0.262	-0.057
Palestine	-0.813	-0.566	-1.216	-0.528	-0.769	-0.444
Syria	-1.006	-1.549	-0.759	-1.441	-0.691	-1.339
Tunisia	-0.106	-0.093	0.466	-0.128	0.173	-0.118

*Source: World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators*

In fact, only Morocco (which remains relatively unscathed by the turmoil following the “Arab Spring”) and Palestine (the situation of which is highly instable and therefore indicators are highly fluctuant) register improvements in all three indicators. Morocco has indeed made quite some progress with regards to its judicial reform, freedom of the press and fight against corruption, even though the latter remains one of the government’s major challenges.

At the other end of the scale, Lebanon, Libya and Syria – the countries most impacted by the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” – have regressed in all three indicators. The Syrian conflict also affects its neighbour, Lebanon, and has led to rising tensions between ethnic and religious groups. In Lebanon, the last parliamentary elections took place in 2009 and the electoral framework has not been reformed ever since.

Nevertheless again, these aggregated indicators only tell part of the story. In Jordan, steps to strengthen the impartiality and effectiveness of the judiciary were taken and the government stepped up its efforts to combat corruption. The freedom of media and of expression on the other hand remained sensitive issues and restrictive press and publication laws remain in force. In Tunisia, despite the significant decrease in available indicators, the democracy is developing successfully. A new constitution and electoral framework, as well as the success-



ful elections in 2013 and 2014, have boosted the confidence in the newly found political consensus. Civil society continues to play an important role in stabilising the country's democratic transition. The attribution of the Nobel Peace Prize 2015 to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet acknowledge both: i) the effectiveness of the democratic progress, ii) the "Global public good" nature of the Tunisian experience.

The ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report of 2015 states that ENI interventions have actually delivered good quality outputs in the field of rule of law and good governance (e.g. by strengthening the civil society in various countries), but the prospects for sustainability were limited and the effects on the general situation in the countries have been marginal, because of the unfavourable political environment in several countries. Field work and EUD interviews have confirmed the value of ENI programmes in this field. However, the effectiveness and the sustainability of these interventions are extremely dependent of the countries' specific contexts. Nevertheless, protection and consolidation of the seeds of governance reform and democratic progress has already contributed to remarkable transition processes (Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia) in the Neighbourhood. The number of countries is small in absolute terms, but much more impressive when compared at world trends during the period.

These observations suggest that even though there has been little overall progress, limited improvements and success stories exist in specific contexts or fields. In the long-term, these partial achievements can prove to be crucial in further advancing the European Neighbourhood's democratic transition process, if there is enough improvement of the security situation in the region.

### Presentation of collected proof

EUD interviews analysis:

Six out of 12 countries also report improvement in the rule of law and better governance (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Morocco, Georgia and Armenia), and in the areas of human rights (Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Moldova and Georgia), sub-regional cooperation (Jordan, Belarus, Georgia, Egypt, Moldova and Azerbaijan) and management of mobility of people and of legal migration (Jordan, Ukraine, Morocco, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan). Five countries refer to an improvement in the management of irregular migration (Morocco, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan) and only 3 countries see progress in CBC cooperation (Belarus, Moldova and Armenia).

Progress is also slow in Egypt in some areas such as the rule of law and better governance, human rights, economic development, mobility of people and legal migration.

Tunisia field report

"Strong involvement of the EC, as well as of the donors community, to support progress in this sector in Tunisia, which is valued as a "global public good" by most of them.

*Ukraine: Justice and anti-corruption reform: Significant contributions were made to prepare the adoption of new legislation through the 'Support to Justice Sector Reform' project and follow up on fulfilment of conditions under in the State Building Contract, Macro-financial Assistance programmes and, Visa Liberalisation Action Plan [...] " (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3-9).*

*"There seems to have been little palpable change regarding corruption and the way public finances are managed and accounted for in the Eastern partner countries. There was even a very slight worsening in perceived levels of corruption, according to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index." (EaP Index 2014, p. 80)*

Ukraine

*"Public Administration Reform: Combining the achievement of conditions in the SBC and the implementation of the Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB) programme and the twinning project on civil service reform as well as the EU-OECD SIGMA initiative, EU-DEL pursued dialogue with the National Agency on Civil Service, Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs and Economic Development and Trade contributed to following key results: – New draft law "On civil service" finalised in December 2014 conform with the European principles of public administration. Expected to be adopted by parliament early 2015; – New draft law prepared on administrative procedures is aligned with the EU principles and best practices; – Establishment of the Government Office for Euro-*

pean Integration within the Cabinet of Minister as a single coordination body for implementation of the AA.” (EAMR Ukraine 2014, 4-7);

Ukraine “Justice and anti-corruption reform: Significant contributions were made to prepare the adoption of new legislation through the 'Support to Justice Sector Reform' project (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3-9)

#### Ukraine EUD interview

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation)	1. Improved rule of the law and better governance (reforms of the judiciary PAR, PFM, taxation, customs). 2. Economic development and aid efficiency. 3. Inclusive growth: the
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#### EAMR 2015

Ukraine “Justice and anti-corruption reform: Significant contributions were made to prepare the adoption of new legislation through the 'Support to Justice Sector Reform' project and follow up on fulfilment of conditions under in the State Building Contract, Macro-financial Assistance programmes and, Visa Liberalisation Action Plan [...] Substantive discussion to reform the State Migration Service through support in capacity building and upgrading the information management systems of the institutions dealing with migration in Ukraine. A major achievement in 2015 was the first-time issuance of biometric passports (over 0.5 Million issues by August 2015) [...]

#### Jordan EUD interview

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	1. Improved rule of the law and better governance. 2. Improved respect of human rights to a certain extent (not 100%). 3. Enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation to a certain extent (not fully). 4. Economic development. 5. Inclusive growth through social inclusion of the most vulnerable groups into the skills and employability systems. 6. Integration to EU market: this has been a success of the ENPI. 7. Improved management of the mobility of people: e.g. Mobility partnership with the EU but we need yet to see concrete results. We are still waiting for a new CBC based on ENI progress so I don't know where we are at this moment. Irregular migration is not a big issue.
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#### Georgia EUD interview

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	1. Improved rule of the law and better governance: e.g. Visa liberalization Action Plan a number of reforms were demanded (an EC report highlights progress in this area), judiciary independence though in this case there are remaining gaps and Public Administration Roadmap adopted in 2015. 2. Improved respect of human rights: improved anti-discrimination legislation and introduced mechanisms to fight discrimination; HR Action Plan adopted by the government in 2015. 3. Enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation. 4. Economic development: e.g. agriculture (development
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“High-quality public administration is a precondition for the implementation of effective, sustainable reform in different sectors in any country. The Index considers such aspects as policy formulation and co-ordination and an impartial and professional civil service, the latter including legal, institutional and procedural aspects and the management of public service quality. The 2014 Index, as in previous years, showed minor developments in this area.” (EaP Index 2014, p. 79)

“All six countries have made significant efforts in increasing the institutional independence of the judiciary by introducing special measures to ensure guaranteed tenure of judges and to protect them from threats. In Georgia, since the change of government in 2013 the Prosecutor's Office is no longer seen as exerting pressure on the judicial branch, and the number of pre-trial detentions has been dramatically reduced.” (EaP Index 2014, p. 78)

“In this context, Ukraine, Belarus and Azerbaijan still face systemic problems. In Belarus and Azerbaijan, the executive branch is involved in the appointment and disciplining of judges. In Ukraine, the parliament has the same authority. Despite the progress that Armenia made in ensuring that the selection, appointment, and removal of judges be regulated by a body comprised mostly of judges and located within the judiciary, the fact that the president of the country is vested with the power of approving the Justice Council's list of selected, promoted and disciplined judges remained a matter of concern.” (EaP Index 2014, p. 78)

*“There was limited progress on Egypt’s reforms in the areas of democratic governance and human rights. The new Constitution, which includes certain provisions that are more liberal than the preceding ones, entered into force with many areas to be governed in detail by ordinary law. The President is subject to stronger controls by parliament and his term is limited. The implementation of this new legal framework with tangible results was pending at the end of the year. Egypt remained without a parliament to enact legislation and to implement the Constitution throughout the whole year, and the President continued to issue legislation by decree. A discrepancy between existing (or amended) laws and the basic Constitutional tenets was therefore noted.” (Progress report Egypt 2015, p. 2)*

*“A new Constitution was adopted in January 2014, following its approval in a referendum in which 38.6 % of voters participated. In general, the Constitution can be considered to be more liberal than the previous constitutions, but remains conservative, in particular on freedom of religion and belief. It limits the powers of the President in a semi-presidential system, notably through term limits and parliamentary checks, but it strengthens the autonomy of state institutions such as the military, and especially the judiciary. Importantly, it includes an unprecedented level of protection for human rights and individual freedoms, and bolsters the rights of women and gender equality. However, these liberal precepts have not yet been applied in the spirit of the constitution.” (Progress report Egypt 2015, p. 4)*

*“Armenia made limited progress on deep and sustainable democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. In April 2014 the Specialised Commission on Constitutional Reform presented its draft concept paper proposing a transition from a presidential system to a parliamentary system, changes related to the electoral system, a better balance of powers and more human rights protection. However, no broad consensus within the society and with the political opposition parties exists on this reform.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 2)*

*“The government did not start amending the Electoral Code at least one year before the next elections as the OSCE/ODIHR recommended. The next parliamentary elections will take place in February 2017. Women remained underrepresented in political positions. The EU continued to support their participation in local decision-making.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 5)*

*“In April 2014 the committee for constitutional reform published a concept paper for comprehensive constitutional reforms, including changing to a parliamentary system of governance, other changes to the electoral system, better balancing of powers and greater respect of human rights. In October 2014, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe adopted an opinion on the paper, commending the objectives, while refraining from commenting on the choice of the governance system.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 5)*

*“Regarding the independence of the judiciary, the implementation of the Judicial Reforms Strategy 2012–16 continued. Legal amendments to the Judicial Code strengthened the independence of judges by defining the duties of the self-governing structures, improved the criteria for evaluating and promoting judges and made the procedure for appointing them more transparent. However, the amendments formally endorsed the role of the President in the final appointment of judges. Public distrust of the system and its integrity remained high.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 5)*

*“There were no significant developments with respect to the right to a fair trial. Discussions on adopting criteria for randomly assigning cases to judges, taking into account their specialisation, did not lead to concrete results. With courts still dependent on the public prosecution service, their independence and impartiality was not fully guaranteed. The Court of Cassation continued to influence other judicial bodies. A new Criminal Procedure Code was drafted, putting presumption of innocence and equality of arms between the defence and the prosecution at its core. Armenia also started drafting a new Criminal Code. Armenian authorities expressed their aim to comply fully with Council of Europe standards when it comes to torture and ill-treatment. However, in 2014 claims about instances of torture and mistreatment during pre-trial investigations were ignored or not properly investigated. Decisions on imposing or prolonging pre-trial detention were not well substantiated by courts.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 6)*

*“In April, Armenia approved a concept paper for the fight against corruption focusing on education, state revenues, police and healthcare. It led to the development of a draft strategy and an action plan,*

presented to national and international stakeholders in October. The draft documents provide for the participation of civil society. It is still necessary to strengthen the mandate and functions of the Ethics Committee for High-Ranking Officials. SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) continued to provide related policy support. The anti-corruption council was not established in 2014.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 6)

“Georgia made some progress on deep and sustainable democracy and human rights and fundamental freedoms: local elections in June and July 2014 are considered to have generally complied with international standards. Constitutional reform was initiated with the creation of a State Constitutional Commission. The role of parliament was strengthened and the power of the president reduced. The status of the prosecution service is one of the most urgent issues to be decided. Institutional reform of the Prosecutor’s Office was also launched in December 2014. Electoral reforms to prepare for the 2016 parliamentary elections have not yet started. Media freedom improved but freedom of association and freedom of assembly were not fully ensured during the electoral campaign. Amendments made to the Law on Common Courts create the basis for judges to be more independent; however, a three-year probation period for judges prior to their life-term appointment remains problematic. In general, judicial independence remained fragile. Georgia made some progress in the fight against corruption.” (Progress report Georgia 2015, p. 2)

“Discussions on electoral reform have not restarted yet. There are a number of issues which remain to be addressed arising both from previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, like improving the ‘equality of the vote’, and from legislative amendments passed recently, such as the provision allowing for a majority of local council members to impeach a directly elected mayor. If the electoral reform starts without delay, it can apply to the parliamentary elections in October 2016.” (Progress report Georgia 2015, p. 5)

“In March 2014 the State Commission for Constitutional Reform discussed the powers and competences of the judicial branch of the government and the powers of other constitutional actors. The 58-member commission composed of members of the parliamentary majority and opposition, representatives of non-parliamentary parties and civil society and legal experts, was tasked with drafting constitutional amendments and defining the new constitutional status of the Prosecutor’s Office. Parliament extended the mandate until March 2015.” (Progress report Georgia 2015, p. 6)

“The fight against corruption remains high on the government’s agenda and there was continued success in eradicating petty corruption. The implementation of major reforms of the public administration remained pending, such as the adoption of the revised anti-corruption strategy and action plans, measures to strengthen institutional capacity, the reform of the political party financing legislation and decisions on the mechanisms to tackle and prevent elite corruption. Transparency International ranked Georgia 52nd out of 175 countries in its 2014 Corruption Perception Index, a slight improvement over 2013 when it came 55th out of 177 countries.” (Progress report Georgia 2015, p. 7)

“The October presidential elections marked a second step in the democratic transition of power in Georgia after the 2012 parliamentary elections and were widely assessed as the best in Georgia’s post-independence history by the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). The pre-electoral environment was less tense and polarised than it had been before the parliamentary elections and voters were able to express their choice freely. The victory of the Georgian Dream (GD) candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili, marked the end of an uneasy but functioning period of cohabitation that served as a rehearsal for the new constitutional system, and Mikheil Saakashvili’s two terms as President came to a close. Autumn 2013 marked the beginning of a threefold transition in Georgia. The new President was inaugurated on 17 November, on the same day that a new constitution entered into force, changing Georgia from a presidential to a parliamentary system. Prime Minister Ivanishvili stepped down on 24 November and handed over the post of Prime Minister to the former Interior Minister, Irakli Garibashvili. In 2013 and first few months of 2014 Georgia navigated successfully complex and unprecedented transition with two landmark elections in which power has changed hands peacefully, two changes of Prime Minister, change of President, a functioning cohabitation and constitutional shift in the political system, moving away from one party dominated state and at the same time tackling the legacies of past abuse –while it continued to deliver on a busy reform and approximation agenda in the framework of the Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) and Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP).” (Progress report Georgia 2014, p. 2)

*“Taking this particular background into account, Jordan continued to make progress on deep and sustainable democracy. The jurisdiction of the Independent Election Commission was expanded to municipal and other elections. A new legal framework for political parties was proposed. Steps to strengthen the impartiality and effectiveness of the judiciary were taken and the government stepped up its efforts to combat corruption. Jordan made progress on other governance-related issues in particular by merging public institutions and reducing public expenditure.”* (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 2)

*“Constitutional amendments were adopted by the parliament in August. The amendment to Article 67 expands the jurisdiction of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) with regard to the management and supervision of municipal and other elections. In July 2014, the IEC presented its strategic plan for 2014-17 and an update of the voters’ database, carried out with the support of the EU. The amendment to Article 127 assigns the King sole authority to appoint and discharge the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the director of the General Intelligence Department. The government stated that the constitutional amendment was necessary in order to re-establish the Ministry of Defence and to ensure that the army and the General Intelligence Department remain professional and apolitical.”* (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 4)

*“A new draft law on political parties was submitted to the parliament in May. It is expected to ease certain requirements for founding or joining a political party. The 2012 electoral law remained in force, with the government announcing a new draft electoral law to be presented in early 2015 to further enhance political life. The performance of political blocs in the lower house of parliament remained inconsistent and highly diversified.”* (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 4)

*“The freedom of the media remained a sensitive issue in Jordan, closely related to the freedom of expression. Jordan ranked 155th out of 197 countries in the 2014 Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index, a drop of 10 compared with its ranking in 2013. The 2012 press and publications law remained in force. Several media objected to the requirement that a licence needs to be granted by the authorities, though some media outlets have rectified their status to comply with the law. In July the authorities blocked access to nine unregistered news websites. Arrests of journalists continued. In June the prosecutor of the State Security Court raised terrorism charges against the owner and 13 journalists working for the Iraqi TV-station Al-Abasiya three days after they had been arrested. The charges were lifted and the journalists were freed. A high degree of self-censorship continued to exist among the media in Jordan. Amendments to the press association law were adopted in June. They removed some restrictions on joining the Jordan Press Association, expanding the scope of who can officially be recognised as a journalist in Jordan. Another amendment guaranteed that the authorities cannot dissolve the Jordan Press Association. In July the EU signed a EUR 3 million contract with UNESCO on support to media, aiming to strengthen an enabling regulatory and institutional environment and build capacity for an independent, quality-based media sector.”* (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 5)

*“In January 2014 the Ministry of Justice launched its 2014-16 strategy to improve the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary. The strategy for the sector as a whole, the ‘judicial upgrade strategy’, remained unchanged. In September parliament adopted a new judicial independence law. A key element is the transfer of authority regarding the appointment of judges from the government to the Judicial Council. In February 2014 a new automated system was introduced to monitor and ultimately minimise detention periods. The High Institute for the Judiciary of Jordan should continue to be actively involved in the activities of the Euro-Arab judicial Training Network.”* (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 5)

*The government continued its work on combating corruption. Jordan ranked 55 out of 175 countries included in the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, advancing eleven spots compared with last year’s ranking (66th out of 177 in 2013). However, corruption remained an issue of general concern to the public, causing a lack of trust in public institutions. Implementation of the anti-corruption strategy adopted in 2013 continued. In April parliament adopted amendments to the anti-corruption law. These expand the definition of corruption to include money laundering and illicit enrichment. Also in April, a regulation protecting whistle-blowers, witnesses and informants in corruption cases was adopted. It entails the establishment of a special unit within the Anti-Corruption Commission to process requests for protecting individuals who have information on corruption and laying the ground for a future witness-protection programme. In June the illicit fortunes law was adopted. The law makes it obligatory for all ministers, Members of Parliament, judges, heads of public institutions and*

other officials to disclose information on their financial assets to a special unit in the Ministry of Justice. In 2013 the Anti-Corruption Commission handled 230 cases of suspected corruption, of which 74 were referred to the Prosecutor General. Jordan began to implement the National Integrity System.” (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 5)

“Lebanon’s institutions were put under pressure in 2014. The Government of Prime Minister Salam had to assume presidential prerogatives following the expiration of the mandate of President Michel Sleiman in May. Failure to elect a new President negatively affected the functioning of the government, as well as parliament. Resorting to the difficult security situation, parliament decided to postpone legislative elections due in November and to extend its term for a second time until 2017. In this context, the restricted functioning of the legislature, the limited effectiveness of the executive body and the serious security challenges did not constitute an appropriate ground for reforms. Taking this particular background into account, there was limited progress in Lebanon on deep and sustainable democracy. The parliamentary elections were postponed and the extended timeframe was not used to reform the electoral framework. The double extension of parliament’s mandate denied Lebanese citizens the right to vote and choose their political leadership.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 2-3)

“Legislative elections, originally scheduled for June 2013, were postponed for the second time in November 2014 and parliament’s term was extended for an additional two years and seven months. The justification given for this extension was the difficult security situation. If implemented in full, parliament will have gained an additional four years to its mandate, as the new legislative elections will be held only in June 2017. The result is that Lebanese citizens have been deprived of their right to vote.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 4)

“Reforms of the electoral framework, to bring it into line with international standards, did not further advance. The preparations for elections were ongoing on the basis of the 2008 electoral law when the decision was made to postpone them. The EU continued to support the electoral reform process through projects with the government and civil society.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 4)

“The work of parliament was limited in 2014. While a number of draft laws were adopted at the beginning of the year, failure to elect a new President before 25 May 2014 blocked the legislative work further on. Parliament met on fewer occasions due to the continued lack of agreement on a presidential candidate. The number of draft laws awaiting discussion and adoption in parliament grew further in 2014.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 4)

“Press and other media continued to enjoy a high level of freedom and Lebanon’s active civil society plays an important role in advocating reforms, albeit with limited influence. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by Lebanon’s Constitution. Nevertheless, media law reform is overdue, especially with a view to refining the definition of defamation/slander.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 4)

“The establishment of a Secretariat of the High Judicial Council, enhancing its autonomy, was the only new development in improving the independence of the judiciary. The Council still depends on the Ministry of Justice and appointments of judges continue to suffer from political interference. Inefficiency in judiciary proceedings and limitations in legal aid provisions hinder access to justice. The Minister of Justice announced that cases of civilians being brought before military courts would be stopped, but the relevant legislation has not been approved yet. The EU’s commitment to supporting judicial reform is reflected in its engagement to provide financial assistance totalling EUR 22 million for projects in this sector. Lebanon continued its cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and paid its contribution to the STL’s 2014 budget.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 5)

“There were no tangible developments with regard to legislation to make the fight against corruption more effective. Lebanon’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has worsened, from 127<sup>th</sup> out of 177 in 2013 to 136<sup>th</sup> out of 175 in 2014.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 5)

“Moldova made less progress than in previous years on deep and sustainable democracy and on the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The overall level of political freedom in Moldova continued to be comparatively high.” (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 2)

*“According to the International Election Observation Mission, the parliamentary elections held on 30 November 2014 offered voters a wide choice of political alternatives and were generally well administered. However, one contestant was deregistered a few days before the elections, and one political party took part in the elections despite a court decision to deregister it. There were also problems over the functioning of the electronic system for the processing of voters on the polling day and the opening of criminal cases against several supporters of the deregistered Patria party in December 2014 raised concerns.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 2)

*“The media enjoyed a good level of freedom in comparison with the region as a whole. However, there were some concerns over the concentration and transparency of media ownership, as many outlets were subject to political interference. The government made some progress on implementing legislation on judicial reform and, by the end of 2014, some important parts of the benchmarks for the 2011-16 Justice Sector Reform Strategy had been implemented. However, corruption in the Moldovan judiciary remained a major concern and the reform of the Public Prosecutor’s office has stalled. Reforms to prevent torture, to better ensure gender equality and on the protection of children were launched and continued in 2014. Moldova also made limited progress on reforming its public administration and on fiscal decentralisation. The reform of the public sector has been hampered by vested interests closely interlinked with politics.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 2)

*“Civil society in Moldova is still rather weak, but has grown in a favourable environment. The partnership between public authorities and civil society organisations (CSOs) made continuous progress, which resulted in particular in a heightened role for civil society in decision-making.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 3)

*“In June 2014 Moldova and the EU signed the AA/DCFTA. The agreement committed Moldova to developing democratic institutions and to upholding human rights in accordance with European Union rules and standards. The agreement was ratified in July 2014 and provisionally came into force in September 2014.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 5)

*“Electoral legislation was improved through amendments to the Electoral Code. These included introducing a centralised voter registry and discontinuing the use of Soviet-era passports. Recommendations by the Council of Europe and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to reduce the electoral threshold remained unaddressed. The Moldovan authorities have so far not introduced any special measures to facilitate minority representation in Moldova’s proportional representation electoral system.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 5)

*“The draft Audiovisual Code, drawn up in 2011 with support from the Council of Europe, the EU and civil society, has yet to be adopted by the Moldovan Government and Parliament. Proposed amendments included improving ownership transparency, editorial freedom, media plurality and independence of the Audiovisual Coordination Council. At the beginning of 2014, Moldova’s commitment to upholding the principle of media plurality was shaken by a seemingly politically motivated attempt to restrict several television channels’ access to the audiovisual landscape. The perceived lack of independence of the Audiovisual Coordination Council remained a concern. Media plurality was also limited by an unfavourable financial environment for the media sector, as the advertising services and mail delivery services markets were heavily monopolised.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 5)

*“Moldova continued to work in 2014 on implementing the 2011-16 justice sector reform strategy by implementing some important parts of the benchmarks laid down in the action plan. However, the pace of reforms slowed in the second half of 2014. Corruption and the stalled reform of the public prosecution service remained major concerns, as confirmed by an external assessment mission evaluating the implementation of the EU-supported justice sector reform programme.”* (Progress report 2015, p. 6)

*“In 2014 Moldova continued implementing the laws on judiciary reform that were adopted by parliament in the previous two years. The laws introduced a new system for appointing, promoting and periodically assessing the performance of judges, based on a transparent procedure and a balance of quantitative and qualitative criteria. This system created the conditions for a transparent and merit-based promotion system for judges. Most judges have been assessed under the new system, alt-*

though the procedure and outcome of assessment process remained questionable, with some methodological imperfections leading to excessively positive appraisals of judges. The European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) granted the status of observer to the National Institute of Justice of the Republic of Moldova in June 2014.” (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 6)

“Moldova’s political and economic development continued to be hampered by systemic and high level corruption. Corruption still remained a major cause of concern, with the sectors most vulnerable to corruption including the judiciary, customs, public procurement, health, the social sphere and education. Moldova continued to implement its 2011-15 national anticorruption strategy. In May 2014, after a delay of more than five months, parliament approved the 2014-15 action plan to implement the strategy. In 2014, Transparency International ranked Moldova 103th out of 175 countries on its Corruption Perception Index (in 2013 Moldova ranked 102nd out of 177 countries.)” (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 6)

“D’un point de vue global, le Maroc a fait des progrès significatifs dans la mise en œuvre du plan d’action de la PEV sur la voie de la consolidation des droits de l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales, surtout par l’adoption d’importants textes réglementaires. Ce constat s’applique également à la réforme de la justice. Le Maroc a adopté et mis en œuvre une politique migratoire ambitieuse qui prévoit un processus de régularisation et d’intégration des migrants irréguliers ainsi que des réfugiés.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 3)

“Concernant la réforme du code de la presse, l’avant-projet du nouveau code a été soumis en juillet par le ministère de la communication pour commentaires aux professionnels du secteur et mis en ligne en octobre sur le site du Secrétariat général du gouvernement, avant son adoption par le Conseil de gouvernement et le Parlement. Ce nouveau code sera composé de cinq textes de loi sur la presse et la publication, le statut de journaliste professionnel, le Conseil national de la presse, la presse électronique et le secteur de la publicité. Le principe central de ce code rénové est qu’il ne prévoit plus de peine privative de liberté pour les journalistes. Toutefois, les journalistes resteraient passibles d’inculpations ou de sanctions sur base du code pénal, ou de la loi anti-terroriste. Les journalistes de la presse écrite comme les journalistes en ligne restent soumis à des mesures répressives telles des sanctions judiciaires et/ou économiques, et une certaine autocensure est à constater principalement dans la presse écrite. Dans le classement mondial de la liberté de presse publié par Reporters sans frontières en 2014, le Maroc occupe la 136ème place sur 179 pays, comme en 2013.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 5)

“En ce qui concerne la réforme de la justice, suite à la Charte nationale élaborée par la Haute instance du dialogue national sur la réforme de la justice et présentée publiquement en septembre 2013, le projet de nouveau code de procédure pénale a été mis en ligne pour concertation sur le site du Secrétariat général du gouvernement en mai. Le texte introduit notamment de nouvelles dispositions susceptibles de renforcer les droits de la défense et de consolider les principes fondamentaux d’un procès équitable, telle l’obligation d’enregistrement audiovisuel des interrogatoires au sein de la police judiciaire, des mesures alternatives à la détention préventive et aux peines privatives de liberté, comme le port du bracelet électronique et le travail d’intérêt général.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 5)

“La lutte contre la corruption reste un vaste chantier pour le gouvernement. La perception de la corruption a en effet augmenté durant ces deux dernières années: selon l’organisation Transparency International, le Maroc se classe au 80ème rang mondial sur 175 pays dans l’index 2014 de perception de la corruption (en 2013, il était 91ème sur 177 pays). Le Conseil de gouvernement a adopté en juin un projet de loi relatif à l’Instance nationale de la probité et de la lutte contre la corruption (INPLC), destinée à remplacer l’Instance centrale de prévention de la corruption. Certaines organisations de la société civile dont Transparency Maroc ont critiqué cette nouvelle version, qui serait régressive par rapport à la version précédente publiée en 2012 sur le site du SGG et soumise à une consultation publique. Alors que la nouvelle loi devrait conférer à cette instance, conformément aux standards internationaux, des compétences renforcées et notamment des pouvoirs d’investigation pré-judiciaires et d’autosaisine, le projet réduit l’essentiel de son rôle à des missions de conseil, d’étude et de sensibilisation. Il ne garantit pas l’anonymat des plaignants. Le projet relatif à l’INPLC, et un projet de programme national de lutte contre la corruption seront prochainement soumis au Parlement.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 6)



*“La transition politique tunisienne a connu dès le mois de janvier 2014 des avancées politiques et institutionnelles considérables à la suite du « dialogue national » lancé en octobre 2013. La première étape de cette dynamique positive a été l'adoption de la nouvelle Constitution tunisienne le 26 janvier 2014 à la quasi-unanimité des membres de l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante (ANC). La nouvelle Constitution consacre l'ensemble des droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales ainsi que l'égalité en droits et en devoirs devant la loi des citoyennes et des citoyens, sans discrimination.” (Progress report Tunisia 2015, p. 2)*

*“Ce gouvernement a reçu pour mandat d'appliquer la « feuille de route » arrêtée lors du « dialogue national », et a eu pour priorité d'assurer la bonne organisation et la sécurité des élections législatives et présidentielles avant la fin de l'année 2014, comme prévu par la nouvelle Constitution. Un accord politique a été trouvé pour commencer par les législatives le 26 octobre, puis la présidentielle en deux tours, les 23 novembre et 21 décembre 2014. À l'instar des élections d'octobre 2011 pour l'ANC, les autorités tunisiennes ont invité l'UE à déployer une mission d'observation électorale (MOE) pour couvrir l'ensemble des élections. Cette mission a vérifié que le processus électoral s'est fondé sur des principes démocratiques conformément aux normes et bonnes pratiques internationales. La MOE a considéré que l'Instance supérieure indépendante pour les élections (ISIE), constituée début 2014, avait assuré une bonne organisation des scrutins, dans la transparence et l'impartialité, et ce malgré des délais très serrés entre l'approbation du cadre législatif et les élections.” (Progress report Tunisia 2015, p. 2)*

*“La campagne d'inscription des électeurs a permis d'augmenter leur nombre de presque un million par rapport à 2011. Le nombre de femmes élues dans la nouvelle Assemblée est passé à 70, soit 32,3%, contre 59 femmes en 2011. La Tunisie s'est ainsi engagée dans une dynamique démocratique volontariste caractérisée par l'adoption de la nouvelle loi électorale et la tenue d'élections législatives et présidentielles libres, transparentes et inclusives. La société civile a continué à jouer un rôle important dans le processus de stabilisation politique du pays et dans sa transformation démocratique.” (Progress report Tunisia 2015, p. 3)*

*“Following dramatic changes at the beginning of the year, and despite some months in which severe abuses of human rights took place, Ukraine made overall good progress on deep and sustainable democracy, on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Ukraine conducted its presidential and parliamentary elections largely in compliance with EU and international standards, as confirmed in reports from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). Election legislation was improved before these elections. However, the need for comprehensive reforms in this area remained. A law on public prosecution and several anti-corruption laws were adopted. Some steps were taken towards the establishment of the National AntiCorruption Bureau. Progress is still pending on judicial reform and law enforcement reform, where several proposals were discussed but new legislation was not produced. The lack of accountability in the police for cases of ill-treatment persisted. After worrying developments at the beginning of the year, the situation improved with regard to freedom of expression, freedom of the media and freedom of assembly. Anti-discrimination legislation was improved and now needs to be implemented.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 3)*

*“In mid-January 2014, legislation severely restricting freedom of assembly and other fundamental freedoms was introduced to curb the nation-wide protests. Riot police violently attacked the 'Maidan' on several occasions. The protests peaked during the second half of February 2014, leaving up to a hundred people dead. The restrictive legislation was partially withdrawn a week later and entirely repealed after the change of government in February 2014. Demonstrations and manifestations were frequent in 2014, but since May no major violent incidents have occurred. The tragic incident resulting in the death of over 40 anti'Maidan' demonstrators in Odessa in May is under investigation.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 6)*

*“The beginning of 2014 saw a very difficult situation regarding freedom of expression and freedom of the media, with most media strictly under central state authority control and journalists being a physical target for the riot police. The situation substantially improved after February 2014, except in those parts of the Ukrainian territory which were illegally annexed by the Russian Federation (Crimea and Sevastopol) or were under the control of illegal armed groups (parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). The law on public broadcasting was adopted by parliament, aiming to transform the state broadcasting service into an independent public service. However, its implementation was significantly*

delayed due to attempts by various interest groups to derail the process of establishing a public broadcasting service. The lack of transparency of ownership of media remained an issue and a proper legislative framework on media ownership was not created in 2014.” (Progress report Ukraine, p. 6)

“In April Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) signed a new agreement on reconciliation. In accordance with the agreement, a consensus government of independent technocrats was formed in June under Prime Minister Hamdallah, including four ministers from Gaza (Labour, Public Works, Justice and Women’s Affairs). Other elements of the agreement included presidential and parliamentary elections, no earlier than six months after the government’s formation, while many of the most sensitive issues (including Hamas’s inclusion within the PLO and the integration of respective security forces) were entrusted to committees. In this context, the EU emphasised that full democratic legitimacy and institutional sustainability can only be restored through genuine democratic legislative and presidential elections throughout Palestine. In the meantime, progress in returning the PA to Gaza was slow, partly due to complex legal, political and practical issues but primarily as a result of the Israeli operation, which lasted 50 days in July and August. Since then, the PA played a leading role in efforts at recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Gaza. An international conference on Reconstructing Gaza was held in Cairo in October, during which the EU pledged more than EUR 450 million.” (Progress report Palestine 2015, p. 4)

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 2.1.2 I-212. Evidence (nature and scope) of improved respect of human rights

### Global analysis of the indicator

Three quarters of the ENP countries have ratified at least 10 out of the 18 Core International Human Rights Treaties listed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights<sup>18</sup>, which reveals a wide-spread formal respect of HR in the European Neighbourhood.

Table 12 Status of ratification/signature of 18 Core International Human Rights Treaties

Countries	Ratified	Number of ratifications since 2007	Number of signatures since 2007
Algeria	11	2	2
Armenia	13	2	3

<sup>18</sup> International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Azerbaijan	15	3	2
Belarus	10	0	1
Egypt	10	2	0
Georgia	14	3	1
Israel	9	2	0
Jordan	9	2	1
Lebanon	8	1	3
Libya	11	0	1
Moldova	13	3	1
Morocco	13	4	1
Palestine	8	8	0
Syria	11	2	0
Tunisia	14	5	0
Ukraine	16	5	0

Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights – Interactive Dashboard on the Status of Ratification

Since 2007, there have been a series of new signatures and ratifications, which can be seen as an evidence of successful advocacy for HR. The case of Morocco is a particularly interesting one: the country's participation in the United Nations Human Rights Council during that period has given rise to an intensified cooperation with the EU and the Council of Europe on HR issues. In the wake of this cooperation and continued progress towards democratic reform and the respect of HR, the Moroccan Parliament was even granted the status of "Partner for Democracy" by the Council of Europe in 2011.

Overall, EUD interviews shows that Six out of 12 countries report improvement in the areas of human rights (Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Moldova and Georgia. ENI interventions in this field often clash with national policy priorities of the different countries. A good example is Egypt, where the new Constitution of 2014 comprises an unprecedented level of protection for human rights and individual freedoms, including the rights of women and gender equality; however these liberal precepts have not yet been applied in the spirit of the constitution. There has been numerous reports of arbitrary arrests by security forces and inhumane conditions in prisons, and the EC has not succeed in promoting ENI programmes on HR. Therefore, the main problems of EU support to human rights are *"related to the different obstacles set by a hostile or non-supportive national political environment"*, as states the ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report of 2015. As a consequence, and notwithstanding the satisfactory performance and outputs of individual interventions, the expected outcomes are difficult to achieved.

Consequently, no major progress could be observed analysing international indicators related to advancements in deep and sustainable democracy and in the respect of human rights, with the exception of Tunisia, which has progressed remarkably. The same can be said for Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, which shows little evidence of change during the first years of ENI.

Table 13 Overview of international "deep" democracy indicators over time

Countries	Freedom in the World			Corruption perceptions index <sup>19</sup>	
	2007	2013	2016	2013	2015
Algeria	36	35	35	36	36

<sup>19</sup> According to Transparency International, data before 2012 is not comparable over time.

Armenia	41	42	46	36	35
Azerbaijan	32	23	16	28	29
Belarus	14	14	17	29	32
Egypt	27	38	27	32	36
Georgia	62	60	64	49	52
Israel	84	81	80	61	61
Jordan	42	34	36	45	53
Lebanon	51	49	43	28	28
Libya	8	43	20	15	16
Moldova	57	65	60	35	33
Morocco	45	43	41	37	36
Palestine <sup>20</sup>	34	49	42	n.a.	n.a.
Syria	9	5	-1	17	18
Tunisia	24	58	79	41	38
Ukraine	73	57	61	25	27

Source: Freedom House's Freedom in the World Reports 2007, 2013 and 2016; Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 and 2015

Furthermore, the global situation of other HR issues has not improved either. Capital punishment still exists in all southern ENI countries, even though executions are no longer carried out in all of them (de-facto abolition). The remaining retentionist countries have shown no signs of progress in that respect and Jordan – which had a moratorium on the death penalty in place between 2006 and 2014 – has once again taken up the practice of executions in 2015. The fast increase of executions in Egypt since 2013 informs on the violence of the new political regime.

Table 14 Reported death sentences and executions over time

Countries	2007		2013		2015	
	Sentences	Executions	Sentences	Executions	Sentences	Executions
Algeria	271	0	40+	0	62+	0
Belarus	4	1+	4+	0	2+	0
Egypt	40+	0+	109+	0	538+	22+
Jordan	17+	0	7+	0	3+	2
Lebanon	4+	0	7+	0	28	0
Libya	0+	9+	18+	0	10+	0
Morocco	1	0	10	0	9	0
Palestine	0	0	14+	3+	12+	0
Syria	10+	7+	0	0	20+	0
Tunisia	3	0	5+	0	11	0

Where “+” appears after a figure it means that this is the minimum figure calculated by Amnesty International. Where “+” appears after a zero, it means that there were executions or death sentences (more than one) in that country but insufficient information to provide a credible minimum figure.

<sup>20</sup> As of 2011, Freedom House has split the evaluation of the Palestinian territory in West Bank and Gaza strip, treating both regions separately. For the purpose of this table, both regions' scores have been aggregated.

Source: Amnesty International Death Sentences and Executions 2007, 2013 and 2015.

There is no evidence that the gender inequalities in the European Neighbourhood have decreased in the past years and in most countries the situation has stagnated at best, according to the Gender Inequality Index.

Table 15 Gender Inequality Index over time

Countries	2013		2014		2015	
	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank
Algeria	0,391	74	0,425	81	0,413	85
Armenia	0,340	59	0,325	60	0,318	62
Azerbaijan	0,323	54	0,340	62	0,303	59
Belarus	n.a	n.a	0,152	28	0,151	31
Egypt	0,590	126	0,580	130	0,573	131
Georgia	0,438	81	n.a	n.a.	0,382	77
Israel	0,144	25	0,101	17	0,101	18
Jordan	0,482	99	0,488	101	0,473	102
Lebanon	0,433	78	0,413	80	0,385	78
Libya	0,216	36	0,215	40	0,134	27
Moldova	0,303	49	0,302	51	0,248	50
Morocco	0,444	84	0,460	92	0,525	117
Palestine	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Syria	0,551	118	0,556	125	0,533	119
Tunisia	0,261	46	0,265	48	0,240	48
Ukraine	0,338	57	0,326	61	0,286	57

Source: Human Development Reports 2013, 2014 and 2015

However all those indicators rather reflect upon the long-term performances of a country. As a consequence, just because changes are not reflected on the global scale of indicators, does not mean that there has been no progress. In the context of long-term processes, which often are non-linear, partial achievements can also prove to be of crucial importance. In Armenia, dialogue in the field of human rights was extended to various political fora and in particular within the context of the Human Rights Budget support programme signed in December 2015, which is expected to lead to improvements in the protection of human rights through relevant legislation. Moldova displays a continued comparatively high standard of political freedom, which has been further consolidated by the signing of the AA/DCFTA which commits the country to uphold HR in accordance with European Union rules and standards. Progress has also been made with regards to gender equality and the integration of national minorities.

Available evidences on the respect of human rights, as well as on better governance, stress the divide between a small number of countries ahead or progressing (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Tunisia) and the rest of the Neighbourhood.

## Presentation of collected proof

## Georgia Field Report

2(2)a – *Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, (...)*: ENI financed a BS on (Criminal) Justice, with matrix that contribute to these objectives, in continuation with a former financed by ENPI.

## Tunisia Field Report:

There has been a continuity of ENPI/ENI programmes in the sectors such as Appui a la société civile, Promotion of fundamentals freedom, Gender equality, Fight against discrimination, which are still domains of interventions. Significant results have been achieved by several programs (for instance: 50 % gender balance in the electoral lists for national elections; similar scheme proposed for the local elections, still under discussion)

## Ukraine Field Report

An ENPI programme on Justice is still under implementation; this programme has a technical content (not political) and thus it is being continued without problems. One of the Special Measures which have been approved up to now is the “Anti-corruption” programme;

## EUD interviews analysis

Six out of 12 countries also report improvement in the rule of law and better governance (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Morocco, Georgia and Armenia), and in the areas of human rights (Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Moldova and Georgia), sub-regional cooperation (Jordan, Belarus, Georgia, Egypt, Moldova and Azerbaijan) and management of mobility of people and of legal migration (Jordan, Ukraine, Morocco, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan). Five countries refer to an improvement in the management of irregular migration (Morocco, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan) and only 3 countries see progress in CBC cooperation (Belarus, Moldova and Armenia).

Progress is also slow in Egypt in some areas such as the rule of law and better governance, human rights, economic development, mobility of people and legal migration.

## Palestine EUD interview

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	1. Improved respect of human rights: we are supporting the country in the ratification and implementation of international treaties on human rights (PA has ratified 5 UN human rights treaties). Difficult to answer because of the particular context: Our instrument is mainly political to contribute to state building. There has been some progress on state building.
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## Georgia EUD interview

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	1. Improved rule of the law and better governance: e.g. Visa liberalization Action Plan a number of reforms were demanded (an EC report highlights progress in this area), judiciary independence though in this case there are remaining gaps and Public Administration Roadmap adopted in 2015. 2. Improved respect of human rights: improved anti-discrimination legislation and introduced mechanisms to fight discrimination; HR Action Plan adopted by the government in 2015. 3. Enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation. 4. Economic development: e.g. agriculture (development
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## EAMR 2015

Some examples of EU contribution to ENI objectives include:

Armenia *“Dialogue in the field of human rights was also stepped up, using various political fora, but more particularly, in the context of the Human Rights Budget support programme signed in December 2015 which will aim at improving the protection of human rights through enacting and implementing relevant legislation in the areas of right to free elections, torture prevention, anti-discrimination (including minorities, people with disabilities, refugees and other vulnerable groups), gender equality and child protection.”* (EAMR Armenia 2015, 7-9).

In some cases the above-mentioned obstacles have proved to be a significant burden on the achievement of ENI objectives mainly related to the promotion of democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Particularly challenging seems to be the cases of Egypt *“The current suspension of BS operations’ in strategic development areas like health, energy, transport and water, and in particular the impossibility to further extend the BS operation in education, also limited the Delegation’s options to achieve its specific objective of supporting Egypt in fostering sustainable and inclusive*

development [...] The Constitution of January 2014 does contain some provisions for better protection of vulnerable groups (e.g. women), however, it does not enhance democratic scrutiny of both the military and the judicial system. This worrying situation represented an important challenge to the Delegation's general objective to contribute to building a democratic society in Egypt, and in particular to its specific AMP objective of providing support to Egypt in promoting democracy and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms." (EAMR Egypt 2015, 5-6), and Syria "Although the situation has slightly improved compared to 2014 when the delegation was split between Brussels, Amman and Beirut, the delegation still remains split between Brussels and Beirut. This, combined with the impossibility for the operational staff to enter Syria complicates very much the day to day work, o the perception of the real situation on the ground, o the coordination at all levels, as well as o the follow-up, monitoring and evaluation of the EU funded projects." (EAMR Syria 2015, 4-6).

#### *Egypt Field Report:*

Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, (...): No ENI programmes to promote HR; support provided through EIDHR; All other aspects not addressed due to GoE reluctance, unless for a PAR programme under preparation.

*"A new Constitution was adopted in January 2014, following its approval in a referendum in which 38.6 % of voters participated. In general, the Constitution can be considered to be more liberal than the previous constitutions, but remains conservative, in particular on freedom of religion and belief. It limits the powers of the President in a semi-presidential system, notably through term limits and parliamentary checks, but it strengthens the autonomy of state institutions such as the military, and especially the judiciary. Importantly, it includes an unprecedented level of protection for human rights and individual freedoms, and bolsters the rights of women and gender equality. However, these liberal precepts have not yet been applied in the spirit of the constitution."* (Progress report Egypt 2015, p. 4)

*"Throughout the year, reports emerged of arbitrary arrests by security forces and inhumane conditions in prisons. Other reports referred to forced disappearances and torture in facilities outside judicial oversight. The National Council for Human Rights and the Fact Finding Committee were granted access to prisons only in some cases. Prisons remained in general closed for inspection by local or international organisations."* (Progress report Egypt 2015, p. 7)

*"As regards the freedom of religion or belief, the Egyptian authorities obliged mosques to lay down a theme for their weekly Friday sermons in a move to curb Islamist dissent and extremism. The Minister for Religious Endowments banned all NGOs from collecting donations inside mosques and instructed imams not to let anyone speak from the pulpit or give religious lessons without prior written ministerial permission. On the other hand, there was a noticeably positive approach towards Coptic Christians, including through symbolic gestures and through easing of restrictions on church construction and restoration."* (Progress report Egypt 2015, p. 7)

*"There was progress on investigations into cases of targeted sexual violence against women, recurrent in crowded squares during demonstrations and holiday celebrations. A number of defendants received sentences up to life imprisonment for sexual assault. Reports emerged that female protesters were subject to abuse and rape by the police while in detention and that these incidents were not subject to any form of investigation."* (Progress report Egypt 2015, p. 7)

*"An increasing number of arrests of members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community took place under accusations of debauchery. The defendants were referred to trial where they were given harsh sentences after very short proceedings. LGBTI people continued to face harsh treatment in police custody, physically and mentally, and were often subjected to non-consensual medical examinations."* (Progress report Egypt 2015, p. 8)

*"There was significant corruption in dealings related to land properties and in the security administration. The mandate of the Administrative Control Authority (ACA) was extended to cover strategy development, prevention and investigation; the ACA's role in fighting corruption and organised crime was thus strengthened. The role of the National Coordinating Committee for Combating Corruption was also strengthened given that it was placed under the ACA's leadership and transferred from the Ministry of Justice and placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. Support for finalising the implemen-*

tation of the national strategy to combat corruption remained the main way in which the EU continued to support Egypt.” (Progress report Egypt 2015, p. 8)

“A Human Rights Action Plan was adopted in February 2014, an important step forward. However, the Action Plan does not address areas that should be a priority, such as the compliance with the UN Convention against Torture (CAT). The right of freedom of association was generally respected. Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation is still missing, although some legislative measures were taken. The anti-discrimination strategy, which would help making legislative steps more consistent, remained a draft. There were no tangible developments in the implementation and enforcement of legislation on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Several reforms remained at drafting stage and only some steps are missing to make them legal reality. Shortcomings stated in previous progress reports, such as the lack of trust in the judicial system and the fight against corruption persisted.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 2)

“Awareness of international human rights instruments and Armenia’s human rights obligations remained low among national institutions, including the judiciary and law enforcement bodies. The government prepared the second national report on the Universal Periodic Review (review at the UN Human Rights Council in early 2015). Armenia is a signatory to more than 50 international human rights conventions, including all fundamental conventions. However, it has not yet ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The government accepted the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed at abolishing the death penalty, but has yet to ratify it. Ratification of the Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families is also still pending.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 6-7)

“The government approved the human rights national action plan in March, based on the national strategy for human rights protection. It is a roadmap for coordinated action by public institutions to fulfil Armenia’s international obligations and can be seen as a welcome step forward. The government said that it would be revised and amended regularly. While the adoption of the strategy and action plan is an important step forward, it failed to address certain priority areas, including the UN Convention against Torture, electoral rights and ensuring greater respect for women’s rights. The EU continued its dialogue with Armenia on human rights. A new EU programme will scale up human rights assistance, in particular in relation to elections, preventing torture, anti-discrimination, gender equality and child protection. The government confirmed it would include the conditions of the programme in the human rights action plan.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 7)

“Armenian law prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. There were no tangible developments on bringing national law to criminalise torture into line with Article 1 of the Convention against Torture. This does not feature in the Human Rights Action Plan. The current definition of torture does not include crimes committed by public officials. There were no tangible developments regarding ill-treatment in police custody. There is concern about the use of coerced confessions in trials and the failure to investigate defendants’ allegations that confessions have been obtained using torture. Reports from monitoring groups confirm that ill-treatment and police violence continue to take place mostly during arrest and are not properly addressed in courtrooms.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 7)

“The law on equal rights and equal opportunities for women and men has still not been implemented efficiently. There is no way of complaining about inequality. There is concern about deeply rooted patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes regarding the role of women and men, coupled with persistently high levels of violence against women. The law on domestic violence was not adopted. Reforms of the Criminal and Administrative Codes were scheduled to be completed by the end of 2016 only and it was unclear how conscience would participate. Despite the increasing challenges, the visibility of women’s rights defenders increased thanks to the internet and social media. A side effect of this was an increase in threats and hate speech against women’s rights organisations, not investigated properly by the police.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 8)

“Armenia still does not have a comprehensive legal framework against discrimination. The human rights action plan only suggested assessing the compatibility of relevant Armenian legislation with international law and weighing the merits of adopting an anti-discrimination law. No measures were put in place to protect the rights of LGBTI people, while discrimination and hostility continued to be a ma-



job problem. There was also widespread discrimination against people with disabilities with regard to their economic, social and cultural rights. People with disabilities were also socially segregated in all areas.” (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 8)

“The National Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan were adopted. The prison system and the protection of children’s rights improved. An anti-discrimination law was adopted; the lack of accountability for abuses by law enforcement authorities persisted. In general, the rights of minorities were not substantially improved. Major public administration reforms are pending, including reform of the financing of political parties.” (Progress report Georgia 2015, p. 2)

“The EU-Georgia Association Agreement and its related Association Agenda contain provisions to advance governance and human rights. In 2014, the Georgian Parliament unanimously adopted a national human rights strategy, largely based on recommendations made by EU Special Adviser Thomas Hammarberg in his report ‘Georgia in Transition’. The implementation of selected areas of the strategy and its action plan will be supported by EU funding.” (Progress report Georgia 2015, p. 7-8)

“A national action plan on gender equality (2014-16) was adopted and all existing gender and women’s rights action plans were integrated into the human rights action plan (2014-15). In June, Georgia signed the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. Inter-sectoral coordination and cooperation remained a challenge for the government. There is a continued need to step up efforts to combat violence against women, address the needs of women from different minority groups and introduce special measures to enhance women’s participation in politics. In 2014, at least 26 women died as a result of domestic violence. The Ombudsman noted the problem of girls marrying early and dropping out of school.” (Progress report Georgia 2015, p. 8)

“In the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 2014 was a year of mixed results in Jordan. Influenced by regional developments, there was no tangible development on the freedom of the media, and the government did not take any steps to further strengthen the freedom of association or the freedom of assembly. The policy dialogue between the government and civil society organisations (CSOs) was not strengthened either. There was limited progress on the fight against ill-treatment and torture and on women’s rights. There was a clear setback in December, when Jordan cancelled its de facto moratorium on the death penalty and executed eleven people. The EU called upon the Jordanian authorities to re-apply a moratorium as a first step towards abolishing the death penalty.” (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 3)

“As a follow-up to the 2013 UN Universal Periodic Review, in April 2014 Jordan set up a technical committee to draft a national plan for human rights, which addresses the need to review national legislation in order to bring it in compliance with international agreements and human rights conventions. In June 2014, Jordan’s authorities announced that they would produce a guidebook entitled ‘Know Your Rights’ to raise public awareness about citizen rights.” (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 6)

“In December Jordan cancelled its de facto moratorium on the death penalty. Eleven people, all sentenced to death in 2005 and 2006, were executed by hanging. This change to the application of the death penalty came after no executions had been carried out since 2006. It is estimated that 113 prisoners, including 12 women, are currently on death row.” (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 6)

“In March 2014 two amendments to Article 208 of the penal code were adopted with the aim of categorising all types of torture as illegal. However, the amended Article 208(1) is limited to acts of torture that are inflicted in order to obtain confessions to a crime, while the amended Article 208(2) leaves room for broader interpretation, though omitting ‘mental’ torture. In June 32 Members of Parliament submitted a memorandum calling for tougher penalties for offenders who commit crimes of torture. Jordan’s penal code categorises crimes of torture as a misdemeanour and is therefore incompatible with the requirements of United Nation Convention against Torture (UNCAT) to which Jordan is a party. The EU encourages Jordan to move forward with the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT). The EU launched two projects to strengthen civil society organisations, to increase the protection of groups vulnerable to discriminatory torture and ill-treatment, and to include UN standards for preventing torture in the domestic legal framework.” (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 6)

*“Jordan continued to play its long-term role in promoting religious coexistence and its support for the freedom of religion or belief. No steps were made towards lifting Jordan’s remaining reservations to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In the 2014 Global Gender Gap Index, Jordan ranked 134th out of 142 countries monitored (in 2013, it had ranked 119th out of 136 countries). In February 2014 Jordan signed a memorandum to join the UN Women’s COMMIT initiative to end violence against women.”* (Progress report Jordan 2015, p. 6)

*“Lebanon made some progress with regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular in the area of rights of women and children. New legislation was adopted to protect victims of domestic violence and fighting parental violence. Lebanon made limited progress in governance-related issues, such as public procurement and public finance management.”* (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 3)

*“Human rights and fundamental freedoms continued to be respected in Lebanon. During the reporting period, no new developments were noted in improving the general legal framework for their protection. The adoption and implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan and the establishment of a human rights institution stalled, as did the establishment of a national mechanism for torture prevention. Lebanon did not ratify any of the outstanding international instruments (e.g. the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). In 2014 Lebanon was a subject to an inquiry under Article 20 of the Convention against Torture (CAT). The inquiry, whose methodology and outcomes were contested by Lebanon, reported that torture is being routinely used by the armed forces and law enforcement agencies for the purpose of investigation, and for securing confessions. The existing law fails to criminalise all forms of torture. The Internal Security Forces continued to work on promoting respect for human rights within their structure.”* (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 5-6)

*“Major progress in protecting the rights of women and children was made with the adoption of legislation protecting women and other family members from domestic violence. It introduced emergency procedures providing protection to the victims within 48 hours in urgent cases. The immediate implementation of the new legislation was another step forward. Lebanese women are still not able to pass their nationality to their children. Female participation in political, social and economic life remains very low. In the Global Gender Gap Report prepared by the World Economic Forum, Lebanon ranked 135 out of 142 countries. Some improvement was made in nominating women to key government positions. Out of 56 key posts, 12 were filled by women. Discrimination against LGBTI persons, including cases of detention, prosecution and use of ‘honour tests’, continued, as reported by civil society organisations.”* (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 6)

*“Moldova made less progress than in previous years on deep and sustainable democracy and on the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The overall level of political freedom in Moldova continued to be comparatively high.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 2)

*“In June 2014 Moldova and the EU signed the AA/DCFTA. The agreement committed Moldova to developing democratic institutions and to upholding human rights in accordance with European Union rules and standards. The agreement was ratified in July 2014 and provisionally came into force in September 2014.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 5)

*“Some progress was made on the respect of human rights. The reform of the Ombudsman’s office to bring it in line with the Paris Principles on national human rights institutions proceeded slowly. A new law on the Ombudsman (the Law on the Public Advocate) was adopted by parliament in April 2014, after an earlier draft had been returned to legislators by the President in response to complaints from development partners and civil society. New ombudsmen have not yet been selected under the new law due to a lack of consensus in parliament on the selection process for candidates, and this weakened the Ombudsman’s office as an institution.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 7)

*“The government began to take steps to promote the integration of national minorities into society. In line with the government’s action plan, the Bureau for Inter-ethnic Relations formed a working group to draft a ‘Strategy on the integration of national minorities’ with support from the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The drafting of the strategy was suspended in October 2014, due to the parliamentary electoral campaign. As part of its efforts to strengthen Romanian as the state language, the Ministry of Education drafted amendments to the Educational Code. Under the new code, which*

came into force in October 2014, the Russian language was made an optional rather than a compulsory subject for schools teaching in Romanian, which caused concern among some minorities. The Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages was signed by Moldova in 2002, but has yet to be ratified." (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 8)

"Moldova continued to implement the 2012 law on equality. The Equality Council created under this law became operational and, in March 2014, approved a plan to implement the law on equality. A public information campaign on preventing discrimination and how to ensure equality continued in 2014. Since its creation, the Council received 108 complaints and examined 79 of them. Twenty-nine decisions were taken, seven of which related to the private sector and twenty-two to the public sector. The second parade for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community was held in Chişinău in May 2014: this was the first to be held without any legal challenge from the Chişinău city authorities. The Ministry of Interior provided good protection for the demonstrators." (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 8-9)

"Progress was made in promoting gender equality, especially on women's participation in decision-making. The government approved a draft law on introducing a minimal representative quota of 40 % for women on the electoral lists of political parties, but this law has not yet been approved by parliament. Women held only 20 % seats in the outgoing parliament and the proportion will be the same in the incoming parliament. Underrepresentation of women in public life remained an issue: 18.5 % of serving mayors are women, and women hold 17.4 % of seats in district and municipal councils and 28.6 % in local councils. This was also an issue in the private sector, the third sector and tripartite mechanisms. Women faced specific barriers on the labour market and faced a significant pay gap (women's wages are 87.1 % of men's wages). On a positive note, according to the International Labour Organisation report 'Women in Business and Management, Gaining Momentum' 2015, Moldova ranks in 10th place for women with management experience, with 44.1 % of all managers in Moldova being women. Moldova's General Police Inspectorate conducted information campaigns together with specialised NGOs on the legal framework governing the prevention of domestic violence. The General Police Inspectorate also took action towards further reform on gender-based violence and this was ongoing at the end of 2014, in particular as concerns amending practices for prosecuting rape." (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 9)

"Ainsi les questions d'égalité de genre ont pu être régulièrement abordées avec les autorités dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du programme « Egalité hommes/femmes » et de son dialogue politique. Ceci a ainsi permis de poursuivre les efforts d'intégration de la dimension « genre » dans l'ensemble des programmes en cours ou en formulation." (EAMR Morocco 2015, 5-9).

"Les efforts du Maroc sur le plan des principes démocratiques et des droits de l'Homme pour mettre en œuvre la Constitution de 2011 devront s'accélérer notamment pour la promotion de la concertation avec la société civile, l'égalité des sexes ainsi que le renforcement des libertés d'association, de rassemblement et d'expression. Les différentes instances créées par la Constitution, instances nationales ou consultatives, pour assurer le respect des principes démocratiques et des droits de l'Homme devraient rapidement devenir opérationnelles." (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 2)

"D'un point de vue global, le Maroc a fait des progrès significatifs dans la mise en œuvre du plan d'action de la PEV sur la voie de la consolidation des droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales, surtout par l'adoption d'importants textes réglementaires. Ce constat s'applique également à la réforme de la justice. Le Maroc a adopté et mis en œuvre une politique migratoire ambitieuse qui prévoit un processus de régularisation et d'intégration des migrants irréguliers ainsi que des réfugiés." (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 3)

"Le Maroc continue d'appliquer un moratoire de facto en matière de peine de mort, qui existe toujours dans le dispositif législatif du Maroc. Plusieurs avancées sont toutefois à souligner. La proposition d'abolition de la peine de mort est largement soutenue depuis quelque temps au Maroc par la Coalition marocaine, le Réseau des parlementaires pour l'abolition de la peine de mort (qui comprend environ 240 membres représentant presque tous les partis), le réseau des avocats, plusieurs partis politiques et le Conseil national des droits de l'Homme (CNDH). Une proposition de loi visant à abolir la peine capitale et la remplacer par d'autres peines avait d'ailleurs été déposée au SGG par plusieurs partis politiques, tant de la majorité que de l'opposition. Le projet de réforme du code de procédure pénale préparé par le gouvernement maintient néanmoins la peine de mort, tout en durcissant les

*conditions pour l'invoquer et en réduisant le nombre d'infractions donnant lieu à la peine capitale.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 6-7)*

*“Le Maroc a déposé en novembre 2014 les instruments de ratification de l'OPCAT. Cette mesure est une avancée considérable, dans la mesure où elle prévoit la mise en place d'un mécanisme indépendant de contrôle. Une circulaire du ministère de la justice et des libertés de juin exige des procureurs de décliner dans un PV officiel les traces de torture constatées sur les personnes prétendant en avoir été victimes. La circulaire précise que des examens médicaux doivent être pratiqués par des médecins indépendants et spécialisés, et que les procureurs doivent répondre positivement aux demandes d'examens médicaux formulées devant les juges d'instruction ou autres magistrats.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 7)*

*“Le projet de loi concernant l'Autorité pour la parité et la lutte contre toute forme de discrimination (APALD) a été déposé en août au Secrétariat général du gouvernement. Le projet de loi pour la lutte contre toutes les formes de violences à l'égard des femmes, qui avait été déposé au SGG en septembre 2013 et soumis au Conseil de gouvernement en novembre de la même année, a été examiné au sein de la commission ad hoc nommée par le Chef du gouvernement en automne de cette année et resoumise au ministère compétent. En février 2014, le Parlement a adopté un amendement du code pénal portant suppression d'une disposition qui permettait à un adulte d'échapper à toute condamnation s'il se mariait avec une mineure. L'observatoire de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes dans la fonction publique a été institué en mars au sein du ministère de la fonction publique et de la modernisation de l'administration (MFPMA). Cet observatoire a pour mission la collecte de données, des recherches et des analyses sur les situations des femmes, ainsi que la formulation de propositions et recommandations de réformes législatives, réglementaires et de programmes destinés à garantir l'équité hommes-femmes et résorber les inégalités entre les sexes.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 7)*

*“La participation du Maroc au Conseil des droits de l'Homme des Nations unies lui a permis d'appuyer certaines résolutions déposées ou soutenues par l'UE. Le Maroc a poursuivi sa coopération approfondie avec le Conseil de l'Europe dans de nombreux domaines, notamment par la mise en œuvre du programme «Renforcer la réforme démocratique dans les pays du voisinage méridional» financé par l'UE. Le rapporteur de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe pour le statut de «partenaire pour la démocratie», que le Maroc s'était vu octroyer en juin 2011, s'est rendu au Maroc en juillet 2014. Ce statut fera l'objet d'une réévaluation en 2015.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 8)*

*“Following dramatic changes at the beginning of the year, and despite some months in which severe abuses of human rights took place, Ukraine made overall good progress on deep and sustainable democracy, on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Ukraine conducted its presidential and parliamentary elections largely in compliance with EU and international standards, as confirmed in reports from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). Election legislation was improved before these elections. However, the need for comprehensive reforms in this area remained. A law on public prosecution and several anti-corruption laws were adopted. Some steps were taken towards the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau. Progress is still pending on judicial reform and law enforcement reform, where several proposals were discussed but new legislation was not produced. The lack of accountability in the police for cases of ill-treatment persisted. After worrying developments at the beginning of the year, the situation improved with regard to freedom of expression, freedom of the media and freedom of assembly. Anti-discrimination legislation was improved and now needs to be implemented.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 3)*

*“The human rights situation deteriorated drastically for people living in Crimea and Sevastopol after the illegal annexation and in the areas controlled by illegal armed groups in eastern Ukraine. Fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression and freedom of the media were not guaranteed in these regions. The number of internally displaced persons and refugees increased, exceeding 1.4 million. Ukraine's capacity for providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons proved insufficient. The armed conflicts had a significant impact on children's and women's rights.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 3)*

*“Even though the number of cases of ill-treatment decreased due to the implementation of the new Criminal Procedure Code, the lack of police accountability for recurrent cases of ill-treatment and tor-*

ture remained a problem. This is due to the absence of effective and independent investigation and the lack of a police complaint mechanism. The State Bureau of Investigation, provided for in the new Criminal Procedure Code and which could investigate cases of ill-treatment and torture, was not yet set up.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 7)

“National legislation on gender equality and women’s empowerment was, in general, well advanced, based on existing UN Conventions. However, Ukraine still did not meet European standards in this area. According to the World Economic Forum’s global gender gap index, in 2014, Ukraine was ranked 56 out of 142 countries. Gender-based violence remained a major concern. The state programme for gender equality and equal opportunities for 2014-16 continued to lack adequate resources. The number of cases of domestic violence increased. A state hot line for the victims was not yet set up. The NGO-operated hotline was insufficiently resourced and did not cover the whole country. In December 2014, the Ministry of Social Policy, supported by an EU twinning project, prepared amendments to the legislation on employing people with disabilities. They focused on incentives for employers and administrative sanctions for companies violating the rights of people with disabilities.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 7-8)

“Regarding national minorities, in February 2014 the Acting President vetoed the revocation proposed by parliament of the 2012 language law. This would have meant that regional and local authorities no longer had the right to declare minority and regional languages for official use on their territory, in addition to Ukrainian, as provided for by the law. Large parts of the 2012 language law had been positively assessed by the Venice Commission, who made however several suggestions for improvements. An ad hoc parliamentary committee was set up to prepare a new draft law on languages, but it did not come up with an agreed draft before the early parliamentary elections. The 2012 language law therefore remained in force.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 8)

“The ongoing armed conflict made many people leave their homes, becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. There were more than 1.4 million of them altogether, according to estimates by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs from December 2014. Legislation on IDPs, adopted by parliament in October 2014, came into force in November. However, a number of issues hampering the delivery of humanitarian aid remained to be addressed. The Ministry of Social Policy was tasked with registering IDPs and channelling relief efforts. A dedicated agency focusing on IDPs was created, but the head of the agency was not appointed. Housing remained an issue, as many private houses were destroyed during the conflict. The decisions taken by president and government in December regarding the suspension of social transfers to people from the areas outside government control in the Donbas (unless they resettled as IDPs) are also of concern.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 8)

“Human rights issues continued to be a matter of concern, despite some limited progress, such as the amendment of the Penal Code on the issue of honour killing and the accession of Palestine to a number of international conventions. In the West Bank, despite a relatively positive environment, there has been a shrinking of democratic space with complaints of arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, as well as reported violations of freedom of expression (undue pressure on journalists) and assembly (violent dispersion of demonstrators). The socio-economic vulnerability of women across Palestine was of concern. The death sentence remained in use in Gaza and approximately 25 ‘suspected collaborators’ were summarily executed in August. This was of particular concern, though it should be noted that the Gaza Strip has, for the most part, not been under the PA’s control.” (Progress report Palestine 2015, p. 2-3)

“The National Action Plan for Human Rights was approved by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Planning after 12 months of consultations, research and drafting, with the support of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Most of the plan’s recommendations were subsequently incorporated into the final version of the Palestinian national development plan for 2014–16. Seven death sentences were handed down in 2014 by the de facto authorities in Gaza. Two people were executed in Gaza in May 2014. In addition, approximately 25 ‘suspected collaborators’ were summarily executed in August by Hamas in Gaza.” (Progress report Palestine 2015, p. 5)#

“There were regular complaints during 2014 of torture and ill-treatment in detention centres, in both Gaza and the West Bank. Most complaints in the West Bank, registered but not investigated by the Independent Commission on Human Rights, concerned the Palestinian Civil Police. Torture and ill-

treatment continued despite the Presidential Decree issued in May 2013, confirming the PA's commitment to the prohibition of all forms of torture. However, one of the national intelligence agencies, the Palestinian Preventive Security Service, developed a revised code of conduct for its staff, which clearly prohibits the use of torture. Similarly, both the Palestinian Preventive Security Service and the General Intelligence Service agreed to unannounced visits to their detention centres by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Since January 2011, no civilians have been tried in West Bank military courts. However, 22 civilians sentenced by a military court prior to that date remained in prison, with no possibility of a retrial before a civilian court. Arbitrary detention remained a matter of concern, with 32 complaints being lodged before the Independent Commission of Human Rights. These included failure to observe due process, illegal detention procedures, and non-separation of civil and political detainees." (Progress report Palestine 2015, p. 5-6)

"Violence against women and their overall socio-economic vulnerability remained challenges for Palestinian society. Based on the data provided by the Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), 23 femicides occurred in 2014 (16 in the West Bank and seven in Gaza). 16 honour killings and seven suicides for violence were documented by WCLAC. According to the 2013 statistics on women and men in Palestine issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), married and previously married women were those most subjected to all forms of violence in Palestine. In a positive step, President Abbas issued a decree amending the Penal Code to remove the power of the judiciary to take into account certain 'mitigating factors' when sentencing in cases of honour killings or femicide. However, another provision remained in place, giving any family member of the victim the right to relinquish his/her rights, following which a case is often dropped. Palestinian women's rate of participation in the labour market remained among the lowest in the world (17.3 % against 69.3 % for men for 2013) even though women now comprise the majority of Palestinian university graduates. A general increase in unemployment and poverty contributed in turn to an increase in early marriages for girls and in the number of girls dropping out of school. Both human security and access to justice remained highly problematic for women, who often only have recourse to traditional informal justice systems." (Progress report Palestine 2015, p. 6)



### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EAMRs, ROM ENI Report 2015;

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 2.1.3 I-213. Evidence that confidence is under construction among neighbours and good relation developing, notably through enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation as well as CBC

#### Global analysis of the indicator

A number of evidence allows to conclude that in both the East and South, centrifugal forces have remained too powerful and the cooperation has not become very effective at the regional level (as presented in detail in indicator I-2.3.1). As a consequence, mistrust clearly dominates the cooperation and relations between many countries. However, the opportunities for partnership created by ENI (and, before, ENPI) regional activities have succeeded in the establishment of sub-regional cooperative networks, that could become the "noyau dur" of further regional integration process in a future, more peaceful, geo-political context.

Complementary information is provided in indicators I-2.3.1 and I-2.3.2

#### Presentation of collected proof

Evidence on the current status of regional cooperation and its difficulties can be found in indicators I-2.3.1 and I-2.3.2. Interviews from field visits complement the evidence.

Ukraine Field Report:

*Promoting confidence-building, good neighbourly relations and other measures contributing to security in all its forms and the prevention and settlement of conflicts, including protracted conflicts:* Due to the tensed relations of Ukraine with Russia and Belarus, ENI is not supporting any actions contributing to the promotion of neighbourly relations with these countries; Wide exchanges of knowhow and collaboration exists between Ukraine and Georgia, while the relations of Ukraine with the EU Member-states (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) can potentially be supported by ENI (depending on the bilateral/ multilateral cooperation of Ukraine with these countries).

Interviews at the HQ did not provide any evidence or information that confirm that confidence is developing between neighbours in the South region, nor in the East region.

EUD interviews and Field visit confirm the weakness of the cooperation in the Neighbourhood, with the exception of Ukraine which has developed effective partnerships with Georgia.

CBC are mostly implemented between 1 UE country and 1 ENP country, thus leaving little opportunity to develop confidence among neighbours. See indicator 2.3.2 on CBC

Various analysis of the South context were made and consider that:

- *“Arab economies still remain insignificant players in export markets, with limited success in entering new markets or introducing new products. This failure is partly rooted in the region’s inability to benefit from the forces of gravity—forces that create natural advantages of trading with neighbours. Behind a weak private sector lies a key puzzle: the Arab world’s economic fragmentation despite its favourable coastal access and high levels of urbanization.” It remains one of the most fragmented regions of the world in terms of production, trade and economic linkages.”*

Adeel Malik, « De la malédiction des ressources à la malédiction de la rente dans la région MENA, *Série sur les notes de politiques en Afrique du Nord, BAD, 2015*

- *“Many of the security, economic and social challenges in the Neighbourhood are directly linked to low levels of regional integration. (...) The overall political climate in the southern Neighbourhood remained tense, affecting the possibilities for regional cooperation. While southern partner countries continued to develop their bilateral relations with the EU, the region as such remained one of the least integrated in the world”*

EC (2015) Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014, p15

In the East, countries of the Eastern Partnership have chosen specific and rather diverging geopolitical partnerships and they have been engaged in different economic integration schemes.

Additional evidences on regional cooperation can be found in indicator I-2.3.1

### Sources of information used

Interviews – at HQ, Field missions (in particular Ukraine, Georgia, Egypt, Tunisia)

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Limited</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### 2.1.4 I-214. Evidence (nature and scope) of contribution to smart inclusive economic development at country level, further aggregated at regional level

#### Global analysis of the indicator

ENP South economies still remain marginal players in the world economy. This failure is mainly rooted in the region’s inability to benefit from the forces of gravity and from the regional economies of scale. They benefited from growth acceleration in the second half of the 2000 decade that increased nominal income levels, both in absolute and relative terms, from

an average of 16% in 2004 to 22% of the EU level in 2009. The global financial crisis was the first impediment to this expansion phase. Then the instability generated by the Arab Springs, combined with a flat growth in the EU main markets, resulted in a slower growth rate in the region. Since then, growth trajectories have become more differentiated between countries, depending on: i) their political stability and economic resilience and ii) the nature of their immediate neighbours. Morocco, stable and far from the Syrian and Libyan crisis, has maintained an almost stable growth rate. By contrast, Tunisia has been strongly hit by the spillover of the fragmentation of Libya. Still, the resilience of its institutions and of its economy has allowed the country to maintain a positive growth rate. Regional stability and the establishment of sound inclusive institutions are key to socio-economic progress in the ENP South.

In the East, growth has also declined in the recent period, except in Georgia. The much slower demographic growth and the improvement of competitiveness indicators are significant advantages to promote better standard of living in the near future. As incomes grow and economic opportunities expand, the quality of public governance will become critical in the differentiation of economic performances between countries; as evidenced already positively by Georgia.

In both regions, EC interventions have been large and usually they have corresponded to the needs of the countries. The EC has been particularly effective at delivering emergency financial assistance (See also EQ1 and EQ3). In the most vulnerable countries, EC support has been critical to avoid recession (Tunisia) or deeper recession (Ukraine). While interviews of EUD and field visits lead to the overall conclusion that ENI has had a positive impact on the economic situation of the Neighbourhood, it is however difficult to evaluate the specific impact of EC interventions – both emergency and programmed- on economic development in the neighbouring countries.

### Presentation of collected proof

Macroeconomic trends show mitigated performances in both regions.

The ENP supports economic reforms for a better business and investment climate. Surveys, such as the World Bank's 'Doing Business' report, show that:

- In the South, the considerable progress achieved in the pre-2011 period have been challenged since then. In all countries indicators of « Doing business » have declined since 2011. The fall has been impressive for Israel, Tunisia and of course Syria. Exceptions are Palestine (improvement from one of the worst rankings in the world) and Morocco (stable), but they do not modify the overall negative trend.
- In the East: all countries have improved their performances, except Ukraine, for obvious reasons. Georgia has consolidated its fast improvement since 2005 (now 24<sup>th</sup> on 189 countries; better than France, Switzerland and the Nederland...), while the worst performers have made formidable progress since 2011: Armenia + 23; Belarus + 48; Moldova + 49.

Analysis of the WEF *Global Competitiveness Index* shows a similar divergence in regional trends. The main difference is that East countries rankings are much lower.

Table: Competitiveness indicators

Rankings	Doing Business				Global Competitiveness Index			
(Decreasing scale of performance)	2005	2011	2015	Change 2015/2011	2004	2010	2016	Change 2016/2010
<b>ENI South</b>								
<b>Algeria</b>	128	143	161	-18	71	83	87	-4
<b>Egypt</b>	141	108	126	-18	62	70	115	-45
<b>Israel</b>	29	32	50	-18	19	27	24	+3
<b>Jordan</b>	74	95	107	-12	35	50	63	-13
<b>Lebanon</b>	95	104	121	-17	na	na	101	ns



Libya	na	na	<b>188</b>	ns	na	88	<b>na</b>	na
Morocco	102	82	<b>80</b>	-2	56	73	<b>70</b>	+3
Syria	121	133	<b>173</b>	-40	na	94	<b>ns</b>	ns
Tunisia	58	46	<b>75</b>	-29	42	40	<b>95</b>	-55
Palestine	125	173	<b>127</b>	+46	na	na	<b>na</b>	na
ENI East								
Armenia	46	61	<b>38</b>	+23	na	97	<b>79</b>	+18
Azerbaijan	98	69	<b>63</b>	+6	na	51	<b>37</b>	+14
Belarus	106	91	<b>43</b>	+48	na	na	<b>na</b>	na
Georgia	100	17	<b>24</b>	-7	94	90	<b>59</b>	+31
Moldova	83	96	<b>49</b>	+47	na	na	<b>100</b>	ns
Ukraine	124	118	<b>87</b>	-29	86	82	<b>85</b>	-3
Number of countries	155	183	<b>189</b>		104	133	<b>140</b>	

Sources: <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index/>;  
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/custom-query#Economies>

Table: Economic Growth 2010-2015 (% real gdp change)

ENI SOUTH	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average	2015/2011
Algeria	3,6	2,9	3,4	2,8	3,8	3,9	3,4	0,3
Egypt	5,1	1,8	2,2	2,1	2,2	4,2	2,9	-0,9
Israel	5,5	5,0	2,9	3,4	2,6	2,5	3,6	-3,0
Jordan	2,3	2,6	2,7	2,8	3,1	2,4	2,6	0,0
Lebanon	8,0	2,0	2,2	0,9	1,8	1,5	2,7	-6,5
Libya	5,0	-62,1	104,5	-13,6	-24,0	-10,2	-0,1	-15,2
Morocco	3,8	5,2	3,0	4,7	2,4	4,4	3,9	0,6
Palestine	2,3	7,8	14,5	-4,3	-1,1	12,4	5,3	10,1
Syrian	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Tunisia	3,5	-2,4	3,7	2,3	2,3	0,8	1,7	-2,7
Average South	<b>4,3</b>	<b>3,1</b>	<b>4,3</b>	<b>1,8</b>	<b>2,1</b>	<b>4,0</b>	<b>3,3</b>	<b>-0,3</b>
ENI EAST	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average	2015/2011
Armenia	2,2	4,7	7,2	3,3	3,5	3,0	4,0	0,8
Azerbaijan	4,9	0,1	2,2	5,8	2,0	1,1	2,7	-3,8
Belarus	7,7	5,5	1,7	1,1	1,7	-3,9	2,3	-11,6
Georgia	6,3	7,2	6,4	3,4	4,6	2,8	5,1	-3,5
Moldova	7,1	6,4	-0,7	9,4	4,8	-0,5	4,4	-7,6
Ukraine	4,2	5,2	0,2	0,0	-6,6	-9,9	-1,1	-14,1
Average East	<b>5,4</b>	<b>4,9</b>	<b>2,8</b>	<b>3,8</b>	<b>1,7</b>	<b>-1,2</b>	<b>2,9</b>	<b>-6,6</b>

Source: World Bank

The Southern Mediterranean countries have shown a significant resilience to external shocks so far. While the growth rate has been roughly divided by two in several countries, growth has remain significant and positive in the region (Lybia and Syria exceptions). However, the growth rate is far insufficient to generate neither individual income growth, nor inclusive economic development. A 3.3% aver-

age rate of growth of the gdp/capita is necessary to double the income in one generation (20 years). It stands now at 2,9 % in Egypt, while the population growth is 2,6 % / year !

In the East, growth has been instable and weak during the period 2011-2015, except in Georgia.

Table: Gini index (incl: most recent year available)

<b>SOUTH</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>EAST</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Algeria</b>				<b>Armenia</b>	30,71	31,32	30,48	31,54
<b>Egypt</b>	30,75			<b>Azerbaijan</b>				
<b>Israel</b>			42,78	<b>Belarus</b>	27,22	26,46	26,01	
<b>Jordan</b>	32,57		33,66	<b>Georgia</b>	40,57	41,58	41,35	40,03
<b>Lebanon</b>				<b>Moldova</b>	34,69	30,63	29,16	28,53
<b>Libya</b>				<b>Ukraine</b>	26,64	24,55	24,74	24,55
<b>Morocco</b>								
<b>Syria</b>								
<b>Tunisia</b>			35,81					
<b>West Bank and Gaza</b>		34,46						

Source: Banque Mondiale

Gini index show that the income distribution has been, on average, less unequal than in the EU for instance in most of the Eastern countries. However this conclusion has three limitations:

- Lack of data for the most recent years in the South
- There is no clear improvement in countries for which historical data are available
- This indicator does not consider difference in wealth and assets, only income, and it cannot appreciate the grey (and black) economy.

Table: UNDP Human Development Index

<b>Country</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2014/2011</b>
<b>South</b>				
<b>Algeria</b>	0,69	0,73	0,74	0,006
<b>Egypt</b>	0,65	0,68	0,69	0,008
<b>Israel</b>	0,87	0,89	0,89	0,006
<b>Jordan</b>	0,73	0,74	0,75	0,005
<b>Lebanon</b>	0,73	0,76	0,77	0,008
<b>Libya</b>	0,75	0,71	0,72	0,013
<b>Morocco</b>	0,57	0,62	0,63	0,007
<b>Palestine</b>	0,66	0,68	0,68	0,003
<b>Syria</b>	0,63	0,64	0,59	-0,041
<b>Tunisia</b>	0,69	0,72	0,72	0,006
<b>East</b>				
<b>Armenia</b>	0,70	0,72	0,73	0,01
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	0,69	0,74	0,75	0,009
<b>Belarus</b>	0,72	0,79	0,80	0,005
<b>Georgia</b>	0,71	0,74	0,75	0,014

Country	2005	2011	2014	2014/2011
Moldova	0,65	0,68	0,69	0,014
Ukraine	0,71	0,74	0,75	0,009
average South	0,70	0,72	0,72	0,0021
average East	0,70	0,74	0,75	0,010

Source: UNDP

Indicators of “Human Development” (HDI) have slightly improved in both regions during the periods, except in Syria.

Economic difficulties and crisis in the 2 regions, especially in the South, have been informed regularly in reporting documents, such as:

For the South:

- *In 2014, economic growth in the remained subdued and continued to be far below pre-2011 levels. There were signs, however, of a partial recovery and the growth trend began accelerating moderately. Average GDP growth, excluding Syria and Libya, was projected to recover to 2.8 % in 2014, slightly up from 2.5 % in 2013, although well below the 2007-10 average of 5 %. Economic activity in Libya was expected to contract sharply as a result of the renewal of armed conflict and the breakdown of the political and security situation.*
- *Regional fiscal positions continued to deteriorate (with the average budget deficit expected to increase from 7.2 %8 in 2013 to 7.4 % in 2014) and the balance of payments situation remained weak. Subsidies continued to be one of the largest common factors weighing on the fiscal deficits. The average current account deficit9 persisted at high levels (7.4 % of GDP). Foreign direct investments remained below pre-2011 levels.*
- *The regulatory environment for businesses in the Southern Neighbourhood continued to slowly improve. However, entrepreneurs across the region were still held back by weak protection for investors and intellectual property rights, and restricted access to credit.*
- *The business climate in the region remained challenging. The rankings awarded to individual countries in the region in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015 report varied widely, with Israel in 40th place and Algeria ranked 154th. Lebanon and Morocco had improved their ranking since the previous year, but the other countries had lost ground.*
- *High unemployment rates, especially among young people and women, remained one of the main regional problems, along with the very low participation of women in the labour market. Poverty and social exclusion were widespread and employment opportunities were often in the informal sector.*

(03/2015, p9,11, Implementation of the ENP Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean Partners Report)

For the East:

*“In 2014 the eastern Neighbourhood was hit hard by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The conflict had large direct and indirect effects on the region’s economic and political landscape, on top of the existing internal and external macroeconomic imbalances building up over the years in many of its countries. As a result of the deep recession in Ukraine and the significant slowdown of economic activity in Azerbaijan and Moldova, the average GDP growth in Eastern Partnership countries is expected to more than halve in 2014 to only 1.1% from 3.4% in 2013. Georgia deviated from the downward pattern, benefitting not only from expansionary fiscal policies but also its low exposure to Russia, which was reduced after the conflict in 2008.*

(03/2015, p4, Implementation of the ENP Eastern Partnership Implementation Report)

The case of Tunisia

- *« L’économie tunisienne a été affectée négativement par la difficile transition politique qui a suivi la révolution de 2011. Dans un contexte de disparités sociales et régionales persistantes et d’un environnement externe peu favorable (zone euro en récession, prix élevé des produits de base), la situation macro-économique de la Tunisie demeure délicate avec une croissance*

*timide et un chômage qui reste élevé (plus de 15%), particulièrement chez les jeunes. Malgré ce contexte difficile, la détérioration du déficit budgétaire a été limitée par d'importants efforts d'ajustement budgétaire, dans le cadre d'un accord de « stand-by » avec le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI). » p 3*

- *L'économie tunisienne a continué à être affectée négativement par l'instabilité régionale (surtout par la situation en Libye), et un environnement international de faible croissance, en particulier dans l'UE (principal partenaire commercial de la Tunisie). On estime que l'économie n'a crû que de 2,4%<sup>1</sup>, taux comparable à celui de 2013 (2,5%). P 9*
- *Le marché du travail continuait à souffrir de plusieurs contraintes structurelles aggravées par la perturbation de l'activité économique et le recul de la croissance depuis 2011. Selon des estimations officielles, le taux de chômage global aurait atteint 15,3 % (contre 15,9 % en 2013), mais les jeunes et les femmes continueraient à être les plus touchés par le chômage: les jeunes (15-29 ans) constitueraient 72% des chômeurs et leur taux de chômage continuerait à suivre une courbe ascendante. Le taux de chômage aurait augmenté également chez les diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur (passant de 23% en 2010 à 31% en 2014), surtout parmi les femmes, jeunes et diplômées avec un taux de 41% (en 2014)., p10 »*

EC (2015) 03/2015, Mise en oeuvre de la politique européenne de voisinage en Tunisie Progrès réalisés en 2014 et actions à mettre en oeuvre

In both regions, negative impact of shocks on growth have been reduced by the large support of the EC, that was channelled through different means, notably to Lebanon, Jordan, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia:

*“EU-Georgia programme for agriculture and rural development. In 2014, the EU disbursed €13 million for the Georgia strand of ENPARD, the European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development. Funded for the first time in 2012 (€40 million), replenished in 2013 (€12 million) and 2015 (€50 million), ENPARD is a successful example of EU-Georgia cooperation in a sector with significant impact on growth and jobs. In this case, success is linked to the programme's capacity to act as a catalyser and use an innovative mix of aid delivery modalities: budget support, policy advice, technical assistance, grants, and collaboration with specialised international organisations. ENPARD brings together all actors working in the sector (public institutions and small farmers, NGOs and associations, business community, university and schools) under a recognisable EU brand with the common aim of harnessing the untapped potential of Georgia's rural economy”*

In: Working Group on Financial Instruments – Summary of recommendations, Ref. Ares(2015)2364053 – 05/06/2015, p 2

EUD interviews analysis:

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country?

Ten out of 12 countries attest that ENI has contributed to a better economic health in the country. Exceptions are found in Algeria and Belarus due to modest EU support that limits the impact of actions taken. Main examples given by countries are related to PSD and SME support (Jordan, Ukraine, Lebanon, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia). Other illustrations include PFM and energy efficiency (Jordan and Egypt), BS on economic governance that led to a new law on budget management (Morocco), access to basic infrastructure and social cohesion and inclusion (Palestine), ENPAD programme in the sector of agriculture (Georgia) and rural and regional development and education (Azerbaijan).

EUD interviews analysis

According to EUD interviews, 8 out of 12 countries see major progress in: economic development (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), inclusive growth (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, Georgia, Egypt and Azerbaijan) and integration to the EU market (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan although in the case of the latter, there has been little improvement).

While interviews of EUD bring to the overall conclusion that ENI has had a positive impact on the economic situation of the Neighbourhood, it is however difficult to evaluate the specific impact of EC interventions – both emergency and programmed- on economic development in the neighbouring countries.

*“Specific Objective 4: Supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive development in all aspects; poverty reduction, including through private-sector development and reduction of social exclusion; promotion of capacity building in science, education and in particular higher education, technology, research and*

*innovation; promotion of internal economic, social and territorial cohesion; rural development; public health; environmental protection, climate action and disaster resilience.”*

#### Georgia Field Report

2(2)d – *Supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive development in all aspects(...)*: ENI programme concentrate in agriculture and rural development. BS programme under ENPI are continued under ENI, supporting among other consolidation of a fragmented land ownership through cooperatives; ENI BS in the Justice sector includes a Land Registration reforms that should authorise more structural changes in agriculture production.

Egypt Field Report: *Supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive development in all aspects(...)*<sup>21</sup>: ENI programmes are not yet at implementation stage; several ENPI programmes are addressing poverty reduction (basic infrastructure/community services/basic services with systematically a participatory approach; TVET) and are to be continued under ENI.

#### Tunisia Field Report:

Steadiness of ENPI/ENI programmes in the field of inclusive development and growth, targeting notably Regional Development and Fight against poverty

*Private Sector Development: Main achievement has been the adoption in April by parliament of the revised Law on Public Procurement which introduces and considerably decreases the number of exemptions. Although further amendments are required to make the Law fully compatible with relevant EU legislation, EU-DEL and project based TA as well OECD SIGMA have been advising against ad-hoc new exemptions and call for utmost prudence regarding the introduction of e-procurement system so as not to lose on the gains made so far. (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3-9)*

#### EAMR 2015

*Moldova “Moldova has already made progress in aligning its laws with the EU anti-discrimination legislation in the process of Visa Liberalisation [...] As part of the DCFTA, Moldova booked clear successes in conquering EU agricultural markets, such as the sugar and wine industries, which have both seen sizeable increases of exports to the EU [...] Moldova has made considerable progress in developing a comprehensive institutional framework for the SME sector, thanks to the development of an SME development strategy [...] A positive recent development has been the drafting of the First Trade Policy Review since Moldova’s accession to the WTO in 2001 [...] In the field of Energy, transposition of relevant EU legislations in the field of Energy efficiency continued with the support of EU technical assistance and budget support. Approval by the Parliament of the Law on Renewable Energy Sources had been postponed. New laws on natural gas and electricity in line with the EU 3rd Energy Package have been prepared by the Government [...] In the field of health, the most notable achievement was the adoption of the New Law on Tobacco, in line with EU directives, on May 29, 2015.” (EAMR Moldova 2015, 3-6).*

#### Algeria EUD interview:

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country ?	No
Could you illustrate your answer by one or two examples.	EU support is very limited so we don't have the capacity to have an impact on the economy. We have launched a programme on the diversification of the economy that could do some good but it hasn't started yet so to be seen in the future.

#### Jordan EUD interview:

<sup>21</sup> Supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive development in all aspects; reducing poverty, including through private sector development, and reducing social exclusion; promoting capacity-building in science, education and in particular higher education, technology, research and innovation; promoting internal economic, social and territorial cohesion; fostering rural development; promoting public health; and supporting environmental protection, climate action and disaster resilience.

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country ?	Yes
Could you illustrate your answer by one or two examples.	3 examples: 1. Our continuous support to PFM to ensure that resources are well managed. This had an impact in the economy. 2. Programmes on PSD that are disconnected from the past ideology that was not very conducive. We are rather encouraging the government to improve business environment for companies, investors and entrepreneurs. With the London Compact on the Syria crisis Jordan has got an agreement with the EU to simplify the "rules of origin" (requirements for products to enter duty free to Europe). And in exchange of this facilitation we asked that companies exporting to Europe under this agreement need to employ 15% of Syrian refugees and 25% after two years. We are supporting refugees to access the labour market. 3. Energy efficiency: our support to country's policies for a better integration of renewable energy and reduce imports of oil and gas.

### Jordan EUD interview

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	1. Improved rule of the law and better governance. 2. Improved respect of human rights to a certain extent (not 100%). 3. Enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation to a certain extent (not fully). 4. Economic development. 5. Inclusive growth through social inclusion of the most vulnerable groups into the skills and employability systems. 6. Integration to EU market: this has been a success of the ENPI. 7. Improved management of the mobility of people: e.g. Mobility partnership with the EU but we need yet to see concrete results. We are still waiting for a new CBC based on ENI progress so I don't know where we are at this moment. Irregular migration is not a big issue.
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### Ukraine EUD interview

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country ?	We have started substantial support for economic growth so I would say Yes we have contributed to it but a lot is yet to be delivered.
Could you illustrate your answer by one or two examples.	Private Sector Development Programme to create better business environment and foster economy recovery. A major component consists of setting up a network of Business Support Centers around the country. A credit guarantee facility is soon to be started. We are at an initial stage but have good prospects.

### Lebanon EUD interview

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country ?	Yes, without our contribution it would have been worse but headlines say that overall the economy is doing poorly and getting worse mainly because of the war.
Could you illustrate your answer by one or two examples.	Private Sector Development that contributed to the private sector thus to the economy in that sector.

### Palestine EUD interview

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country ?	Yes but limited
Could you illustrate your answer by one or two examples.	1. Access to basic infrastructure (provision of drinking water) 2. Social cohesion and inclusion (to help the poorest of the poor).

### Belarus EUD interview

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country ?	No.
Could you illustrate your answer by one or two examples.	The economic situation is worsening in PC. The economy in the country is connected with the economy of Russia. Policies are more social-oriented. The EU provides some assistance in economic development but our interventions are very modest. There is not a systemic approach.

### Georgia EUD interview

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country ?	Yes
Could you illustrate your answer by one or two examples.	E.g.: 1. ENPAD programme (bilateral) in the sector agriculture: contributed to the development of agriculture cooperatives. 2. Blending facilities for SMEs (regional). 3. the government has adopted a SME strategy with EU support.

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	improved anti-discrimination legislation and introduced mechanisms to fight discrimination; HR Action Plan adopted by the government in 2015. 3. Enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation. 4. Economic development: e.g. agriculture (development of cooperatives) and strategy in business development (progress on WB indicator "doing business"). 5. Inclusive growth: decrease in poverty identified by international indicators, the country has been re-classified though a lot to be done. 6. Integration to EU
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### Armenia EUD interview

Do you consider the ENI has contributed to a better economic health in your country ?	Yes
Could you illustrate your answer by one or two examples.	Direct support to capacity of 1500 SMEs, improvement of access to finance to 100 SME,

### Sources of information used

Documentary and data analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### 2.1.5 I-215. Change in level of integration to EU market

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The EC has contributed to a significant extent to increase trade potential within the ENP South region and between ENP South and the EU In the South. The specific contribution took place through the progressive implementation of (bilateral) Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA); 3 DCFTA have been signed with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia in 2016. Provisional application of major parts of the AAs/DCFTAs began in Georgia and in of Moldova end of 2014: import duties were reduced or abolished, and the commitments to approximate to the EU acquis began to gradually apply. In the ENP South, the Association Agreements provide for free trade in manufactured goods between the partner country and the EU through tariff dismantling over a transitional period, and various forms of economic cooperation. These agreements were signed before 2005 and have been implemented for all countries but Syria; however, full tariff reductions are not yet realized. Negotiations on further liberalisation were launched but they have had limited results so far.

As a whole, the 2010-2014 period was characterized by a significant growth in foreign trade between the 27 EU countries (EU27) and the ENP South Countries, except Libya and Syria. In 2010, exports from the Southern partner countries to the EU accounted for 49 % of their total exports. However in 2014, the share of the EU decreased to 34 . This decline of the EU share is significant, even when excluding Libya and Syria (for which no data is available for 2014) from the calculations. As a consequence, the Southern partner countries trade more with the rest of the world than with the EU. In the East, the 2010-2014 period was characterized by a slow growth of the value of ENP East countries trade with the EU. But the region's trade polarisation on EU has remained stable on average The share of ENP East exports to the EU increased, from 33 % to 36 %, while the share of the EU in their imports decreased from 38 % to 34 %.

#### Presentation of collected proof

ENP South:

As a whole, the 2010-2014 period was characterized by a significant growth in foreign trade between the 27 EU countries (EU27) and the ENP South Countries, except Libya and Syria. In 2010, exports from PC to the EU accounted for 49 % of their total exports. In 2014, as shown in the table below, the share of the EU decreased to 34 %, due to the fall of Lybia and Syria trade (and the lack of available data).

On the import side, the change is comparable: The share of EU in ENP South imports fell from 41 % to 36 % between 2010 and 2014. ENP South traded more with the EU than with the Rest of the World

(RoW) in 2004; Since 2008 these countries have more exchange with the RoW than with the EU. Recently, the decreasing trade intensity with the EU has been significant in Egypt and Tunisia.

Table: ENP South countries trade with the EU

ENP South	IMPORTS from EU					EXPORTS to EU				
	2010	2014	2004	2010	2014	2010	2014	2004	2010	2014
Bio \$; % of total trade										
<b>Algeria</b>	20,7	29.7	69.2%	50.5%	51%	28.1	40.6	63.3%	49.2%	64 %
<b>Egypt</b>	19,8	22.4	43.4%	37.3%	29%	9.6	7.9	25.3%	36.6%	29%
<b>Israel</b>	19,2	24.1	41.9%	32.4%	33%	14.8	18.8	30.2%	25.3%	27%
<b>Jordan</b>	3.7	4.5	32.5%	24.3%	20%	0.3	0.3	9.7%	4.7%	4%
<b>Lebanon</b>	6.3	8.8	47.6%	35.0%	41%	0.4	0.4	18.6%	10.3%	9%
<b>Libya</b>	8.9	na	66.5%	45.1%	na	38.9	na	88.4%	80.8%	na
<b>Morocco</b>	18.2	23.6	66.6%	51.5%	51%	10.3	15.1	88.4%	58.0%	64%
<b>Palestine</b>	0.1	0.5	na	27.3%	9%	0.05	0,02	na	41.9%	2%
<b>Syria</b>	4.9	na	46.9%	27.7%	na	4.8	na	63.5%	57.1%	na
<b>Tunisia</b>	14.8	13.2	79.7%	66.5%	53%	12.7	12.5	92.9%	77.3%	74%
<b>Total/Avg</b>	<b>116.6</b>	<b>126.8</b>	<b>53.3%</b>	<b>41.4%</b>	<b>36 %</b>	<b>120.0</b>	<b>95.6</b>	<b>53.9%</b>	<b>49.2%</b>	<b>34 %</b>

Based on Comtrade data

ENP East:

As a whole, the 2010-2014 period was characterized by a slow growth of the value of ENP East countries trade with the EU. But the region's trade polarisation on EU has remained stable on average

The share of ENP East exports to the EU has also increased, from 33 % to 36 %, while the share of the EU in their imports has decreased from 38 % to 34 %.

Table: ENP East countries trade with the EU


ENP East	IMPORTS from EU					EXPORTS to EU				
	2010	2014	2004	2010	2014	2010	2014	2004%	2010%	2014
Bio \$; % of total trade										
<b>Armenia</b>	0.7	1.0	33.4%	19.5 %	24 %	0.3	0.4	45.6%	34.1%	29 %
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	3.1	3.8	47.2%	19.5%	35 %	13.0	11.6	47.6%	60.8%	53 %
<b>Belarus</b>	8.8	12.8	21.6%	47.4%	32 %	3.5	10.6	25.8%	13.9%	29 %
<b>Georgia</b>	1.5	2.4	44.0%	25.3%	28 %	0.8	0.6	64.7%	47.7%	22%
<b>Moldova</b>	2.0	2.5	68.9%	30.2%	48 %	0.8	1.2	70.3%	50.3%	53 %
<b>Ukraine</b>	23.1	21.1	48.6%	52.8%	39 %	15.3	17.0	34.5%	29.7%	32%
<b>Total/avg</b>	<b>39.4</b>	<b>43.6</b>	<b>40.4%</b>	<b>38.0%</b>	<b>34 %</b>	<b>33.6</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>34.3%</b>	<b>32.9%</b>	<b>36 %</b>

Based on Comtrade data

As a result of these changes, the EU has enjoyed a growing trade surplus with the East, except with Azerbaijan. Similarly, the EU trade surplus has increased with non-oil producers in the ENP South. The EU has a large deficit with oil&gas exporters.



Figure: Trade balance between the EU and the Neighbouring Partners (in thousand \$)



Based on Comtrade data

The development of trade potential between ENP countries and the EU has relied on the progressive implementation of the (bilateral) Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

In the ENP South, the Association Agreements provide for free trade in manufactured goods between the partner country and the EU through tariff dismantling over a transitional period, and various forms of economic cooperation. These agreements were signed before 2005 and have been implemented for all countries but Syria; however, full tariff reductions are not yet realized. Negotiations on further liberalisation for agricultural, processed agricultural and fishery products were launched but they have had limited results so far. However significant progress has been achieved on the front of trade liberalisation.

In the ENP South, the EU has now free trade agreements with the whole of the region except for Syria and Libya. These agreements provide free market access for industrial products. In addition the EU has recently upgraded preferential market access for agro-fish products, with Egypt and Jordan in particular, while several other agreements in this field are being negotiated. These bilateral FT agreements have amplified the incentives and the opportunities to trade “vertically” in the Euro-Med region, between the EU and Med countries. Consequently they increase the opportunity cost of South-South exchanges (“horizontal trade” cost were initially very high within the area).

In the ENP East, negotiations on the first generation of DCFTA have recently led to the agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia.

Table: Trade and partnership bilateral agreements (situation September 2016)

Country	Agreement	Date
Algeria	Association Agreement	1 September 2005
Egypt	Association Agreement	1 June 2004
Israel	Association Agreement	1 June 2000

Jordan	Association Agreement	1 May 2002
Lebanon	Interim Agreement	1 March 2003
Morocco	Association Agreement	1 March 2000
Palestinian Authority	Association Agreement	1 July 1997
Syria	Co-operation Agreement	1 July 1977
Tunisia	Association Agreement	1 March 1998
Albania	Stabilisation and Association Agreement	22 May 2006
Azerbaijan	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement	entered into force on 17 09 1999
Armenia	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement	entered into force on 9 September 1999
Georgia	Association Agreement	1 July 2016
Moldova	Association Agreement	1 July 2016
Ukraine	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement Association Agreement	1 January 2016 29 May 2014

Source: DG Trade.

In the South: *“The main EU objectives with regard to the southern Mediterranean in this area were to improve trade and investment relations and to increase the integration of the partners in the EU single market, in particular through the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) as soon as necessary conditions are met. DCFTA negotiations with Morocco progressed, with two negotiating rounds held in January and April 2014. The preparatory process for the DCFTA negotiations with Tunisia advanced, including consultations with civil society and between experts and concluding that there are no technical obstacles to the launch of negotiations. Preparatory talks on a DCFTA with Jordan also progressed and sustainability impact assessments on possible DCFTAs with Egypt and Jordan were carried out. Ensuring the correct implementation of the existing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) established by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements remained an ongoing focus of activity. Increasingly protectionist tendencies were identified in some parts of the region — Algeria, Egypt<sup>16</sup> and Tunisia implemented new trade-restrictive measures, while Morocco increasingly relied on the trade in defence equipment.”*

*“Egypt, Israel and Palestine ratified the Regional Convention on Pan-Euro Mediterranean (PEM) Preferential Rules of Origin, and Lebanon signed the convention. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia still have to complete the ratification process. Good progress was made in collecting relevant information and trade data for the inclusion of the Southern Mediterranean countries in the Euro-Mediterranean Trade and Investment Facilitation Mechanism database”*

*(03/2015, p11, Implementation of the ENP Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean Partners Report)*

In the East:

*“The Eastern Partnership made significant progress in 2014. The new Association Agreements signed with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are already being provisionally applied. For Georgia and Moldova, provisional application already includes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), while for Ukraine provisional application of this part of the agreement has been postponed until the end of 2015. The AA/DCFTAs involve ambitious political, economic and social reform agendas, drawing the eastern partner countries concerned closer to the EU.”*

*“After intensive high-level dialogue at the beginning of the year, and against the background of the illegal annexation of Crimea and the crisis in the east of the country, on 21 March 2014 Ukraine and the EU signed the political chapters of the Association Agreement. The remaining chapters were signed on 27 June 2014. After simultaneous ratification by both the European Parliament and the Verhovna Rada on 16 September 2014, the agreement provisionally took effect from 1 November, except for the*

DCFTA part, which is postponed until the end of 2015. 27 June 2014 also marked the signature of Moldova's and Georgia's AA/DCFTAs with

the EU. After swift ratification by Moldova on 2 July 2014 and Georgia on 18 July 2014, both agreements provisionally took effect from 1 September 2014. The first EU-Georgia Association Council under the Association Agreement was held on 17 November 2014 to supervise implementation of the Agreement.”

(03/2015, p2,3, Implementation of the ENP Eastern Partnership Implementation Report)

“The Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AAs/DCFTAs) with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine were signed in 2014. The AAs/DCFTAs are the ENP's core achievements and represent a milestone in the EU's relations with some of its closest partners, upgrading these ties to a significantly higher level. The AAs/DCFTAs are expected to have a positive effect on growth and employment in partner countries, creating welfare and making their economies more sustainable and resilient.

Provisional application of major parts of the AAs/DCFTAs began in Georgia and the Republic of Moldova on 1 September 2014. These countries started to implement the agreements: import duties were reduced or abolished, and the commitments to approximate to the EU acquis began to gradually apply.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, 2014 showed some improvement in bilateral trade relations, as previous trade irritants were removed or were being phased out. However, the Ukrainian authorities reacted to the critical macroeconomic situation by adopting new trade restrictions and other measures which risk reversing the improvements in trade relations and worsening the business climate. The Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs), adopted in April 2014, eliminated 94.7 % of current EU tariffs on imports of industrial goods from Ukraine and all EU tariffs on Ukraine's agricultural exports to the EU, while reducing tariffs on certain chemicals and other products originating in Ukraine. Following the decision to delay the provisional application of the DCFTA part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement until 1 January 2016, the ATMs were prolonged until that date. Ukrainian authorities are preparing the implementation of the DCFTA in close cooperation with the EU. “

EC (2015) Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014, p10

Moldova “Moldova has already made progress in aligning its laws with the EU anti-discrimination legislation in the process of Visa Liberalisation [...] As part of the DCFTA, Moldova booked clear successes in conquering EU agricultural markets, such as the sugar and wine industries, which have both seen sizeable increases of exports to the EU [...] Moldova has made considerable progress in developing a comprehensive institutional framework for the SME sector, thanks to the development of an SME development strategy [...] A positive recent development has been the drafting of the First Trade Policy Review since Moldova's accession to the WTO in 2001 [...] In the field of Energy, transposition of relevant EU legislations in the field of Energy efficiency continued with the support of EU technical assistance and budget support. Approval by the Parliament of the Law on Renewable Energy Sources had been postponed. New laws on natural gas and electricity in line with the EU 3rd Energy Package have been prepared by the Government [...] In the field of health, the most notable achievement was the adoption of the New Law on Tobacco, in line with EU directives, on May 29, 2015.” (EAMR Moldova 2015, 3-6).

Morocco “Un séminaire, organisé par la Délégation dans le cadre d'une mission du Directeur géographique, sur les "Opportunités et défis pour le Maroc d'un rapprochement vers les normes de l'Union européenne" tenu le 15 juin 2015 a permis d'alimenter le débat interne au Maroc sur le sujet avec la participation d'administrations gouvernementales, de représentants de la société civile, du Conseil Economique et Social et du monde académique. Cet événement, qui a bénéficié d'une bonne couverture de presse, a sans doute contribué aux évolutions atteintes en 2015 en termes de gouvernance du processus de convergence. [...] Le dialogue de politique sectorielle dans le domaine de la migration a été marqué par: (i) la revue du partenariat pour la mobilité UE-Maroc en juin 2015, (ii) le bilan d'étape de la nouvelle politique migratoire en septembre 2015. La Délégation a poursuivi son dialogue sur la nécessité de mettre en place un cadre législatif adéquat pour lutter contre la traite des personnes: le projet de loi a été transmis au Parlement en 2015. La Délégation a également suivi avec attention le processus de régularisation des migrants au Maroc, qui s'est terminé en novembre 2015 avec la décision de la commission nationale de recours. Ce processus a permis d'accepter au total 92% des demandes de régularisation... [...] Ainsi les questions d'égalité de genre ont pu être régulièrement abordées avec les autorités dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre du programme « Egalité hommes/femmes » et de son dialogue politique. Ceci a ainsi permis de poursuivre les efforts d'intégration de la dimen-

sion « genre » dans l'ensemble des programmes en cours ou en formulation.” (EAMR Morocco 2015, 5-9).

Israel “2013 was marked by progress in several areas of the ENP Action Plan such as the signature of the Comprehensive Aviation agreement, the entry into force of the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance for pharmaceutical products (ACAA) and reaching an agreement on the participation of Israel in the Horizon 2020 research programme.” (EAMR Israel 2013, 3-4).

Tunisie: En matière douanière, la Tunisie a ratifié en novembre 2014 la convention sur les règles d'origine préférentielles pan-euro-méditerranéennes. La convention est entrée en vigueur pour la Tunisie en janvier 2015.

EC (2015) 03/2015, Mise en oeuvre de la politique européenne de voisinage en Tunisie Progrès réalisés en 2014 et actions à mettre en œuvre, p11

#### Egypt Field Report

*Achieving progressive integration into the Union internal market and enhanced sectoral and cross-sectoral cooperation(...)*<sup>22</sup>: ENI programmes are mainly focused on sectoral reforms (energy and watsan), with limited progress in implementing trade aspects of the AA. GoE is facing currency shortage and is engaging protection measures rather than market integration and alignment on EU rules and standards.

#### Tunisia Field Report

EC increased the olive oil import quota for Tunisia in 2016 and 2017, to compensate for low tourism receipt. (temporary measure)

Ukraine fiche: Technical barriers to trade: In 2014 the horizontal legislation was completed by the development and adoption of three Laws – on Standardisation, Metrology and Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment (adopted on 15.01.15). The implementation of these laws will contribute towards deregulation of the business environment and facilitate, when DCFTA enters into force, the fulfilment of its provisions. Good progress was made in the area of standardisation, through the adoption of 1919 EU harmonised standards, including by the method of endorsement, in the original language. EU-DEL has been pursuing an active dialogue in support of the implementation of the sector policy programme on TBT removal as also general policy issues (e.g. the strategy for the development of the Ukrainian system for technical regulation) and the specific technical issues, such as the application of public procurement rules to the standardisation activities, the structure of the National Standardisation Body to be established and others

#### Ukraine Field Report

A DCFTA was signed in 2014, and ENI programmes are increasingly mainstreaming support to adjustment induced by DCFT; One of the firstly agreed Special Measures was “EU for Business” aiming at re-launching of the Economy of Ukraine and develop trade with the EU (this programme is progressing slowly); other funding source is the DCFTA Facility for SMEs (shared by the three countries having signed this new generation agreement: Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova) which now has been incorporated under the “EU for Business” programme.

#### Georgia Field Report

*2(2)b – Achieving progressive integration into the Union internal market and enhanced sectoral and cross-sectoral cooperation(...)*: A DCFTA was signed in 2014, and ENI programmes are increasingly mainstreaming support to adjustment induced by DCFT; other funding source is the DCFTA Facility for SMEs (shared by the three countries having signed this new generation agreement: Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova).

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<sup>22</sup> Achieving progressive integration into the Union internal market and enhanced sectoral and cross-sectoral cooperation, including through legislative approximation and regulatory convergence towards Union and other relevant international standards, and improved market access including through deep and comprehensive free trade areas, related institution-building and investment, particularly in interconnections

## Tunisia Field Report

Ukraine is one of the few Neighbourhood countries that have signed a DCFTA, aiming at opening/widening the trade relations between the EU and Ukraine.

## EUD interviews analysis

According to EUD interviews, 8 out of 12 countries see major progress in: economic development (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), inclusive growth (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, Georgia, Egypt and Azerbaijan) and integration to the EU market (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan although in the case of the latter, there has been little improvement).

## Jordan EUD interview

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	1. Improved rule of the law and better governance. 2. Improved respect of human rights to a certain extent (not 100%). 3. Enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation to a certain extent (not fully). 4. Economic development. 5. Inclusive growth through social inclusion of the most vulnerable groups into the skills and employability systems. 6. Integration to EU market: this has been a success of the ENPI. 7. Improved management of the mobility of people: e.g. Mobility partnership with the EU but we need yet to see concrete results. We are still waiting for a new CBC based on ENI progress so I don't know where we are at this moment. Irregular migration is not a big issue.
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## Georgia EUD interview

Integration to EU market: the EU is the main trading partner; 1st year DCFTA led to significant increase of exports.

## EAMR 2015

Some examples of EU contribution to ENI objectives include:

*Georgia "Concerning DCFTA/SME Budget Support it has to be stated that this is the main programme in support of the EU-Georgia agreement-driven agenda. It is realized through the bilateral EUR 45 million sector budget support programme "Support to EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs)". Launched in 2015 under AAP 2014 it will constitute a roadmap for the modernization of the Georgian economy, while ensuring the continuation of trade and private sector development reforms [...] the EU Delegation has managed to prompt progress in the following areas: (i) establishment of a policy and analytical division. (ii) the full revision of the Livelihood Action plan, (iii) the reform for the shift from status to needs base is back on track with the EU funded consultancy agreed upon with MRA and (iv) the policy matrix for a 5th budget support tranche was successfully negotiated and approved by GoG." (EAMR Georgia 2015, 4-11).*

## Sources of information used

Documentary and data analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

## Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 2.1.6 I-216. Evidence (nature and scope) of improved management of the mobility of people and of legal and irregular migration

### Global analysis of the indicator

Only seven out of 16 countries<sup>23</sup> have ratified or endorsed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Yet, especially the countries in the Southern Neighbourhood have very high rates of immigrants and refugees (in particular Lebanon, Libya and Jordan). While a lot of improvement can be made

<sup>23</sup> Ratified: Azerbaijan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria. Endorsed: Armenia.

in the European Neighbourhood with regards to the management of migration in general and the status of migrants in their host countries in particular, the situation has become critical in a number of countries in the South.

In Jordan, in addition to an immensely high number of refugees (more than 2 million long-time registered Palestinian refugees and approximately 700.000 Syrian refugees as of December 2015.<sup>24</sup>), the country is also host to a large number of migrant workers (in majority from Egypt). By signing a joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership with the EU and its participating Member States, Jordan commits itself to ensuring that migration is managed as effectively as possible and to improving the situation of migrants, especially asylum-seekers. This is considered a major improvement and the ENI progress report of 2015 attests noteworthy progress towards the achievement of migration and mobility objectives.

In Lebanon, the detention conditions for migrant workers, asylum-seekers and refugees with irregular migrant status have not changed and remain in bad condition. In particular Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continue to face limitations to their right to employment, to own property and to benefit from social security. The living conditions further deteriorated with the arrival of more refugees from Syria. In these circumstances, it is particularly regrettable that a revised memorandum of understanding with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was not signed by the country's government.

In Libya, despite the countries' formal commitment to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, living conditions of migrant workers are considered extremely poor. The government has achieved limited progress in bringing detention centres under central control and continuing reports of human rights violations, in particular against migrants of Sub Saharan origin, have been reported by CSOs and international organisations.

In comparison, significant improvements have been achieved in countries where the migration pressure is lower. Morocco has established a Mobility Partnership with the EU which proved to be a major factor in the country's migration policy which foresees ambitious plans in terms of regularisation and integration of irregular migrants and refugees. By November 2015, Morocco had advanced considerably well with this project, having accepted 92% of regularisation requests. Major improvements have been made with regards to the human rights of migrants, even though the situation, in particular of Sub Saharan migrants, is still preoccupying. Tensions between migrants and native population have led to several expulsions of irregular migrants, during which the procedures laid down by Moroccan law have not been fully respected.

Moldova's good progress on adopting and implementing migration- and asylum-related legislation was helped by the establishment of an EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership. In particular, progress was made on dealing with irregular migration through the opening of three regional offices of the Bureau for Migration and Asylum's directorate for combating illegal stays by foreigners and the general efficiency of the country's migration management system was improved.

Ukraine has made continued progress on preventing and fighting human trafficking. Police efforts in this respect were considerably strengthened by increasing the number of personnel dealing with human trafficking to a total of 470 people in 2013. The collaboration between government and NGOs continued to develop and a memorandum was signed to further facilitate this cooperation. In Georgia, good progress was reached in the visa liberalisation dialogue and in the implementation of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements. In Armenia, the implementation of the EU-Armenia visa facilitation and readmission agreements began in 2014, a new department responsible for integration was set up at the State Migration Service September and a referral centre for reintegrating returning migrants was set up with EU support.

Thus a number of countries have made significant progress in their management of migration

<sup>24</sup> Numbers taken from the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. The unofficial numbers are estimated to be even higher.

and have improved the status and conditions of migrant workers. These improvements have been helped greatly by the establishment of EU Mobility Partnerships. Despite clear advancements, the situation of migrants must still be considered precarious in many of the Neighbourhood countries, in particular in those with a relatively high share of immigrants, and which have been afflicted by major political crises.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“Implementation of the EU-Armenia visa facilitation and readmission agreements began in September. Activities under the EU-Armenia Mobility Partnership and the 2012–16 national action plan continued. In March, a referral centre for reintegrating returning migrants was set up with EU support and an online information site for returning migrants was launched. In July, Armenia approved the 2014–16 action plan on approximating migration legislation to international standards (including ‘approaches and principles adopted in the European Union and the Common Economic Space’). A new department responsible for integration was set up at the State Migration Service set up to establish a policy for long-term migrants. Amendments to the law on asylum and refugees are pending at the national assembly. Amendments to the Criminal Code came into force in August, bringing Armenian law more closely into line with Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, protecting refugees and asylum-seekers from penalisation for illegal border crossing. Amendments to the citizenship law, introducing provisions to prevent and reduce statelessness, were submitted to the national assembly for discussion in autumn.”* (Progress report Armenia 2015, p. 12)

*“Moldova has already made progress in aligning its laws with the EU anti-discrimination legislation in the process of Visa Liberalisation.”* (EAMR Moldova 2015, 3-6).

*“In the framework of the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership, Moldova made good progress on adopting and implementing migration- and asylum-related legislation and on making its migration management system more efficient. Of particular significance were the drafting of a ‘Methodology on combating illegal stays by foreigners on the territory of Moldova’ (to be approved by ministerial order in January 2015) and a ‘Handbook on good practices for police on combating illegal migration’, and the approval of a ‘Blueprint to combat illegal migration on the territory of Moldova’. Progress was made on dealing with irregular migration through the opening of three regional offices of the Bureau for Migration and Asylum’s directorate for combating illegal stays by foreigners.”* (Progress report 2015, p. 14)

*“On the fight against trafficking in human beings, standard operating procedures were developed in line with EU standards and good practices. Instructions on joint investigation teams were approved in July 2014 by an interdepartmental working group consisting of officials from Moldova’s General Prosecutor’s Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Customs Service and National Anti-Corruption Centre. On the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, a new action plan on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings (covering 2014-16) was approved. Despite every effort by the authorities, Moldova continued to be a source country for the trafficking of men, women and children.”* (Progress report Moldova 2015, p. 15)

*“Le dialogue de politique sectorielle dans le domaine de la migration a été marqué par: (i) la revue du partenariat pour la mobilité UE-Maroc en juin 2015, (ii) le bilan d’étape de la nouvelle politique migratoire en septembre 2015. La Délégation a poursuivi son dialogue sur la nécessité de mettre en place un cadre législatif adéquat pour lutter contre la traite des personnes: le projet de loi a été transmis au Parlement en 2015. La Délégation a également suivi avec attention le processus de régularisation des migrants au Maroc, qui s’est terminé en novembre 2015 avec la décision de la commission nationale de recours. Ce processus a permis d’accepter au total 92% des demandes de régularisation.”* (EAMR Morocco 2015, 5-9).

*“Le Maroc a poursuivi son processus de réforme tout au long de l’année 2014 y compris la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle politique sur la migration et sur l’asile, la réforme du code de la justice militaire, l’adoption de la loi de finances organique ainsi que le dépôt en novembre 2014 des instruments de ratification du protocole facultatif se rapportant à la Convention des Nations unies contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants (OPCAT). D’autres réformes prévues par la Constitution sont en cours d’élaboration, notamment concernant la justice, le processus de régionalisation avancée et le code de la presse. Concernant les projets de loi sur l’accès à l’information et la lutte contre la corruption, ceux-ci comportent des régressions par rapport aux versions précédentes: dans le premier cas, du fait des dispositions limitant le champ d’application de la loi et, dans le se-*

*cond, en raison du manque de pouvoir d'investigation pré-judiciaire et d'auto-saisine de l'Instance nationale de la probité et de la lutte contre la corruption.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 2)*

*“D'un point de vue global, le Maroc a fait des progrès significatifs dans la mise en œuvre du plan d'action de la PEV sur la voie de la consolidation des droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales, surtout par l'adoption d'importants textes réglementaires. Ce constat s'applique également à la réforme de la justice. Le Maroc a adopté et mis en œuvre une politique migratoire ambitieuse qui prévoit un processus de régularisation et d'intégration des migrants irréguliers ainsi que des réfugiés.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 3)*

*“Concernant le respect des droits de l'homme envers les migrants, l'année 2014 a été marquée par la mise en œuvre encourageante de la nouvelle politique migratoire lancée en septembre 2013. La pression migratoire dans le nord du pays reste très forte avec des assauts de plus en plus massifs, des arrestations parfois violentes lors de tentatives de franchissement de la frontière, et le refoulement de migrants irréguliers des régions du nord vers les grandes villes du centre du pays, où les structures d'accueil et de soins sont insuffisantes. Toutefois, la situation des migrants subsahariens reste préoccupante. Depuis la fin août, de fortes tensions entre citoyens marocains et ressortissants subsahariens ont été constatées notamment dans certains quartiers défavorisés de grandes villes du nord du pays, où affluent de nombreux migrants irréguliers. En réaction, les autorités ont procédé à l'expulsion de migrants irréguliers par avion vers leur pays d'origine. Dans certains cas, les procédures en vigueur au sein de la législation marocaine n'ont pas été respectées.” (Progress report Morocco 2015, p. 8)*

*“Justice and anti-corruption reform: Significant contributions were made to prepare the adoption of new legislation through the 'Support to Justice Sector Reform' project and follow up on fulfilment of conditions under in the State Building Contract, Macro-financial Assistance programmes and, Visa Liberalisation Action Plan [...] Substantive discussion to reform the State Migration Service through support in capacity building and upgrading the information management systems of the institutions dealing with migration in Ukraine. A major achievement in 2015 was the first-time issuance of biometric passports (over 0.5 Million issues by August 2015) [...] A new migration strategy was drafted and is expected to be adopted in early 2016. Legislation on External Labour Migration was adopted in November 2015.” (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3-9).*

*“Ukraine adopted a number of important legislative reforms to meet the benchmarks set in the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. As a consequence, Ukraine moved on to the second phase of implementing the action plan.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 3)*

*“Continued progress was made on preventing and fighting trafficking in human beings. The size of the trafficking in human beings department within the police, set up in 2013, increased, to a total of 470 people. As a consequence, 88 cases of trafficking in human beings were under investigation in 2014, of which 68 were taken to court. Collaboration between government and NGOs continued to develop. A memorandum of understanding was signed to facilitate the government and NGOs working together on issues relating to trafficking in human beings. Funding for NGOs dealing with trafficking in human beings remained limited. The EU-Institute of Migration MIGRECO project added three more regions to the national referral mechanism.” (Progress report Ukraine 2015, p. 16)*

*“The situation of migrants and asylum-seekers remains unchanged as Lebanon is not party to the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. The revised memorandum of understanding with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was not signed by Lebanon's government. The need to formalise relations became evident with the rising importance of better management of flows of refugees from Syria to Lebanon. The detention conditions for migrant workers, asylum-seekers and refugees with irregular migrant status have not changed and remain in bad condition. The Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights — a Lebanese NGO — recently reported cases of suicide by domestic workers. In some cases, the mistreating parties have been jailed.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 6)*

*“Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continue to face limitations to their right to employment, to own property and to benefit from social security. Their poor living conditions further deteriorated with the arrival of more Palestinian refugees from Syria. In May the General Security restricted entry for Pales-*



*tinians coming from Syria, denying entry to most of them and making it illegal for those already in Lebanon to stay. Registering marriages and newborns became impossible due to missing residence permits. The proposed exemption on outstanding residency-related fees introduced by the government in September 2014 provided only a temporary solution.” (Progress report Lebanon 2015, p. 7)*

*“Good progress was reached in the visa liberalisation dialogue and the implementation of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements. The second implementation phase of the visa liberalisation process was launched.” (Progress report Georgia 2015, p. 2)*

*“The Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs is working on the practical implementation of the amended Code and on a new law on health and safety, providing for the establishment of labour inspection in the country. An interim labour market strategy and an associated action plan (2013-2014) were adopted in August 2013, with five key measures: improve the legal base; enhance the range and quality of services available to job-seekers; improve labour market information; ensure greater synergy between the needs of the labour market and education; and support legal, temporary migration. Work also started on a longer-term strategy and action plan.” (Progress report Georgia 2014, p. 13)*

*“Bien que la Tunisie soit partie prenante des instruments internationaux et régionaux contre la criminalité organisée, notamment dans le domaine de la traite des êtres humains et du trafic illicite des migrants, la communauté internationale continue à rencontrer des difficultés d'accès aux données recueillies par les autorités. En consultation avec la société civile et les organisations internationales compétentes, le gouvernement tunisien a développé un projet de loi sur la traite des êtres humains, qui fournira les outils pour prévenir et contrer ces activités criminelles, punira les trafiquants et protégera mieux les victimes. Le projet est encore à l'examen des autorités.” (Progress report Tunisia 2015, p. 13)*

#### Tunisia case study

*Tunisia also benefits from funding under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa. The part of the Trust Fund that provides assistance to the North Africa region is managed by the Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations<sup>25</sup>.*

*Ukraine: Substantive discussion to reform the State Migration Service through support in capacity building and upgrading the information management systems of the institutions dealing with migration in Ukraine. A major achievement in 2015 was the first-time issuance of biometric passports (over 0.5 Million issues by August 2015) [...] A new migration strategy was drafted and is expected to be adopted in early 2016. Legislation on External Labour Migration was adopted in November 2015” (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3-9).*

#### EUD interviews analysis

Six out of 12 countries also report improvement in the rule of law and better governance (Algeria, Jordan, Ukraine, Morocco, Georgia and Armenia), and in the areas of human rights (Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Moldova and Georgia), sub-regional cooperation (Jordan, Belarus, Georgia, Egypt, Moldova and Azerbaijan) and management of mobility of people and of legal migration (Jordan, Ukraine, Morocco, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan). Five countries refer to an improvement in the management of irregular migration (Morocco, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan) and only 3 countries see progress in CBC cooperation (Belarus, Moldova and Armenia).

Exception is found in Lebanon, where despite EU-funded programmes in key areas such as integration to EU market, mobility of people and legal migration and irregular migration, progress is not noticeable because of the difficult context.

#### Lebanon EUD interviews:

<sup>25</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/tunisia/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/tunisia/index_en.htm)

What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	Overall, we have tried and funded a lot of programmes but it's very hard to see progress due to the context. Though the EU has key projects in the following areas that help: 1. Integration to EU market: but partially because more TA is needed to get to EU standards. 2. Improved management of the mobility of people and of legal migration: key projects especially in integrated border management. 3. Improved management of irregular migration. We have programmes in other areas such as human rights, regional
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### Georgia Field Report

2(2)c – *Creating conditions for the better organisation of legal migration (...)*: Following a Visa liberalization dialogue, action plan and 4 Progress reports between 2011 and 2015, EC issued a proposal for that purpose. The proposal did not go through until now.

*A new migration strategy was drafted and is expected to be adopted in early 2016. Legislation on External Labour Migration was adopted in November 2015 [...](EAMR Ukraine 2015, 3-9).*

### EAMR 2015

*Morocco "Un séminaire, organisé par la Délégation dans le cadre d'une mission du Directeur géographique, sur les "Opportunités et défis pour le Maroc d'un rapprochement vers les normes de l'Union européenne" tenu le 15 juin 2015 a permis d'alimenter le débat interne au Maroc sur le sujet avec la participation d'administrations gouvernementales, de représentants de la société civile, du Conseil Economique et Social et du monde académique. Cet événement, qui a bénéficié d'une bonne couverture de presse, a sans doute contribué aux évolutions atteintes en 2015 en termes de gouvernance du processus de convergence. [...] Le dialogue de politique sectorielle dans le domaine de la migration a été marqué par: (i) la revue du partenariat pour la mobilité UE-Maroc en juin 2015, (ii) le bilan d'étape de la nouvelle politique migratoire en septembre 2015. La Délégation a poursuivi son dialogue sur la nécessité de mettre en place un cadre législatif adéquat pour lutter contre la traite des personnes: le projet de loi a été transmis au Parlement en 2015. La Délégation a également suivi avec attention le processus de régularisation des migrants au Maroc, qui s'est terminé en novembre 2015 avec la décision de la commission nationale de recours. Ce processus a permis d'accepter au total 92% des demandes de régularisation... [...] Ainsi les questions d'égalité de genre ont pu être régulièrement abordées avec les autorités dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre du programme « Egalité hommes/femmes » et de son dialogue politique. Ceci a ainsi permis de poursuivre les efforts d'intégration de la dimension « genre » dans l'ensemble des programmes en cours ou en formulation." (EAMR Morocco 2015, 5-9).*

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Satisfactory
Degree of confidence		Satisfactory

## 2.2 JC22: ENI programmes encourage policy dialogue

### 2.2.1 I-221. Evidence that a pre-determined set of criteria in accordance with Article 4(1) exists, and that corresponding credible information were available during the programming process

#### Global analysis of the indicator

Article 4(1) of the Regulation requests: "Union support under this Regulation provided to each partner country in accordance with point (a) of Article 6(1) shall be incentive-based and differentiated in form and amounts, taking into account all the elements listed below, reflecting the partner country's:

(a) needs, using indicators such as population and level of development;

(b) commitment to and progress in implementing mutually agreed political, economic and social reform objectives;

(c) commitment to and progress in building deep and sustainable democracy;

(d) partnership with the Union, including the level of ambition for that partnership;

*(e) absorption capacity and the potential impact of Union support under this Regulation. Such support shall be reflected in the multi-annual programming documents referred to in Article 7.”*

All programming documents include an analysis of the partner country achievements and objectives in these domains. Depending on the specific context/period, they provide a deeper focus on different issues. They always comprise assessments on macro-economic issues, including budget balance and employment results, Millennium Development Goals performances, Democratic and HR achievements, Environment issues and challenges, Partnership process with the EU, etc. Usually a complete set of economic data is available (See extracts below). While this information is systematically provided, there are however not many evidence that it is used as a basis for cooperation programming. While references to policy dialogue and the level of commitment are frequent, and can then be considered as an input in the programming process, the other criteria (level of development, population, absorption capacity) are difficult to find in the programming documents.

[Impact and use of Incentive schemes analysed in JC 3.2]

Anyhow, emergency needs and fast intervention processes in fragile or in crisis countries has not made it possible to base the EU support on a set of objective elements such as those listed in the regulation Art 4(1). Change in the geopolitical context in the Neighbourhood, political priorities of the EU, economic and/or political crisis in the partner countries resulted in the priority given to more flexible decision criteria; A relevant choice.

## **Presentation of collected proof**

### Tunisia Field Report

The capacity of policy dialogue of the EU is weakened by issues in capitalising experience and technical expertise, relative “isolation” of EUDs staff, and quality of services provided by framework contractors:

These limitations were not confirmed by the EUD and its partners. GovT indicated that the EUD expertise was appreciated, particularly during strategic and programming exercises. The MS Development agencies had the same judgment, while they sometimes complain that EUD has too limited resources and time to lead the coordination process between European Donors.

In Tunisia, where the EC has considerably increased its volume of intervention, there is clearly an issue of “absorption capacity” at the EUD level. The EUD will soon benefit from 2 additional staff members; a late acknowledgment of an expanding workload.

### Ukraine field report

Extensive policy dialogue is exercised since the political change in 2014 between the EU and Ukraine at various (many) levels; this dialogue is not driven by the ENI but by the wider political relations between the EU (EEAS) and the Ukrainian Government; however the ENI supports the implementation of specific measures decided under this policy dialogue, thus indirectly it supports the continuation and facilitation of the political and policy dialogue between the two parties (EU-UA).

*Implementation of reform objectives:* This is the main issue of the country following the revolution: to implement radical reforms leading to a democratic, values based, fair –transparent and inclusive and open economic, social and political framework; all ENI funded interventions are directed to the implementation of this major objective.

Validation of desk report hypotheses:

*The scope for policy dialogue is increasingly negatively influenced by the deepening of the social and political tensions in the Neighbourhood:* NA. On the contrary, the scope of policy dialogue with Ukraine is extremely positive following the change of the regime and the clear pro-EU orientation of the country.

*The capacity of policy dialogue of the EU is weakened by issues in capitalising experience and technical expertise, relative “isolation” of EUDs staff, and quality of services provided by framework contractors:* NA. On the contrary in order to deal with the huge challenges created following the Ukrainian revolution the EU has set up a Special Group (SGUA) aiming at coordinating all EU relevant actions and implement the policy guidelines developed and agreed at political level; The operation of the SGUA is considered to be appropriate for the situation and that so far it has contributed a lot to its goal; however it seems that there are internal coordination issues between SGUA, the EUD-Kiev, EEAS and all other EU organisations which are acting in Ukraine (like the Court of Auditors, the E.

Parliament, the EU Member States, etc.); it seems that the overall decision process is not yet clear; furthermore, it seems that there are multiple interests of most of the above EU bodies/ authorities on the political and policy part but rather limited interest about the programming and (good/ timely) implementation of the EU (mainly ENI) interventions in the country; thus, together with the positive there are some negative results, including: (i) confusion of the officials of the main Ministries about who-is-who from the EU and what do they exactly represent; (ii) delays in the promotion/ implementation of the programmes, which in turn results to loss of time (this is critical for Ukraine, because there is still enough political and social momentum –opportunity- for changes/ re-structuring) and funds (the Budget Support programme for State Building will lose more than 50 mn Euros- out of the total 350 mn Euros of the programme).

#### Jordan EUD interview

Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?	Yes
If yes, please identify 2-3 key areas of improvement below	1. More ability to respond to emergencies and prevent crises (e.g. The EU Trust Fund). 2. Improved strategic framework: in the programming cycle we are trying to identify key areas where we can make a difference. 3. More involvement of PC and CS in implementation.

*“This new National Indicative Programme (NIP) covering the period 2011-2013 was drafted by the Commission in consultation with the Georgian government, Member States and other international donors and civil society organisations following the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Georgia 2007-2013. The Mid-Term Review undertaken by the Commission concluded that the political, economic and social developments in Georgia between 2007 and 2009 (including the August 2008 war) and the development of new EU policies have changed the dimensions but not the substance of the main challenges identified in the CSP. Also, taking into account Georgia’s progress in implementing the ENP Action Plan, the development of new EU policies, and the results and impact of EU assistance to Georgia, the CSP 2007-2013 for Georgia remains largely valid. (...)*

*Since 2007, Georgia has made progress in implementing the ENP AP priorities, especially in democratic development and economic reforms. Progress has been achieved in justice sector reform, improving the business climate and the fight against corruption. Georgia has been and remains committed to European integration. Nevertheless, during 2007-2009 Georgia was also confronted with grave internal and external crises. In mid-2007, Georgia entered a period of political turmoil, marked by anti-government mass demonstrations and a polarised atmosphere between the ruling majority and opposition parties (...)*

*On the economic front, Georgia’s macro-economic performance was very strong until the conflict in August 2008. Real growth figures were above 9 % in 2005 and 2006 and 12 % in 2007. In the first half of 2008 the annual growth rate remained robust at 8.6 %. Nonetheless, the conflict in August 2008 dented the strong growth performance of previous years. (...) The deepening of EU-Georgia relations implies an ambitious agenda for deeper bilateral engagement by upgrading contractual relations in the form of an enhanced agreement (Association Agreement). This would include i.a. the objective of establishing a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) between Georgia and the EU once the necessary conditions are met. In September 2009, the Commission was tasked by Member States to prepare draft negotiating directives for the enhanced agreement’s negotiations with the three South Caucasus countries and these draft directives were subsequently adopted by the College on 30 October (2009). Both the political and trade/economic aspects of these negotiations will require continuing progress on reforms and the fulfilment of certain conditions. The EU should aim to help Georgia achieve these objectives under this NIP. Energy is also a core area of the Eastern Partnership, where the EU and Georgia have a mutual interest in developing a robust regulatory framework, in line with the EU acquis. As these priorities are already broadly contained within the policy priorities of the CSP, the deepening of relations in these areas does not call for rewriting or extensive revision of the CSP.”*

(Georgia National Indicative Programme 2011-2013)

*“One of the main goals of Jordan’s political reform process is therefore to increase and institutionalise public participation in decision-making and to maximise grass-roots participation. A development in the direction of increased public participation has taken place with the launch in 2009 of a decentralisation project at the governorate level. To maximise grass-roots participation NGO’s need to be further empowered. Their influence is now limited as a result of their often weak capacity and restrictions on the freedom of association. The adoption of a new Societies Law regulating the activities of NGO’s was generally seen as a step towards more, not less, government control. (...)*

*Practical measures have been taken to improve transparency, accountability and justice for all. Progress has been made in the fight against corruption and against torture and ill-treatment, in protecting women from violence and in improving the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary.*

*(...) Growth in GDP remained between 5.6% and 8.6 % in the period 2004-2008 but slowed markedly to 3.5 % in the first quarter of 2009. (...)*

*Despite relatively strong economic growth in 2004-2008, the trickle-down effect has been limited: poverty levels and unemployment have not been reduced and the gap between rich and poor is growing. So far, unemployment has not risen dramatically as a result of the economic downturn but the situation is likely to worsen. An employment strategy is expected to be adopted before the end of 2009. The official poverty rate is 14.5 % and in November 2008 the Government of Jordan endorsed the Strategy for Poverty Alleviation. A draft Social Security Law is before Parliament and could be adopted before the end of 2009.*

*Several of Jordan's sectoral policies, such as the transport, energy, e-commerce and water management strategies, have undergone, or are currently undergoing, a review."*

*(Jordan National Indicative Programme 2011-2013)*

*"Political developments: Egypt is a key partner for the EU in the region, offering stability and vital Arab leadership on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). In 2008 Egypt (together with France) took on the role of Co-President of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The Co-Presidency system and a newly established secretariat will assure the UfM increased visibility and a more project-oriented focus, helping to achieve tangible results for the people of the entire region. Within the context of EU-Africa Joint Strategy, Egypt currently co-chairs the Democratic Governance and Human Rights partnership, established to advance the implementation of the first action plan for 2008-2010.*

*Egypt's Government continues to place strong emphasis on national security. In May 2008 the Egyptian Parliament extended the national state of emergency, in place since the assassination of President Anwar al Sadat in 1981. The state of emergency was prolonged until 2010 or until new anti-terror legislation is enacted. Elections to the Shura Council (the upper house of Egypt's bicameral parliament) in 2007 and local municipal elections in 2008 saw a consolidation of National Democratic Party (NDP) control. National parliamentary and presidential elections are scheduled for 2010 and 2011 respectively.*

*Economic developments: Since July 2004, the Egyptian government has pursued an ambitious agenda of economic reforms in the areas of trade, taxation, the financial system and general economic liberalisation. The success of these reforms has been reflected by increasing foreign investment and growing exports, resulting in GDP figures of 7.1% and 7.2% in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Egypt is also emerging as a key energy partner in the region and has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on strategic energy co-operation with the EU, to which it is already the sixth-largest supplier of natural gas. Economic growth is expected to fall to around 4% in both 2009 and 2010 (...)*

*Since the beginning of the 1990s Egypt has succeeded in introducing a number of reform measures which have resulted in improved economic fundamentals and faster growth. Reforms had been rather unequal however, as political and social development lagged behind economic progress. In recent years, the Government has pledged to attribute special attention to political and social reforms, specifically to improve the political and legislative environment, access and quality of public services, and reduce poverty and regional disparities.*

*The review found that the overall policy framework guiding EU-Egypt relations – to develop a privileged partnership through deeper political co-operation and economic integration, supported by the appropriate financial assistance and other instruments – had not changed significantly since the current CSP was drawn up. The key strategic importance of Egypt continues to lie in its commitment to political, social and economic reforms, in its potential for deeper economic relations with the EU and in its willingness to co-operate with the EU on promoting peace and security in the region.*

*The MTR acknowledged that overall progress on implementation of reforms in Egypt can so far be summarised as limited but encouraging, with a stronger commitment to economic reforms, increasingly to social reforms, and to a lesser extent to political reforms. Importantly, Egypt displays a strong desire to advance co-operation beyond current levels of ambition, as evidenced by its 2008 request to begin a process of enhancing relations with the EU. (...)"*

*(Arab Republic of Egypt National Indicative Programme 2011-2013)*

*"La situation politique n'a pas connu de changements fondamentaux qui justifieraient une modification de stratégie. Le gouvernement issu des élections de 2007 a poursuivi les réformes structurelles en cours, malgré une certaine lenteur dans la mise en œuvre de quelques stratégies de réforme. (...)*

*Sur le plan économique, on enregistre une poursuite de la croissance du PIB non agricole, qui progresse sur une moyenne de 5,5% depuis le début de la décennie, tiré par la demande intérieure (consommation et investissement), et un rétablissement du PIB agricole après une récolte faible en 2007. La conjoncture peu favorable (prix du pétrole et des denrées alimentaires, demande européenne faible) pèse sur la balance commerciale, le manque de dynamisme des exportations ne compensant pas la forte hausse des importations. La balance des paiements accuse un léger déficit, mais qui reste pour le moment peu important grâce aux recettes du tourisme, aux investissements et aux transferts des MRE. Sur le plan budgétaire, les recettes fiscales dépassant les prévisions (en progrès de 21%) ont permis de suppléer la forte augmentation des dépenses de compensation et ont permis un budget en quasi-équilibre en 2008. (...)*

*Sur le plan social, la montée des prix des produits de première nécessité a créé un climat social difficile ponctué de quelques émeutes, malgré les subventions des produits pétroliers et de la farine. Afin d'atténuer l'impact social de cette montée des prix, le gouvernement a augmenté le salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti (SMIG) de 10% sur quatre ans. Le développement humain est toujours affecté par des problèmes très importants d'analphabétisme, de mortalité infantile, et de pauvreté. Le Maroc s'attelle cependant en priorité aux chantiers sociaux (poursuite de l'Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain, lancement d'un Régime d'Assistance Médicale pour les Economiquement Démunis–RAMED-, et d'un Plan d'urgence de l'Éducation Nationale). (...)*

*En matière de droits de l'homme, en dépit d'une annonce réitérée à plusieurs reprises en 2008 par le Roi, la réforme en profondeur de la justice n'a pas encore réellement vu le jour. »*

(Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper Morocco 2007-2013 and National Indicative Program 2011-2013)



### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EAMRs, CSP-NIP

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 2.2.2 I-222. Evidence of involvement (consultation, timely sharing of relevant information) of (i) national and local authorities and (ii) civil society organisations {Art. 4} in policy dialogue platforms

### Global analysis of the indicator

The information collected, both at the desk stage and at field level, show that in most countries there is an effective policy dialogue on the important policy areas of the country. In conflict-affected countries or crisis situations such as in the cases of Syria and Lebanon, the policy dialogue is particularly challenging.

A number of evidence has already been provided in indicators I-1.1.3 and I-1.2.3, and discussed. Additional evidences are provided below this box.

This dialogue is implemented by the EUD (sometimes supported by HQ officials) with the competent National Authorities. Efforts are increasingly rolled-out by EUDs and HQ staff when in mission to establish regular contacts with CSOs. As a result, the participation of the Civil Society is frequent and systematically promoted by the EUD. An issue mentioned for the South Neighbourhood is the sometimes limited legitimacy of umbrella organisations, their lack of capacity for a structured dialogue, and political/religious rationale (rather than development). In the East, these limits are not as strong, and national/regional NGOs/CSOs are more suitable partners in policy dialogue; also, most governments are more open to dialogue with the civil society. In the South, Algeria and Egypt governments are reluctant to integrate CSOs in the policy dialogue. The ENI approach to CSOs involvement in programming is however still a matter of by-side consultation events, rarely based on sharing of information like draft programmes, and with little concern on the timeline and structure of the dialogue. This does not help CSOs, with their prominent dependency on fund raising from EU, to over-

come their vested interests, and care about representing the needs of their constituencies. Therefore EUDs have developed their own contacts with the CSOs of their countries and keep them informed, while at the same time receive their requests (usually for the funding of specific projects, which they take up for discussion with the national Authorities). In countries where significant political progress has been achieved, such as Ukraine or Tunisia, field interviews confirm that ENI support to CSOs has been critical and has helped them to consolidate their status of stakeholder in the consultation processes and policy dialogue.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

A number of evidence has already been provided on this issue in EQ1, under indicators I-1.1.3 and I-1.2.3. (Additional evidences are provided below.)

*“Georgian authorities and all relevant stakeholders were widely consulted during the preparation of this NIP in the course of two programming missions in February and April 2009 and through bilateral contacts, wide circulation of the concept paper on the NIP 2011- 2013, and its publication on the Commission website. During the programming missions, there were visits to and discussions with the Georgian government, IFIs and other donors, local NGOs and EU Member State Development Counsellors in local representation offices. In the period between and following the programming missions, the EU delegation in Tbilisi ensured continued communication with all local stakeholder representatives, who also submitted written comments on the concept paper.” (...)*

*The main outcome of the consultation process can be summarised as follows:*

- *The government is concentrating its efforts on trying to ensure the political and economic stability of the country since the August 2008 armed conflict and in view of the current global economic and financial crisis. Hence, their identified priorities concentrate on actions that will have an immediate impact in 2009-2010. Similarly, most donors on the ground are making efforts to meet current needs and deliver on the pledges of the October*
- *2008 donors’ conference, which covers the period up to 2011. This also means that there has not yet been any thorough reflection on priorities beyond this date.*
- *Due to the comparatively long lead-in times for the implementation of EU programmes, no projects under the current NIP have been completed at this time. For this reason, it is difficult to draw concrete lessons from current ENPI programmes.*
- *The priorities identified under the NIP 2007-2010 are still valid, and should continue to be supported as priorities until 2013. This would ensure not only continuity in implementing general priorities but also consolidation of reforms supported by the EU through the ENPI. Additionally, these priorities correspond to areas where the EU has the appropriate tools and comparative advantages (right aid delivery mechanisms, know-how and established norms).*
- *The participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) is important, not only at the programming stage, but also in identifying actions and monitoring progress. CSOs are keen to play a more active role, which should be mainstreamed within EU assistance. The establishment of a tripartite dialogue between the EU delegation, CSOs and the Georgian government could be a good step forward.*
- *Concerns regarding the integration of minorities, internally displaced people and environment matters should be addressed in a comprehensive manner in the programming of new assistance. For example, continued social reforms and poverty reduction assistance*

(Georgia NIP 2011-2013)

EAMR 2015 Analysis:

ENI programmes encourage policy dialogue

The EU is holding in-depth bilateral talks on policy with key stakeholders, notably national and local authorities, at many different levels in almost every country, mainly in the framework of EU priority sectors for financial assistance and in some cases through non-focal sectors. Some EAMRs discuss the strategic sectors for policy dialogue in great detail (e.g. Egypt, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, West Bank & Gaza Strip). Overall, policy dialogue is reported to be satisfactory though pace and outcomes differ from country to country or even between sectors. *E.g.: “Globalement, le dialogue avec le Coordonnateur national (Ministère du Développement, de l’Investissement et de la Coopération internationale – MDICI) sur l’ensemble des domaines de la coopération technique et financière est très régulier et satisfaisant [...] Les interactions avec les principaux ministères sectoriels sont très nombreuses, tant de manière formelle qu’informelle. Le dialogue sur les politiques sectorielles (qualité, intensité) est également satisfaisant.”* (EAMR Tunisia 2015, 3-4); “As stated in the answers to questions 3 and 4 below,

*the policy dialogue is at satisfactory level with the specificities for the various sectors [...] (EAMR Georgia 2015, 4-11).*

Overall, ENI programmes use policy dialogue as a strategic tool to achieve objectives and build on results. In numerous cases, talks on ENI programmes have served as windows of opportunity for raising major EU concerns and taking policy dialogue to a higher level. Policy dialogue has also supported the launch and implementation of ENI programmes as highlighted in the EAMR Algeria (2015, 4-6) *“Les efforts pour renforcer le lien au niveau de l’Accord d’Association (AA) entre le dialogue politique et la coopération ont continué. Ces deux volets se renforcent mutuellement à chaque rencontre et travaillent ensemble vers les mêmes objectifs.”*

Some examples include: Armenia *“Priority area 2: Public Administration Reform Dialogue in the field of public finance was strong, as the EU was supporting the drafting of a revised PFM strategy, as well as several specific activities through ongoing programmes. In parallel, a further programme specifically targeting PFM was approved by a Commission Decision, which will allow further strengthening this dialogue [...] The launch of a second twinning project strengthening the National Statistical System of Armenia also allowed the Delegation to reinstate policy dialogue with Armenian authorities on statistical dissemination, demographic statistics, poverty statistics as well as innovation statistics. Dialogue in the field of e-governance was also strong.”* (EAMR Armenia 2015, 7-9); Azerbaijan *“Justice/ Rule of Law In the area of justice, policy dialogue took place in the framework of an experts’ mission initiated by the Delegation in June-September 2015 to better understand the dynamics of the justice sector in Azerbaijan as an input for future EU interventions in the sector (programming, policy dialogue, risk management).”* (EAMR Azerbaijan, 2015, 4-6); Egypt *“The policy dialogue on PFM – reinstated in 2014 – continued in 2015 and represented a critical tool to address the issues faced with regard to Budget Support operations.”* (EAMR Egypt 2015, 4-5); Jordan *“The monitoring and steering of our Budget Support Operations have been opportune occasions to maintain the policy dialogue with MoP-IC and line ministries.”* (EAMR Jordan 2015, 6-7); Moldova *“Two twinning projects, with the National Bank of Moldova and the National Commission for Financial markets, were launched in 2015 to assist the authorities in enhancing the supervision of the financial sector. Both projects provide a platform for policy dialogue on the implementation of the provisions of the Association Agreement related to the financial sector.”* (EAMR Moldova 2015, 3-6); West Bank and Gaza Strip *“Policy dialogue was also held to underline the importance to advance on the implementation of the adopted main international conventions on Human Rights.”* (EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2015, 12-19).

Particularly challenging examples can be found in conflict-affected countries or crisis situations such as in the cases of Syria and Lebanon: *“Following the outbreak of the conflict and the subsequent suspension of bilateral aid to the Syrian regime in May 2011 there has been no official policy dialogue with the Syrian regime (just regular visits from the Chargé d’affaires).”* (EAMR Syria 2015, 4); *“Lebanon was understandably pre-occupied with a multitude of crises (Presidential vacuum, postponed elections, attacks by militants, the huge influx of Syrian refugees, the waste crisis) and thus achieving progress in the EU-Lebanon policy dialogue was challenging. While the review of the ENP was ongoing during 2015, the policy dialogue with Government remained strong.”* (EAMR Lebanon 2015, 2-3).

#### Tunisia Field Report:

The scope for policy dialogue is increasingly negatively influenced by the deepening of the social and political tensions in the Neighbourhood:

*“In Tunisia, there is rather a process of (non-linear) consolidation of the policy dialogue between the EC, the donors and the GovT.*

New coordination mechanisms have been initiated, such as the “G7” coordination groups that have been recently created to cover each of the 5 priorities axis of the govT new development plan. They incorporate the govT + EC and MS + other G7 countries + IFIs.

Donors estimate that the capacity of the Ministry of Dev and Coop to coordinate and manage the co-operation issues has improved.

However, the critical economic, social and security contexts in Tunisia do produce specific priorities.”

#### Georgia Field Report

*Policy dialogue – Policy dialogue with GoG is regular and intense, based on shared values and shared geostrategic interests. Both parties recognise a good level of expertise in the partnership, with some further capacity building for GoG decision-makers. The level of education, qualification and mastering of the EU cooperation processes and procedures is high among responsible persons met during the field visit. A major subject discussed with national authorities is the BS matrix – rather than values or reform path; thus more the rhythm than the content. Some CSOs met during the field visit question the expertise of the GoG when negotiating the ENI programmes.*



### Georgia Field Report

*Implementation of reform objectives* – The BS monitoring reports are positive regarding implementation of the reforms for past programmes. GoG has a clear political will to implement its reform agenda, aligned on EU approximation.

#### Analysis EAMRs 2013-2014-2015

In 2015 there are more countries that explicitly refer to the difficult context in which CSOs operate, thus limiting EU support and policy dialogue: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt and Palestine. The lack of regulation and sometimes restrictions imposed by governments on NGOs has led to the early termination and even suspension of programmes. This compares to two cases in 2013 and 2014: Egypt and Palestine. Nonetheless, in 2013 political crisis, insecurity and weak institutional capacity of governments and CSOs have also undermined the EU's capacity to engage in policy dialogue and involve CSOs in the preparing, implementation and follow-up of ENI programmes. This is true in Armenia, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Palestine.

Overall, most countries increasingly attest that consultations with CSOs are extremely helpful and have led to the establishment of a long-term partnership between the EU and CSOs/CSO networks with the exception of Algeria, Israel, Moldova and Syria in 2013; Israel and Syria in 2014 and Syria in 2015.

In 2014 there was a decrease in the number of projects that promote structured dialogue between CSOs/LAs and governments and EU institutions, 171 projects compared to 2013 with 279 ongoing interventions. However, 2015 saw a significant increase in this kind of interventions with 387 ongoing projects. The number of projects differs significantly from one country to another but it is worth noticing the case of Lebanon, which went from 4 and 3 projects in 2013 and 2014 respectively, to 140 in 2015. The case of Belarus is also worthy of note for its upward trend of 16 and 18 projects in 2013 and 2014 respectively to 51 projects in 2015. Conversely, Georgia saw a big drop in projects down from 40 in 2013 to just 2 in 2014 and 2015.

2015 saw a substantial rise to 523 projects in which objectives include the inclusion of CSOs/LAs in national policymaking. This compares to 162 in 2013 and 155 in 2014. Lebanon is a case in point with a significant increase in the number of projects, from 9 in 2013 to 12 in 2014 surging to 300 in 2015. Also noteworthy are the cases of Morocco, from 4 projects in 2013 and 2014 to 55 schemes in 2015, and Ukraine with 6 projects in 2013, 11 in 2014 and 43 in 2015.

Examples of CSO-government relations are scarce but interesting examples are found in 2013 (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Palestine) and 2015 (Georgia, Morocco and Ukraine).

2014 and 2015 saw a slight increase in 3 (Algeria, Egypt, Palestine) and 4 (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Palestine) countries respectively that attest a hostile and difficult environment regarding CSOs. This compares to 2 countries in 2013 (Algeria and Libya).

*“Within the Jordanian Government, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) is responsible for coordinating and implementing assistance and promotes coherence amongst donors and between Jordanian line ministries. In 2008, the MoPIC established government-donor coordination working groups in different thematic areas, including good governance. The working groups meet on a yearly basis.*

*The EU has supported MoPIC in the development of a new donor coordination mechanism called the Jordan Aid Information Management System (JAIMS). This database is intended to provide information on ongoing financial assistance, projects, and programmes. JAIMS supports the goals of the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and the International Aid Transparency Initiative, which promotes transparency and accessibility of information to increase the accountability, predictability, and effectiveness of aid and reduce transaction costs.”*

(Jordan National Indicative Programme 2011-2013)

*“Des consultations avec le Gouvernement à titre préliminaire ont commencé début mars 2009 et se sont poursuivies jusqu'en mai 2009 pour définir les axes de coopération. Une « concept note » a servi d'outil de communication. Deux réunions se sont tenues avec le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et le Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances pour présenter et discuter de la concept note. Lors d'une troisième réunion mi-juin 2009 à Rabat, les autorités marocaines ont donné leur accord de principe sur le PIN 2011-2013. Ces réunions contribuent à l'établissement de la cohérence du PIN avec le programme de réforme national marocain et permettent une appropriation effective du PIN par les deux parties. ”*

“La société civile: Les organisations de la Société Civile (OSC) sont des acteurs importants et ils peuvent jouer un rôle clé dans la mise en œuvre de l’Accord d’association. Afin d’assurer une transparence et une objectivité maximales, pour mieux cibler ses interventions et mieux saisir la réalité locale, la Commission a souhaité consulter un éventail d’acteurs aussi large que possible, incluant particulièrement la société civile. Des « inputs » de la part des OSC ont dès lors été sollicités lors d’une réunion de consultation à Rabat au début de l’exercice de programmation, et une consultation « on line » sur le site Internet de la Délégation a été organisée. L’exercice de consultation s’est basé sur le document préliminaire du PIN et a permis une réflexion sur les secteurs d’intervention, les acteurs impliqués, les types d’actions et le rôle de la société civile. Les recommandations et observations reçues portaient essentiellement sur la nécessité d’une référence plus systématique au respect des droits de l’homme, d’intégrer certaines questions transversales (genre, environnement, handicap et bonne gouvernance) dans tous les programmes et stades de la programmation, et le peu de fonds prévus pour la société civile.”

(Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper Morocco 2007-2013 and National Indicative Program 2011-2013)



### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EAMRs, CSP-NIP

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – NEAR B and C, EEAS, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 2.2.3 I-223. Degree of leadership of partner countries in policy dialogue platforms (national and regional).

#### Global analysis of the indicator

Bilateral policy dialogue of the EU (EEAS and EC) with the partner countries is always organised by the EU to be implemented on an equal basis (full mutual respect of each other, not many vetos from either side under a friendly environment). In many cases the level of preparation and the capacities of the representative officials of the two (or more) sides determine the real leadership in the specific subjects of the discussions. In the multilateral fora the chair person is determined and this is usually accepted by all parties.

For formal policy dialogue platforms, the aid effectiveness agenda calls for a strong leadership of the partner country. However it is difficult to provide an assessment on leadership based on second source data (CSP, NIP or other documents). Relevant information collected during the field work shows that real leadership relies on a strong or improving expertise and coordination capacity of the governmental body in charge of international cooperation. In Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia the level of qualification and mastering of the EU cooperation processes and procedures is high among officials in charge of the cooperation. However, the coordination function (at the PC level) has been difficult to implement by the relevant bodies both in Tunisia ( Ministère du développement, de l’investissement et de la coopération) and in Ukraine (Minister of Economic Development) mainly for two reasons: i) frequent change of ministry/department heads in these countries in transition, and lack of experience; ii) difficulties to streamline the ministers requests (and countries needs) in a planning process; iii) too frequent changes in the EC procedures.

#### Presentation of collected proof

*Tunisia Field Report*

*The scope for policy dialogue is increasingly negatively influenced by the deepening of the social and political tensions in the Neighbourhood.*

In Tunisia, there is rather a process of (non-linear) consolidation of the policy dialogue between the EC, the donors and the GovT.

New coordination mechanisms have been initiated, such as the “G7” coordination groups that have been recently created to cover each of the 5 priorities axis of the govT new development plan. They incorporate the govT + EC and MS + other G7 countries + IFIs.

Donors estimate that the capacity of the Ministry of Dev and Coop to coordinate and manage the co-operation issues has improved.

However, the critical economic, social and security contexts in Tunisia do produce specific priorities.

#### Ukraine Field Report

“Policy dialogue: Extensive policy dialogue is exercised since the political change in 2014 between the EU and Ukraine at various (many) levels; this dialogue is not driven by the ENI but by the wider political relations between the EU (EEAS) and the Ukrainian Government; however the ENI supports the implementation of specific measures decided under this policy dialogue, thus indirectly it supports the continuation and facilitation of the political and policy dialogue between the two parties (EU-UA).” (...)

In order to deal with the huge challenges created following the Ukrainian revolution the EU has set up a Special Group (SGUA) aiming at coordinating all EU relevant actions and implement the policy guidelines developed and agreed at political level; The operation of the SGUA is considered to be appropriate for the situation and that so far it has contributed a lot to its goal; however it seems that there are internal coordination issues between SGUA, the EUD-Kiev, EEAS and all other EU organisations which are acting in Ukraine (like the Court of Auditors, the E. Parliament, the EU Member States, etc.); it seems that the overall decision process is not yet clear; furthermore, it seems that there is a multiple interest of most of the above EU bodies/ authorities on the political and policy part but rather limited interest about the programming and (good/ timely) implementation of the EU (mainly ENI) interventions in the country; thus, together with the positive there are some negative results, including: (i) confusion of the officials of the main Ministries about who-is-who from the EU and what exactly represents; (ii) delays in the promotion/ implementation of the programmes, which in turn results to loss of time (this is critical for Ukraine, because there is still enough political and social momentum – opportunity- for changes/ re-structuring) and funds (the Budget Support programme for State Building will lose more than 50 mn Euros- out of the total 350 mn Euros of the programme).”

#### Georgia field report:

*“Policy dialogue* – Policy dialogue with GoG is regular and intense, based on shared values and shared geostrategic interests. Both parties recognise a good level of expertise in the partnership, with some further capacity building for GoG decision-makers. The level of education, qualification and mastering of the EU cooperation processes and procedures is high among responsible persons met during the field visit. A major subject discussed with national authorities is the BS matrix – rather than values or reform path; thus more the rhythm than the content. Some CSOs met during the field visit question the expertise of the GoG when negotiating the ENI programmes.

*Implementation of reform objectives* – The BS monitoring reports are positive regarding implementation of the reforms for past programmes. GoG has a clear political will to implement its reform agenda, aligned on EU approximation.

#### Validation of desk report hypotheses:

*The scope for policy dialogue is increasingly negatively influenced by the deepening of the social and political tensions in the Neighbourhood:* In Georgia, social and political tensions are weak; elections are democratic; social tensions are limited to discontent linked to the social cost of reforms, stretched over times. GoG is however expecting from ENI to provide direct subsidies to people directly affected by the regulatory approximation (for instance subsidy for renewing private cars due to CO<sup>2</sup> controls).

*The capacity of policy dialogue of the EU is weakened by issues in capitalising experience and technical expertise, relative “isolation” of EUDs staff, and quality of services provided by framework contractors:* To a large extent, policy dialogue is managed in-house; EUD does not feel isolated (from HQ) nor lacking capitalisation from previous periods. “

#### Egypt field report:

*“Policy dialogue* – The policy dialogue takes place almost only at programme level, in the course of the programming and implementation phases (sometimes backed by related regional programmes). Through programmes, policy dialogue looks somehow centred on key implementing partners unless prolonged by support to a national policy (renewable energy) and to a master plan (water). Donors

established a dialogue platform (DPG) mainly among themselves, though key implementing partners are invited.

*Implementation of reform objectives* – As already analysed above, at sector level, ENPI programmes are achieving their reform objectives, at least regarding adoption of revised policy documents. The overall perception is that EU programmes have not succeeded to change much the administrative culture and the Egyptian bureaucracy. The preparation of a PAR programme covering several sectors might be an opportunity to promote deeper changes. BS is praised on both sides as suitable vehicle for policy dialogue; they are frozen since 2013 as a collateral effect of a decision of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council.

Validation of DR hypotheses:

*The scope for policy dialogue is increasingly negatively influenced by the deepening of the social and political tensions in the Neighbourhood.* Such a link was not noticed; issues in policy dialogue are more related to the Egyptian administrative/political culture and the meagre backing of EU programmes by the Ministry of International Cooperation. The EU programmes concentrate up to now on technical areas (water, wind farms, basic services), failing to scale-up towards more key reform areas (PFM, administration, accountability). The situation might be changing with PAR. “

« Des consultations avec le Gouvernement à titre préliminaire ont commencé début mars 2009 et se sont poursuivies jusqu'en mai 2009 pour définir les axes de coopération. Une « concept note » a servi d'outil de communication. Deux réunions se sont tenues avec le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et le Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances pour présenter et discuter de la concept note. Lors d'une troisième réunion mi-juin 2009 à Rabat, les autorités marocaines ont donné leur accord de principe sur le PIN 2011-2013. Ces réunions contribuent à l'établissement de la cohérence du PIN avec le programme de réforme national marocain et permettent une appropriation effective du PIN par les deux parties. »

(Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper Morocco 2007-2013 and National Indicative Program 2011-2013)

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; CSP-NIP

Interviews – NEAR B and C, EEAS, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>	■	Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>	■	Satisfactory

## 2.2.4 I-224. Existence of a follow-up by the partners of decisions taken in policy dialogue

### Global analysis of the indicator

The policy dialogue in each country may be very intense in the ENI programming period (and some time before this), but in general is a continuous, on going process taking place almost on a daily basis (at least for the EUDs); Considering that the subjects under discussion are always difficult, both sides (EU and country stakeholders) do follow up on all discussed subjects. However there is no monitoring system functioning at a central level, providing in an organised way the outcomes of the negotiations together with the obligations according to their previous agreements.

This indicator cannot be informed more thoroughly.

### Presentation of collected proof

NA

This indicator cannot be informed more thoroughly.

Georgia Field Report

*Implementation of reform objectives* – The BS monitoring reports are positive regarding implementation of the reforms for past programmes. GoG has a clear political will to implement its reform agenda, aligned on EU approximation.

## Sources of information used

NA

## Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Poor
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Poor

## 2.3 JC23: ENI programmes enhance sub-regional, regional and European Neighbourhood-wide collaboration as well as cross-border cooperation

### 2.3.1 I-231. Extent to which ENI programmes enhanced sub-regional and regional cooperation

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The EC has contributed to a large extent to promote sub-regional and regional cooperation through a number of programmes, however it is extremely difficult to identify causality links between these activities and the real level of regional cooperation. Besides, this evaluation is not implemented at the programme level. No information has been identified on effective impact of ENI programmes on regional cooperation enhancement. However a number of evidence allows to conclude that sub-regional cooperation is low and has not increased.

In the South, EUD interviews and field reports acknowledge the lack of cooperation between countries. In this region the tradition has been fragmentation and rivalries rather than partnership and cooperation [see also indicator I-2.1.3). Tensions between countries have increased since the Arab Spring because of the diverging national trajectories, and the wars in Syria and Lybia that created widespread difficulties in the neighbouring countries. Lack of cooperation can be evidenced by the incapacity of the 4 members countries (Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco) to contribute significantly to the sunk cost of their “Agadir free-trade area”. It can be illustrated as well by the marginal share of their trade with their sub-regional partners: Mahghreb countries share of Morocco exports accounts for 2,4 %, while only 15 % of Egypt exports is directed to ENP South countries. Tunisia is partly an exception, because the country has been able to use regional activities to strengthen its specific “democratic” status in the region.

In the East there is a clear divide between the group of three pro-EU countries – Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova- which have used the regional integration programmes and mechanisms to support their alignment on the EU, and to counter Russian influence on other countries of the East Neighbourhood. While ENI regional (and CBC) programmes are strengthening bridges among countries sharing interests against Russian regional strategy, the other members of the “Eastern Partnership” –Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaidjan- have made political choices, as far as regional integration is concerned, which are different from those envisaged under ENI (Armenia and Belarus have joint the Eurasian Economic Community, controlled by Russia). This does however not exclude the possibility that regional integration between countries is happening in a different way and context.

In both regions, centrifugal forces have remained too powerful and the cooperation has not become very effective at the regional level. However, Neighbourhood countries have indeed diverse interests, but they also share a high number of important features and are increasingly aware of this fact. The opportunities for partnership created by ENI (and, before, ENPI) regional activities have reinforced the awareness raising and succeeded in establishing a sub-regional cooperative network that could become the “noyau dur” of further regional integration process in a future, more peaceful, geo-political context.

#### Presentation of collected proof

*Egypt Field Report: Regional programmes – Regional programmes were praised several times by line ministries for their technical inputs regarding sector reforms. They were not presented as enhancing regional cooperation. The EUD indicated that limits placed on visa delivery by security forces impeded participation to networking.*

### Tunisia Field Report

Negotiation are starting on DCFTA (ALECA). They are promising, but it will be a long process. The objective is to offer Tunisia the same openness on the UE market as UE MS.

Negotiation of 12 chapters, including services liberalisation, notably GATS Mode 4 (temporary mobility of workers), that will be difficult to deal with.

### Tunisia Field Report

#### *Regional programmes –*

Tunisia has become a “regional hub” for Regional programs, with Jordan and Morocco. Many Regional Programs implement conference, workshops etc... in Tunisia, because it is one of the rare countries in the region where it is possible to organise effectively such events.

Thus, EUD is well informed about ENI regional activities and has been often participating to corresponding events.

Furthermore, EUD often consulted on the design and programming of Regional programs.

#### *European-wide collaboration –*

Important. Unformal process of specialisation among MS, through regular exchange of information on the intervention sectors of the European donors.

EUD coordination effort appreciated by MS. They would appreciate more coordination but they acknowledged the limited capacity of th EUD in this domain.

### Georgia Field Report

*Regional programmes –* Regional programmes were evoked several times by GoG in a positive way; exchanges of expertise are valued. The Civil Society Forum linked to EaP is poorly assessed by activist CSOs while valued by international NGOs, and local staff. Activists see participants as part-time professionals taking advantages of the financial and reputational benefits of EU support.

*European-wide collaboration –* TAIEX and twinning projects are positively assessed by the majority. Some CSOs have mixed feelings regarding hiring of teams dominantly from EU MS having joint EU recently; harmonisation tracks are not necessarily shared and reference to EU MS with fully developed *acquis* was felt more useful.

*The geostrategic tensions are a major impediment for developing regional and sub-regional integration:* It is rather the contrary for Georgia; regional integration with Ukraine and Moldova is utilised to counter Russian influence on other countries of the East Neighbourhood.

*Financial resources and “political weight” of ENI programmes are not sufficient to oppose to mistrust between neighbouring regions:* ENI programmes are mainly country-centred; tensions with Azerbaijan prevented to develop EU-funded initiatives; the fact that Azerbaijan is not sharing Georgia Euro-Atlantic strategy further limits the possibility of the EUNI to develop joint programmes. ENI regional and CBC programmes are strengthening bridges among countries sharing interests against Russian regional strategy.

### Ukraine Field Report

The major part of Ukraine’s borders is with non-friendly countries (Russia, Belarus); however the country has also borders (to the west and south) with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania; relations and cooperation with these EU member states can be enhanced through CBC programmes (such a programme exists between Ukraine and Hungary).

*Sub-regional collaboration:* Ukraine and Georgia have developed strong relations and good cooperation on the exchange of knowledge, knowhow and good practices about the development of the countries and the implementation of reforms (the flow of information is mainly from Georgia to Ukraine); in this respect many officials from the Ukrainian Ministries are visiting their counterparts of Georgia; there is no specific information about the jointly development and implementation of actions/ programmes financed by ENI (the SMEs’ support programme, promoted by the EBRD just follows the same general lines of support, but not common funding- programming).

*The geostrategic tensions are a major impediment for developing regional and sub-regional integration:* Although the area of ENI-East has never been a homogenous region (their only common feature is that they were for years, until 1991, part of the Soviet Union) and after the dissolving of the Soviet Union they presented their differences and sometimes disputes and conflicts (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh), their “regional integration” seem necessary due to their shared transport and energy net-

works and the need for trade cooperation and common addressing of wider issues (international criminality, human rights, etc.). This regional integration has always been impeded by the existing bilateral tensions/ problems as well as by their choice of the geopolitical side they would belong, i.e. with the Russian Federation or with Europe/ western alliances. ENI and its predecessor programmes succeeded in bringing all the countries to the same table to discuss and accept common projects (e.g. in the transport & energy sector) which did not have immediate political risks; this has been a major success of the programme; but the vision of a regional or sub-regional integration is far away and most probably it will never be fully attained. Especially in the current period the countries of the region have made political choices which impede their regional integration as foreseen under ENI (even on non-political subjects) since: Armenia and Belarus have joint the Eurasian Economic Community, controlled by Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova have a pro-European choice and Azerbaijan is trying to develop its own policy based on the wealth of its oil.

*Financial resources and "political weight" of ENI programmes are not sufficient to oppose to mistrust between neighbouring regions:* This has been found true, especially as Ukraine has suffered the annexation of Crimea to Russia and the war with Russia in its eastern regions; this conflict has increased the mistrust of Ukraine (not only for Russia, but also) for the "allies" of Russia, namely Belarus and Armenia. In such a tense situation what ENI can succeed is to keep alive the cooperation dialogue between its partner countries and to develop/ implement as possible common projects beneficial to all.

#### EUD interviews analysis

##### *Did ENI programmes enhance sub-regional cooperation?*

Five out of 12 countries (Algeria, Ukraine, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan) affirmed that ENI programmes did not enhance sub-regional cooperation. Lebanon stated they tried but progress was imperceptible. Algeria and Jordan referred to regional programmes but stated that they are managed by HQs.

Only Georgia, Egypt, Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Moldova responded affirmatively to this question. They mainly referred to integrated border management, environment and connectivity projects and EaP exchanges. Palestine did not provide any answer to this question.

##### Algeria EUD interview:

Did ENI programmes enhanced sub-regional cooperation? Can you illustrate your answer?	No. Regional programmes are managed by HQ. Regional programmes from 2014 have not yet started.
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##### Jordan EUD interview:

Examples of regional projects: police, justice, Med-Media but they are only starting now. There is a programme with Council of Europe that supports the country in terms of judiciary cooperation. I wouldn't say it has enhanced but the aim is to enhance regional cooperation.

##### Morocco EUD interview:

Did ENI programmes enhanced sub-regional cooperation? Can you illustrate your answer?	No. The only visible regional institution is the Union for the Mediterranean.
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##### Lebanon EUD interview

Did ENI programmes enhanced sub-regional cooperation? Can you illustrate your answer?	No. The EU has tried but it wasn't noticeable.
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##### Belarus EUD interview:

Did ENI programmes enhanced sub-regional cooperation? Can you illustrate your answer?	Regional programmes are led by HQs. EUD only has thematic programmes in integrated border management and customs. There is stronger cooperation between Belarus and some partners:e.g. Poland, Latvia.
What are the major progresses made by PC since 2014 in implementing reforms related to ENI (regulation) priorities	1. Enhanced regional and sub-regional cooperation in some areas. 2. CBC cooperation. 3. Integration to EU market: one programme helped Belarus to develop standards in the energy sector. 4. Improved management of irregular migration: not results yet but hope in the future.

##### Armenia EUD interview:

Did ENI programmes enhanced sub-regional cooperation? Can you illustrate your answer?	Yes through interconnection projects (electrical line Armenia/ Georgia), interconnection (roads and border crossing point ARM/GE)
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Azerbaijan EUD interview: in fact, no:

Did ENI programmes enhanced sub-regional cooperation? Can you illustrate your answer?	Yes to some extent: increased exchanges and stimulate reforms though Azerbaijan is not very active in EaP and prefers bilateral cooperation.
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Moldova EUD interview:

Did ENI programmes enhanced sub-regional cooperation? Can you illustrate your answer?	Yes. E-g.: border control, environment
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### ENP South / Regional Trade

		Export to Maghreb							
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Algeria	All products	\$ 1 626 154,00	\$ 857 498,00	\$ 1 281 259,00	\$ 1 584 435,00	\$ 2 072 846,00	\$ 2 752 536,00	\$ 3 082 052,00	
Morocco	All products	\$ 320 084,00	\$ 312 411,00	\$ 394 468,00	\$ 478 558,00	\$ 564 830,00	\$ 524 549,00	\$ 514 818,00	\$ 536 851,00
Tunisia	All products	\$ 1 536 942,00	\$ 1 509 998,00	\$ 1 463 533,00	\$ 1 516 482,00	\$ 1 546 703,00	\$ 1 578 997,00	\$ 1 496 945,00	\$ 1 300 200,00
Libya	All products	\$ 992 790,00	\$ 601 123,00	\$ 175 024,00					
Egypt	All products	\$ 1 512 978,00	\$ 2 009 578,00	\$ 2 136 301,00	\$ 1 629 266,00	\$ 2 511 584,00	\$ 2 427 367,00	\$ 2 262 367,00	
		Import from Maghreb							
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Algeria	All products	\$ 394 869,00	\$ 478 460,00	\$ 553 726,00	\$ 690 196,00	\$ 806 570,00	\$ 1 024 011,00	\$ 738 314,00	
Morocco	All products	\$ 1 320 191,00	\$ 994 552,00	\$ 1 137 587,00	\$ 1 371 550,00	\$ 1 392 682,00	\$ 1 523 068,00	\$ 1 560 018,00	\$ 982 658,00
Tunisia	All products	\$ 1 890 775,00	\$ 1 129 878,00	\$ 1 006 245,00	\$ 754 318,00	\$ 1 429 280,00	\$ 1 691 250,00	\$ 1 744 648,00	\$ 949 728,00
Libya	All products	\$ 211 735,00	\$ 595 255,00	\$ 432 817,00					
Egypt	All products	\$ 893 347,00	\$ 690 732,00	\$ 887 782,00	\$ 877 103,00	\$ 1 518 785,00	\$ 648 433,00	\$ 434 753,00	
		Trade Balance between country and Middle East							
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Israel	All products	\$ -39 017,00	\$ -247 481,00	\$ -585 078,00	\$ -180 879,00	\$ -563 063,00	\$ 83 502,00	\$ -108 882,00	\$ -999 567,00
Palestine	All products	\$ -2 372 787,00	\$ -2 364 878,00	\$ -2 634 072,00	\$ -3 044 093,00	\$ -3 028 475,00	\$ -3 326 941,00	\$ -3 651 221,00	-
Jordan	All products	\$ -2 842 950,00	\$ -1 784 730,00	\$ -2 642 059,00	\$ -3 811 404,00	\$ -4 612 491,00	\$ -3 312 101,00	\$ -3 582 314,00	\$ -2 198 186,00
Lebanon	All products	\$ -934 945,00	\$ -828 480,00	\$ -976 156,00	\$ -2 263 008,00	\$ -2 124 529,00	\$ -1 391 380,00	\$ -869 809,00	-
Syria	All products	\$ 4373139	\$ 1651477	\$ 809023	-	-	-	-	-
		Export to the Middle East							
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Israel	All products	\$ 2 081 061,00	\$ 1 486 440,00	\$ 1 667 809,00	\$ 2 347 224,00	\$ 1 805 981,00	\$ 2 771 120,00	\$ 3 011 230,00	\$ 1 911 848,00
Palestine	All products	\$ 545 028,00	\$ 491 858,00	\$ 547 552,00	\$ 711 778,00	\$ 741 811,00	\$ 871 020,00	\$ 906 009,00	
Jordan	All products	\$ 3 352 452,00	\$ 3 154 357,00	\$ 3 270 045,00	\$ 3 600 970,00	\$ 3 683 070,00	\$ 3 882 657,00	\$ 4 117 009,00	\$ 3 711 142,00
Lebanon	All products	\$ 1 379 881,00	\$ 1 840 340,00	\$ 1 608 793,00	\$ 1 924 872,00	\$ 1 726 670,00	\$ 1 777 948,00	\$ 2 100 223,00	\$ 1 792 310,00
Syria	All products	\$ 7 476 664,00	\$ 5 279 123,00	\$ 5 142 082,00					
		Import from the Middle East							
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Israel	All products	\$ 2 120 078,00	\$ 1 733 921,00	\$ 2 252 887,00	\$ 2 528 103,00	\$ 2 369 044,00	\$ 2 687 618,00	\$ 3 120 112,00	\$ 2 911 415,00
Palestine	All products	\$ 2 917 815,00	\$ 2 856 736,00	\$ 3 181 624,00	\$ 3 755 871,00	\$ 3 770 286,00	\$ 4 197 961,00	\$ 4 557 230,00	
Jordan	All products	\$ 6 195 402,00	\$ 4 939 087,00	\$ 5 912 104,00	\$ 7 412 374,00	\$ 8 295 561,00	\$ 7 194 758,00	\$ 7 699 323,00	\$ 5 909 328,00
Lebanon	All products	\$ 2 071 870,00	\$ 2 775 285,00	\$ 2 437 273,00	\$ 2 901 028,00	\$ 3 989 678,00	\$ 3 902 477,00	\$ 3 491 603,00	\$ 2 662 119,00
Syria	All products	\$ 3 103 525,00	\$ 3 627 646,00	\$ 4 333 059,00					

### ENP East / Regional Trade

		Export to BSEC							
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Armenia	All products	\$ 377 729,00	\$ 231 296,00	\$ 379 288,00	\$ 441 260,00	\$ 501 086,00	\$ 580 691,00	\$ 480 524,00	\$ 469 616,00
Azerbaijan	All products	\$ 2 526 965,00	\$ 1 801 312,00	\$ 2 736 973,00	\$ 3 761 898,00	\$ 3 708 088,00	\$ 3 422 019,00	\$ 2 124 224,00	-
Belarus	All products	\$ 14 125 823,00	\$ 8 944 606,00	\$ 13 184 078,00	\$ 19 432 777,00	\$ 22 532 779,00	\$ 21 786 298,00	\$ 20 042 001,00	\$ 13 482 444,00
Georgia	All products	\$ 883 803,00	\$ 696 581,00	\$ 864 220,00	\$ 1 150 621,00	\$ 1 307 518,00	\$ 1 763 507,00	\$ 1 647 195,00	\$ 1 042 823,00
Moldova	All products	\$ 886 071,00	\$ 688 222,00	\$ 872 673,00	\$ 1 313 260,00	\$ 1 266 288,00	\$ 1 406 289,00	\$ 1 171 429,00	\$ 876 040,00
Ukraine	All products	\$ 26 122 305,00	\$ 13 450 088,00	\$ 20 079 927,00	\$ 28 365 553,00	\$ 25 135 223,00	\$ 22 900 630,00	\$ 16 832 802,00	-
		Import from BSEC							
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Armenia	All products	\$ 1 709 333,00	\$ 1 400 454,00	\$ 1 569 830,00	\$ 1 688 274,00	\$ 1 736 508,00	\$ 1 818 890,00	\$ 1 659 687,00	\$ 1 383 089,00
Azerbaijan	All products	\$ 2 846 046,00	\$ 2 577 097,00	\$ 2 488 075,00	\$ 3 658 830,00	\$ 3 664 198,00	\$ 3 804 156,00	\$ 3 305 938,00	
Belarus	All products	\$ 26 090 534,00	\$ 18 421 530,00	\$ 20 486 885,00	\$ 28 165 785,00	\$ 30 236 706,00	\$ 25 414 365,00	\$ 24 496 842,00	\$ 18 663 234,00
Georgia	All products	\$ 2 953 855,00	\$ 2 084 201,00	\$ 2 577 816,00	\$ 3 291 946,00	\$ 3 551 243,00	\$ 3 685 448,00	\$ 3 944 887,00	\$ 3 123 834,00
Moldova	All products	\$ 2 413 702,00	\$ 1 418 339,00	\$ 1 859 118,00	\$ 2 555 112,00	\$ 2 563 923,00	\$ 2 694 941,00	\$ 2 516 299,00	\$ 1 854 03
Ukraine	All products	\$ 23 496 159,00	\$ 15 421 376,00	\$ 25 756 098,00	\$ 33 191 252,00	\$ 31 302 357,00	\$ 27 132 911,00	\$ 15 785 519,00	-

### Sources of information used



Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – Field missions



## Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### 2.3.2 I-232. Evidence that areas of cooperation of cross-border programmes implemented are consistent with ENI framework and partners' priorities

#### Global analysis of the indicator

Evidence of the coherence and consistency between the areas covered by the ENI policy frameworks, the partner countries priorities and the CBC thematic and priority areas can be assessed by comparing them with the relevant CBC programming documents. These documents were mostly adopted in 2015, while the new ENI framework was being laid down.

In general, most of the CBC priorities can be linked to one or more ENI framework objectives. In particular, the support to SMEs and modernization of the economy, the interest in mobility, the improvement of cooperation in security and the support to civil society are the most recurrent matching themes. The most common priority that is not fully covered by the ENI frameworks is the role of environmental cooperation (which is often expressed also in terms of management of common resources”).

#### Georgia Field Report

*2(2)f – Enhancing sub-regional, regional and European Neighbourhood-wide collaboration as well as cross-border cooperation: GoG has developed a special interest for CBC.*

#### Presentation of collected proof

The Programming Document for the Cross-Border Cooperation under the ENI<sup>26</sup> lists three overarching strategic objectives:

- promote economic and social development in regions on both sides of common borders;
- address common challenges in environment, public health, safety and security;
- promotion of better conditions and modalities for ensuring the mobility of persons, goods and capital.

Each programme must contribute to at least one of the strategic objectives. The summary list of thematic objectives, from which programme partners must select a maximum of four, is below:

Business and SME development;

Support to education, research, technological development and innovation;

Promotion of local culture and preservation of historical heritage;

Promotion of social inclusion and fight against poverty;

Support to local & regional good governance;

Environmental protection, climate change mitigation and adaptation;

Improvement of accessibility to the regions, development of sustainable and climate-proof transport and communication networks and systems;

Common challenges in the field of safety and security;

Promotion of and cooperation on sustainable energy and energy security;

Promotion of border management and border security, mobility and migration management

Other areas not listed above likely to have a substantial cross-border impact (case by case justification required).

<sup>26</sup> Programming document for EU support to ENI Cross-Border Cooperation (2014-2020); EEAS-DG DEVCO (2014), available at [https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/financing-the-enp/cbc\\_2014-2020\\_programming\\_document\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/financing-the-enp/cbc_2014-2020_programming_document_en.pdf)

The period covered by the document (2014-2020) overlaps with two different frameworks for the ENI, the 2011 one stemming from the Communication “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” and the 2015 one, based on the “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy”. Coherence and complementarity between the ENI CBC programmes and the national ENP Action Plans, ENI multi-country strategies and Single Support Frameworks (and relevant EU-Russia agreements) and other relevant EU instruments are to be ensured through the programming process. Most importantly, CBC programmes should not cover elements which are already funded or could more suitably be funded from other ENI or EU programmes<sup>27</sup>.

In general, most of the CBC priorities can be linked to one or more ENI framework objectives. In particular, the support to SMEs and modernization of the economy, the interest in mobility, the improvement of cooperation in security and the support to civil society are the most recurrent matching themes. The most common priority that is not fully covered by the ENI frameworks is the role of environmental cooperation (which is often expressed also in terms of management of common resources”).

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 2.4 JC24: ENI mainstreams EU policy priorities

### 2.4.1 I-241. Evidence that ENI programmes promote EU policy priorities

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The programming instructions 2014-2020 do not provide a full picture of the EU policy priorities as identified in the preamble of the ENI regulation:

- Mitigation and adaptation to climate change {[19]}
- Gender equality {[21]}
- Rights of persons belonging to minorities {[21]}
- Fight against discrimination and inequalities {[21]}
- Promotion of decent work and social justice {[22]}
- Ratification and implementation of internationally recognised labour standards, including the eradication of child labour {[22]}
- Ratification and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements {[22]}.

Having been drafted before the adoption of the regulation, the programming instructions convey a more limited understanding of cross-cutting issues: “*Proper integration of cross-cutting issues, in particular gender and environment/climate change* (p.7)”. Indications on how the EU policy priorities will be integrated into ENI programmes are not presented in bilateral programming documents or, for instance, in NIF strategic orientations 2014-2020.

EU policy priorities stated in the ENI regulation are unevenly taken on board at project formulation stages. In line with the programming instructions (and previous programming practices), limited emphasis is given to the consistency with EU policy priorities, as stated in a dedicated sub-section: “*The proposed EU-Lebanon [/Jordan] "Partnership Priorities and Compact", whilst reflecting the long standing commitment of the EU towards its Mediterranean partners, are fully aligned with the EU Global Strategy's call for an integrated approach in addressing crises: encompassing its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies. (...) The documents take into account, inter alia, the promotion of human rights and good governance, the external dimension of EU migration policies, the increased focus on international co-operation to counter terrorism and violent extremism and the potential of trade to generate fair growth and decent*

<sup>27</sup> Baltic Sea programme remains an INTERREG programme managed by DG Regional and Urban Policy and was adopted already in 2014.

*employment*" (p.3 in both Lebanon and Jordan compacts).

From the extracts above, there is a significant gap between the understanding in the ENI regulation of 'EU policy priorities' and the one applied by the services in formulating ENI programmes. The latter is far more reflecting the new priorities stated by the ENP review than the ENI regulation. However, while documentation analysis show that most ENI programmes are considered relevant and in line with EU policy priorities, information collected during field phases confirms that these objectives have been challenged by the renewal of strategic priorities.

In addition, coherence between ENI and EU priorities is analysed in EQ5, see JC 5.3.

## Presentation of collected proof

### Analysis of Quality Review Documents

The sample reviewed covers thirty-five programmes from five countries: six programmes in both Egypt and Georgia, seven in Lebanon and Ukraine and nine in Tunisia.

Conclusion: At least twenty-six out of thirty-five programmes are considered relevant and in line with EU policy priorities.

### Analysis EAMRs 2013-2014-2015

EU policy priorities (I-241) are poorly addressed in 2014, particularly in Moldova, Morocco, Georgia and Ukraine, compared to 2013 and 2015, where such priorities are the focus of more robust attention. In 2015 there is an increase of gender issues mainly because EAMRs contain a subheading in the policy dialogue section referring to "the objectives in the Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2016-2020". In this regard, all countries seem to either mainstream gender equality through ENI interventions or implement specific programmes to deal with gender issues with the exception of Belarus. The environment policy priority received wider coverage in 2013 (8 countries) than in 2014 (2 countries) and 2015 (4 countries). It has to be noted that specific mentions of climate change are rare; only one example is found in Armenia in 2015, though it could be indirectly referenced in the part concerning countries dealing with energy interventions. In 2014 and 2015 new priorities emerged that were not identified in 2013: right of persons belonging to minorities and fight against discrimination and inequalities.

### EAMR 2015

The EU covers a wide range of sectors selected in line with country priorities and needs. Among the EU policy priorities included in this indicator, the areas more commonly mentioned are: gender equality (all countries but Belarus), environment (e.g. Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan), access to labour market (e.g. Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova) and fight against discrimination and right of minorities (e.g. Armenia, Moldova, Morocco). It has to be noted that EAMRs barely refer to climate change, only one example can be found in Armenia "The run up to COP21 in December 2015 provided a significant opportunity for progress in policy dialogue relating to climate change with the Government, in particular with the Ministry for Nature Protection." (EAMR Armenia 2015, 7-9). As regards gender equality, EAMRs contain a subheading within the policy dialogue section referring to "the objectives in the Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2016-2020". In this regard, all countries seem to either mainstream gender equality through ENI interventions or implement specific programmes to deal with gender issues. Exception can be found in Belarus where "Gender has not been a regular feature of our political dialogue with the partner country during 2015. The political section has been focusing its attention on other human rights issue such as political prisoners, which have been the priority of the Delegation" (EAMR Belarus 2015, 3). Overall, countries refer to gender issues very generally but in the cases of Georgia and Morocco they go through the different programmes in greater detail. Only a few countries have selected specific objectives from the GAP (e.g. Egypt, Algeria, West Bank and Gaza Strip), some do not specify any (e.g. Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Tunisia, Syria) and others plan to identify them in the near future (e.g. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine).

*Tunisia Field Report: The 'new' ENP priorities are felt to have a far higher relevance in the present context of the Neighbourhood than the 'priorities' induced by EU international commitments, with limited demand by partner country:*

While some cross-cutting issues have remained present in the targets and programming process in Tunisia, they have been considered still relevant as long as they are shared priorities with the local

partners, for instance gender issues or fight against discrimination or climate change management, ie: they contribute to the democratic consolidation, social stabilization, and/or future growth.

#### *Georgia Field Report*

*The “EU priorities” (vs ENI/ENP priorities) are marginalized in the process of programming and furthermore during implementation, particularly in the South:* “EU priorities” are sub-chapters of the approximation agenda; as such, they are fully taken into consideration in the national legislative framework and in ENI action documents.

#### Ukraine Field Report

*The “EU priorities” (vs ENI/ENP priorities) are marginalized in the process of programming and furthermore during implementation, particularly in the South:* In Ukraine the EU priorities have also been neglected for the implementation of actions that respond to the needs of the country.

The elaboration of the best short-term policies to address the critical situation of Ukraine after the revolution has been the main concern in the period 2014-today; recently the process to create a multi-annual strategy paper for Ukraine for the period 2018-2020 has started with the contribution of all the involved EU & UA competent stakeholders; this is expected to mainstream the EU policies in the country and put on track again a structured approach to ENI implementation on the basis of a support strategy with specific objectives and content.

Under the critical situation of Ukraine neither the “new” ENI priorities nor the EU International commitments were the policy drivers for the EU action in the country. The situation has been considered as a major crisis which has to be addressed in the best possible way according to the existing capacities of the country; obviously both the international engagements of the EU and its own policy framework consisted the background (and in certain cases the framework, but not the driving policies) for the development of the special measures financed by ENI.

#### Egypt Field Report:

Increasing divergence was not perceptible, unless on the control of the CSOs. It is noteworthy that GoE control over Salafist CSOs is of mutual interest of EU and Egypt, and the stabilization of the Near-East altogether, while it is still blocking ENI cooperation and affecting the trust of GoE on EU policy (with a conspiracy theory background at country level). It is a case for growing internal contradictions between the so-called “EU priorities”, EU policy framework for the area, and EU interest at very short term (the return to a Salafist regime, as well as an economic crisis, would drive thousands of migrants to Mediterranean seashore).

#### Egypt Field Report:

EU “priorities” in Egypt are since 2013 almost solely focused on the CSOs issue; 25% of EUD contracts are passed with CSOs and even service delivery CSOs (the most of EU partners) are affected by government and security forces control (less in small cities and rural areas).

#### Egypt Field Report

Project formulation complies with requirement, even if often by constraint rather than by conviction. The importance of imposed priorities is down-scaled during implementation, often for the sake of the lack of interest and ownership by beneficiaries. Only thematic instruments by selecting committed/activist CSOs through oriented calls of proposals succeed to carry on projects focused on HR, gender equality, climate change...

#### Tunisia Field Report

The “EU priorities” (vs ENI/ENP priorities) are marginalized in the process of programming and furthermore during implementation, particularly in the South:

In the case of Tunisia, there is rather a convergence between ENI activities and EU “priorities”. The EU priorities are well integrated into the programming process in Tunisia. Support to CSO and their integration in the programming and management of programmes has been frequent; Gender issues activities; projets dédiés à Environment and climate (efficacité énergétique); Support to zone défavorisés.

Gender dedicated programs have been successfully implemented in partnership with CSO. However public administration has been more reluctant to adopt new gender-balanced rules.

COP21 and COP22 prospects – in addition with the strong presence of the Moroccan rival in the environment field- have stimulated the GovT appetite for environment-climate projects.

#### Georgia Field Report

EU policy priorities are included in the process of harmonisation/approximation. They are therefore mainstreamed in ENI programmes and supported by GoG – though with some concerns with the induced financial cost for citizens, in particular the vulnerable. In some critical cases, GoG considers that targeted subsidies to compensate losses linked to EU policy priorities should be considered by the EU.

#### EUD interview analysis:

Most countries attest that ENI strategy is coherent with development policy (10 out of 12 countries); cross-cutting issues, mainly gender and human rights (10 out of 12 countries); fight against climate change (9 out 12 countries though Azerbaijan is doing very little because the Ministry is not very active in this respect); and PCD (9 out of 12 countries).

Additionally, 7 out of 12 countries report policy coherence with international commitments, mainly related to human rights treaties and climate change, (e.g. Jordan, Ukraine, Palestine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova).

Regarding common foreign and security policy, only 5 countries (Jordan, Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco and Belarus) refer to the coherence between ENI and CFSP.

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; ENP Review; ENI regulation; Programming instruction 2014-2020; NIF strategic orientations 2014-2020; SSFs; Lebanon and Jordan proposal for compacts

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

## 3 EQ 3 on efficiency

### 3.1 JC31: ENI management is administratively cost effective.

#### 3.1.1 I-311. Ratio of administrative costs (defined as “ENI Support Expenditure” in the Draft General Budget of the EU25) to overall budget of ENI (engaged, spent, programmed – trends over the last 3 years)

#### Global analysis of the indicator

**Administrative cost-efficiency** – The administrative costs for ENI are identified in the table below which uses figures from the financial data for the Annual Reports 2016 and 2015, covering the implementation years 2015 and 2014 respectively. It indicates that EUR 47 million or 2.0% of the EU budget for ENI was committed for administrative costs in 2015, and EUR 58 million or 2.5% in 2014. Below is also a comparison with the other external financing instruments. ENI is the most cost-efficient among the main instruments (IPA, DCI, and EDF) but for ECHO (0.8%).

Table 16 Administrative costs as percentage of overall budget (committed amounts)

Country / Region	IPA2	ENI	DCI	EIDHR	ICSP	INSC	CFSP	HUMA	EDF	Other
Total 2015 (million €)	1,647	<b>2,397</b>	2,478	173	240	61	260	1,401	4,893	390

Admin Costs 2015 (million €)	40	<b>47</b>	79	10	7	1	12	11	127	260
Total 2014 (million €)	1,340	<b>2,294</b>	2,295	185	194	30	294	1,084	836	393
Admin Costs 2014 (million €)	49	<b>58</b>	98	11	8	1	1	9	104	272
<b>% Admin of Total 2015</b>	2.4%	<b>2.0%</b>	3.2%	5.8%	3.0%	2.3%	4.5%	0.8%	2.6%	66.8%
<b>% Admin of Total 2014</b>	3.7%	<b>2.5%</b>	4.3%	5.9%	4.1%	3.3%	0.3%	0.8%	12.4%	69.2%

Source: Financial annexes of upcoming 2016 Annual Report (Sheet 12A) and Financial annexes of 2015 Annual Report (Table 5.18).

Respectively, as shown by the table below, the ratio of spent administrative costs to all ENI costs spent is 3.1% for 2015 and 3.5% for 2014. The comparison with other EFIs is less favourable than for commitments, ENI being roughly aligned with IPA (2.8%), DCI (3.5%) and EDF (3.8%). The difference with ECHO is confirmed.

Table 17 Administrative costs as percentage of overall budget (disbursed amounts)

Country / Region	IPA2	ENI	DCI	EIDHR	ICSP	INSC	CFSP	HUMA	EDF	Other
Total 2015 (million €)	1,364	<b>1,560</b>	2,198	142	233	53	277	1,246	2,900	384
Admin Costs 2015 (million €)	38	<b>48</b>	78	10	6	1	10	10	111	265
Total 2014 (million €)	1,213	<b>1,642</b>	1,751	159	250	46	255	1,352	3,180	323
Admin Costs 2014 (million €)	48	<b>57</b>	96	10	8	1	1	10	107	276
<b>% Admin of Total 2015</b>	2.8%	<b>3.1%</b>	3.5%	7.0%	2.7%	2.1%	3.5%	0.8%	3.8%	69.0%
<b>% Admin of Total 2014</b>	4.0%	<b>3.5%</b>	5.5%	6.3%	3.2%	2.2%	0.4%	0.7%	3.4%	85.4%

Source: Financial annexes of upcoming 2016 Annual Report (Sheet 12B) and Financial annexes of 2015 Annual Report (Table 5.19).

A key driver of the MFF midterm review is the struggle for more cost-effectiveness and coherence. As identified by many interviewees (DG NEAR B, C)<sup>28</sup>, internal procedures in place are impeding significant changes towards simplification and flexibility. It is unclear at this stage, whether their observations are correct or whether the interviewees are simply unaware of the possibilities given to them by the regulations; as experience also shows ways for flexibility with special measures, umbrella programmes or trust funds. The midterm review "(...) is tabling together with this Review an ambitious revision of the general financial rules accompanied by corresponding changes to the sectorial financial rules." (p.4)

**Efficiency gains from EUTFs** – Efficiency gains for ENI can be expected from the use of EUTFs. Their ratio of administrative costs is estimated at 1.5% (interview DG NEAR B), which is far lower than the ratio usually observed by major IFIs and UN agencies (4-5%) for similar facilities. The maximum administrative costs authorised by EUTFs statutes is 3%. The management of TFs is still relatively new in DG NEAR, and the actual administrative costs might have to be revised when their institutional set-up will stabilize (creation of a Madad Fund unit was one of the recommendations of the Deloitte report, but DG NEAR has in the meantime decided not to follow this recommendation).

<sup>28</sup> NEAR B – Neighbourhood South, NEAR C – Neighbourhood East

**Efficiency gains from budget support** – Budget support is the preferred aid modality for ENI, even if for the moment only few programmes have started yet. BS is generally presented as a more cost-effective aid modality as far as administrative costs are concerned (limited overheads, high cash-flow) (interview NEAR B3). Budget support represents 29% of the commitment contracted in 2014-2015 (see table below): 21% for sector budget support, 9% under general budget support (mainly State Building Contracts).

*Table 18 ENI commitments/disbursements in 2014-2015 by type of aid (in mio EUR)*

Type of aid	Commitments	%	Disbursements	%
Project-type interventions	2,463.53	51.4%	1,632.65	48.3%
Sector budget support	995,50	20.8%	579,65	17.1%
General budget support	412,00	8.6%	447,53	13.2%
Basket funds/pooled funding	381,00	8.0%	12,33	0.4%
Contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by international organisations (multilateral, INGO)	259,00	5.4%	242,89	7.2%
Administrative costs not included elsewhere	107,32	2.2%	108,92	3.2%
Other technical assistance	73,96	1.5%	180,28	5.3%
Scholarships/training in donor country	58,02	1.2%	161,94	4.8%
Development awareness	20,00	0.4%	6,95	0.2%
Core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes	19,00	0.4%	3,70	0.1%
Core contributions to multilateral institutions	2,20	0.0%	6,70	0.2%

Source: EC Statistical Dashboard

From the analysis of EAMRs, the use of country systems seems to fluctuate depending on country circumstances. For instance, in Egypt a large percentage of EU assistance was being channelled through BS but this trend has been reversed due to the context with little change expected for the foreseeable future. This is also the case for Algeria and Azerbaijan. However, 2015 saw an overall increase in the use of national systems in 8 out of 14 countries: Armenia, Jordan, Georgia, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia, Ukraine and Palestine, compared to 2014 which saw an increase in 6 of 14 countries: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine, with 2 BS; and Moldova with one SBS. This compares to 6 out of 16 countries in 2013: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

*Table 19 Use of country systems by year*

Use of country systems			
Countries	2013	2014	2015
Algeria	Yes	Yes	No
Armenia	Yes	No EAMR	Yes
Azerbaijan	Yes	Yes	No (suspended)
Belarus	No	No	No
Egypt	No (suspended)	No (suspended)	No (suspended)
Georgia	No	No	Yes
Israel	No	No	No EAMR
Jordan	Yes	Not clear	Yes
Lebanon	No	No	No
Libya	No answer	No EAMR	No EAMR

Moldova	No	Yes	Yes
Morocco	Yes	Yes	Yes
Syria	No	No	No
Tunisia	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ukraine	No	Yes	Yes
West Bank and Gaza Strip	No	No	Yes

Source: EAMRs, synthesis done by Particip

According to the EAMRs from 2013, seven countries channel a big proportion of their aid through national systems (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia). However, in the case of Azerbaijan, no new BS operations have been undertaken since 2011, and in Egypt this trend has also been broken. In the remaining countries, decentralised management is not a possibility. It has to be noted that Libya did not provide any answer, Jordan was not clear in its response and Israel is not a recipient country of ODA funds. In 2015, seven out of 14 countries attest that aid is channelled through national systems mainly using the BS aid modality thus reducing transaction costs (Armenia, Jordan, Georgia, Morocco, Tunisia, Ukraine and West Bank and Gaza Strip). In the remaining countries national systems are not used (e.g. Algeria, Belarus, Lebanon, Syria) or the BS operations have been suspended due to either weak public finance systems, or for political reasons e.g.: Azerbaijan “Most of the budget support operations have come to an end in Azerbaijan, with only one programme still left ongoing (Rural Development Support Programme). Since 2011 no new budget support operations were initiated and no new commitments are foreseen to take place in 2016-2020. The last budget support payment is foreseen in 2017.” (EAMR Azerbaijan 2015, 26); Egypt “Given the recent challenges encountered (and explained above) related to the political situation, the limited absorption capacity of the national administration and also the European Council conclusions of 2013 and 2014 (limiting direct engagement with the Egyptian Government), no new programmes were designed in the indirect management modality. BS operations, a significant share of our ongoing commitments, had been on hold since 2013 and remained suspended during 2015 (general conditions PFM and macroeconomic stability not met).” (EAMR Egypt 2015, 32).

Budget support programmes are implemented in countries where the administrative governance and the PFM discipline is consistent with the EU requirements for BS in this respect. In those countries, the share of budget support becomes quickly significant (60% and more, as for Morocco and Tunisia). The relatively low 20% ratio of BS is reflecting the difficulties faced by most ENI partner countries in complying with PFM requirements. However, with positive results expected from a focus of ENI programmes on PFM and PAR, improvements are to be expected and hence an increase in partner countries eligible for BS might follow. In the future, ENI should see its administrative cost ratio reduced.

**Other potential gains** – A similar effect on ENI administrative cost-efficiency can be expected by a further sector focus for pooling expertise and know-how at programming and implementation stages, thus avoiding losses of time and resources in iterative processes due to the lack of compliance with procedures and content (ENI priorities, EU policy priorities, thematic frameworks).

**Potential cost-efficiency losses at project level** – ROM reports monitor cost-efficiency at project level. The overall conclusion for 2015 is that the resources allocated to the projects were adequate and quality inputs were available on time and properly managed. KPIs do not provide further information on administrative cost. It is therefore not possible to differentiate performance among EUDs or implementing modalities. The effect of the increasing use of indirect management by IFIs, UN agencies and EU MS agencies might counterbalance the efficiency gains obtained by NEAR management and the use of budget support by adding overheads and in some cases exposing the use of ENI funds to weak control systems (field missions).

## Presentation of collected proof



“Given the substantial increase in the amount of assistance that accompanies the signature of the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and the low administrative capacity of partner countries' administrations, good absorption capacity in these countries will require additional efforts. In addition, the Delegations in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine will have to also match the needs to administer higher amounts of assistance, raising the question of their capacities to effectively implement the designed actions.” DG NEAR 2015, Management Plan 2015, p.13

“Focus/Concentration: The new programming documents need to respond to the demand for a simplified and more focussed financial assistance, given that a smaller number of sectors/areas will increase value for money, impact and leverage of EU assistance and will help to keep it manageable both for the recipient countries as well as for the Commission and EU Delegations.” DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI – 2014-2020, p.6

“Cost-efficiency of the projects is positively assessed. Most projects were assessed as being implemented in an efficient way: the resources allocated to the projects were adequate and quality inputs were available on time and properly managed. Elements of cost-efficiency of projects implemented by NGOs were often related to the sharing of resources among partners or use of partners own resources (e.g. office space, meeting rooms, complementary knowledge, and mutual referrals), opting for economical travel and lodging arrangements and relying on volunteer work. While the projects' cost-efficiency was in general judged to be positive, evidence is not always strong and monitors base their assessment on personal sector knowledge.” Particip 2016, ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, p.90

“The multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2014-2020 was agreed in 2013 against the background of the financial and economic crisis and strained public finances in many Member States. Consequently, the MFF placed a strong emphasis on investing in areas of EU value-added to boost jobs and growth. The MFF also reinforced the link between the EU budget and essential administrative and structural reforms in the Member States by introducing strong conditionalities. It introduced a more performance-based approach to budgeting and simplified delivery mechanisms so as to deliver results quickly. Innovative techniques and instruments strengthened the EU budget's capacity to respond to new challenges and to leverage public and private funds.” EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results, COM(2016) 603 final, p.2

“Improving the budget's performance in addressing the EU's priorities not only requires appropriate financial means but also cost-efficient delivery mechanisms. In consultation with stakeholders, the Commission has assessed how the measures aimed at simplifying the implementation of EU funds introduced under the current legislation have worked in practice and has identified room for further improvements. On that basis, it is tabling together with this Review an ambitious revision of the general financial rules accompanied by corresponding changes to the sectorial financial rules.” EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results, COM(2016) 603 final, p.2

« A part les deux programmes en appui budgétaire, toute la coopération en Algérie est faite en modalité soit centralisée directe, soit décentralisée partielle, modalité sous laquelle les procédures de passation de marché sont décentralisées (mais appliquant le PRAG de l'UE) et les paiements sont faits par la DUE. Ces modalités sont appliquées depuis la décision en ce sens pour toute la région Voisinage, en 2003-2004, et n'a jamais été revue. La raison étant le manque de progrès dans la région en ce qui concerne les systèmes de passation de marchés et les progrès réduits dans la lutte contre la corruption. En fait, la Délégation estime inutile la décentralisation partielle, dans le sens où toutes les procédures sont vérifiées et endossées par la Délégation, entraînant un travail encore plus important de la Délégation qu'avec les procédures centralisées, et n'aidant pas à l'apprentissage des nationaux dans la passation des marchés, car imposant des systèmes très complexes de passation établis par le PRAG qui sont bien au-delà de la capacité de gestion des équipes nationales et qui changent souvent. De ce fait, la Délégation prône pour les années à venir la recentralisation de tous les marchés, avec participation au comité d'évaluation des responsables opérationnels nationaux, pendant que la décentralisation complète ne soit pas possible de réaliser. » EAMR Algeria 2013, p. 20

“Nearly two thirds of EU bilateral cooperation to Armenia flows through country systems, through the budget support instrument. Concerning the remaining one third, activities support government struc-

tures with technical assistance, and implement works contracts through international organisations, or support civil society organisations (an activity which should increase in the post September 3rd environment). Until now, this was a breakdown that seemed relevant for Armenia. In view of the new political context and the increased future support to CSOs, this percentage may fall down accordingly.

Whereas Armenia was selected on 2011 as a pilot Delegation for decentralisation, the EUD has continued to assess in 2013 the Armenian administration as relatively weak to be able to handle the ensuing procedures. However, given the importance of this initiative, the EUD will continue discussing with the public administration in order to identify a service with the appropriate capacity to implement this initiative on a pilot basis.” EAMR Armenia 2013, p. 25

“Assistance in Azerbaijan is channelled mainly through Budget Support (around 50%), Twinning and support to civil society. An evaluation of the Twinning instrument in 2012 has confirmed that the modality is well suited for helping Azerbaijan approximating to EU best practices and standards. Going forward however the amount channelled through budget support and therefore through country systems is likely to decrease. Since 2011 no new BS operations have been committed and it is not sure if the BS will be resumed in the future programming cycle 2014-2017 due to issues with PFM eligibility as well to the Country specific situation.” EAMR Azerbaijan, 2013, p. 19

“An important share of overall aid is channelled through country systems. Nevertheless, the current crisis in Egypt has demonstrated that under certain circumstances, the choice of aid modalities, in addition to ownership and efficiency, should also be based on the modality's potential to ensure continuity and complementarity of EU aid.

The mentioned 2013 interruption of all budget support programmes demonstrated the importance of counting with diversified systems to channel aid. The Delegation achieved such a diversification by including in the overall portfolio initiatives with key international development partners, including EU member state agencies, IFI and specialised international organisations, as well as CSO.” EAMR Egypt, 2013, p. 21

“At the present stage and in light of the policy dialogue with the GoG on decentralized management mode it can be stated that this is an option not foreseen at the moment. However, the Delegation upholds the Dialogue with the GoG in case this implementation mode would be an option.” EAMR Georgia, 2013, p. 20

“Projects that do not go through Country System are mainly implemented by UN agencies (UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP, UNHCR,..) or other IOs (INTERPOL) due to their level of expertise. Implementation of thematic projects are by nature outside country systems.” EAMR Jordan, 2013, p. 18

“The national systems in Lebanon do not meet the requirements, notably in terms of PFM (absence of budget approved by the Parliament since 2005), which would allow channelling assistance through country systems with a reasonable level of assurance.” EAMR Lebanon, 2013, p. 21

“Besides the Sector Policy Support Programmes (Budget Support), the country systems as regards of Public Finance Control are not certified by the EU services and, therefore, the Decentralised Management mode for EU Assistance for projects is not available.” EAMR Moldova, 2013, p. 14

“La grande majorité de l'aide de l'UE au Maroc transite par les systèmes nationaux; ce qui peut se confirmer par le % d'aide budgétaire utilisé. Il existe certains projets qui ne transitent pas par les systèmes nationaux, soit par nature: appui à la société civile, soit du fait de leur objectif spécifique: FIV, projets classiques sur des thématiques spécifiques où il n'existe pas d'approche programmatique (IER par exemple, appui au développement local –DRIN).” EAMR Morocco, 2013, p. 25

“Prior to the suspension of bilateral aid, the Syrian government systems were not considered sufficiently robust to be used for EU funds. An EU funded Public Finance Reform project (EUR 10.7 million) was supporting the government to improve public financial management but was suspended following the Council Conclusion of May 2011. The potential use and improvement of government systems, once bilateral aid resumes, should be a priority for donors.” EAMR Syria, 2013, p. 18

*“Compte tenu des capacités de l'administration tunisienne et d'une qualité certaine de la gestion des finances publiques en Tunisie, la quasi-totalité de notre coopération transite par les systèmes nationaux (en dehors des contrats qui pour des raisons techniques (contrats cadres) ou structurelles (appui à la société civile) échappent à cette règle.*

*Une exception significative concerne le programme justice dans le cadre duquel le volet infrastructure a été confié à UNOPS, à la demande du gouvernement. La raison en est la capacité limitée d'exécution des travaux dans ce domaine qui transite pour le compte du Ministère de la Justice par le Ministre de l'Équipement. Compte tenu de l'urgence d'intervenir dans ce domaine, en particulier pour saisir les opportunités du contexte post-révolution.*

*Ceci pose néanmoins le problème de l'exécution de la dépense publique en matière d'investissement en Tunisie. Cette question fait et fera de plus en plus l'objet d'une attention soutenue dans nos programmes d'appui budgétaire pour soutenir les réformes structurelles.”* EAMR Tunisia, 2013, p. 18

*“Implementation of cooperation is fully centralised. Due to the extremely high level of corruption this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future.”* EAMR Ukraine, 2013, p. 20

*“About two thirds of EU bilateral assistance flows through budget support, hence using country systems. In 2015, one more budget support programme, in the field of the protection of human rights was signed (AAP 2014), whereas two more budget support programmes were approved at the ENI Committee of September 2015. The remainder of the funding uses a wide range of tools including support to government structures such as technical assistance and twinning projects, as well as contracts with international organisations or Member States. In addition, grants are being made to civil society organisations.”* EAMR Armenia, 2015, p. 29

*“Assistance in Azerbaijan is channelled mainly through twinning, technical assistance, support to civil society in the form of grants and budget support. Most of the budget support operations have come to an end in Azerbaijan, with only one programme still left ongoing (Rural Development Support Programme). Since 2011 no new budget support operations were initiated and no new commitments are foreseen to take place in 2016-2020. The last budget support payment is foreseen in 2017.”* EAMR Azerbaijan, 2015, p. 26

*“None of the programmes make use of the Belarusian public financial management system. Although there is a "National Strategy for Sustainable Socio-Economic Development of Belarus until 2020" and a "National programme of international technical assistance for 2012-2016," there is no government-led process for coordinating assistance. Although the second document even lists priority projects, it does not present a systematic set of policy priorities. It as well proved to be a rather rigid instrument unilaterally promoted by the government without comprehensive consultations with donors. Furthermore, the existing strategies in the different sectors do not really foresee the donor community to chip in. As a result, assistance is mainly programmed and implemented on a case by case basis.”* EAMR Belarus, 2015, p. 18-19

*“While an important share of overall EU aid to Egypt remained being channelled through country systems in 2015, no EU-funded procurements were tendered under local public financial management systems. Given the recent challenges encountered (and explained above) related to the political situation, the limited absorption capacity of the national administration and also the European Council conclusions of 2013 and 2014 (limiting direct engagement with the Egyptian Government), no new programmes were designed in the indirect management modality. BS operations, a significant share of our ongoing commitments, had been on hold since 2013 and remained suspended during 2015 (general conditions PFM and macroeconomic stability not met). For the AAP 2014 and 2015, no BS programmes were foreseen neither programmes designed under indirect management with the partner country. The same is expected to apply for the AAP 2016.”* EAMR Egypt, 2015, p. 32

*“More than half of the EU funding to Georgia is targeted via Sectorial Budgetary Support which makes the direct use of the country systems. Budget Support programs are running and country systems are used in the fields of Justice, VET, PFM, support to the IDP's, Regional Development, Agriculture and Rural Development, DCFTA and soon also in the Public Administration reform. In addition, funds stemming from the CIB programme (overall volume EUR 30 million) are largely channelled through direct grants to Georgian public institutions notably in the trade cluster to the National Food Agency but also beyond in cases of direct award to Georgian Public Institutions such as the Police Academy or*

*the Tbilisi State University. This implies the use of EU procurement rules and allows to sample to which degree country systems are able to apply EU rules.” EAMR Georgia, 2015, p. 33*

*“BS represents 60 % of funding in Jordan. In partially decentralized management through Programme Estimates PAO, MOPIIC, JEDCO, NERC, HCST, PLEDJ, EUROMED YOUTH.....manage support with varying success and usually requiring extensive support and attention from the Delegation.” EAMR Jordan, 2015, p. 28*

*“For the time being Budget Support cannot be envisaged for Lebanon. Absorption capacity of the Government is limited (OMSAR, Ministry of Education etc.). Thus, a large programme volume is still channelled through the UN and CSOs.” EAMR Lebanon, 2015, p. 25*

*“Besides the Sector Policy Budget Support Programmes, the country systems as regards of Public Finance Control are not certified by the EU services and, therefore, the Decentralised Management mode for EU Assistance for projects is not available.” EAMR Moldova, 2015, p. 30*

*“La grande majorité de l'aide de l'UE au Maroc transite par les systèmes nationaux compte tenu de la proportion très importante d'appui budgétaire. Il existe cependant certains projets qui ne transitent pas par les systèmes nationaux en raison de leur nature (appui à la société civile), ou du fait de leur objectif spécifique: FIV, projets classiques sur des thématiques spécifiques où il n'existe pas d'approche programmatique. Par ailleurs les enveloppes d'aide complémentaire aux appuis budgétaires sont gérées en mode de « gestion directe » pour des raisons variées (qualité de l'assistance technique, charge de travail, impératifs de procédure, etc.). Les projets sous financement FIV sont mis en oeuvre via les Institutions financières européennes (BEI) et des EMs (KfW, AFD) mais en utilisant les systèmes de passation de marché marocains ou, dans le cas des projets NOOR (énergie solaire), les procédures de la Banque Mondiale.” EAMR Morocco, 2015, p. 39*

*“Compte-tenu des capacités de l'administration tunisienne et d'une qualité certaine de la gestion des finances publiques en Tunisie, la quasi-totalité de notre coopération transite par des systèmes nationaux, en dehors des contrats qui échappent à cette règle pour des raisons techniques (contrat cadre) ou structurelles (soutien à la société civile). Les projets les plus récents sont mentionnés à la section 3, question 7. Le programme d'appui à la réforme de la justice est un bon exemple des cas où il est fait recours à une mise en oeuvre déléguée : le volet infrastructure relatif à la rénovation des prisons et des tribunaux a été confié à l'UNOPS à la demande du gouvernement en raison des capacités limitées d'exécution des travaux dans ce domaine sensible. Le volet infrastructure du programme d'appui à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité adopté en 2015, également confié à l'UNOPS pour les mêmes raisons.” EAMR Tunisia, 2015, p. 26*

*“The Delegation manages only centralized operations in Ukraine. A significant part of the assistance is provided through the budget (58%) and subject to the national PFM. Important is to continue putting more attention to better analyse the expected evolution of sector budgets as part of the preparation of new sector Reform contracts as also in the follow up of existing programmes.” EAMR Ukraine, 2015, p. 34*

*“For decentralised funds the PA is the contracting authority using EU procurement and grant procedures and the EC approves all these procedures ex-ante together with endorsing contracts. Under the PEGASE mechanism, the Ministry of Finance of Planning is in the lead of processing transactions using country systems e.g. communicating with banks after ex ante authorization by EUREP. The whole PEGASE mechanism is subject to quite detailed ex-ante and ex-post checks by EUREP.” EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2015, p. 50*

### **Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EU Budget, EAMRs, ROM report 2015, AARs

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – DG NEAR R, B, C, EUDs, Field missions

### **Level of information and confidence**

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 3.1.2 I-312. Evidence that the management utilizes an active internal audit process

#### Global analysis of the indicator

With reference to the strategic vision of its policy framework, ENI efficiency must be assessed for programmed measures (supporting long-term reforms and providing incentive for more reforms) and non-programmed ones (answering to political crises, localized or large scale conflicts and their repercussions on civilians). While both assistance modalities follow common financial rules and regulations for which compliance and control can be assessed jointly, specific rules apply to non-programmed measures linked to crises activities to authorize their faster programming and implementation. Conversely, requirements for an efficient timeline differ when applied to regular programming and implementation, and quick responses to urgencies.

Within the limits of the present exercise, control and audit systems are assessed positively as being comprehensive, in place, and running. They are based on ex ante checks to take into account the high risk level attached to most of the 16 partner countries of the Neighbourhood. They are however perceived by the staff all across the implementation system as too time consuming, leaving not enough time for actions' planning and management. Nonetheless, they lead to a residual error rate (RER) of 0.7%, which is below the ratio benchmarked in NEAR Management Plans.

Risk assessments are given increasing emphasis by NEAR in the new control plan. They have become systematic since 2016 and address operational and contractual/financial aspects. They are linked to corrective actions (audits, ROM missions, mid-term evaluations or on-the-spot checks). Audit plans are prepared annually by EUDs and are aggregated at HQ. They address the financial management at project level, and are funded by the budget of the projects. A specific audit plan is prepared and implemented at HQ for Neighbourhood-wide tools such as institution building, TAEIX, Twinning (NEAR management plans 2016, annex 6a).

**Internal control<sup>29</sup> systems** – The Commission considers that there are 5 distinct internal control objectives (cf. also Article 32 of FR):

22. Effectiveness, efficiency, economy of operations;
23. Adequate management of the risk relating to the legality and regularity of underlying transactions, taking into account the multiannual character of programmes as well as the nature of the payments concerned;
24. Prevention, detection, correction and follow-up of fraud and irregularities;
25. Reliability of reporting; and
26. Safeguarding of assets and information.

The challenges of internal control systems for ENI are a high number of operations and associated financial transactions; the geographically dispersed activities, covering 16 countries, with, in most cases, delegations managing funds for DG NEAR; and, a diversity of partners in the implementation of its activities (Beneficiary states, private firms, Entrusted Entities, NGO's) and of forms and modes of financial implementation (project approach, Budget support, sector approach, indirect management with beneficiary country or with an entrusted entity, blending, trust funds, shared management under Cross Border Cooperation, etc...).

In the framework of this indicator, the analysis focuses on controls during the award/contracting phases and during the execution/implementing stage<sup>30</sup>. The tasks under control are as follows: *“At the award and contracting stage, the DG staff ensures that the award goes to the most advantageous offer to guarantee the best use of resources, following*

<sup>29</sup> Internal control is 'a process designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives ensuring effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations' (NEAR, 2016 management plan, Annex 9)

<sup>30</sup> Control systems are also in place at the annual planning/programming stages.

*established procedures. Also, at the contracting stage, the staff of the DG makes sure that the contract is compliant with established procedures.*

*During the execution/implementing stage, the staff of the DG monitors closely the execution of the projects through on the spot missions, and regular reporting as per contract conditions. Payments are made on the basis of narrative reports, financial reports, and where required, expenditure verification reports. Any risks related to the running of contracts are also assessed annually. Both monitoring (including ROM) and evaluations are planned as appropriate, during the life cycle of the project, and after the end, to look after impact and sustainability aspects. Reporting, mostly focused on results, is also obtained through monitoring. Headquarter staff conducts regular supervision missions in Delegations to obtain additional assurance on the effectiveness and efficiency of the devolved tasks.*

*Under budget support, the transfer of funds may only be made after the agreed conditions for payment have been met. Budget support disbursement files involve a process of operational checks at the headquarters, and a visa by the AOSD. Guidelines have been established to guide this process. All budget support disbursements in IPA countries are also subject to a review by the FAST committee. For ENI disbursements, the FAST involvement is determined during the annual process of validating the Risk Management Frameworks for budget support countries.” (NEAR, 2016 Management Plan, Annex 9, pp.3-4)*

*The aim of the control system is to provide “all levels of management with the necessary input for assessing whether or not they can have their own reasonable assurance that risks, in relation to their legality and regularity, related to the underlying transactions are adequately managed. All the main operational and financial transactions are subject to tight supervision and checks based on the financial circuits of the DG, assisted by very comprehensive and detailed checklists”. (ibid, p.4)*

The types of controls that are performed by the DG staff (ibid, p.5-7) are the following:

- Mandatory audits or expenditure verifications of contractual and legal documents (modalities set by FR);
- Risk-based audits in cases where mandatory audits are not required or where the results of mandatory audits are too limited in scope or are not considered satisfactory;
- Residual Error Rate<sup>31</sup> (RER) audits/study;
- On the spot checks under direct management (to support the operational visa ‘certified correct’ for supplies and works contracts or in grants and service contracts) or Indirect Management by Beneficiary Country (IMBC) and Indirect Management by Entrusted Entities (IMEE);
- Ex ante controls under IMBC;
- Verification missions under indirect management with International Organisations and other beneficiaries;
- Pillar ex ante assessments prior to under indirect management where DG NEAR staff meet requirements with regard to seven 'Pillars' relating to the internal control system, the accounting system, an independent external audit and rules and procedures for providing financing from EU funds through grants, procurement and financial instruments and Sub-Delegation;
- Budget Support risk management framework (RMF) focuses on the systems in place in the country in question in order to identify the risks that might impede the achievement of the objectives of budget support. The risk assessments are prepared by the relevant EU Delegation, reviewed by HQ for coherence and consistency and adopted by the FAST Committee;
- Accounting Quality Review assesses annually that consolidated accounts present a true and fair view of NEAR financial activities in terms of the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, their completeness, their accuracy and the period in which they are reported.

<sup>31</sup> Residual Errors are those that have evaded all prevention, detection and correction controls in the existing control framework.

For the ENI instrument, ex ante controls remain in place under indirect management (i.e. partial decentralisation) due to the high level of risk in the partner countries (some more than others) associated to the political, institutional, administrative and social environment of these partners.

In addition to the above already significant body of control systems, NEAR is engaged since 2016 in an anti-fraud strategy.

These various control systems and procedures use several reporting tools:

- The Monthly financial report.
- The Strategic Plan 2016-2020 of the Directorate General.
- The annual Management Plan of the Delegation.
- The Management plan of the Unit.
- The Annual Activity Report, by the Directorate General.
- The reports by the Authorising Officers by Sub-Delegation made at year end (by Directors to the Director General).
- The EAMR reports produced by the delegations.
- DG NEAR annual report to DG DEVCO on the cross-sub-delegation of DG DEVCO to DG NEAR for the management of the thematic budget lines.
- The Critical Risk Warning Reports sent at mid-year.
- Ad-Hoc generated Management information System (MIS) reports.
- The reports from authorising officers in other DG managing budget appropriations in cross sub delegations.
- The reports on control results from management/audit authorities in Beneficiary Countries with regard to indirect management by those countries, as well as the result of the Commission supervisory control on the activities of these bodies.
- The contribution of the Internal Control Coordinator, including the results of internal control monitoring at the DG level.
- The Management report to the Commissioner.

It is beyond the duties of this evaluation to assess the full implementation of these systems but information collected through interviews with NEAR staff at HQ and EUDs confirms that they are in place and running. They are often mentioned more for the time they take rather than for their benefits for the fiability of the financial management.

**Audit central systems** – The internal audit service (four staff) in DG NEAR was moved to a separate entity in 2014, like in other DGs, due to the reengineering of the Commission organisation and overall policy of human resources management (interview R1). This decision is consistent with an overall trend of centralization and specialisation on financial control rather than organizational audit (Interview B3, R1). This Commission-wide trend is replicated at DG NEAR level by regrouping all finance and audit functions within Directorate R. The objective of this reorganisation is to liberate resources for redeployment towards political priorities (Deloitte 2015, p.93). Even though the necessity of the rationalization process is not questioned, the option to extract all Finance and Contracts units from their present geographical directorate is internally debated. A downside of the centralization is the loss of expertise within the units/EUDs. In interviews with B3 (Finance, Contracts and Audit) the opinion was conveyed that EUD staff's understanding and handling of even such technical issues as finance and contract management improves the overall relevance of advisory services.

The Internal Audit Service (IAS) is a core part of the internal audit system for the European Commission and EU agencies. The service provides independent advice, opinions and recommendations on the quality and functioning of internal control systems: *“The purpose of the Internal Audit Service is to contribute to effective implementation of policies, programmes and actions and to efficient and economical management of resources by the European Commission and EU agencies. The IAS audits the management and control systems that exist within the Commission and the EU agencies and provides independent and objective assurance on their adequacy and effectiveness. On request of management, it also offers consulting activities”* (ibid. p.8). IAS reports to the Audit Progress Committee (APC). The latest available annual report on their website dates back to 2014 and therefore does not cover ENI. However NEAR management confirmed that the DG underwent several financial audits

for IAS during the period covered by the evaluation. IAS reports are for internal use. Controls are also performed by the external audit body, the European Court of Auditors (ECA). The audits performed by the IAS and the Court (performance audits and DAS) are useful tools to support the assurance process. Within the framework of the DAS, the Court<sup>32</sup> provides each year the most likely error rate (MLE) for a given chapter, which gives the DG a clear indication on the functioning of its control systems.

The internal auditing system set in place for the Commission applies fully to trust funds benefiting from funds transferred from ENI (Amended agreement, art. 11.2.2). The contribution of ENI funds to a EUTF is a case of direct management and not indirect management, as the Commission implements the "action" detailed in a financing decision. It does so by transferring the funds from the EU budget to the EUTF. It is a new form of implementation and the Control Strategy is still to be developed for the EUTF, nevertheless the rules established in the manuals (ex Elarg manual, DEVCO companion and Practical Guide, Financial Regulation) should be applied for the award of grants and contracts (NEAR, 2016 Management plan, annex 9).

**Audit decentralized systems** – Each directorate (and SGUA) issues annually an audit plan, aggregating EUD plans prepared in accordance to Neighbourhood Methodology for Audit Planning 2016 drafted by NEAR A3. The audit coverage ratio for 2016 is expected to be of 14.6% for NEAR B, 4.9% for NEAR C and 11.0% for Ukraine.

*Table 20 Overview of contracts by directorate (contracted and paid amounts, audit coverage ratio) in 2016*

	NEAR B	NEAR C	SGUA
Number of Contacts	2,353	1,154	281
Contracted amounts (EUR million)	6,616	2,767	832
Paid amounts (EUR million)	4,527	1,848	472
Audit coverage ratio	14.6%	4.9%	11.0%

*Source: DG NEAR Audit Plans*

A Contract-by-Contract Risk Assessment is performed for the contracts for which a risk assessment is deemed necessary. Four types of risks are systematically analysed and assessed: i) Risks related to external environment (i.e. political and institutional risks); ii) Risks related to Planning, Processes and Systems (i.e. action/project complexity); iii) Risks related to legality and regularity (i.e. contract implementation issues), and iv) Risks related to financial exposure (i.e. linked to contract amount). Following the risk assessment, ROM missions, evaluations, audits or on the spot checks are scheduled.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“Overarching objective [of financial management]: The Authorising Officer by Delegation should have reasonable assurance that resources have been used in accordance with the principles of sound financial management, and that the control procedures put in place give the necessary guarantees concerning the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions including prevention, detection, correction and follow-up of fraud and irregularities.*

*Objective 1 (mandatory): Effective and reliable internal control system giving the necessary guarantees concerning the legality and the regularity of the underlying transactions.*

*Indicator 1 (mandatory): Estimated residual error rate; Source of data: AAR DG ELARG 2014; AAR DG DEVCO 2014; Target for ENI <2%*

*Indicator 2 (mandatory): Estimated overall amount at risk for the year for the entire budget under the DGs responsibility; Source of data: Budget execution 2015; RER 2015*

*Indicator 3 (mandatory): Estimated future corrections; Source of data: ABAC report – Recovery \_Context\_by\_Year; target 2% for ineligible amounts*

<sup>32</sup> the European Court of Auditors analyses each year in the framework of the DAS the legality and regularity of a sample of transactions.



- *In order to ensure the adequate management of the risk relating to the legality and regularity of underlying transactions, taking into account the multiannual character of programmes as well as the nature of the payments concerned, the DG has a clear control system in place, made up of a number of different elements (p.26)*

*Objective 2 (mandatory): Effective and reliable internal control system in line with sound financial management.*

*Indicator 1 (mandatory): Conclusion reached on cost effectiveness of controls*

- *With a view of reaching a conclusion on the cost effectiveness of controls, a new methodology has been implemented, starting in 2016, that follows DG BUDG Guidelines on the matter. (...) This definition of "Control" and the activities in relation to it have also been detailed further in the Internal Control Strategy (Annex 9). The activities of each unit are then divided into 3 categories: Direct costs, Indirect Costs and Overhead Costs. Thus the cost of control in terms of personnel is obtained. This is added to other costs of control (Audits and Evaluations). Finally, the cost of control per management modes is broken down on the basis of the volume of transactions of each management mode.(p.26)"*

*Objective 3 (mandatory): Minimisation of the risk of fraud through application of effective anti-fraud measures, integrated in all activities of the DG, based on the DG's anti-fraud strategy (AFS) aimed at the prevention, detection and reparation of fraud.*

*Indicator 1 (mandatory – information available in DG's AFS): Updated anti-fraud strategy of DG NEAR, elaborated on the basis of the methodology provided by OLAF; The last update was made on 14/01/2016.*

*Indicator 2 (optional): Fraud awareness is increased for target population(s) as identified in the DG's AFS; The target is to raise the anti-fraud awareness of over 100 members of staff through: The adoption and dissemination of an OLAF manual; the completion of an anti-fraud questionnaire; and, the launching of an online training tool, amongst other initiatives.*

*Indicator 3 (optional): Regular monitoring of the implementation of the anti-fraud strategy and reporting on its result to management; Source of data: DG NEAR's AFS, objective 2, actions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 inclusive; Implementation of the AFS will be reported upon twice a year as part of the Management Report to the Commissioner, or as part of an equivalent management report.*

- *An Anti-fraud strategy has been adopted on 14/01/2016 (Ares(2016)206453) for the years 2016-2017. This document outlines the anti-fraud strategy of the DG, as a specific strategy within the broader context of the strategies of the other DG's involved in External Relations. It is addressed to all NEAR staff, both in HQ and in the European Union Delegations/Office where DG NEAR staff are present." DG NEAR 2015, Strategic Plan 2016-2020, pp.23-26*

*"DG NEAR will develop and start implementing a DG wide Internal Control Strategy. This strategy will define the concept of Internal Control and refer to the control environment of the DG before describing its implementation in the **5 areas of internal control**: effectiveness, efficiency, economy of operations; adequate management of the risk relating to the legality and regularity of underlying transactions; prevention, detection, correction and follow-up of fraud and irregularities; reliability of reporting; safeguarding of assets and information.*

*In 2016, the first activity planned relates to the establishment of internal procedures and guidelines for reporting serious irregularities and/or suspected fraud, thereby increasing the efficiency of staff members' responses in such situations. This will be achieved through the production and dissemination of an **OLAF manual for DG NEAR**. The second planned activity relates to the design and dissemination of an **anti-fraud questionnaire** to both gauge, and raise, awareness of procedures and issues related to OLAF and anti-fraud, as well as provide the basis for an analysis of where to target further anti-fraud training and awareness raising activities. Finally, a third activity will deal with the provision of **training for OLAF Focal Points (OFPs)** in EUDs and HQ, covering the role and responsibilities of an OFP and the new DG NEAR OLAF manual." DG NEAR 2016, Management Plan 2016, p.19*

*"DG NEAR will also prepare guidelines and instructions on how to deal with the discharge procedure and with Court of Auditors performance audits. This will enable staff to become familiar with the overall process and also to understand how to deal with the Court and what the specific procedures and timetables related to the Court are." DG NEAR 2016, Management Plan 2016, p.20*

*"Objective 1: Effective and reliable internal control system giving the necessary guarantees concerning the legality and the regularity of the underlying transactions*

- *The control system is in place and provides management with the necessary controls and information as to determine reasonable assurance on the transactions.*
- *Instructions regarding Manuals, Financial circuits, sub delegation, deputisations, prior approvals and deviations are available to staff. Training is realised where necessary. NEAR MAP as near to finalisation as possible.*
- *Also, all financial transactions should be checked following the DG's instructions and Guidance on the matter.*
- *All possible controls are implemented and functioning well. Problems are reported when found and solutions found.*
  - *Instructions available on the Intranet.*
  - *Training and awareness raising provided to staff.*
  - *Staff is in place and following instructions.*
  - *Reporting on ineligible expenditure and problems/issues detected by the controls in place (see also indicator on ineligible expenditure below)*
- *Reporting of deviations. The Non-compliance events and exceptions are reported on, their causes analysed and mitigating measures proposed when possible.*
- *Also the cases of "Passer-Outre" are recorded and reported on.*
  - *Reporting on Non-compliance events and exceptions is undertaken on a regular basis.*
  - *The causes of Non-compliance events and exceptions are analysed and mitigating measures are proposed when possible.*
- *The Reporting system is in place and gives a true and fair view of the activities.*
  - *Quality of reports and respect of deadlines for reports. EAMR and KPI system in place and functioning.*
- *The Annual Audit Plan that has been approved is being implemented.*
  - *1- % implementation of the Annual Audit Plan: year N*
  - *2-% implementation of the Annual Audit Plan: year N-1*
  - *3-% implementation of the Annual Audit Plan: year N-2.*
- *The controls in place are effective and detect ineligible expenditures, be it by ex-ante controls or by audits.*
  - *DG NEAR will use two sub set of indicators:*
  - *1- Ineligible amounts identified by ex-ante controls, in relation to DG NEAR annual overall spending.*
  - *2- Ineligible amounts identified by audits as a % of the audited amount.*
- *The action plans to audit recommendations from the Court of Auditors, the IAS and recommendations from the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers are being implemented.*
  - *Number of critical and very important recommendations overdue for more than 6 months, whose action plan has not been fully implemented yet.*
- *The residual error rate is calculated on a yearly basis for IPA and ENI instruments and has a coverage of at least 90% of the DG expenditures.*
  - *Estimated residual error rate*
- *The Estimated overall amount at risk is calculated each year.*

*Objective 2: Effective and reliable internal control system in line with sound financial management.*

- *Execution of payments and commitments in DG NEAR are following forecasts.*
  - *1-Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast for payments. (Between 90% and 110%)*
- *The RAL (RAC+RAP) is under control (indicator 3 and 6).*
  - *-2- Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast for contracts. (Between 90% and 110%)*
- *The prefinancings are cleared regularly on the basis of contractual landmarks.*
  - *3- RAL absorption period. (Not more than 4 years)*
- *The expired contracts are closed.*
  - *4- Reduction of Old Pre-financing.( Decrease by 25% at least)*

- 5- Expired Contracts as a % of the contract portfolio (Not more than 15%)
- The payments are made in time.
  - 6- Reduction of Old RAL. (Decrease by 25% at least)
  - 7- % of payments paid within the EC internal target of 30 days (at least 66%).
- The cost effectiveness of controls is assessed on a yearly basis. (Costs of controls are under 5% of the DG overall spending)
- The Internal Control Standards are assessed on an annual basis in Delegations and at Headquarters.
  - (KPIs in the EAMR, Survey or Desk review)
- Internal Control weaknesses are detected and mitigating measures proposed.
  - An Internal Control Standards report is drafted every year
- Safeguarding of information. Documents should be registered and filed according to the defined rules. Access to confidential documents should be restricted.


*Objective 3: Minimisation of the risk of fraud through application of effective anti-fraud measures, integrated in all activities of the DG, based on the DG's anti-fraud strategy (AFS) aimed at the prevention, detection and reparation of fraud.*

- *Minimisation of the risk of fraud through application of effective anti-fraud measures, integrated in all activities of the DG, based on the DG's*
  - 1- Updated anti-fraud strategy of DG NEAR, elaborated on the basis of the methodology provided by OLAF.
  - 2- Fraud awareness is increased for target population(s) as identified in the DG's AFS.
  - 3- Regular monitoring of the implementation of the anti-fraud strategy and reporting on its result to management.
  - 4- The number of cases/suspected frauds reported to OLAF in 2016 and the number of cases closed. The target is to: 1) Ensure the application of fraud awareness within the control system, demonstrated by the reporting of suspected cases of fraud to OLAF (target of > 30 transmissions to be made during 2016); and, 2) to have over 30 cases closed.
  - 5- Amounts recovered following recommendations of an OLAF investigation.

*The three objectives indicated below are the objectives of the Strategic Management Plan for the period 2016-2020.* DG NEAR 2016, Management Plan 2016, p.21-26

*“Concerning sound financial management, it should be noted that DG NEAR works in complex circumstances, with a very wide range of partners, and in particularly complicated circumstances. This requires that DG NEAR continues to implement its financial obligations based on a coherent and comprehensive set of necessary processes and controls in order to continually strive to reduce the number and importance of errors and irregularities.”* DG NEAR 2015, Management Plan 2015, p.15

Figure 10 Quality Assurance and Improvement Program framework



Source: Internal Audit Foundation 2013, Quality Assessment Manual, chp 2, p.19

“The key messages presented in this chapter can be summarised as follows:

- Overall, the workload distribution within DG NEAR reflects well its core business;
- Assistance Management (including the definition of financial processes as well as auditing and budgeting) play a dominant role in the workload distribution;
- Another important area of DG NEAR business is the management of political and policy processes (including the preparation of briefings);
- The typical support processes seem to have an appropriate level of staffing, however, “Secretarial and Administrative Support” takes a significant share of the workload;
- Based on the information gathered, we did not find evidence that DG NEAR is overstaffed.
- At this point, it is noteworthy that DG NEAR can be considered a lean DG and, as a consequence, the proposed options in Chapter 5 touch upon less than 5% of the workforce at headquarters.” Deloitte 2016, Assessing and optimising DG NEAR’s workload distribution in all entities of HQ, p.18

“Overall, Deloitte identified 15 recommendations, of which 3 focus on strengthening FTEs on processes, 5 on applying efficiency gains, and 7 on improving way of working. Along the axes that allow to improve way of working, 2 recommendations focus on harmonising processes, 2 on providing more effective training on specific processes, and 3 on efficiently sharing knowledge.” Deloitte 2016, Assessing and optimising DG NEAR’s workload distribution in all entities of HQ, p.72.

“Following the current economic climate and financial austerity affecting the public sector, there is a growing need for synergies and efficiency gains in the Commission. This has forced the institution to investigate new ways of working in several domains, including human resources management, information and communication technologies (ICT), communication, logistics, events and meeting room management. In order to obtain the desired synergies and efficiencies, these support processes are planned to be modernised and centralised over the coming years. Doing so, the Commission aims to liberate resources for redeployment towards political priorities.” Deloitte 2016, Assessing and optimising DG NEAR’s workload distribution in all entities of HQ, p.93.

“11.2.2. The internal auditor of the Commission and the European Court of Auditors shall exercise the same powers over the Trust Fund in its entirety as they do in respect of the other actions carried out



by the Commission.” EC 2016, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to The Syrian Crisis, 'The Madad Fund', and its Internal Rules, p.6

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; Audit plans 2016, management plans, IAS and COA websites;

Interviews – NEAR R1, R2, B3, CoA

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### 3.1.3 I-313. Evidence that the management has made a critical examination of its business processes in an effort to increase productivity, reduce duplication, and improve the quality of services provided to its internal customers

#### Global analysis of the indicator

During the period covered by the evaluation, DG NEAR demonstrated its interest and capacity for improving its business processes. First, in the broader framework of the ENP review (2015) by organizing a consultation with HQ and EUD staff on key aspects of management of ENI resources (accelerating aid delivery, coordination with EU MS...); second, by hiring a consulting firm for analysing workload of HQ staff and proposing required corrective measures.

**NEAR internal organization** – DG NEAR is interested in improving its internal organisation, notably in order to optimise the structure, process and procedures after the merger (January 2015) of DG ELARG with DEVCO F. NEAR found resources to contract Deloitte in 2015 for a workload analysis that recently (July 2016) issued recommendations regarding i) optimization of DG NEAR, ii) organisational redesign (as per their TOR), and iii) additional considerations (promote common corporate identity through cultural alignment).

Key recommendations for optimizing DG NEAR are the following:

- Strengthen full time equivalents for specific processes where workload deficiencies were identified;
- Policy cooperation, relations and interactions with external/internal stakeholders in Units B1 and C1 ;
  - Planning, implementation, management and assessment of the assistance” in Unit B1;
  - Supervision of Delegations, including organisation and processes, notably via supervisory missions to delegations. Exchanges of questions and consultations with delegations in Unit C1
- Apply efficiency gains, mainly in administrative and logistics functions;
- Improve ways of working to overcome silo mentalities by i) harmonizing tools, templates, methods and ways of working identifying and adopting best practices across Directorates; ii) effectively train people on specific processes; and, iii) documenting and/ or transferring identified untapped knowledge across Units, CoTEs, Delegations and other DGs.

Overall, DG NEAR’s organisational structure is found to be fit for purpose by Deloitte, implying among others that there’s no duplication. Proposed organisational changes are i) Merge and move staff on “Financial management of level 1, level 2 and on-going commitments, and related procedures, including procurement” under Directorate R; ii) Merge and move staff on “Accounting” under Directorate R; iii) Merge and move staff on “Budget & Auditing” under Directorate R, and iv) Create a separate Unit for “Manage EU Trust fund Madad” and other crises funds (Deloitte 2015, p.92).

In parallel, DG NEAR developed a human resources strategy after the merger in January 2015, aiming at securing the best elements and using the attractiveness of the DG to recruit

new talent. According to R1, a balance is been achieved between HR needs and recruitment (including contractual agents). This point is sustained by the Deloitte study. The process is perceived as relatively lengthy (three to four months to recruit a contract agent). The main weakness lies in trust funds management, where certainty of resources is low, thus delaying recruitment, and in-house knowledge in the specificities of their management could still be improved. (interview R1)

Some interviewees do not identify a clear set of incentives to increase productivity. Ways to improve productivity are simplification and streamlining processes, but will be hard to implement especially in a constantly changing operative context impacted by successive crises.

The internal control principles are implemented and function as intended (DG NEAR 2016; see I311).

Further improvements of internal procedures are expected from the development of a single procedural guidance manual "NEAR MAP" (manual of Procedures for financial implementation). This manual will provide a single entry point to procedures applying to the whole DG for activities implemented under IPA and ENI (DG NEAR management plan 2016).

**NEAR expertise** – The quality of EU expertise is acknowledged as a factor of added-value by most (10) of the 12 EUDs that answered the telephone survey. The creation of centres of thematic expertise (CoTE) at HQ has been a landmark in improving the available expertise. The support of the CoTEs is valued by all interviewees in DG NEAR B and C, as well as the SGUA. The thematic networks on the Capacity4dev website are also appreciated (Georgia). However, the downside of the CoTEs is the fact that expertise is no longer (or only to a lesser extent) held or created within the main geographic units at HQ and EUD level. This reduced expertise outside the CoTEs is often perceived as a key challenge to upscale the quality of the programming and the policy dialogue themselves, essential to achieve the ENI objectives (interviews NEAR A, B). The uneven quality of the expertise provided by framework contractors is a shared concern of almost all interviewees in NEAR (including EUDs in the telephone survey), with the related issue of lack of flexibility in case of deficiency and limited absorption capacity of operation staff. CoTEs are partly addressing the issue, the SGUA being the most comprehensive answer to that kind of lack of in-house expertise. QSGs are regularly frustrated by the lack of time for line DGs staff to bring the expertise expected by DG NEAR staff (cf. Analysis of Quality Reviews).

Within the broad framework of the ENP review process in 2015, an examination of ENI procedures of resource mobilisation, coordination with EU MS and accelerating aid delivery was conducted by internal working groups. Several ways forward were identified that witness the will and capacity of the management to examine critically the internal business processes and provide solutions within existing budgetary and regulatory framework (annual flexibility cushion), and sometimes beyond (multiannual flexibility cushion).

The establishment of the EUTFs was another evidence of the same momentum to overcome the issues faced by the regular aid delivery processes, as emphasized by most of the strategic evaluations during the last 10 years. Also, proposals to speed up decision-making are being issued for MFAs.

### Presentation of collected proof

*"In 2016, DG NEAR will develop a single procedural guidance manual "NEAR MAP" (manual of Procedures for financial implementation). This manual will provide a **single entry point to procedures applying to the whole DG** for activities implemented under IPA and ENI. The NEAR MAP will then be regularly updated. It is expected that this manual will become available in wiki format on DG NEAR's intranet in the course of 2017."* DG NEAR 2016, Management Plan 2016, p.19

*"1 January 2015 will mark the creation of the new DG NEAR, which will be twice the size of the current DG ELARG and of the current DEVCO F. The merger provides a series of opportunities as well as challenges in the context of HR management. The key opportunities will be streamlining management practices by drawing on the best from the two source entities, developing synergies and increasing overall efficiency due to economies of scale. (...) Finally, in the context of doing more with less, the new DG will have to rapidly develop a matrix system of "centres of thematic expertise" within its re-*

source limits, which will require a focused recruitment and training policy.” DG NEAR 2015, Management Plan 2015, pp.14-15

“The Delegation also welcomes the creation of centers of thematic expertise at HQ and the creation of thematic networks such as in the case of PAR. On this end, it would be very much welcome if these networks could also reach out more systematically to the political platforms under the EaP, such as e.g. on PAR and anti-corruption so that work in the cooperation field and thematic political dialogue could be even stronger synchronized.” Georgia, EAMR 2015, p.14

“In order to speed up the slow decision-making process, which was identified by the European Parliament as one of the MFA instrument’s main shortcomings, the Commission submitted on 4 July 2011 a proposal for a Framework Regulation laying down general provisions for MFA to third countries<sup>33</sup>. The main objectives of the proposal were to:

- i. provide for a swifter and more efficient decision-making process;
- ii. create an overarching framework for MFA operations;
- iii. align decision-making with that of other external financing instruments.

As a result of extensive discussions with Parliament and the Council, the Commission considered that the nature of its proposal had been changed during the lengthy legislative procedure to an extent that deprived it of its *raison d’être* and therefore decided on 8 May 2013 to withdraw its proposal<sup>34</sup>. (...) As a result, legislative decisions on individual MFA operations continue to be adopted by Parliament and the Council on a case-by-case basis under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP).

Recent experience, in particular the need to swiftly launch new MFA operations in Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, has again underlined the need to ensure that MFA, as an emergency instrument, can be mobilised rapidly in reaction to crisis situations. In this context, the co-legislators have made efforts to speed up decision-making under the OLP, in particular for the latest MFA operation in Ukraine, which was adopted within a little more than three months in 2015. Nevertheless, the margin for accelerating the adoption procedure under OLP remains limited, as highlighted by the use of the urgency procedure under Article 213 TFEU for the adoption in 2014 of the second MFA operation for Ukraine.” EC 2016, The implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015, COM(2016)376 final, pp.4-5



“The Commission has adopted a set of internal control principles, based on international good practice, aimed to ensure the achievement of policy and operational objectives. The financial regulation requires that the organisational structure and the internal control systems used for the implementation of the budget are set up in accordance with these standards. DG NEAR has assessed the internal control systems during the reporting year and has concluded that the internal control principles are implemented and function as intended.” DG NEAR 2016, Annual Activity Report, p.10

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – R1, R2, B3, B & C, ECFIN

### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Satisfactory
Degree of confidence		Satisfactory

## 3.2 JC32: Budget allocation and execution are efficient, in particular in managing the incentive-based approach and response to crises

### 3.2.1 I-321. HQ and EUDs work in accordance with the principles of sound financial management

#### Global analysis of the indicator

<sup>33</sup> COM(2011) 396 final, 4.7.2011.

<sup>34</sup> For more details, see the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2013 - COM(2014) 372 final.

NEAR internal/external control and audit systems are presented in I-312 and I-313. The assessment is that the budget allocation and the execution are well framed by adequate instructions and controls. This indicator focuses therefore on EUDs financial management, based on EAMRs 2013, 2014, and 2015. The analysis of these reports of the pre- and post-ENI regulation periods has not identified significant structural changes, rather erratic changes linked mainly to the evolution of the local contexts that are out of the control of the EUDs. The implementation of ENI programming and actions appears to react to external shocks rather than respond to a strategy spelling out realistic short, medium and long-term priorities.


In 2013, overall, most countries attest that they work in accordance with the principles of sound financial management taking the specific context into account. For instance, the general assessment in Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Syria and Ukraine is quite satisfactory despite the challenging environment in which they operate. It is worth noting that KPI compliance is much better compared to 2015. The highest scoring countries are West Bank, with 20 out of 26 KPIs, and Tunisia, Moldova, Israel and Georgia, with 18 out of 26 KPIs. In contrast, Libya is at the bottom of the list with 3 out of 26 KPIs met. Most problems encountered are external circumstances such as political turmoil, insecurity, weak institutional capacity and corruption. Some countries (e.g. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Moldova, West Bank and Gaza) also point to insufficient staff to manage Delegations' portfolio.

In 2015, KPI compliance differs from one country to another. Overall, and taking into consideration country specific contexts, global assessment from EU Delegations is satisfactory in terms of sound financial management. However, though an accuracy analysis should be taken on a case-by-case basis, a closer look reveals that the highest scoring countries are Jordan and Armenia with 14 and 13 out of 18 KPIs, respectively. It is also worth noting that from 2014 to 2015 there has been a significant drop in all indicators. For instance, in Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, KPI achievement has fallen by half. KPI 1 (Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast for payments), KPI 2 (Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast for contracts), KPI 10 (% of payments paid within the EC internal target of 30 days) and KPI 21 (% Implementation of the Annual Audit Plan: Year N (2015)) appear to be the more challenging indicators. Yet, regarding KPI 10, most Delegations refer to the closure of CRIS as the main cause of delays due to the transition of DG DEVCO to DG NEAR. It has to be noted that in some cases underachievement of certain indicators was due to the suspension of BS disbursements such as those reported in the case of Moldova: *"[...] the main factor for the underachievement of the benchmarks/targets for KPIs 1, 4, and 9 was the suspension in 2015 of all disbursements under all our BS contracts. The suspension resulted from the effective application of controls over the compliance of the BS tranches with the BS general conditions and does not indicate any weaknesses in the sound financial management of the BS for Moldova, but quite on the contrary – sound financial management of the related EU assistance has been ensured by the aforementioned suspension of BS payments."* (EAMR Moldova 2015, 57)

The figure below provides a comprehensive overview of the KPIs by country during the reporting period:



Figure 11 Overview of KPIs per country in 2013, 2014 and 2015



Source: KPIs found in the EAMRs.

Apart from Syria and Libya that stand aside for obvious reasons, the performances of the EUDs are not characterized by marked differences. The overall budget execution is sound, and for most of the countries, has improved in 2014 compared to 2013 performance. The change in KPIs in 2015 makes it difficult to assess the evolution over the whole period under scrutiny, as presented below:

Table 21 Sound Financial Management and Efficient Use of EC Resources

KPIs	2013	2014	2015
% of Projects with Red Traffic Lights for Achieving Objectives	3.1%	2.4%	0%
% of Projects with Red Traffic Lights for Implementation Progress	3.6%	2.4%	0%
Evolution of Old Pre-financing	-37.0%	-42.0%	35.8%
Evolution of Old RAL	39.4%	-26.5%	27.7%
Execution of Financial Forecasts: Contracts	125.0%	163.5%	231.5%
Execution of Financial Forecasts: Decisions	123.4%	102.8%	0%
Execution of Financial Forecasts: Payments	102.2%	77.7%	90.8%
Expired Contracts in the Delegation's Portfolio	9.1%	6.5%	9.9%
Payment Period	75.7%	70.7%	53.7%
RAL Absorption Capacity	5.8%	117.8%	63.6%
Respect of DEVCO/EEAS Agreement on the Use of Staff in Delegations	0%	0%	0%
ROM Performance	74.7%	0%	0%

Source: EAMRs

Table 22 Efficiency of Internal Controls

KPIs	2013	2014	2015
% of Projects Visited in the EAMR Period	61.8%	76.4%	0%
Evaluation and Audit	79.2%	94.4%	96.6%
Ex-ante Ineligible Amounts	3.8%	3.5%	6.7%
Human Resources	78.1%	91.3%	93.6%
Implementation of the Annual Evaluation Plan	91.7%	57.1%	0%
Information and Financial	87.5%	91.3%	88.6%

Mission and Values	90.6%	806.0%	93.6%
Operations and Control Activities	88.8%	92.6%	91.9%
Planning and Risk Management Processes	90.6%	90.5%	91.9%

Source: EAMRs

Table 23 Efficiency of Audit Systems

KPIs	2013	2014	2015
Audit Ineligible Amounts	2.4%	6.6%	5.6%
Implementation of Annual Audit Plan: Year N – 1 (2012, 2013, 2014)	80.4%	96.6%	84.0%
Implementation of Annual Audit Plan: Year N – 2 (2011, 2012, 2013)	92.7%	100.0%	97.3%
Implementation of Annual Audit Plan: Year N (2013, 2014, 2015)	62.1%	77.4%	29.7%
Recovery of Justification of Audit Ineligible Amounts	73.6%	0%	0%

Source: EAMRs

It can be concluded from the analysis of EAMRs 2013, 2014 and 2015 that even if the number of KPIs met by EUDs varies, the explanations indicate that performances are most often close to the benchmarks and are mostly dependent on the absorption capacity of partner countries. Overall, the EAMRs – as well as interviews held during the field visits – are evidencing that budget allocation and execution are sound.

## Presentation of collected proof

### Responses to the ENI-specific survey (telephone)

**Question: "Do you witness improvements since 2014 in ENI budget allocation and execution, in particular to support the incentive-based approach, responses to crises and prevention of crisis?" (n=11/12)**

Incentive-based-approach. It is not clear how we link what we expect from countries into giving them an incentive. It's an opaque and subjective process. When we provided the partner country with extra money they didn't feel it that it was a compensation for what they did. We need to review the system.

Reliability by the country is not ensured.

Responses and prevention of crises: We are responding to the impact of crises and the suffering of a number of people but we don't have influence in the prevention of crises.

No. If you are in a country where there are no crisis you lose funds.

Incentive-based approach: the amount is so small that we don't have the capacity to produce good behaviour. It could work better if we tell the country that if they do well they will have extra funds (ex ante but not ex post). The political recognition is more effective than the money. The money it doesn't make a big difference. In order to have a real incentive you have to put more funds and target them (raise the standards).

The partner country is now discussing and trying to introduce the incentive-based approach but there should be more guidance particularly on fragile countries. The incentive-based approach is not being implemented in the partner country. There should be more guidance on that.

We do not have access to umbrella programmes due to lack of improvement in good governance. Funds for 2014-2017 period have been reduced due to the policy "more for more" and it has had a negative impact in relations with authorities. Especially because the partner country has received more funds.

We've benefited from the incentive-based-approach but I think it is rather about better management of the programme: if we are capable of putting away the money ensuring the absorption then it's good to get more. It's different from the "more for more" principle. The country doesn't see it because the rewarding process is too complex. But It's an important instrument in the sense that if the reform process is not advancing then you would not want to have all that money because you're going to accumulate

**Question: “Do you witness improvements since 2014 in ENI budget allocation and execution, in particular to support the incentive-based approach, responses to crises and prevention of crisis?” (n=11/12)**

too much funding. I see it more from a review budget management perspective.

Yes. Our budget has been doubled since 2015 because there has been some political changes in the country. There are some changes but not big reforms. Reforms are very slow and it's a very centralised country.

Yes. In 2014 rules became more flexible. There were some crisis and there was a perception that the country was doing well so it was rewarded with extra resources. Also in response to crisis and prevention of crisis it helps: the EU funds medication for refugees that leads to stability and can prevent other crisis, in that sense it has been successful.

Incentive-based approach is limited by the sequence between political reports of ENI countries and the moment they are translated into additional budget resources and the programming time necessary to use those resources. Additional funding based on incentive-based approach is officialised late in the year. It has not really allowed us to enforce new needs.

As regards prevention/responses to crisis the country is not a good example for this question (low-level crisis but not difference from the past).

No. The incentive-based approach is mainly political not very objective and does not work in practice. Resources were taken to support crisis in Ukraine. In the case of the partner country there's more appetite for reforms but there's not an increase in resource allocation. With the ENI we are not at the execution phase.

Not really. More attention should be given to the absorption capacity of the country.

Yes. Improved: Financial allocations are more relevant to the country and the interest of the EU. Decision making (quicker)

**To the question “Can you please identify below key areas where efficiency should be improved?” responded by 10 over the 12 EUD interviewed, the most frequent keywords are flexibility, acceleration of programming, response to emergencies/crises. (n=10/12)**

1. Flexibility of financial rules to quickly re-direct funding. Financial rules do not allow us to quickly adjust to the new needs.  
2. Better DoL between HQ and EUD.

1. Responses to crisis and prevention of crisis: we could do better to reduce the time and simplify procedures.  
2. More transparency in the way that the incentive-based approach is executed and forward planning on how much resources would be available in a certain year for a certain country.

Budget support but it's not easy because there's not a clear policy in the country.

Contracting procedures.

In the partner country side: need a central focal point (national coordination) for donors.  
In the EU side: more flexibility (rules) to be more effective e.g. Madad Fund is more flexible.

Need to improve: more flexible/simplified rules for programming, contracting and execution of ENI budget.

Procedures and allocation of resources. There should be an emergency fund to cover crisis.

Procedures: reduce time between programming and implementation. The process is too long to adapt to needs and changes in the country.  
EUD doesn't have the resources to implement programmes.

Programming cycle: it's very long, need to simplify the adoption of programming documents.  
The process is not very efficient especially if compared to EU MS.

Review our standard about the choice to work with UN Agencies. In certain cases we can work with UN Agencies as implementing partners because they have the capacity and expertise. This would increase the efficiency of our actions.

*“The legal acts which guide the work of the DG as concerns financial assistance for both the enlargement and Neighbourhood zones are provided through articles 209 and 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.” DG NEAR Strategic Plan 2016-2020, p.4*

*“During 2016 a smooth transition for the processing of invoices and other financial transactions is planned from CRIS (the IT system used so far by DG DEVCO and NEAR) to ABAC (the Commission's corporate financial IT system) for all DG NEAR users, ensuring business continuity to the greatest possible extent.*

*(...) The main benefits of CRIS ABAC migration will be as follows:*

*o The direct encoding of financial transactions in ABAC will contribute to smoother processing of invoices (and other financial transactions) within DG NEAR as the workflow will no longer be delayed due to potential technical problems/bugs between CRIS and ABAC. In addition, at the beginning of the year, processing of payments will no longer be delayed due to CRIS closure. As from January 2017 the processing of invoices will be possible directly in ABAC without the need to wait for re-opening of CRIS.*

*o The internal approval process of any financial transaction (mainly invoices, but also recovery orders and forecast of revenue) will be documented in a mandatory e-signatory generated in ARES. This will contribute towards the achievement of document management objectives of our DG and ensure a clear audit trail of all financial transactions (invoices, recovery orders and forecast of revenue) processed within DG NEAR.” DG NEAR 2016, Management Plan 2016, pp.19-20*

*“In 2014, the implementation of actions has been hindered by the lack of payment credits. Coupled with a reduction in commitment credits, this situation should be expected to continue in 2015. For bilateral cooperation, the lack of payment credits could lead to less leverage to strengthen reforms and incentivize partner countries. Therefore, the issue of payment and commitment credits is a critical one that needs to be addressed in order to ensure that the premises for a successful implementation of our policy are met. Moreover, in practice, as a result of payment credits limitations, EU services face extra administrative constraints.” DG NEAR 2015, Management Plan 2015, p.14*

*“The current programming process includes a number of broad consultations and many other procedural steps, and takes on average 18 months. The length of the programming process undermines the relevance of assistance. The scope of the programming documents (Country Strategy Papers) under the ENPI follows the format used for development cooperation, which means making an extensive analysis of the situation in a given country and increasing the length of the process. For Neighbourhood countries, however, the reality is different and the country analysis for most partners (countries that have concluded an Action Plan or an equivalent set of joint objectives with the EU) is described annually in dedicated Progress Reports, which make the general part of the Country Strategy Paper redundant. There is therefore both the need and the scope to streamline, shorten and better focus the programming process.” EC 2011, Proposal for a regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, p.3*

*« 1.Au chapitre de la bonne gestion financière, de l'efficacité des contrôles et des systèmes d'audit actuels, et de la légalité et régularité des actions, la situation actuelle à la Délégation permet la signature de la Déclaration d'Assurance avec suffisamment de garanties de l'existence. (...) Une bonne performance, compte-tenu des contraintes et défis liés au contexte et l'environnement administratif et politique local. » EAMR Algeria 2013, p. 4-5 & 35 (Section 1 Question 8)*

*“I have reasonable assurance that the resources assigned to the activities described in this report have been used for their intended purpose and in accordance with the principles of sound financial management. (...) Section 8: Improving as compared to the EAMR 2012. 77%” EAMR Armenia 2013, p. 11 & 40-Section 1 Q 8*

*“No potential weaknesses with regard to the sound financial management have been identified. As can be seen from KPI's 20 and 24, a very low percentage of costs are deemed ineligible due to the close collaboration with and monitoring of our project partners. This is also reflected in the conclusions from the DEVCO verification mission in 2012, establishing that all necessary capabilities and required controls are present in the Delegation's workflow.*

*In terms of achieving the operational goals of the Delegation's project portfolio, while there are significant challenges with working in Azerbaijan, it should be noted that these are all external – the Delegation has the necessary capacity and resources to cope with the challenges.*

*Section 8 – I have during my period as HoD in Baku going through the performance of the delegation made the assessment based on different reporting materials and verifications that EC resources are used efficiently and that sound financial management is in place.” 8 KPIs out of 12; EAMR Azerbaijan, 2013, p. 5 & 33-Section 1 Q 8*

*“The delegation is managing the resources in a very responsible manner, as testified by the KPIs. If sufficient credits would have been available, all 12 indicators would have given a positive mark. Not only statistics are proof of a sound financial management, also the achievements that have been accomplished should be seen as evidence. I have a high degree of confidence in the performance of the Delegation in terms of sound financial management and the efficient use of the resources.” ten out of twelve KPIs; EAMR Belarus, 2013, p. 4 & 29-Section 1 Q 8: NA*

*“Concerning the legality and regularity of operations, there are no systematic weaknesses identified, except with reference to reliability of expenditure verification reports for grants contracts. To mitigate this risk the delegation is normally performing extra checks, on the spot visits and recently trying to directly contract the auditors. (...) The handling of Egypt's crisis also demonstrated the Delegation's sound risk management in a major crisis situation. When minimum macro-economic and PFM conditions for EU budget support were no longer complied with through budget support, sound financial management and financial control of EU cooperation with Egypt were ensured in a responsible and adequate way by putting on hold budget support disbursements. The legality and conformity of EU operations was also ensured through adequate controls and financial management, and the application of correct measures in respect of EU financial regulations.*

*Section 8 – I have a reasonable degree of assurance that the resources assigned to the activities described in this report have been used for their intended purpose and in accordance with the principles of sound financial management. Human and financial resources allocated to the Delegation and under my responsibility have been used, at the best of my knowledge, in an efficient and effective way.” seven out of 12 KPIs; EAMR Egypt, 2013, p. 6 & 35-Section 1 Q 8*

*“Section 8 – Considering that 9 out of 12 KPIs have been met entirely and that 1 KPI (1st) has only been missed by 1 percent I do consider the use of EC funds in compliance with the principle of sound financial management under Art. 27 of the Financial Regulation. For the two indicators that were exceeded, i.e. KPI 2 and 3 this is due to the high volatility of funding for Georgia, where notably NIF and EaPIC funds are not always easy to predict at the beginning of the budgetary year and thus making it likely that the forecast does not hold the initial expectations as they were built. The same applies to large scale thematic. This provides with a high degree of assurance towards the compliance with the principle of sound financial management and that it can be further built upon.” nine out of twelve KPIs; EAMR Georgia, 2013, p. 5 & 33-Section 1 Q 8*

*“As regards the results in the 2013 report regarding sound financial management; especially focusing on follow-up of forecasts/payment execution, planning of activities (launching of CfP/tenders), preparation and follow-up of the Annual Audit Plan and common project monitoring missions as well as closures and de-commitments of the finalised contracts further improvement is needed in the FCS.*

*Section 8 – The financial management is performed in accordance with the financial regulations for all contracts. There is a big emphasis on sound financial management and beneficiaries are notified of that. Financial reports are being checked carefully and if they do not comply with the rules the beneficiaries are requested to revise them.” nine out of twelve KPIs; EAMR Israel, 2013, p. 5 & 31-Section 1 Q 8*

*“The Delegation is compliant with the principles of sound financial management as well as legality and regularity of the operations. Following the reinforcement of our internal control mechanisms we detected some errors in the framework of JEDCO's file (HQ was informed and gave us the instructions in December 2013).*

*Section 8 – The general performance is excellent. The Delegation has reached 11 out of 12 KPIs. Despite the figures mentioned in KPI1 and KPI2 we are close to the benchmarks. The over-performance for KPI3 is due to the massive additional funds received in 2013 related to the Syrian crisis.” nine out of twelve KPIs; EAMR Jordan, 2013, p. 5 & 32-Section 1 Q 8*

«Section 8 – The performance of the Delegation in Lebanon in term of sound financial management and efficient use of EC resources has been quite outstanding. Benchmarks for assessing performance established that at least 7 green out of 12 KPI should be attained. As indicated throughout the report the outbreak of the Syrian crisis and its impact on Lebanon obliged to review the forecasts for payments and contracts for 2013, and that is the reason why KPI 1, 2 and 3 showing execution of financial forecasts are shown in orange as they are calculated based only on the initial forecasts. Taking into account the midyear review of forecasts, the performance of the Delegation is translated into 11 green out of 12 KPI.» Eight out of twelve KPIs; EAMR Lebanon, 2013, p. 5 & 40-Section 1 Q 8

“DEVCO, in consultation with EEAS, should continuously assess the risks resulting from the worsening security context. The Delegation, which is working in a very difficult environment should be fully supported by EEAS and DEVCO services and adequately staffed. Gradual de-concentration of the Delegation for example transferring Gest-op and Res-op functions to the delegation. This would accelerate considerably the implementation of the cooperation and alleviate the work load of DEVCO/F/4.” three out of seven KPIs; EAMR Libya, 2013, p. 5 & 31-Section 1 Q 8

“Section 8 – Even if under-staffing has been a problem, the professional level and experience of both the Operations and the FCA sections are excellent, and the two sections work with a commendable level of mutual co-operation. This is one of the key assets for a Delegation working in an environment with considerable corruption and other risks. I have worked closely with the Heads of both sections, and review situations with them regularly, together. Based on the professional quality and the two sections and of their officials, I feel a very high degree of confidence in the performance of the Delegation in terms of sound financial management and the efficient used of resources.” 11 out of 12 KPIs ; EAMR Moldova, 2013, p. 3 & 28-Section 1 Q 8

« La déclaration d'assurance confirme, d'une manière générale, la bonne gestion financière des fonds de la CE par la Délégation. Tel que la mission de vérification l'avait constaté en 2013, les systèmes de contrôle interne et d'audit mis en place et la bonne structuration des sections "Opérations" et "Finance, Contrats et Audit" permettent de donner une assurance raisonnable quant au bon fonctionnement de la Délégation et au respect des règles en vigueur. Plus spécifiquement, la mission de vérification a indiqué qu'elle n'avait pas décelé de manquement particulier témoignant de la méconnaissance des standards de contrôle interne. De plus, les plans d'audit sont mis en œuvre de façon régulière, aucun retard particulier n'ayant été à déplorer. Enfin, la Délégation a mis en place des outils de reporting permettant une bonne compréhension du portefeuille. Le personnel de la Section finances & contrats et des Opérations dans son ensemble est composé d'agents ayant les compétences requises pour assurer leur fonction de manière professionnelle et indépendante. Les points d'amélioration concernent pour 2014 des prévisions de paiements encore plus réalistes. Des efforts ont déjà été entrepris en ce sens en 2013 et se poursuivront cette année.

Section 8 – L'exécution des prévisions de paiements s'est améliorée par rapport à 2012, notamment pour les appuis budgétaires, malgré la difficulté à anticiper, pour un nombre élevé de programmes, l'évolution des réformes appuyées. Il aurait été plus élevée (de 100% en fait pour cet instrument, de 91% globalement) sans l'indisponibilité des fonds en fin d'année. Une prévision encore plus réaliste sur la partie projet notamment devra être effectuée. L'exécution des prévisions sur les décisions (et en moindre mesure les contrats qui en découlent) a été supérieure au benchmark du fait de l'allocation supplémentaire de ressources Spring en faveur du Maroc annoncée en milieu et en fin d'année, qui nécessitait un engagement rapide et auquel la Délégation a su répondre efficacement. Le système de contrôle efficace et efficient est la base de gestion saine des finances. Je considère que le système tel que mis en place à la Délégation à Rabat me permet de statuer en tant qu'ordonnateur subdélégué sur l'ensemble des transactions.” Seven out of twelve KPIs; EAMR Morocco, 2013, p. 9 & 39-Section 1 Q 8

“The Delegation has performed well in terms of sound financial management and the efficient use of EC resources. With regards to efficiency of the internal control systems, the Delegation was not able to fully comply with a number of control standards. This was due to the fact that in 2013 the Delegation was a fraction of its former size (5.2 persons in DEVCO operations; 2.8 persons in EEAS; 1 FPI); evacuated and operating principally from HQ and; responding to one of the largest and most complex crisis in recent times with the suspension of bilateral assistance to the GoS. (...) Section 8- The Delegation has performed well in terms of sound financial management and the efficient use of EC resources, meeting or exceeding 10 of 11 indicators (please see our comments in section 1.2 on KPI 1 and KPI 3). The only KPI not met was KPI 9 for which a justification has been provided in section 3.” eight out of eleven KPIs ; EAMR Syria, 2013, p. 5 & 31-Section 1 Q 8

« Certaines faiblesses ont été détectées en matière de respect strict des procédures, mais ne mettent pas en cause l'intégrité des acteurs de la coopération ni les excellents résultats obtenus, tels qu'en attestent les valeurs des différents indicateurs de ce rapport. Un plan d'action a été élaboré et proposé au siège. Il vise notamment à développer les connaissances de l'ensemble du personnel concerné sur les règles en vigueur, accroître la supervision par le management et renforcer la rigueur dans l'élaboration et les circuits des dossiers au sein de la Délégation.

« Section 8 – 8 indicateurs sur 12 sont remplis par la délégation en Tunisie. C'est un bon résultat, qui reflète bien la situation compte tenu du contexte politico-économique très difficile qui a marqué toute l'année 2013. Ce résultat aurait pu être meilleur (10 indicateurs positifs sur 12) si la Commission avait bénéficié de crédits de paiement suffisants permettant de décaisser en fin d'année le montant total de la 1ère tranche du programme d'appui à la relance n°3.” eight out of twelve KPIs; EAMR Tunisia, 2013, p. 4 & 34-Section 1 Q 8

“Section 8 – The Delegation has adequate human resources to implement DEVCO-mandated standards and procedures. In the uncertain political and policy environment of Ukraine it is inevitable that some projects and programmes will not achieve expected results and impacts, hence it is too early to assess, whether additional means would be needed.” eight out twelve KPIs; EAMR Ukraine, 2013, p. 5 & 36 – Section 1 Q 8

“In general, the Delegation's performance with regard to sound financial management of EC funds, the efficiency of control and audit systems, and the legality and conformity of related operations is in line with the relevant benchmarks (see also summary tables under Section 8). (...) Due to operational understaffing, substantial increase of workload and difficulties of access to Gaza as mentioned in previous sections, the operational staff capacity to monitor projects on the field is worsening substantially.

Section 8 – As also shown through the KPIs, the performance of the Delegation with regard to Sound Financial Management and Efficient Use of EC resources is overall very good and in the requested range for all benchmarks. As for KPI 11, the system assessment for KPI 11 is erroneous. That KPI for the Delegation should in fact be in the 'green' area as the value for the Delegation is in the requested range as compared to the benchmark.” 12 out of 12 KPIs; EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2013, p. 11 & 41-Section 1 Q 8

“Regarding sound financial management and efficient use of EC resources, the Delegation has performed effectively during 2015. I have a high degree of assurance on the basis of the achieved results. It is also imperative to note that the deviations experienced compared to DEVCO benchmarks under KPIs 1 and 2 were due to the fact that the NIF envelope was not taken into account in the automatic calculation. Regarding KPI 10 the internal target for payment delays could not be kept in the first months of 2015 due to circumstances and developments outside of the control of the Delegation, namely the CRIS closure due to transition from DG DEVCO to DG NEAR. The Delegation will nevertheless continue to improve its performance, notably on these red areas. This will take place through close monitoring of KPI throughout the year, an increased dialogue with relevant institutions and the active implementation of relevant plans such as the 2016 Annual Management Plan.” EAMR Armenia, 2015, p. 52

“Based on the different reporting materials and verifications carried out during my period as HoD in the Delegation I assess that the management of EC resources is efficient and financial management in the EUD is sound.” EAMR Azerbaijan, 2015, p. 49

“Although certain KPIs in this section are outside the benchmarks none of these values put into question the degree of assurance, as deviations were analysed and explained in the comments to these KPIs. I have a high degree of confidence in the performance of the Delegation in terms of sound financial management and the efficient use of EC resources.” EAMR Belarus, 2015, p. 40

“I have a high degree of assurance that the resources deployed have been used in accordance with the principles of sound financial management. The Delegation's human and financial means under my responsibility have been used, to the best of my knowledge, in an efficient and effective manner.” EAMR Egypt, 2015, p. 55

*“2 out of 7 applicable KPIs have been met entirely and a number of KPIs have only been slightly missed. Furthermore, the trends are positive as for future compliance, notably on (old) RAL. Therefore I do consider the use of EC funds in compliance with the principle of sound financial management under Art. 27 of the Financial Regulation. For the indicator that was not met in terms of payment forecasts, i.e. KPI 1, this is due to a deferral of a large disbursement for Georgia, where payments due in the second semester were not always easy to predict at the beginning of the budgetary year. This made it likely that the forecast would not reflect all the effective elements. The same applies to large scale thematic funds and also to the availability of IT empowerments at the beginning of the reporting period. All these points provide me with a high degree of assurance towards the compliance with the principle of sound financial management and that the Delegation can further built on these results.”* EAMR Georgia, 2015, p. 59

*“Despite the heavy workload and challenges faced in terms of staff vacancies, the overall performance of the Delegation is good. Even if there are only 4 KPIs green out of 7, this can be explained as follows: 1- concerning the payment execution (KPI 1), in case of comparison against the mid-year forecast figures and if payment credits were available the performance rate would have achieved 90.85% and therefore within the acceptable range. 2- Concerning the delay of payment execution (KPI 10), the KPI has been only exceeded by 0.5%. The KPI was negatively impacted by the long CRIS closure at the beginning of the year. Therefore, the delegation considers that 6 out of 7 KPIs were in fact attained. The other KPI on Old RAL could not be reached in view of the increased workload combined with a very important mobility and vacancy rate of staff. However, the proportion of old RAL with the active portfolio remains limited (EUR 11 Million against EUR 559 Million for contracts and EUR 1.7 Million against EUR 625 Million for decisions).”* EAMR Jordan, 2015, p. 51

*“The performance of the Delegation in Lebanon in term of sound financial management and efficient use of EC resources has been satisfactory, particularly if taking into account the following:*

*- Despite red indicators for KPI 1 and 2, EU Delegation to Lebanon well achieved its objectives on both execution of payments and contracting. Initial forecast for payments is lightly above the benchmark since negotiations for the biggest contract signed during 2015 were at a very early stage, mid-year forecast showing a more accurate forecast while execution on contracting is here distorted by the fact that system wrongly took into account thematic contracts. It should be green (109.9%).*

*- Delegation's performance on execution of KPI 10 – payment period- was highly affected by the lack of payment credits in 2014 followed by the NEAR migration implications early 2015. ENI Delegations were not able to visa any payment till late in March 2015. Not only DG NEAR Delegations remained unable to proceed with payments for several months, once the system become operational, new IT problems emerged. Also, an increasing number of payment orders involving Lebanon are been subject to additional checks at European banks in charge of releasing payments, informing that this additional information is required for Lebanon as a country under embargo (Common position 2006/625, Council Regulation 1412/2006) meanwhile payments remained blocked by bank authorities.”* EAMR Lebanon, 2015, p. 47

*“As discussed previously in the report, the main factor for the underachievement of the benchmarks/targets for KPIs 1, 4, and 9 was the suspension in 2015 of all disbursements under all our BS contracts. The suspension resulted from the effective application of controls over the compliance of the BS tranches with the BS general conditions and does not indicate any weaknesses in the sound financial management of the BS for Moldova, but quite on the contrary – sound financial management of the related EU assistance has been ensured by the aforementioned suspension of BS payments. As far as the underachievement of the target/benchmark for KPI 7 (reduction of old pre-financing) is concerned, the most important reason for it, as discussed elsewhere in the report, was the specificities of the 14 NIF contracts which are managed by the Delegation. The Delegation has no control over the existing (standard) contractual arrangements within those NIF contracts, nor is there any reason to think that those arrangements are engendering risks for the sound financial management of the assistance. As far as the underachievement of the target for KPI 10 (% of payments within the internal target deadline) is concerned, it should be stressed that the focus of the Delegation's efforts has been the compliance with the contractual/legal payment deadlines so as to avoid paying late-payment interest. While the Delegation has made all efforts possible to comply also with the shorter internal target deadlines, the steady increase in the workload and the continued shortage of staff in the FCA section have prevented us from consistently meeting the latter objective. That circumstance, however, has not had any effect on the sound financial management of the assistance and is not a reason for me to express reservations in my Statement of assurance. The planned remedial actions include recruitment of*



staff in the vacant positions in the Operations section and increasing the number of staff in the FCA section by at least one more CA or LA.” EAMR Moldova, 2015, p. 57

“Comme indiqué dans les commentaires spécifiques de différents indicateurs, un certain nombre de biais affectant le calcul de KPI liés à l'exécution de la coopération ne permettent pas de rendre une image fidèle de la réalité. Une fois corrigés (comme explicité dans l'annexe "détails des calculs des KPIs Maroc" et dans les champs de commentaires spécifiques à chaque KPI concerné) un bon nombre de ces indicateurs atteignent voire dépassent les valeurs cibles / benchmarks. Durant l'année 2016, l'effort de clôture des vieux contrats ainsi que l'apurement des préfinancements sera poursuivi. De même, l'amélioration de la performance de la Délégation en termes de délais de paiement figure parmi les objectifs spécifiques pour 2016. En ce qui concerne les prévisions, le déploiement de MIS facilitera leur préparation et leur suivi.” EAMR Morocco, 2015, p. 64

“The Delegation to Syria has performed very well in terms of sound financial management and efficient use of Commission resources, taking into consideration the justifications provided in section 3 and the war situation in the country.” EAMR Syria, 2015, p. 50

“Avec quatre indicateurs remplis sur sept, la performance de la délégation en matière de bonne gestion financière et d'utilisation efficace des ressources de la commission est satisfaisante. Les performances sur les indicateurs 4, 7, 8 et 9 (en amélioration par rapport à l'année dernière), me donnent une bonne assurance quant au fait qu'une culture de bonne gestion est désormais en place à la délégation. Un effort spécifique sera mené en 2016 concernant l'amélioration de la fiabilité des prévisions de paiement. S'agissant du KPI10 sur la période de paiement, le manque de crédit de paiement a contraint à différer certains paiements en fin d'année. De plus, l'importante proportion de subventions et la lourdeur inhérente à ce type de contrat (approbation des rapports d'activités et financiers avec des partenaires souvent peu réactifs en Tunisie), rend difficile le respect du délai de paiement de 30 jours.” EAMR Tunisia, 2015, p. 49

“As explained in detail within the report, major deviations in the benchmarks /targets were mainly caused by external factors (delays in the reforms of the Government – delays in programs implemented by EBRD – creation of DGNEAR). These deviations were recognised by the Delegation in a timely manner and have been / will be addressed. Therefore, I have a positive assessment of the performance of the Delegation in terms of sound financial management and efficient use of EC resources.” EAMR Ukraine, 2015, p. 60



“The implementation and the use of EU funds by the Delegation is in line with the principles of sound financial management and of efficiency, even though 3 KPIs are calculated to be out of range. In fact, as also highlighted in the relevant sections, these should be considered in the appropriate context for Palestine and for this Delegation. As for KPI 2, commitment credits and related payment credits for PEGASE and UNRWA which became available or which were confirmed only during 2015 (EUR 68 million) could not be planned at the start of the year. As for KPI 9, the Delegation has reduced the old "Reste à Liquider" (RAL) over the past years to a large extent. The old RAL stands currently EUR 2.9 million on a total value of allocated amounts on-going decision of EUR 515 million, i.e. 0.6% which is an extremely low figure. There is little room for further substantial reduction of old RAL in double-digit percentage figures. The very low RAL absorption rate expressed in years (KPI 4) is also underlying the above statement (0.83 years as compared to the benchmark of not more than 4 years) As for KPI 10, technical issues in the Commission management information and accounting systems CRIS/ABAC related to the creation of DG NEAR early 2015 persisted until the summer months having a severely negative impact on the proper processing of many transactions, such as the timely execution of payments.” EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2015, p. 77

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EAMRs 2013, 2014, 2015

Interviews – NEAR R and B3, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Satisfactory
Degree of confidence		Satisfactory

### 3.2.2 I-322. Timeline from i) commitments to payments (per management mode); ii) claims' submission to actual payment of the approved amounts (per management mode);

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The procedural changes introduced by the ENI regulation and CIR did not significantly alter by themselves the timeline of the regular programming, allocation, and implementation of ENI funds (interviews NEAR B and C). Lengthinesses in the timeline of the programming phase and the implementation phase are not chiefly related to NEAR procedures, including controls. From the EAMR analysis over the 2013-2015 period, most obstacles that hinder implementation of ENI programmes leading to delays are external. Causes most commonly mentioned seem to be political instability, government restrictions, conflict and security, which are on rise with an increase from five countries in 2013 (Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Palestine) to ten countries in 2015 (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Moldova, Palestine, Syria and Ukraine). Regarding internal obstacles, main problems mentioned by EAMRs are those related to understaffing of EU Delegations but this concern has experienced a decrease from eight countries in 2013 to four countries in 2015. This view is shared by all interviewees at HQ and in EUDs.

The timeline from decision to signature of the agreement with the partner country is of 317 days on average for ENI decisions since 2014 (source: NEAR B3, see table below). The average time between signature and first payment to the contractor is of 122 days. The average length between decision and the first payment is 439 calendar days, thus roughly 1.2 years. The length of the programming phase (up to decision) cannot be determined statistically from CRIS or MIS as the start date is not known. From interviews in NEAR and during field visits, the length of the process is highly variable and clearly depends on partner country political will and administrative capacity. This is not specific to ENI nor depends upon ENI-specific rules or procedures.

The internal working group on aid delivery of DG NEAR has identified several areas of potential acceleration of aid delivery, among which:

- The process of programming and project design
- Limit the use of external experts, perceived as a time-consuming process with a poor outcome in terms of quality; instead in-house expertise should be developed and strengthened ;
- Keep the focus on the identified sectors (in non-crisis situations), to capitalise in-house expertise;
- Procedures (ISC, Comitology, Decision, Financing Agreement)
  - Reduce to a few months the time between approval of the action and the signature of the financial agreement;
  - Do not wait for all projects of AAP to be ready before approving or drafting the Financial Agreement/contracts;
  - Simplify procedures for less sensitive derogations and prior approvals;
  - Reduce the number of actors required for approval at HQ;
  - Widen the scope for non-substantial changes such as increase ceiling of EUR 10 million with regard to budgetary top-ups;
  - Avoid purely administrative and useless decision layers (the number of additional layers in the decision making procedure has increased exponentially e.g. new guidelines for ISC);
  - Limit the too frequent changes of the regulatory framework;
  - Ensure that horizontal service keep a constant and same approach and do not change their procedures.
- Procurement/Calls for proposals
  - Extend the use of suspensive clauses to allow for earlier launch of contracting procedures;
  - Further streamline the contract award procedures.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“The creation of DG NEAR has delayed the opening of financial tools CRIS and ABAC more than in normal years due to the complex interventions DG BUDG, DEVCO and NEAR have to implement. It is to be expected that many payments will be delayed beyond the legal payment deadlines and therefore interest will be due. The delay on former ELARG contracts should be limited to a few weeks given that on those budget lines former ELARG did not face the same lack of payment credits as DEVCO had at the end of last year. It is expected that payment execution could be resumed in January. However, there may be significant impact for former DEVCO F contracts. This is due to the fact that payment appropriations of DEVCO were exhausted at the beginning of the last quarter 2014. A reinforcement of DEVCO's appropriations, approved towards year end, was not sufficient to cover all outstanding payments. All payments of the Neighbourhood area will resume in February.”* DG NEAR 2015, Management Plan 2015, p.14

*“Box1: EDF/DCI programming 2014-2020 ‘by the book’ – The programming process consists of two phases. In the first phase, EU Delegations take the lead in analysing the national development plan or strategy of the partner country, assessing whether it can provide the basis for the programming of EU aid. This assessment considers the plan’s description of the country’s constraints, challenges and perspectives; the definition of development priorities and objectives; their consistency with EU development policy; and its performance assessment and monitoring framework. Following consultation with relevant stakeholders, including the partner country government, civil society organisations, member state representations, and other donors, EUDs submit a proposal for ‘the overall lines of the EU response to the country context’ (i.e. consisting primarily of a listing of and justification for the priority sectors selected) to the relevant desk officers in DG DEVCO and the EEAS in Brussels. Subsequently, HQ assesses the proposals and engages in dialogue with the EUDs (through Country Team Meetings and video-conferences) to ensure that EUD proposals are in line with the EU’s overall external relations priorities, regional and thematic priorities and EU policy orientations, and to finalise the selection of priority sectors.*

*In the second phase, the EUDs, on the basis of the instructions provided jointly by the EEAS and DEVCO prepares a draft multi-annual indicative programme (MIP). The MIP should set out the proposal for the overall lines of the EU response, and should include the context and sector analysis and justification to the choice of sectors in which the EU will enact its development cooperation. The MIPs are to be approved through the EU’s committee procedure, known as ‘comitology’, and upon the adoption of the necessary legal instruments.”* ECPDM 2013, Early experiences in programming EU aid 2014-2020, p.2-3

Table 24 Overview of ENI contract's timelines

Contract title	Contract year	Contract number	Decision number	Regions covered	EC Decision number	EC Decision date	EC signature date	Contractor's signature date	Bank value date	Decision to signature	Signature to payment	Decision to payment	Paid,	Planned amount
Support to Public Finance Policy Reforms in Moldova (PFPR)	2014	353323	33684	East	C(2014)5140	16/07/2014	17/10/2014	17/11/2014	05/04/2016	124	505	629	8,000,000	33,000,000
"Support to the implementation of DCFTA process in Moldova" SRC	2014	353290	34132	East	C(2014)2988	02/05/2014	05/11/2014	17/11/2014	05/04/2016	199	505	704	8,000,000	25,000,000
State Building Contract for Ukraine (AAP 2014)	2014	344231	37370	East	C(2014)2907	29/04/2014	26/05/2014	12/05/2014	22/02/2016	13	651	664	127,000,000	232,000,000
Implementation of the Programmatic Cooperation framework with the Council of Europe in the Eastern Partnership	2014	346257	37697	East	C(2014)5792	18/08/2014	18/12/2014	18/12/2014	10/10/2016	122	662	784	9,500,000	20,000,000
Introduction of an economically feasible model for heating sustainable energy development by the example of a heating district in the city of Gola Prystan – Part 2 from decision ENI/2014/37764	2014	355587	37764	East	C(2013)5300	14/08/2013	24/12/2014	26/12/2014	29/12/2014	499	3	502	387,312	637,622
"Support to Agriculture and Rural Development through promotion of confidence building measures"	2015	371916	34128	East	C(2014)5140	16/07/2014	23/12/2015	23/12/2015	23/12/2015	525	0	525	1,744,224	6,500,000
CHOICE – Cultural Heritage: Opportunity for Improving Civic Engagement	2015	360942	37477	East	C(2014)9117	04/12/2014	11/06/2015	19/06/2015	23/06/2015	197	4	201	455,292	873,000
Financing Technologies against Climate Change ("FINTECC")	2015	369167	37515	East	C(2014)5750	20/08/2014	22/12/2015	23/12/2015	03/02/2016	490	42	532	1,360,000	4,160,000
Programme for Modernization and Rehabilitation of Municipal Infrastructure	2015	368132	37515	East	C(2014)5750	20/08/2014	23/12/2015	23/12/2015	22/02/2016	490	61	551	1,050,000	3,150,000
Moldova North Water Project	2015	366717	37515	East	C(2014)5750	20/08/2014	23/12/2015	29/12/2015	25/01/2016	496	27	523	1,720,400	10,220,400

Contract title	Contract year	Contract number	Decision number	Regions covered	EC Decision number	EC Decision date	EC signature date	Contractor's signature date	Bank value date	Decision to signature	Signature to payment	Decision to payment	Paid,	Planned amount
E5P Expansion to Eastern Partnership – Moldova	2015	371445	37515	East	C(2014)5750	20/08/2014	23/12/2015	29/12/2015	22/02/2016	496	55	551	5,367,647	18,750,000
Modernization of street lighting in town of Mena	2015	342303	37764	East	C(2013)5300	14/08/2013	02/03/2015	25/03/2015	08/06/2015	588	75	663	423,614	500,000
Kramatorsk municipal electric transport power substation modernization	2015	342023	37764	East	C(2013)5300	14/08/2013	29/05/2015	29/05/2015	29/02/2016	653	276	929	768,495	985,663
European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) Phase 11	2015	370265	38159	East	C(2015)5272	22/07/2015	01/12/2015	01/12/2015	01/12/2015	132	0	132	8,000,000	8,000,000
EU4Business: Network of Business Support Centres in Ukraine	2016	372862	32789	East	C(2015)2752	23/04/2015	29/03/2016	01/04/2016	04/04/2016	344	3	347	10,581,388	40,000,000
Support to the European Humanities University	2014	348939	37763	East	C(2014)6937	02/10/2014	07/12/2015	07/12/2015	15/01/2016	431	39	470	1,000,000	2,000,000
Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA)	2014	342179	37698	East and South	C(2014)5750 (Annex 2)	20/08/2014	29/06/2015	01/07/2015	09/07/2015	315	8	323	4,275,000	9,000,000
People with Disabilities in East Jerusalem enjoy Improved Living conditions – Phase II	2014	342667	34090	South	C(2014)5986	26/08/2014	23/12/2014	31/12/2014	25/02/2015	127	56	183	545,232	1,347,644
Preparatory Action for Supporting Arab Spring countries to implement asset recovery	2014	344285	37813	South	C(2014)5206	29/07/2014	11/11/2014	18/11/2014	29/06/2016	112	589	701	1,097,693	2,740,012
Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilization of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations	2014	351068	37868	South	C(2014)9146	04/12/2014	19/12/2014	19/12/2014	15/01/2016	15	392	407	2,332,948	4,050,000
Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey	2014	351055	37870	South	C(2014)9146	04/12/2014	11/12/2014	11/12/2014	12/10/2015	7	305	312	2,500,000	5,000,000
Strengthening democratic reform in the Southern Mediterranean- Phase II	2014	340977	37918	South	C(2014)5948 (Annex 1)	25/08/2014	22/12/2014	22/12/2014	16/11/2016	119	695	814	1,939,052	7,000,000

Contract title	Contract year	Contract number	Decision number	Regions covered	EC Decision number	EC Decision date	EC signature date	Contractor's signature date	Bank value date	Decision to signature	Signature to payment	Decision to payment	Paid,	Planned amount
Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon – Palestine Refugees from Syria Education (ABS-PRS)	2014	351221	N/A	South	C(2014)9115 (Annex 2)	04/12/2014	23/12/2014	29/12/2014	27/04/2016	25	485	510	1,425,000	1,500,000
Bringing people together for fostering common values across the Mediterranean (Anna Lindh Foundation Phase IV)	2014	340463	N/A	South	C(2014)5948 (Annex 7)	25/08/2014	17/12/2014	22/12/2014	13/09/2016	119	631	750	2,897,960	7,000,000
Secretariat Général de l'Union pour la Méditerranée.	2014	342550	N/A	South	C(2014)5948 (Annex 8)	25/08/2014	15/12/2014	18/12/2014	24/12/2014	115	6	121	2,527,937	4,210,000
Enhancing Access to Non Communicable Diseases and Mental Health Services at the level of Primary Health Care for Vulnerable Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities in Lebanon Response to the Syrian crisis	2015	371621	25043	South	C(2015)4071	18/06/2015	22/12/2015	28/12/2015	22/01/2016	193	25	218	2,077,200	2,308,000
European Union-UNICEF support to school-aged children affected by the Syria crisis to access learning opportunities and to ensure health care and reduced vulnerabilities of children, women and caregivers in Lebanon	2015	367663	25043	South	C(2015)4071	18/06/2015	26/10/2015	26/10/2015	16/12/2015	130	51	181	33,846,546	37,920,556
Improved Government of Lebanon capacity for emergency preparedness and crisis response	2015	368536	25057	South	C(2014)5981	26/08/2014	03/12/2015	11/12/2015	11/12/2015	472	0	472	161,304	240,000
Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance for the Protection of Palestinians Affected by or at Risk of Forced Displacement.	2015	342634	34090	South	C(2014)5986	26/08/2014	30/04/2015	30/04/2015	13/05/2015	247	13	260	749,587	1,499,988
The Alternative City	2015	342668	34090	South	C(2014)5986	26/08/2014	25/03/2015	31/03/2015	08/04/2015	217	8	225	488,145	968,176

Contract title	Contract year	Contract number	Decision number	Regions covered	EC Decision number	EC Decision date	EC signature date	Contractor's signature date	Bank value date	Decision to signature	Signature to payment	Decision to payment	Paid,	Planned amount
Fostering Socio-Economic Empowerment and Protection of Vulnerable Palestinian Communities in East Jerusalem	2015	342671	34090	South	C(2014)5986	26/08/2014	27/03/2015	31/03/2015	15/01/2016	217	290	507	280,595	849,850
PURE – Productivity and Urban Renewal in East Jerusalem	2015	360986	34090	South	C(2014)5986	26/08/2014	09/10/2015	19/10/2015	27/10/2015	419	8	427	946,215	5,000,000
Support for the TVET System in Palestine	2015	365755	37138	South	C(2014)5986	26/08/2014	02/10/2015	15/10/2015	29/10/2015	415	14	429	1,017,000	8,000,000
EU support to the enabling environment for Investment and Trade Expansion of the Palestinian Market Development Project ( Output 3:)	2015	371527	37138	South	C(2014)5986	26/08/2014	18/12/2015	23/12/2015	22/01/2016	484	30	514	852,627	2,000,000
Accès des enfants à une justice adaptée et respectueuse de leurs droits	2015	372258	37371	South	C(2015)7347	20/10/2015	30/12/2015	30/12/2015	28/04/2016	71	120	191	687,692	2,799,803
Projet d'appui à la réforme des Soins de Santé Primaires-Contrat PAGODA UE/OMS	2015	371049	37373	South	C(2014)7204	10/10/2014	30/12/2015	30/12/2015	18/01/2016	446	19	465	160,616	800,000
Karama Human Rights Film Festival	2015	357672	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	26/03/2015	26/03/2015	28/05/2015	213	63	276	32,000	40,000
Funoun for All	2015	371408	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	23/12/2015	23/12/2015	18/01/2016	485	26	511	101,459	198,081
Palestinian Festivals Towards Co-operation and Community Inclusion/ Cultural Diplomacy.	2015	371724	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	23/12/2015	24/12/2015	18/01/2016	486	25	511	133,329	200,000
Payment to Mohamad Nour Ahmad, winner of the 2015 edition of the Samir Kassir award for freedom of the press	2015	365485	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	23/09/2015	23/09/2015	05/07/2016	394	286	680	10,000	10,000
Frame by Frame	2015	370721	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	22/12/2015	22/12/2015	30/12/2015	484	8	492	24,000	30,000

Contract title	Contract year	Contract number	Decision number	Regions covered	EC Decision number	EC Decision date	EC signature date	Contractor's signature date	Bank value date	Decision to signature	Signature to payment	Decision to payment	Paid,	Planned amount
Payment to HESHAM MOHAMMED AHMED, winner of the 2015 edition of the Samir Kassir award for freedom of the press (investigative article)	2015	365111	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	06/08/2015	06/08/2015	05/07/2016	346	334	680	10,000	10,000
Payment to AYMAN ALAHMAD, winner of the 2015 edition of the Samir Kassir award for freedom of the press (audiovisual report)	2015	365126	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	06/08/2015	06/08/2015	05/07/2016	346	334	680	10,000	10,000
SAWA-Ensemble pour un avenir meilleur	2015	370614	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	17/12/2015	29/12/2015	21/01/2016	491	23	514	24,000	30,000
Festival Culturel Itinerant	2015	370627	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	21/12/2015	24/12/2015	18/01/2016	486	25	511	24,000	30,000
Singing for Peace	2015	370728	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	22/12/2015	30/12/2015	19/02/2016	492	51	543	24,000	30,000
Musical and Theatrical production by persons with disability and underprivileged youth of different sects	2015	370843	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	22/12/2015	23/12/2015	30/12/2015	485	7	492	24,000	30,000
Baldati Green City Culture Campaign	2015	370850	37440	South	C(2014)5948	25/08/2014	22/12/2015	23/12/2015	30/12/2015	485	7	492	24,000	30,000
IFMERE	2015	371598	37510	South	C(2014)5750	20/08/2014	28/12/2015	30/12/2015	21/01/2016	497	22	519	3,200,000	10,200,000
NOORo III – Tour solaire d'Ouarzazate –et partie des infrastructures annexes	2015	371590	37510	South	C(2014)5750	20/08/2014	28/12/2015	29/12/2015	01/02/2016	496	34	530	33,748,000	43,650,000
Peace for Sight	2015	371147	37594	South	C(2014)7224	13/10/2014	19/12/2015	30/12/2015	22/01/2016	443	23	466	143,385	490,065
Drama for Peace Building and conflict transformation in the Gaza Strip.	2015	371625	37594	South	C(2014)7224	13/10/2014	19/12/2015	27/12/2015	22/01/2016	440	26	466	164,928	413,534
Making Public Opinion a Force for Palestinian-Israeli Peace	2015	371454	37594	South	C(2014)7224	13/10/2014	20/12/2015	28/12/2015	08/04/2016	441	102	543	176,407	470,039
Land of Hopes and Dreams – Spreading Nonviolent Conflict Transformation in the West Bank	2015	370934	37594	South	C(2014)7224	13/10/2014	17/12/2015	30/12/2015	22/01/2016	443	23	466	133,676	288,177



<i>Contract title</i>	<i>Contract year</i>	<i>Contract number</i>	<i>Decision number</i>	<i>Regions covered</i>	<i>EC Decision number</i>	<i>EC Decision date</i>	<i>EC signature date</i>	<i>Contractor's signature date</i>	<i>Bank value date</i>	<i>Decision to signature</i>	<i>Signature to payment</i>	<i>Decision to payment</i>	<i>Paid,</i>	<i>Planned amount</i>
Improving Efficiency, Availability, and Management of Water Resources in South Lebanon	2015	365153	37715	South	C(2014)9115	04/12/2014	07/12/2015	09/12/2015	17/12/2015	370	8	378	1,573,383	2,200,000
Enhancing safe water supply and waste management for the vulnerable population affected by the Syria crisis in South Lebanon	2015	364146	37715	South	C(2014)9115	04/12/2014	14/09/2015	16/09/2015	02/11/2016	286	413	699	1,129,780	2,110,823
Mashta Hassan and Chadra Sewage Pipe Network and Waste Water Treatment Plant and Pipeline Capacity Extension in Mashta Hammoud	2015	361832	37715	South	C(2014)9115	04/12/2014	03/08/2015	06/08/2015	22/06/2016	245	321	566	1,403,761	2,700,000
Support to the North Lebanon Water Establishment in improving water supply in target municipalities of Akkar district	2015	361890	37715	South	C(2014)9115	04/12/2014	31/08/2015	01/09/2015	18/09/2015	271	17	288	1,047,836	1,755,000
Water infrastructures construction for rural community in Akkar district	2015	362398	37715	South	C(2014)9115	04/12/2014	28/08/2015	04/09/2015	15/09/2015	274	11	285	1,550,418	1,800,000
Improving access to safe drinking water for Lebanese and Syrian refugees communities in South Lebanon	2015	362453	37715	South	C(2014)9115	04/12/2014	31/08/2015	03/09/2015	08/09/2015	273	5	278	918,484	2,377,512
Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon- Economic recovery and basic infrastructure	2015	365133	37715	South	C(2014)9115	04/12/2014	02/12/2015	07/12/2015	16/12/2015	368	9	377	1,068,019	1,800,000
Contract with UNRWA for "Strengthening the resilience of Palestinian refugees from Syria in Jordan".	2015	351617	37721	South	C(2014)9136	04/12/2014	02/07/2015	06/07/2015	29/03/2016	214	267	481	2,403,500	2,530,000
Increasing Economic Opportunities in Sahel Houran; Ash-Shajara, Thnebeh and Tura.	2015	363435	37721	South	C(2014)9136	04/12/2014	21/12/2015	30/12/2015	24/01/2016	391	25	416	501,349	698,329

Contract title	Contract year	Contract number	Decision number	Regions covered	EC Decision number	EC Decision date	EC signature date	Contractor's signature date	Bank value date	Decision to signature	Signature to payment	Decision to payment	Paid,	Planned amount
Enhancing Employment Opportunities in Jordan Energy and Environment Sectors	2015	371406	37721	South	C(2014)9136	04/12/2014	17/12/2015	23/12/2015	05/06/2016	384	165	549	1,974,121	3,000,000
Support to the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis	2015	367262	37721	South	C(2014)9136	04/12/2014	02/12/2015	20/12/2015	27/12/2015	381	7	388	579,662	1,050,000
Improving Rural livelihoods and the environment through the integral utilisation of residues of treated wastewater and organic solid waste for the production of renewable energy and compost in Mafraq governorate of Jordan	2015	368692	37721	South	C(2014)9136	04/12/2014	02/12/2015	12/12/2015	13/12/2015	373	1	374	1,747,990	3,000,000
Sustainable Food Security for refugees through environmentally responsible SWM	2015	371702	37721	South	C(2014)9136	04/12/2014	22/12/2015	28/12/2015	01/02/2016	389	35	424	899,844	2,330,402
Cluster Munition Clearance in South Lebanon – Norwegian People Aid (NPA)	2015	359869	37725	South	C(2015)5273	22/07/2015	11/12/2015	16/12/2015	29/12/2015	147	13	160	765,131	1,887,500
The provision of higher education to Syrian refugees and disadvantaged Jordanians	2015	368804	37732	South	C(2014)9136	04/12/2014	25/11/2015	17/12/2015	27/01/2016	378	41	419	1,368,133	4,000,000
Enhanced capability for Integrated Border Management (IBM Lebanon 2)	2015	369460	25057; 37808	South	C(2014)5981	26/08/2014	03/12/2015	10/12/2015	15/12/2015	471	5	476	1,765,309	9,000,000
Secrétariat Général de l'Union pour la Méditerranée.	2015	359702	N/A	South	C(2015)6146	01/09/2015	02/12/2015	03/12/2015	07/12/2015	93	4	97	2,514,000	4,210,000
Community Resilience Initiative to support the Regional Development and Protection Programme in North Africa	2015	359758	N/A	South	C(2015)6146	01/09/2015	22/12/2015	30/12/2015	15/01/2016	120	16	136	779,380	3,000,000
Support to Clearance Operations in Lebanon – (DCA)	2016	359857	37725	South	C(2015)5273	22/07/2015	29/02/2016	29/02/2016	08/03/2016	222	8	230	587,625	1,887,500

Contract title	Contract year	Contract number	Decision number	Regions covered	EC Decision number	EC Decision date	EC signature date	Contractor's signature date	Bank value date	Decision to signature	Signature to payment	Decision to payment	Paid,	Planned amount
Battle Area Clearance (BAC) to support socio-economic development in southern Lebanon (MAG)	2016	359866	37725	South	C(2015)5273	22/07/2015	29/01/2016	29/01/2016	11/02/2016	191	13	204	828,820	1,830,839
Enhancing the Capacity of the Lebanon Mine Action Center (UNDP)	2016	373187	37725	South	C(2015)5273	22/07/2015	30/03/2016	05/04/2016	07/04/2016	258	2	260	535,331	1,964,400
Supporting the private sector development in Lebanon	2016	372758	38180	South	C(2015)6924	07/10/2015	11/02/2016	25/02/2016	03/03/2016	141	7	148	1,541,046	15,000,000
Promoting Change and Youth Leadership in East Jerusalem	2016	359893	38312	South	C(2015)5243	22/07/2015	18/02/2016	18/02/2016	04/03/2016	211	15	226	433,227	1,495,378
Improvement of Environment and Hygiene Conditions of the Community of Shu'fat Refugee Camp	2016	359899	38312	South	C(2015)5243	22/07/2015	18/02/2016	15/03/2016	31/03/2016	237	16	253	557,823	1,399,999
										<b>317</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>312,647,878</b>	<b>639,198,90</b>
										<b>72%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>48,9%</b>	<b>100%</b>
										<b>Average number of days</b>		<b>Total amounts</b>		

Source: Table provided by NEAR B3

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; Table prepared by NEAR B3

Interviews – NEAR B3

### Level of information and confidence

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Poor</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

Despite the poor level of information, the degree of confidence is (however) assessed as satisfactory as findings were confirmed (even if in general terms) by all interviewees.

### 3.2.3 I-323. Timeline between umbrella allocations' decision in a given year and the adoption of umbrella-funded programmes

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The financial component of the incentive-based approach (umbrella programmes) follow the same procedures than the bilateral or multi-country programmes, therefore share the same timeframe. Interviews with services (EEAS, NEAR A, B, C) confirm that the announcement of the allocation and the political dialogue on partner country reforming performance (EEAS, NEAR B) are more important than the timeline for delivery (see JC23 for policy dialogue and JC62 for leverage of umbrella programmes).

The other component of the incentive-based approach set by the ENI regulation is to define a +/-10% range to the multiannual indicative envelop. This modality was not actually utilized as such in annual allocation decisions by country. The flexibility introduced by this range approach however was useful right from 2014 to respond to the crisis in Ukraine and then other emergencies during the following years. The ENI regulation does not provide specific procedures and criteria to assess performance along which the ranges allocation should be decided, nor when this should be undertaken (annually, by mid-term review or end-review). The services already foresee that ranges will be exceeded at the end of the programming period for some countries (Ukraine) and will conversely underscore the lower bracket for some other countries.

They are adopted late in the year, later than AAPs, and therefore they increase the pressure on EUDs to hurry the programming steps. Within the frame of the SPRING programme, the pilot of the umbrella programmes, the additional funds were used as top-ups for existing activities. This is still the case in Georgia.

The lack of transparency of this approach vis-à-vis partner countries led to the individualisation of the umbrella programme allocation in stand-alone ENI programmes. EUDs are trying to anticipate the formulation phase with an uneven success, notably linked to the workload required with already stretched human resources.

#### Presentation of collected proof


No documentary proof.

### Sources of information used

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – NEAR B and C; EEAS, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### 3.2.4 I-324. Timeline between emergency and crisis-related ENI allocations' decision and the adoption of subsequent programmes or financial transfers

#### Global analysis of the indicator

**Multiannual indicative programmes** – Multiannual programming documents are adopted

by decision of the Commission and are public; in most cases, they are followed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the partner country. However, multiannual programming documents are by nature indicative: only major changes require amending procedures. In addition, special measures (as defined in the CIR) can always be used to respond to unforeseen and duly justified needs or circumstances, as demonstrated with Ukraine (3 special measures since 2014, and a return to regular programming process not foreseen before 2018; interview SGUA).

**Special measures** – The time needed between the adoption of special measures and their implementation is in principle significantly shorter than regular programming. Implementation of special measures does not require ratification of financing agreements by the Parliament of the partner country; they benefit from a special regime as regards comitology (CIR). Special measures brought a significant improvement in the ENI capacity to respond to crises, like for the first special measure in 2014 that was adopted in a matter of weeks. Tunisia has similar examples. However, the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> special measures for Ukraine are under process for a year or so, implying that if the procedure allows for a swift response, political backing is needed to be implemented quickly.

**EU Trust Funds** – Article 187 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, authorises the Commission to set up and manage a EU Trust Fund under an agreement concluded with other donors. These funds are designed to mobilise various sources of EU financing and to receive contributions from EU Member States and donors from non-member countries. EU Trust Funds have been specifically designed for emergency and post-emergency situations where experience has shown that the fragmentation and weakness of local actors together with the complexity of aid delivery in a crisis requires the international community to respond in a fully coordinated and joined-up manner to avoid duplication and loss of impact for an effective crisis response<sup>35</sup>. Besides allowing swifter procedures, EUTFs contribute to a coordinated response with EU MS to reach out to additional contributions from them. It is not specific to ENI and can be implemented by all EFIs. The 'Madad fund' was established in December 2014 (Decision C(2014)9615) under ENI. EFIs (DCI, IPA, IcSP, EIDHR) and ECHO may contribute to the Trust Fund. Its aim is to help refugees within their host countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Egypt), to support border management (Western Balkans with IPA funds), and to conduct complementary actions deemed necessary by its Board. A similar initiative was taken on migration in Africa (EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa), with a component for North Africa financed by ENI. EUTFs are subject to EU discipline in regard to financial management but can use simplified procedures for project formulation (in parallel with decision) and adoption. Being freed from the step by step approach and multiple visas at HQ, all interview-partner and internally available reporting documents confirm that the process is considerably shorter (though exact figures could not be found by the evaluation team). Actions financed by EUTFs are not subjected to formal agreement or ratification by beneficiary countries.


Special measures were however not used when the crisis took a regional dimension (while not excluded by FR/CIR) or when the situation required to pool resources with EU MS. Even if the CIR does not prohibit multi-country-oriented special measures, none of that kind was adopted. Instability extended to more than one country, such as the refugee displacements in relation to the civil war in Syria, and it seems difficult to address with special measure(s), which might have a focus that would be too narrow and imply common policy reform agendas of neighbouring countries. When it comes to special measures, urgency and rush could undermine the design process, with impacts on the quality of programmes. Also, one EUD would have to take the lead in managing a given multi-country special measure that goes against the strong focus of EU's administrative system on bilateral relationships. ENI regional programmes are not able to respond to multi-country crisis prevention; they are mostly about soft power and networking, with therefore limited amounts and limited capacity and legitimacy to act upon crisis situations.

<sup>35</sup> Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 'The Madad Fund', and its Internal Rules

When faced with the consequences of the Syrian war on displaced persons in neighbouring countries, the EU opted for a EUTF, the 'Madad Fund', as authorised in the Financial Regulation of 2012 (effective 2013) to all EFIs. A similar response was found to illegal migration from Africa, the other multi-country challenge emphasized by the ENP review, with the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

The key answer to major crises affecting the Neighbourhood since the establishment of ENI (Syria's refugees, migration) was implemented through EUTFs that are pooling resources from different donors and instruments. They are expected to organize formulation and adoption processes considerably faster than regular programmes (within a couple of months). They can deliver far more quickly than the regular programming process. As the Fund's Operational Board can meet at any moment during the year and adopt 'Action Documents' for programmes on the basis of financial commitments, the Fund can negotiate and sign contracts soon after the Board meeting. The step-by-step approach of regular programming, with multiple time consuming visas, is replaced by a process that runs in parallel formulation and adoption as illustrated below:

Figure 12 EUTFs' parallel formulation and adoption process



Source: Madad 2016, *State of Play and outlook 2016*.

The following governing bodies of the MADAD Trust Fund are established by the Constitutive Agreement: (a) a Trust Fund Board which shall establish and review the overall strategy of the Trust Fund, and (b) an Operational Board which shall decide on the allocation of funds to individual Actions. The composition of the Board is indicated in Article 5.1: "The Trust Fund Board is composed of representatives of the Donors, of the Commission acting on behalf of the European Union, and, as observers, representatives of non-contributing EU Member States as well as of a representative of the Syria Recovery Trust Fund under a condition of reciprocity".

The establishment of the Madad Fund responded to these needs adequately. This new EUTF set-up allowed for the rationalisation of the programming process, in particular by processing formulation and adoption in parallel, and significantly simplifying the adoption process. The presence in the Board of a representative of the beneficiaries as observer allows not going through national negotiations, agreements, and ratification, saving time and limiting uncertainties and unexpected alterations of the projects.

### Presentation of collected proof

Responses to the structured interviews led with HoC of EUDs in 12 ENI countries

**Do you witness improvements since 2014 in ENI budget allocation and execution, in particular to support the incentive-based approach, responses to crises and prevention of crisis?  
(n=7/12)**

*Incentive-based-approach. It is not clear how we link what we expect from countries into giving them an incentive. It's an opaque and subjective process. When we provided the partner country with extra money they didn't feel it that it was a compensation for what they did. We need to review the system. Reliability by the country is not ensured.*

*Responses and prevention of crises: We are responding to the impact of crises and the suffering of a number of people but we don't have influence in the prevention of crises.*

*No. If you are in a country where there are no crisis you lose funds.*

*Incentive-based approach: the amount is so small that we don't have the capacity to produce good behaviour. It could work better if we tell the country that if they do well they will have extra funds (ex ante but not ex post). The political recognition is more effective than the money. The money it doesn't make a big difference. In order to have a real incentive you have to put more funds and target them (raise the standards).*

*The partner country is now discussing and trying to introduce the incentive-based approach but there should be more guidance particularly on fragile countries. The incentive-based approach is not being implemented in the partner country. There should be more guidance on that.*

*We do not have access to umbrella programmes due to lack of improvement in good governance. Funds for 2014-2017 period have been reduced due to the policy "more for more" and it has had a negative impact in relations with authorities. Especially because the partner country has received more funds.*

*We've benefited from the incentive-based-approach but I think it is rather about better management of the programme: if we are capable of putting away the money ensuring the absorption then it's good to get more. It's different from the "more for more" principle. The country doesn't see it because the re-warding process is too complex. But it's an important instrument in the sense that if the reform process is not advancing then you would not want to have all that money because you're going to accumulate too much funding. I see it more from a review budget management perspective.*

*Yes. Our budget has been doubled since 2015 because there has been some political changes in the country. There are some changes but not big reforms. Reforms are very slow and it's a very centralised country.*

*Yes. In 2014 rules became more flexible. There were some crisis and there was a perception that the country was doing well so it was rewarded with extra resources. Also in response to crisis and prevention of crisis it helps: the EU funds medication for refugees that leads to stability and can prevent other crisis, in that sense it has been successful.*

**Do you witness improvements since 2014 in ENI budget allocation and execution, in particular to support the incentive-based approach, responses to crisis and prevention of crisis?  
(n=4/12; Yes = 1; No = 3)**

*Incentive-based approach is limited by the sequence between political reports of ENI countries and the moment they are translated into additional budget resources and the programming time necessary to use those resources. Additional funding based on incentive-based approach is officialised late in the year. It has not really allowed us to enforce new needs.*

*As regards prevention/responses to crisis the country is not a good example for this question (low-level crisis but not difference from the past).*

*No. The incentive-based approach is mainly political not very objective and does not work in practice. Resources were taken to support crisis in Ukraine. In the case of the partner country there's more appetite for reforms but there's not an increase in resource allocation. With the ENI we are not at the execution phase.*

*Not really. More attention should be given to the absorption capacity of the country.*

*Yes. Improved: Financial allocations are more relevant to the country and the interest of the EU. Decision making (quicker)*

*“To implement the new ENI Regulation, simplified and flexible procedures should lead to swifter adoption of implementing measures and swifter delivery of EU assistance, in particular in situations of crises or threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, or natural or man-made disasters. Revision of the Financial Regulation, which has particularly substantial provisions on external action, will also help facilitate the participation of civil society organisations and small businesses in funding programmes, for example by simplifying rules, reducing the costs of participation and accelerating award procedures. The Commission intends to implement this Regulation using the new flexible procedures provided for in the new Financial Regulation.”* EC 2011, Proposal for a regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, p.10

*“6. In the event of crises or threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, or of natural or man-made disasters, an emergency procedure may be used to conduct an ad hoc review of strategy papers. This review shall ensure coherence between Community assistance provided under this Regulation and assistance provided under other Community financial instruments, including Regulation (EC, Euratom) (2) of the European Parliament and of ... the Council of establishing an Instrument for Stability.”* ENI regulation, Article 8

*“Article 13 – Adoption of special measures not provided for in the strategy papers or multi-annual indicative programmes*

*1. In the event of unforeseen and duly justified needs or circumstances, the Commission shall adopt special measures not provided for in the strategy papers or multi-annual indicative programmes (hereinafter special measures). Special measures may also be used to fund activities to ease the transition from emergency aid to long-term development activities, including activities intended to ensure that the public is better prepared to deal with recurring crises.*

*2. Where the cost of such measures exceeds EUR 10 000 000, the Commission shall adopt them in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 26(2). The procedure referred to in Article 26(2) need not be used for amendments to special measures such as those making technical adjustments, extending the implementation period, reallocating appropriations within the forecast budget, or increasing the size of the budget by less than 20 % of the initial budget, provided these amendments do not affect the initial objectives set out in the Commission decision.*

*3. Special measures shall specify the objectives pursued, the areas of activity, the expected results, the management procedures used and the total amount of financing planned. They shall contain a description of the operations to be financed, an indication of the amounts allocated for each operation and an indicative implementation timetable. They shall include a definition of the type of performance indicators that will have to be monitored when implementing the special measures.*

*4. The Commission shall send special measures the value of which does not exceed EUR 10 000 000 to the European Parliament and the Member States for their information within one month of adopting its decision.”* ENI regulation, Article 13

*“Increases or decreases of up to EUR 10 000 000 of the contribution of the European Union to the Trust Fund, not exceeding 20% of the contribution referred to in Article 1, or cumulated changes to the allocations of specific actions not exceeding 20% of that contribution shall not be considered substantial, provided that they do not significantly affect the nature and objectives of the actions. The responsible authorising officer may adopt these non-substantial changes in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and proportionality.”* EC 2015, on the special measure for the 2015 ENI contribution to the European Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, Commission Implementing Decision – C(2015) 6878 final

*“The Trust Fund would also bring strong efficiency gains on the financial side, as it could operate with overhead costs of less than 5%, depending on the size of overall contributions.”* EC 2016, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to The Syrian Crisis, 'The Madad Fund', And Its Internal Rules, p.4

### **Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – NEAR A, B, R, C

### **Level of information and confidence**



<b>Level of information</b>		Limited
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 3.3 JC33: Appropriate monitoring processes and indicators for measurement of the performance of the ENI are in place and functioning.

#### 3.3.1 I-331. Extent to which appropriate monitoring processes for measurement of the performance of the ENI are in place and functioning

##### Global analysis of the indicator

**Monitoring and evaluation systems** – Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes are individually addressing all critical aspects of the ENI programmes. Monitoring entails the systematic and continued collection, analysis and use of management information to support effective decision-making. Monitoring is intended to be an internal and/or external (independent) activity. The importance of M&E is acknowledged by the NEAR Management Plan 2016: *“Monitoring and evaluation are vital elements of sound operational and financial management: Monitoring provides basic information on progress against plans and highlights problems that can lead the management to adapt the intervention modalities. Evaluation helps to obtain a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, better evidence on impact and the casual links. They help to identify opportunities for improvements of on-going programmes in the case of mid-term evaluations of for future interventions and policy design in the case of ex post evaluations.”* (p.7)

The Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) system is designed to provide both EU Delegations and HQ operational services with support by external contractors and experts with respect to the monitoring of, and reporting on, the performance and results of EU funded projects and programmes in ENI countries. Result-oriented monitoring missions (144 in 2015, of which 103 in the South) are focused exclusively on projects. They cover all five evaluation criteria, based on a normative approach (questions). The system is managed by a contractor on a demand-driven basis (the list of projects earmarked as problematic by Delegations/Operational units being the starting point of the exercise).

At corporate level, an initiative is on-going since 2015 to establish and inform a result-framework. Data entered to-date is mainly of the pre-ENI period (2013-2014). The results of ROM missions are synthesized in an annual report by the contractor, under NEAR A3 guidance. Moreover, a specific exercise, named "end of project results reporting" and implemented by experts sent by the same ROM contractor under the guidance of DEVCO 06, is aiming at providing information on results achieved (mostly at output level) and published by DEVCO in the framework of an annual report integrating indicators at the three levels (development progress; EU contribution to development progress and organisational efficiency) conceived by DEVCO in the framework of the EU Results Framework<sup>36</sup>. Data availed by ROM reports and evaluations fit uneasily into the predetermined set of indicators present in the results framework. Their level of information (number of figures actually extracted from reports) based on the past (2013-2015) products of the M&E system is low. Level 1 and 2 indicators are simple and easy to understand. The extensive, if not systematic, use of aggregated units (i.e. number of...) for level 2 is an issue for credibility at project/programmes level (compared to ratios) and for robustness. In addition, this aggregative approach further weakens the allocation link with level 1 as the information gaps increase between data collected on the ground and highly aggregated global indicators.

At country level, EUDs are providing annually HQ with an internal monitoring report (EAMR), covering implementation of the projects, financial management and administrative aspects (audit, human resources...).

Evaluations are contributing to the monitoring of the EU actions as well. Most projects budget a final evaluation, sometimes also a mid-term evaluation. The Evaluation Unit funds and manages strategic, thematic, regional and sector-wide, aid modality and financing instrument

<sup>36</sup> See <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/eu-rfi>.

evaluations that provide substance to learn from experience.

Finally, the European Court of Auditors issues occasionally performance reports on sector, themes or instruments that are of interest for the design and implementation of ENI programmes.

Based on those several layers of monitoring and evaluation systems shared by DG NEAR and DEVCO, it can be assessed that the system is in place and running. It is designed and implemented to deliver regular (EAMRs, evaluations), systematic (ROMs; half of the projects monitored in 2015 had not been visited by monitoring missions before (Particip 2016)) and on-demand (ROMs, notably for projects flagged as problematic). All the above exercises (with the exception of the discontinued Progress reports) are structured by templates, methodological guidelines and instructions with the aim to harmonise contributions from high diversity of projects, sectors, modalities and countries – and to satisfy minimum quality requirements.

**Learning culture** – The M&E system is running and produces a voluminous amount of reporting, far too voluminous to be meaningfully handled by EUDs and EC headquarters' staff. Structural factors limiting the learning capacity of the EU institutions associated to development policy were identified by the Up-take study (IBF 2013) and are acted upon since then by DEVCO. Despite the publication of 2016 guidelines for M&E, a new NEAR evaluation website and trainings on M&E-related topics, a similar up-take of lessons learnt was not done by DG NEAR staff (interview NEAR A). In strategy and programming documents, even though a “lessons learnt” section is mandatory, it is rather difficult to capture if their authors actually learnt from M&E or are reinventing the wheel or mixing EU jargon to align on emerging keywords.

Last but not least, the system is slow in delivering key messages to decision-makers at corporate level. For example, the report on the result framework for 2015 is not yet available (in September 2016). Reaching decision-makers implies several steps of synthetic notes based on executive summaries of ROM and evaluation reports, the whole upstream reporting taking weeks at best. Such slow processing is preventing the fast enough uptake of findings in a constantly changing environment. From qualitative interviews, the learning process of decision-makers is rather combining dated personal field experience and direct contacts with HQ and EUD staff, and the ministerial level of national authorities. At instrument level, it does not have a lot to do with programme implementations but rather focus on key issues for achieving the ENP objectives such as flexibility, coordination with EU MS, EU branding, accelerating aid delivery i.e. contributing to the Juncker's Commission objective of making EU a global actor.

The way EU TFs are contributing to report on results is not yet clearly identified. The SWD accompanying the MFF midterm review indicated that initiatives are taken in this respect.

**ENP monitoring** – Beyond ENI, the achievements regarding the ENP were also monitored by Progress reports. Progress reports (EEAS) covered the progress of partner countries regarding the reform agenda across the board, based on the framework of the EU acquis, but were discontinued<sup>37</sup> after 2015. They addressed the policy level, irrespective of the instruments utilised by the Commission. They were not seeking to measure the actual role of the EU actions; EU programmes associated to reforms were indicated, assuming some sort of contribution.

ENP annual progress reports were overall well documented and provided between 2011 and

<sup>37</sup> EEAS/DG NEAR decided in 2016 to end producing the Progress reports on an annual basis. The main argument is that they proved counterproductive for countries not sharing the perspective of the acquis. Moreover the monitoring was not based on specific and mutually agreed indicators to assess democracy, rule of the Law and human-rights related issues or keys in allocating umbrella programmes. For now on, progress will be assessed annual broadly i.e. for the neighbourhood as a whole. Country reports will be issued on an ad'hoc basis, focused on the areas of EU cooperation (Interviews EEAS, DG NEAR A). This new approach questions the future methodology for allocating umbrella programmes. As stated in various interviews, the allocation model has only played an indicative role since 2014: responses to crises and high level political commitments were by far more prominent in the umbrella programmes allocation. In any case, the methodology and set of criteria of the allocation model were not a public domain.

2015 a brief presentation of progress towards the harmonisation with EU standards and agreed expectations. They were drafted by the EEAS with the support of the EUDs' staff. Even if they did not use indicators, their common template provided a valuable information basis, that could be aggregated and which provides a feedback at corporate level on the improvements in structural reforms jointly agreed with partner countries in Action Plans, Association Agreements and similar joint policy documents. They were the basis for annual reviewing of the policy framework (in JOIN Communication, see EQ1). The results of the ENP were followed up by the progress reports (country-wide and global). Annual country progress reports prepared for the years 2012 to 2015 present the changes that occurred during the given year, from democracy and human rights to sector reforms. Overall, the 60-page reports were well-grounded and provided a brief presentation of progress towards the harmonisation with EU standards and agreed milestones. They were drafted by EEAS with the support of the EUD staff. The country progress reports shared a common template, but did not inform a pre-determined set of indicators. A statistical annex was associated to each global annual report, with a set of indicators for democracy, good governance and human rights (section 1), macro-economic statistics (section 2), and trade and mobility (section 3). As stated in the ENI regulation, the progress reports were the basis on which the beneficiaries of umbrella programmes were selected and the available funds distributed. Due mainly to views expressed by partner countries on the content of the progress reports (interviews EEAS), the decision was taken to stop issuing progress reports annually. From 2016 on, occasional reports will be drafted, based on opportunities to convey a more positive message. However, two questions remain unanswered: (1) How will the progress of the country-wide political and policy frameworks be monitored? and (2) how will the assessment model for umbrella programmes function?

### Presentation of collected proof

*“Most of the selected projects reviewed have experienced delays. Effective monitoring and coordination mechanisms with regular meetings and internal reviews have supported the smooth implementation of the projects allowing to reabsorb minor delays by adjusting the scheduling of activities in a flexible manner. Conversely, poor quality of M&E frameworks including the lack of use of performance summary tables linking progress against a well selected number of indicators, weaken IPs capacities to quickly react and adjust to changes in external circumstances. A second aspect which negatively affects implementation with important repercussions on effectiveness and sustainability is linked to inadequate risk management which however does not feature among the key issues to be investigated during the ROM mission.”* Particip 2016, ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, p.11

*“The ROM reviews were carried out in Neighbourhood South (10 countries and units at Head Quarters (HQ): Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Near B2) and Neighbourhood East (8 countries and HQ unit: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and NEAR C2) plus the Russian Federation.*

Table 25 Overview of ROM reviews in ENI under the Workplan 2015

	Number of projects monitored (#)	EU contribution (EUR)	Average EU contribution (EUR)
East	41	120,635,568	2,942,331
South	103	452,103,339	4,389,353
<b>Global</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>572,738,907</b>	<b>3,977,354</b>

Source: Particip 2016, ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, p.6

*Twenty two projects monitored had a contribution superior to €10M, and sixty five additional projects monitored a contribution superior or equal to € 750,000. Thirty seven of the monitored projects had a contribution below € 750,000 and above € 250,000, while the remaining twenty monitored projects had a contribution equal or below € 250,000.*

*More than half of the projects were monitored because they had not been visited yet, and around a fourth because they were flagged as problematic. There was a significant difference between the number of innovative projects visited in the South and in the East (25 and 2).”* Particip 2016, ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, p.6

“Evidence collected during this study suggests that several strategic evaluations have, in a variety of ways, influenced EU policies and practices. There are examples of the direct use of knowledge leading to improved country programming or the development of new tools (e.g. building a new conflict analysis framework). (...) Yet, despite the efforts of the Evaluation Unit, the overall picture looks rather sobering. The ‘uptake chain’ has too many weak points and missing elements to allow lessons learnt to be absorbed in a systematic, structured and effective way into policy and practice. Ample evidence was found to support this contention. Strategic evaluations struggle to find clients and consumers. Overall the study observed a major evaluation ‘ownership deficit’, as reflected in the fact that many staff (from senior management, geographic units or EUDs) were either unaware of existing evaluations, did not read the reports or felt it is not part of their work. The same holds true for many stakeholders working within political institutions such as Parliaments. While there are many instances of ‘uptake’ at individual and team level, institutional learning has been limited. As a result, much of the evidence generated by strategic evaluations has not been effectively used.” IBF 2013, Study on the uptake of learning from EuropeAid's strategic evaluations into development policy and practice, p.3

“The Commission proposal to simplify financial rules, which accompanies the review, amends the Financial Regulation in order to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the EU Trust Funds:

- Consultation and involvement of EU institutions: The European Parliament and the Council should be informed before the Commission decides on the establishment of a EUTF.
- Implementing partners: Cooperation with European and international partners will be enhanced through significant simplification and cross reliance, and enabling of Thematic Trust Funds.
- Showing results: The Commission is developing specific tools and templates to improve monitoring and evaluation of EUTFs.
- Trust Funds: The Commission proposal foresees the establishment of EU Trust Funds also for emergency, post-emergency or thematic actions within the EU (and not only for third countries) so as to establish a tool allowing for attracting additional contributions from (all or a group of) Member States and other donors in a flexible and swift way, for example in the digital area. As the boundaries between external and internal policies are increasingly blurred, this would also provide a tool for addressing challenges across borders.” EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results {COM(2016) 603 final}, SWD(2016) 299 final, p.20

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – DG NEAR A-B, EEAS; Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 3.3.2 I-332. Degree of involvement of key stakeholders (EU services and beneficiary countries) in the definition and the implementation of monitoring and evaluation systems

#### Global analysis of the indicator

**Involvement of stakeholders in M&E** – In the 2016 DG NEAR Guidelines on Linking Planning/Programming, Monitoring and Evaluation (p.60), the tasks devoted to national authorities are i) to contribute to an action programme logical framework identification and formulation of indicators (baseline, benchmarks, targets, source of information, etc.), and ii) to collect data informing the indicators. Both tasks are particularly relevant for budget support programmes, more so than for the project approach for which contribution of the beneficiaries to define and inform indicators remains minimal. Those instructions with regards to the implication of beneficiaries are consistent with CIR regulation (articles 4(11) and 15), and provide the suitable level of details. Field missions confirmed that the instructions are followed on the ground.

EUDs did not however modify significantly the process of involving local stakeholders in the monitoring and evaluation system with ENI regulation (interviews DG NEAR B and C). Reporting stays chiefly implemented by EUDs, internally with EAMRs, and with the support of consultants for ROM missions and evaluations. Budget support programmes are introducing

new practices in this respect, with national authorities involved in defining and running the system.

At programmes/projects level, the monitoring is based on ROM reports and projects' evaluations. During monitoring and evaluation missions, stakeholders are systematically (and increasingly) involved, notably after entry into force of the Better Regulation toolbox, but also as a consequence of the increasing focus on ownership and CSOs in the general development agenda. The regulation makes the organisation of open public consultations in strategic evaluations mandatory at HQ level, such as for the present report. The revised evaluation policy<sup>38</sup> also considers building capacity of partner countries in evaluation to improve their involvement in the process. Such actions were not evoked by EUDs or national authorities during the field visits.

**ENP progress reports** – Though not covered by the instrument's evaluation as such, it is worth mentioning that until 2015, the monitoring system at country-level was geared on Progress Reports prepared by EEAS, with the involvement at EUD level of both sections. The country reports are mainly structured towards informing the EEAS allocation model for the calculation of the amount dedicated to umbrella programmes. They also set the framework of the political and policy dialogue with partner countries. Therefore, the involvement of the partner countries in the drafting process would be counterproductive and close to a conflict of interest situation. Drafting of the progress reports was done internally and was not subjected to consultations (with national authorities or civil society). The global report aggregated country reports and was associated to a statistical annex.

In brief, stakeholders are involved in monitoring and evaluation through the consultations held during ROM and evaluation. Their involvement is significantly improved in budget support programmes, which will be increasingly prominent in implementing ENI. At corporate level, stakeholders are not involved, except for the aggregation of results to which they have contributed at action level.

## Presentation of collected proof

Table 26 Activities in developing, collecting data, monitoring, reporting indicators

<i>Actors</i>	<i>Indicative strategy papers indicators (Single Support Framework) indicators (level 1)</i>	<i>Action programme logical framework identification and formulation of indicators (baseline, benchmarks, targets, source of information, etc.)</i>	<i>Data collection system informing the indicators</i>	<i>Monitoring progress of the indicators</i>	<i>Reporting on indicators</i>
<b>EC &amp; EUDs</b>					
<i>DG NEAR HQ Evaluation Service</i>	<i>Quality control</i>	<i>Quality control</i>		<i>Quality control (upon request)</i>	<i>Quality control (upon request)</i>
<i>DG NEAR HQ Country/Regional programmes managers/ DG NEAR HQ (CoTEs)</i>	<i>Prepare</i>	<i>Quality control</i>	<i>NA</i>		
<i>EUDs</i>	<i>Prepare</i>	<i>Prepare</i>	<i>Compile date with</i>		<i>Reports on some level 3</i>

<sup>38</sup> The Evaluation Policy [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-policy\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-policy_en)

Actors	Indicative strategy papers indicators (Single Support Framework) indicators (level 1)	Action programme logical framework identification and formulation of indicators (baseline, benchmarks, targets, source of information, etc.)	Data collection system informing the indicators	Monitoring progress of the indicators	Reporting on indicators
DG DEVCO		NA	support of the ROM end of project results reporting experts  Prepares (level 1 indicators)	Quality control (ENI level 2 indicators)	indicators (i.e. EAMR)  Aggregate and Report (level 1, 2 and 3 indicators) against the EU corporate Results Framework indicators and the specific country level 2 indicators
<b>National authorities</b>					
ENI Aid Coordinators	Consulted	Contributes			
Sector national institution /Operational structures from partner countries	Consulted	Contributes	Collects		Informed

Source: DG NEAR Guidelines on Linking Planning/Programing, Monitoring and Evaluation (p.60)

“Evaluation and monitoring was supported over the reporting period by several measures (The country evaluation, as presented in section 4 below and also other strategic measures). An EU intervention aiming at creating a shared vision and perspective for a common evaluation and monitoring system was conducted. With sustained involvement of the Administration of the Government of Georgia and EU Member States, an outline was created allowing moving gradually to a related system.” Georgia, EAMR 2015, p.4

“The EU believes that evaluation of co-operation establishes important learning channels which help stimulate demand for change in partner countries. Hence evaluation has a role in fostering stronger governance and accountability. The EU therefore works closely with partner governments and is committed to encouraging and assisting them strengthen their own evaluation culture, capacity and systems. Evaluation capacities and system are part of the dialogue conducted with partner countries.

The EU also directly supports capacity development in different ways:

- Involve partners in evaluation planning, implementation and use.
- Organise specific training dedicated to Partners in Brussels and in partner countries.
- Support partner countries attendance at training courses and open EU corporate evaluation training courses to partner government staff.

- *Launch specific programmes to enhance evaluation capacities in partner countries through international organisations.*
- *Fund capacity building initiatives on monitoring and evaluation.*” EC 2015, Evaluation Matters, p.13



### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – DG NEAR A, B, C

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 3.3.3 I-333. Extent to which RACER indicators to measure results achieved by ENI at corporate level are defined and reported on

#### Global analysis of the indicator

**The result framework** – DG NEAR is contributing to several layers of reporting mechanisms, most set in coordination with DEVCO. The key tool for reporting on results is the results-oriented monitoring (ROM), managed since 2014 for Neighbourhood countries by Particip under a framework contract. The ROM reports are processed by DG NEAR A4 into a result framework set in 2015, based on the SWD(2015) 80 final “Launching the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework”<sup>39</sup>.

The result framework provides information on aggregated key results achieved with EU assistance. It intends to delivery on a regular basis a snapshot of key results at a corporate level, linked to interventions financed by the EU. Three levels are analysed:

- Level 1 presents the progress of the partner countries, i.e. medium and long term development outcomes/impact which result from the collective action of the partner countries, donors and other development actors, including private sector as well as external factors.
- Level 2 focuses on development outputs and direct outcomes which can be more closely linked to EU projects and programmes.
- Level 3 captures organisational performance.

The allocation link between level 2 results and level 1 is weak, blurred by several external factors, as demonstrated in the Neighbourhood countries. This refers also to a lack of a defined theory of change by group of countries and by policy areas that should have been overcome after years of external assistance, based on the results of the evaluation system. The case of level 1 and 2 indicator for conflict prevention, peace building and security is illustrative: level 2 is “Number of individuals directly benefitting from EU supported programmes that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peacebuilding and/or conflict prevention” for level 1 “Number of violent deaths per 100,000”. The link between the two is disputable.

The indicators at levels 1 and 2 have been selected on the basis of the following criteria: i) aligned with EU development policy priorities 2014-2020, ii) aligned with indicators commonly used by partner governments and making sure that data are readily available, iii) clearly defined and adequate for aggregation, and iv) aligned, where possible, with indicators being used by other donors. Each indicator is provided with a methodology note that indicates definitions, sources, calculations, etc. that ensure a common understanding.

The baseline for level 2 is zero, due to the impossibility to harmonize targets between highly

<sup>39</sup> It follows on from and develops the key issues that were described in the December 2013 Staff Working Document titled ‘Paving the way for an EU Development and Cooperation Results Framework’.

differentiated countries, even for the 16 Neighbourhood countries.

**RACER indicators** – A ‘RACER’ indicator<sup>40</sup> is:

- Relevant, i.e. closely linked to the objectives to be reached. They should not be over-ambitious and should measure the right thing;
- Accepted (e.g. by staff, stakeholders). The role and responsibilities for the indicator need to be well defined;
- Credible for non-experts, unambiguous and easy to interpret. Indicators should be simple and robust as possible;
- Easy to monitor (e.g. data collection should be possible at low cost);
- Robust against manipulation.

Against that definition, indicators of the result framework are clearly ‘RACER’. The link with EU assistance objectives is a key factor in their identification. The role of the framework is well defined for EUDs, which are in charge of data collection; it might be less clear for other stakeholders, notably partner countries. Roles and responsibilities are identified in the methodology notes. Level 1 and 2 indicators are simple and easy to understand, and sound credible to non-experts. The extensive if not systematic utilization of aggregation of units (i.e. number of...) for level 2 is an issue for credibility at project/programmes level (compared to ratios) and for robustness (can a training for trainers be aggregated with participants of a training on evaluation technics?). Furthermore, this aggregative approach questions the allocation link with level 1.

The result framework indicators are for most of them an inventory with clearly defined units, thus hardly prone to manipulation.

A first result report<sup>41</sup> was issued for 2014. Results are presented by sector (section 1) and by country (section 2). A section 3 presents the Commission organisational performance. The report is easily accessible on the Web. It is moreover accompanied by factsheet with visuals and clear messages. The 2015 result report is not yet published (in September 2016).

**Statistical Dashboard** – Another initiative of reporting at corporate level is the Statistical Dashboard, based on (corrected) CRIS data at decision level (i.e. different from the project level: a decision can be implemented through several projects). The tool is hosted in DEVCO but covers all EFIs, including ENI. Commitments and disbursements are differentiated and the tool allows multi-criteria analyses for a comprehensive set of variables (year, channel for implementation, sector, EU priorities, etc.). A decision is classified under only one sector code, which can be an oversimplification in some cases, notably for complex projects. The dashboard is still under development.

### Presentation of collected proof

*“(...) the list of development sectors covered by the EU RF has been defined to reflect the policy priorities of the EU international cooperation and development assistance as set out in the Agenda for Change in particular. It covers twelve areas and sectors and is associated to 16 out of 17 SDGs corresponding to EU policy priorities.”* EC 2015, Launching the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework, SWD(2015) 80 final, p.2

*“In order to be able to indicate how outputs and direct outcomes from EU financed interventions are linked to development progress of the partner countries, results identified at level 1 are associated to those included at level 2. The link between these two levels is, however, complex which makes it difficult to measure how much of the changes at level 1 are directly attributable to those identified at level 2. Level 1 should therefore be understood as providing the operational context.”* EC 2015, Launching the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework, SWD(2015) 80 final, p.5

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents



<sup>40</sup> Better regulation guides; Tool #35: monitoring arrangements and indicators: [http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/tool\\_35\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/tool_35_en.htm)

<sup>41</sup> EU International Cooperation and Development First report on selected results, July 2013 - June 2014; [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-results-report\\_2013-2014\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-results-report_2013-2014_en.pdf)



Interviews – NEAR A4, Joint meeting 20/09

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 3.3.4 I-334. Extent to which RACER indicators to measure results achieved by ENI at action level are defined and reported on

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The two key M&E products for which RACER indicators are essential to measure results at action level are the Action document (logical framework matrix mandatory as annex) and the ROM reports. They are in principle linked, as the ROM missions are supposed to use indicators set in the logical framework of the projects and existing baselines whether available from the national (statistical or administrative) system or to be elaborated at the start of the project.

**ROM indicators** – The ROM ENI consolidated report for 2015 states that “*the overall quality of the logframes is considered weak in a large number of projects reviewed. Indicators often lack ‘SMART’ or ‘RACER’ features; and a profusion of outputs indicators is observed, as well as a lack of indicators and monitoring of the outcomes and results.*” The focus on output indicators with few –if any- outcome indicators, lack of sex-disaggregation, missing baselines, and imprecise targets imply serious issues for the projects – as well as the ROM missions – to assess the achievement of results.

**Budget support** – This finding applies mainly to the project approach. The issue is even more stringent for budget support programmes. The latest operational guidelines tend to minimise the number of indicators and to move them upwards in the result chain. The tranche indicators are improving but are not yet seen as crystal clear, with a clear focus on leveraging the agreed policy change (interviews DG NEAR A). They are insufficiently linked to a clear theory of change and what should be the related underlying policy dialogue, using in-depth knowledge of the change acquired through a more extensive use of political economy analysis.

**Umbrella programmes allocation model** – Umbrella programmes are allocated following a model designed and managed by EEAS (interviews EEAS). The detailed set of criteria is not disclosed. The allocation is based on progress made by partner countries in democracy and human rights, which are not known for being easy to fit in pre-determined and RACER indicators. The flexibility given by the allocation model is praised by interviewees (interviews EEAS, DG NEAR A, B, and C) to suit the objectives of the incentive-based approach through concentration of the umbrella programmes on few countries, increasing the financial incentives, the reputational effect and finally the leverage of ENI.

**EU Trust Funds** – The two EUTFs do not have specific rules for monitoring.

#### Presentation of collected proof

“*Projects are often well structured but present a number of design flaws. The majority of projects were underpinned by coherent and robust chains of results. The vertical logic of the results’ chains (from activities to outputs and outcomes) is generally robust and well-articulated, but, the overall quality of the logframes is considered weak in a large number of projects reviewed. Indicators often lack ‘SMART’ or ‘RACER’ features; and a profusion of outputs indicators is observed, as well as a lack of indicators and monitoring of the outcomes and results.*” Particip 2016, ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report – 2015, p.7

“*Concerning the 2016 umbrella programme, G. Grippa from the EEAS recalled that country allocations were triggered by progress in building deep and sustainable democracy. Progress is assessed against a set of predefined criteria. Until now, the key reference documents were the annual ENP progress reports. However, the reporting regime is being revised as part of the ENP review roll-out; in this transition year, the analysis was based on the 2015 reports on human rights prepared by the EU Heads of missions. Funds available for the 2016 umbrella programme amount to EUR 193.5 million, allocated*



as follows: 1. EUR 87 million for Tunisia; 2. EUR 86 million for Ukraine; 3. EUR 20.5 million for Georgia.” EC 2016, 11<sup>th</sup> ENI Committee.

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – NEAR A4, B, C; Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 3.3.5 I-335. Level of standardisation of the operational indicators under each policy area/ sector

#### Global analysis of the indicator

DG NEAR has not yet elaborated sector specific sets of indicators. The only related initiative identified to-date is the result-framework presented in I-333. Having been designed chiefly for aggregation, they are not suited to measure performance at action level. It is unlikely that such a standardization is achievable without a significant loss of knowledge and learning substance, notably among actions as differentiated as projects (including from calls of proposals for CSOs), budget support programmes, crises-related interventions (EUTFs) and budgetary assistance.

Standardization of the operational indicators was not evoked by any of our interviewees but could in the future derive from the planned development of standardized sector strategies, as proposed by the internal working group for the ENP review on accelerating aid delivery. The need for standardized sector frameworks was reiterated by several HQ interviewees.


#### Presentation of collected proof

No documentary proof.

### Sources of information used

Interviews – NEAR A and B

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 4 EQ 4 on added value

### 4.1 JC41: ENI offers added value in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy, where ENI is operating in the same field as other donors

#### 4.1.1 I-411. Evidence (nature and scope) of EU added value in terms of financial weight, mix of actions’ modalities, and expertise

#### Global analysis of the indicator

**Regulatory basis of EU added-value** – The ENI regulation emphasizes the in-built added-value of the instrument by referring to “*alignment to Union rules and standards is one of the key policy objectives*” (Whereas 32). The recent experience of EU MS of transition is foreseen as a resource but “*by reason of the scale and effects of the action*” the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU.

The change in the regional context and the reorientations introduced by the ENP review 2015, renewed the legitimacy to question EU added-value. Harmonization of EU rules and standards has become at best a second ranked priority compared to i) implementing the differentiation principle with countries that have quite contrasted expectations regarding association with the EU, ii) integration of EU interest into a policy framework until then focused on

development aid and regulatory harmonization, and iii) addressing the needs of the population of the partner countries regarding resilience and civil protection. ENP Review 2015 states that stabilisation of the Neighbourhood will be the EU's main political priority. This priority will be advanced through i) A continued focus on good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights; ii) Enhancing economic governance, strengthening fiscal stability and supporting structural reforms for improved competitiveness and inclusive growth and social development are keys to developing a country's economic resilience; iii) Stronger cooperation on security, including security sector reform, border protection, tackling terrorism and radicalisation, and improving crisis management; and iv) Cooperation with partner countries on regular and irregular migration and mobility.

Certain specific support can only be provided at EU level, such as promoting economic integration with the EU internal market and access to the Schengen space. They are, with harmonization with EU acquis, the core of ENI added-value.

ENI added-value needs to be partly re-assessed based on i) EU's capacity to provide substantial and coordinated funding in a simultaneous response to long-term (development, treating root causes of instability, migration and lack of democracy and respect of human rights), medium term (sector reforms including security, capacity building of the civil society, reconstruction in a relatively near future), short term (support to election processes, CSOs initiatives, macroeconomic stability), and emergencies (refugees, civil protection), ii) engaging in a coherent way various instruments and aid modalities able to address in parallel short-term and long-term partner countries' needs and priorities, and iii) its comparative advantages in mobilising within a framework consistent to EU and partner countries mutual interest an expertise suitable for the above needs and priorities.

**Added-value in relation to EU financial volumes and flexibility** – The amounts available to programme is acknowledged as crucial for ENI added value by all 12 EUDs that answered the ENI-specific survey<sup>42</sup>. The EU is the biggest donor in most ENI countries. Since 2014, ENI demonstrated moreover (in particular in relation to Ukraine) a strong capacity to attract unprecedented envelopes within a coordinated policy framework. Since the 2014 crisis, some EUR 8 billion were made available by the EU institutions, in a collective effort coordinated by the Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA) in DG NEAR. Following high level political commitments of EUR 12.5 b, ENI in particular has shown flexibility in mobilising its bilateral (approx. EUR 765 million up to 2016, and an umbrella programme) and regional resources. They are complemented by 3 successive MFA operations (mainly loans) for a total of EUR 3.4 billion, EIB and EBRD schemes, other EFIs (mainly IcSP), and ECHO (interview SGUA).

Field visits evidenced, particularly with Ukraine, that EU Member States see the ENI programmes (and their backing policies) as the basis for their additional contribution to the country; for them the added value of the EU is the general political and policy umbrella provided by the EU (as the bigger political and financial player in the country) and the EU efforts for the coordination of the donors in the country.

A similar feature of comparative advantage compared to EU MS scope of action is the 'Madad' trust fund and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (North Africa component). So far, EUR 650 million have been committed to the Madad Trust Fund, including EUR 570 million from the EU budget (ENI: EUR 381 million, IPA: EUR 173 million, DCI: EUR 16 million). 19 EU Member States are contributing an additional EUR 60 million [AAR 2016]. The EUTFs allow and are an incentive to pooling of resources and the existing but often scattered capacities of donors and agencies to analyse, identify and implement high-impact projects in the region. These pooled capacities make a direct contribution to the identification of actions that

<sup>42</sup> The corresponding tables are presented below in the « collected proofs » section.

are presented to all contributors as part of a diversified portfolio.

With 27 Member States contributing and acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has the critical weight to respond to regional challenges that are the only way to contribute to the stabilization of the Neighbourhood (interviews NEAR B)<sup>43</sup>.

Lastly, at a time of budgetary restrictions, when several EU MS have exited entire sectors of cooperation and withdraw their support from certain countries, EUTFs are unique tools to avoid scattered and unproductive interventions, while still contributing to stabilizing EU Neighbourhood.

**Added-value in relation to openness to dialogue with Civil Society** – This response is almost shared by all respondents to the ENI specific survey, based on the coverage by ENI of the support of CSOs, combined with other related instruments. This priority is acknowledged and utilised on the ground by EU MS that in some cases are not in a position to be as strong as EUDs in policy dialogue.

**Added-value associated to alignment on partners' priorities and policy dialogue** – The picture obtained through the ENI survey is more mixed than for financial weight and support to CSOs but still in most cases alignment on partners' priorities is identified as contributing to ENI added-value. The statement is often associated to the ENI policy dialogue (and EU expertise, see below) and good relations with the government and technical ministries.

**Added-value in relation to EU mix of instruments and aid modalities** – ENI resources (budget, staff, and expertise) contribute and provide an incentive framework to roll-out a comprehensive set of aid modalities that permits to answer to the wide diversity of needs of an even wider diversity of stakeholders to address long to short term objectives as well as emergencies. Budget support programmes through grants in the aid environment of Neighbourhood countries is already a unique feature of the ENI. The combination of regional, cross-border and Neighbourhood-wide programmes and initiatives, with resources that – though not sufficient compared to the felt needs of national authorities and civil society expectations regarding the EU – are proportionate to the objectives of the actions, and is already an EU added-value in itself. It is all the more so considering that resources are utilised to open and maintain spaces for dialogues among stakeholders that would refuse to sit together in any other context (countries involved in protracted disputes, notably territorial) or are hardly able to find the way out from confrontational postures (some national authorities and non-state actors).

The capacity for reconciliation and confidence building (sometimes a long term perspective) is reinforced by the mix of EFIs at the disposal of EUDs to answer contradicting needs and priorities. This flexibility of choice between EFIs is not significant in financial terms (ENI provides on average some 90% of the resources available to Neighbourhood partners), but is important to keep a diversified portfolio addressing long/short terms needs and conflicting priorities at country level.

Last, the EU is seen as a referral in the reputational competition among partner countries as a whole, and more prominently among groups of regions used to compete for a sub-regional leadership (Caucasus, West Maghreb, Near-East). Such a position cannot be achieved by any of the EU MS that are strongly identified to the promotion of their national interest.

**Added-value in relation to EU expertise** – In the highly differentiated context of the EU Neighbourhood, a good command on contextual information, knowledge of local political economy and history of structural and sector reforms adoption/implementation/enforcement, are key to realistically align on priorities and needs. Bringing an acknowledged added-value and credibility to policy dialogues requires a similar level qualification and experience. In this respect, the Commission services gather a host of competencies and experiences that is a source of added value compared to EU MS.

According some interviewees (EEAS, NEAR B, C and SGUA), the potential of expertise proved somehow difficult to mobilise around ENI programmes. The technical expertise lies

<sup>43</sup> MFAs, with the unprecedented amounts available on loans to Ukraine and a mix of grants and loans to Caucasus partner countries, is another feature that is made possible by the volume of the EU budget.

rather in the line DGs, while recent experience of the context is with EUDs. The communication lines are not extremely effective and geared towards specific events like ISGs rather than continuous communication. Availability is uneven as the overall impression is that the workload does not really allow to utilize technical expertise as it should (interviews NEAR A, R). The level of fragmentation of the tasks induces cumulative delays and resulting in even shorter deadlines that prevent an optimal use of the available strategic and technical expertise. As a result, the potential added value linked to the EU in-house expertise and experience is only partly tapped. Outsourced expertise and experience, through framework contracts in particular, is strongly questioned by HQ staff, backed by several monitoring and external strategic/project evaluation reports. None of the interviewees indicated this as contributing to EU added value.

**Added-value through leadership in coordination** – The EU contribution to EU MS coordination through Joint Programming is almost systematically identified in EUDs survey as a specific EU added-value, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.

**Joint survey** – The 8 respondents for ENI of the joint survey confirm the prominence of the size of engagement and political influence among factors contributing to EU added-value in the Neighbourhood:

	Number	%
Size of engagement	7	88%
Particular expertise	5	63%
Political influence/leverage	6	75%
Speed of mobilizing or engaging funds	0	0%
Other	0	0%
EUDs using the instrument	8	100%

### Presentation of collected proof

*Responses to the ENI-specific survey (telephone)*

***What are the key areas where the EU has been most convincing in establishing its added-value (chiefly compared to EU MS and, to a least extent, other donors)? (n=12/12)***

1. Amount of resources available to programmes.
2. Flexibility in resource allocation to face unexpected situations (e.g. Migration wave).
3. Quick response to emergency.
4. Openness to PC priorities and measures.
5. Openness to civil society needs: despite difficulties and hostile environment. The EU is the only one that dares to denounce human rights abuses in the country and it's being recognized by EU MS.
5. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogues.
6. Amount and quality of the expertise availed: the EU is a major voice.
7. Leadership in coordinating joint programming with EU MS.
8. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries: with ups and downs but very good with technical ministries.
9. Leadership in coordinating division of labour with EU MS: largest donor

1. Amount of resources available to programmes.
2. Flexibility in resource allocation to face unexpected situations (e.g. special measures and Madad Fund for Syrian crisis).
3. Openness to PC priorities and measures: whenever possible because overall the government has no priorities.
4. Openness to civil society needs: structured dialogue.
5. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogues.
6. Amount and quality of expertise availed.
7. Leadership in coordinating joint programming with EU MS: we've started it.
8. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries.

**What are the key areas where the EU has been most convincing in establishing its added-value (chiefly compared to EU MS and, to a least extent, other donors)? (n=12/12)**

1. Amount of the resources available to programme: biggest donor.
2. Flexibility in resource allocation to face unexpected situations.
3. Quick response to emergency: if we cannot do it with the ENI we use other instruments such as IcSP so we are well positioned.
4. Openness to PC priorities measures.
5. Openness to civil society needs: very well placed with ENI and specific budget for CSOs.
6. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogues: there's a close link with the political side through DG NEAR and EEAS
7. Amount of quality of the expertise availed: compared to EU MS we have substantial means.
8. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries.
9. Leadership in coordinating division of labour with EU MS: substantial improvement over the last two years, before there were no so many MSs in the country. We don't have joint programming but we are very strong and effective on putting EU MS together (e.g. decentralization programme and anticorruption programme). We consult MS but we are not doing a joint assessment because joint programming is a big exercise and takes a lot of time.

1. Amount of the resources available to programmes.
2. Openness to civil society needs.
3. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogues.
4. Amount and quality of the expertise availed.
5. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries.

1. Amount of the resources available to programmes.
2. Openness to PC priorities and measures.
3. Openness to civil society needs.
4. Extent to good relations with government and technical ministries.

1. Amount of the resources available to programmes: biggest donor.
2. Openness to civil society needs.
3. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogue: very active.
4. Leadership in coordinating joint programming with EU MS.
5. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries.
6. Leadership in coordinating division of labour with EU MS.

1. Amount of the resources available to programmes: largest donor in terms of grants.
2. Openness to PC priorities and measures: good dialogue.
3. Openness to civil society needs: to the extent is possible but the EU is seen as a leader when it comes to support CS.
4. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogues: PFM, education, regional and rural development.
5. Amount and quality of the expertise availed: e.g. twinning projects.
6. Leadership in coordinating joint programming with EU MS: though not many MSs providing assistance in the country.
7. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries.

1. Amount of the resources available to programmes: largest donor.
2. Quick response to emergency: sometimes.
3. Openness to PC priorities and measures: yes to measures.
4. Openness to civil society needs: to the level that funding is exceeding absorption capacity of CSOs thus having a negative effect.
5. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogues.
6. Amount and quality of the expertise availed: the quality yes, not the quantity (compared to other donors).
7. Leadership in coordination joint programming with EU MS: but don't have DoL.

**What are the key areas where the EU has been most convincing in establishing its added-value (chiefly compared to EU MS and, to a least extent, other donors)? (n=12/12)**

8. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries.

1. Amount of the resources available to programmes: the EU is the main/biggest donor.
2. Openness to PC priorities and measures: to some extent.
3. Openness to CS needs: substantial support.
4. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogue.
5. Amount and quality of the expertise availed.
6. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries.

1. Amount of the resources available to programmes: we are the largest donor and the EU has sound political framework, capacity and good instruments.
2. Openness to PC priorities and measures: BS is the best example.
3. Openness to civil society needs.
4. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogues.
5. Amount and quality of the expertise availed.
6. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries.
7. Leadership in coordinating division of labour with EU MS.

1. Amount of the resources available to programmes: we are the largest donor but funds have been decreased for the period 2014-2017 (only a few donors in the country).
2. Openness to PC priorities and measures: we always align our strategy and priorities with PC.
3. Openness to civil society needs: context is difficult but we have close collaboration and good relations with CS. We've sent several communications to the government because there's a legal limbo but without response.
4. Commitment to advocacy in policy dialogues.
5. Amount and quality of the expertise availed: yes in EUD and HQ but the quality of expertise of external experts is not good.
6. Extent of good relations with government and technical ministries: to some extent because we always need approval from Ministry of Foreign Affairs before contacting line Ministries and the decrease of funds has negatively impacted relations.
7. Leadership in coordination division of labour with EU MS: The country has not signed the Paris Declaration. We do have good coordination (EU lead sectorial WG with MS) with EU MS and donors. Regarding joint programming we're planning to start it for next programming period but there are only a few EU MS/donors with programmes in the country: only France and the UN. Germany does not have multi-annual programmes.

1. Amount of the resources available: the EU is the biggest donor by far.
2. Openness to PC priorities and measures.
3. Openness to CS needs.
4. Amount and quality of the expertise availed: the EU is the largest donor, provides a lot of assistance and has a good quality expertise.
5. Leadership in coordinating joint programming with EU MS.
6. Extent to good relations with government and technical ministries.
7. Leadership in coordinating division of labour with EU MS.

<b>Do you see an improvement compared to ENPI (before 2014)?</b> (n=6/12; Yes = 1, No = 2, Don't know = 3)
Difficult to judge as I'm new in the region.
NA (not familiar with the ENPI)
No big changes
No, can't compare.
No. It's a continuation of a positive trend.
Yes

<b>If yes, please specify main areas of improvement below:</b> (n=8/12)
1. Amount of resources has increased substantially. 2. Good relations with government and technical ministries. 3. Amount of quality of the expertise. 4. Openness to CS needs: our first priority.
Coordination with other donors has improved but there are not so many donors in the country.
Improved our budget allocations and more focus on civil society. Policy dialogue is more structured and there's an increase of interest in terms of EU policy towards this country.
Improvement: 1. Openness to CS. 2. Policy dialogue. 3. Joint programming. Worsening: 1. Amount (quantity) of expertise within EU.
Improvement: joint programming and DoL
Improvement: Leadership in coordinating division of labour with EU MS.
Joint programming but it's proceeding slower than expected.
Joint programming with EU MS but not linked to the ENI.

*"In European Neighbourhood countries, where alignment to Union rules and standards is one of the key policy objectives, the Union is best placed to deliver its support under this Regulation. Certain specific support can only be provided at Union level. Member States' transition experience can also contribute to the success of reforms in European Neighbourhood countries and to promoting universal values in the European Neighbourhood. [31] (...) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives." [32] Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument*

*"The value added of the EU – and hence the Commission – intervening at this level [Trade agreements] is very clear since the area of trade policy is an exclusive competence of the EU – so only the EU, and not individual member states, can legislate on trade matters and conclude international trade agreements." DG NEAR 2015, Strategic Plan 2016-2020, p.17*

*"The objective of the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) is to build, together with partners, a prosperous, secure and stable Neighbourhood on the basis of shared values and common interests. By acting at the Union level and by streamlining financial resources the EU has greater leverage to achieve a common goal: prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The EU provides financial resources to support partners' own reforms and thus stimulates their transition and modernisation programmes. In addition, the EU has a leading role in bringing together donors, including major actors outside the EU, to work together on providing a comprehen-*



sive response to the new challenges in the region.” EC 2016, Programme Statement, Heading 4: Global Europe, p.374

“MFA is a balance of payments support instrument, which complements and is conditional on the existence of an adjustment and reform programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It takes the form either of loans, for which the Commission borrows the necessary funds in capital markets and on-lends them to the beneficiary country, or, under certain circumstances, grants financed by the EU budget. MFA is conditional on the respect for human rights and effective democratic mechanisms by the beneficiary country. It is released in tranches strictly tied to the successful implementation of strong reform measures aimed at returning the beneficiary country’s economy to a long-term sustainable path. In this way, MFA complements regular EU cooperation assistance and contributes to the wider goal of preserving stability and promoting prosperity beyond the EU.” EC 2016, The implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015, COM(2016)376 final, p.3

Table 27 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Pledged contributions (June 2016)

Donor	Contribution (EUR)
European Union (EDF and EU budget)	1,800,000,000
Austria	3,000,000
Belgium	10,000,000
Bulgaria	50,000
Croatia	-
Cyprus	-
Czech Republic	740,000
Denmark	6,001,920.61
Estonia	150,000
Finland	5,000,000
France	3,000,000
Germany	3,000,000
Greece	-
Hungary	700,000
Ireland	3,000,000
Italy	10,000,000
Latvia	50,000
Lithuania	50,000
Luxembourg	3,100,000
Malta	250,000
The Netherlands	15,000,000
Norway	3,000,000
Poland	1,100,000
Portugal	250,000
Romania	100,000
Slovakia	600,000
Slovenia	50,000
Spain	3,000,000
Sweden	3,000,000

Switzerland	4,624,389
United Kingdom	3,000,000
<b>Total Contributions</b>	<b>1,881,816,309.61</b>

Source: EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Pledged contributions (June 2016) The fund is governed at two levels:

- The Board, chaired by the EU, consisting of representatives of Donors, is responsible for the definition of a general strategy. Non-contributing EU MS invited to act as observers.
- The Operational Committee, chaired by the EU and constituted of representatives of Donors (>EUR 3 million) is deciding on the mobilisation of funds and the approval of projects.
- National and regional authorities participate to both governance bodies.

“The Trust Fund will pursue its objectives through the pooling of resources and the existing but often scattered capacities of donors and agencies to analyse, identify and implement high-impact projects in the region. These pooled capacities will make a direct contribution to the identification of actions that will be presented to all contributors to the Trust Fund as part of a diversified portfolio.” EC 2015, on the special measure for the 2015 ENI contribution to the European Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, Commission Implementing Decision – C(2015) 6878 final

“Seek added value and impact by maximizing coherence and synergies through encouraging larger multi-partner, multi-country, and multi-year actions, which will also reduce transaction costs of Fund interventions. Partners are therefore encouraged to identify maximum scope for joint regional proposals.” EC 2015, Strategic Orientation Document for the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, "The Madad Fund"

“Example of EU-added value: EU regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis: The EU regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, which aims at providing a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional scale, responding primarily in the first instance to the needs of refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries, as well as of the communities hosting the refugees and their administrations, became fully operational in 2015. The EUTF Operational Board adopted a series of projects covering the three most affected countries (Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan), while the decision was also taken to extend the Fund's scope to also cover the Western Balkans. This Trust Fund does not only bring the urgently needed complement to humanitarian relief assistance, it also serves the two main strategic objectives of the EU, namely to stabilise the overstretched host countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq) and to reduce the pull factors and root causes of the migration crisis (in the entire region). This Trust Fund is now one of the main EU instruments to respond to the forced displacement crisis in the region. So far, EUR 650 million have been committed to the Trust Fund, including EUR 570 million from the EU budget (ENI: EUR 381 million, IPA: EUR 173 million, DCI: EUR 16 million). 19 EU Member States are contributing an additional EUR 60 million. This Fund allows for a fast, effective and efficient delivery of assistance. The fund can negotiate and sign contracts soon after its Board has met and much faster than under normal bilateral cooperation modalities. The Fund is also flexible and can quickly react to new crises and displacements should these occur, because it is not bound by fixed country programmes or allocations. The Board can direct funds at short notice where they are most needed. Also, the overhead costs (management fee) of the Trust Fund are limited to a maximum of 3%, which is a competitive and reasonable rate.” DG NEAR 2016, AAR, p.12

“7. Without sufficient additional funding to at least maintain and stabilise the current engagement, the EU's contribution, relevance and leveraging capacity in the Syrian crisis would be severely undermined. Thus, the EU Foreign Affairs Council, in its Common Messages on the humanitarian aspects of the Syria Crisis of 21 October 2013, also stressed that the EU and its Member States should increase efforts to coordinate their response in a strategic and operational manner to avoid duplication and to foster a more coherent and complementary approach and called on the Commission to take practical measures to that end.

(...)12. Concerning the required added value to the Union intervention, the Trust Fund would bring a four-pronged added value compared to bilateral actions: First, it would allow – with additional funding from EU Member States and non-member countries – to create economies of scale that individual countries or organisations or the EU alone cannot achieve, especially vis-à-vis the refugee host coun-

tries, the UN system and other players. Secondly, it would enhance the role of the EU in contributing to coordinating the international response. Thirdly, while other already existing Funds for the host countries only have national or sub-national scale and limited funding to offer, the Trust Fund would be the first (and possibly only) funding instrument with a regional scope responding to a regional crisis, thus providing the EU and donors with a strategic financing mechanism that can intervene flexibly and quickly in response to shifting needs during the crisis. Fourthly, it would provide the urgently needed sustainability and predictability of funding for what is going to be a medium to long term crisis response, while existing budgets, both at EU and at national level, are not equipped to respond to such a large and long-term crisis. The Trust Fund would also bring strong efficiency gains on the financial side, as it could operate with overhead costs of less than 5%, depending on the size of overall contributions.

14. In terms of additionality, the Trust Fund would allow for pooling and tailoring resources and response at a regional level thus further enhancing strategic prioritization, coherence and coordination.” EC 2016, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to The Syrian Crisis, 'The Madad Fund', And Its Internal Rules, p.3-5

“In 2014, the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the marked deterioration of the country’s economic and financial situation triggered MFA support at an unprecedented level. Between 2014 and 2015, EUR 3.4 billion, all in the form of loans, were made available to Ukraine under three MFA operations, of which EUR 2.21 billion had been disbursed by December 2015. This represents the largest financial assistance ever granted to a non-EU country in such a short period of time.

While there have been signs of macroeconomic stabilisation in Ukraine since mid-2015, the situation remains vulnerable. It also remains fragile in other eastern neighbours, particularly in Belarus and Moldova, reflecting both domestic factors and the impact of economic developments in Russia. Similarly, and despite improvements in some countries, regional conflicts and security issues continued to weigh on macroeconomic performance in the southern Neighbourhood in 2015. These have led to the adoption of a new MFA proposal for Tunisia and discussions on a follow-up operation also for Jordan, linked again to the impact the Syrian war is having on the country, including through the refugee crisis.” EC 2016, The implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015, COM(2016)376 final, p.4

“[Jordan] On 29 April 2013, following Jordan’s official request for MFA in December 2012, the Commission adopted a proposal for a decision to provide MFA of up to EUR 180 million in the form of a medium-term loan. The decision was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 11 December 2013. The assistance was meant to complement IMF funds under the three-year SBA that started in August 2012. It was justified by the negative macroeconomic impact the Syrian conflict was having on Jordan, notably through the fiscal cost of hosting refugees and the exogenous shock of major disruptions to gas flows from Egypt.

In early 2014, negotiations were concluded on the MoU setting out the economic policy measures to be taken by the Jordanian authorities, and on the LFA, both of which were signed in March 2014. These MFA conditions aimed to support reforms in the areas of PFM and taxation, social security, labour markets, the investment and trade framework, and the energy sector.” EC 2016, implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015; Background Analysis per beneficiary country, SWD(2016) 192 final, p.11

“[Tunisia] Tunisia continues to face significant structural reform challenges. While it enjoyed a period of relatively high per capita economic growth in 2000-2010 (one of the highest among the oil importers in the Middle East and North Africa), it continues to suffer from a number of structural deficiencies. In particular, it relies excessively on export-oriented, low value-added industry located near the coast, which contributes to an unbalanced pattern of regional economic development and suffers from rigid labour markets and skills mismatches, which contributes to high unemployment, particularly among young people. Coupled with perceptions of a lack of transparency and weak economic governance, the growth model has resulted in an unfair distribution of economic gains across the population. As in 2014, progress on structural reform was mixed. (...) Overall, reform progress has been constrained by the delicate political transition, although the recent positive momentum is encouraging and the government remains committed to pursuing a positive reform path.” EC 2016, implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015; Background Analysis per beneficiary country, SWD(2016) 192 final, pp.18-19

*“[Ukraine] Overall, the Commission thus extended MFA for EUR 850 million to Ukraine in 2015, bringing total MFA disbursements to EUR 2.21 billion. Ukraine can still access two tranches of EUR 600 million from MFA III. This assistance is conditional on successful implementation of the policy measures specified in the MoU and continuous progress with the IMF programme for Ukraine — a four-year extended fund facility of around USD 17.5 billion, which the IMF Board approved in March 2015. The first USD 4.9 billion was disbursed in March and a further USD 1.7 billion in August, following the successful first review of the programme.”* EC 2016, implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015; Background Analysis per beneficiary country, SWD(2016) 192 final, p.24

*“[Lebanon] Major political and economic reforms remain stalled by the lack of political consensus. (...) The Single Support Framework (SSF) builds on the priorities identified in the new Action Plan and outlines areas where EU assistance will be directed. The selected sectors of intervention are fields where greater EU involvement is needed to effectively advance the reform agenda and respond to the most pressing challenges. These are also sectors where the EU has the necessary expertise and experience to have a substantial impact.”* EC 2014, Lebanon SSF 2014-2020, pp.2-4

*“[Armenia] Despite the decision not to initial the negotiated Association Agreement with the EU in September 2013, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), Armenia and the EU further continued their political and trade dialogue in 2014, in areas where this was compatible with Armenia’s new international EEU obligations. To this end, in November 2014 the EU and Armenia launched a scoping exercise on possible areas of cooperation for future relations.”* EC 2015, Armenia ENP Progress report for 2014, p.2

*“The EU has established dedicated bilateral and regional migration dialogues with countries of West, Central and North Africa (Rabat Process) and East Africa (Khartoum Process). In addition, bilateral Mobility Partnerships (MP) and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) have been established with a number of strategic partners, such as Morocco, Tunisia (MPs) and Nigeria (CAMM). Further such bilateral dialogues are under consideration with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Niger. The Trust Fund will contribute to this overall approach on migration with high level dialogues at its centre.”* EC 2015, The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa – Strategic Orientation Document, p.1

*“In terms of subsidiarity, action at EU level brings essential added value, linked to a number of factors:*

- In Neighbourhood countries where alignment to EU rules and standards, guidelines and measures is one of the key policy objectives, the EU is best placed to provide assistance. Certain specific support can only be provided at EU level, such as promoting economic integration with the EU internal market, access to the Schengen space or participation in EU programmes. Thus the EU is the leading cooperation partner in most ENP countries, a role widely recognised by Member States, international financial institutions and other donors. Helping EU neighbours to align with EU policies, rules and standards is a key driver for reforms in the ENP partner countries.*
- With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has the critical weight to respond to global challenges. Action at national level can be limited and fragmented, as projects are often too small to make a sustainable difference. Streamlining the work of Member States through the EU improves the coordination and effectiveness of EU action.*
- At a time of budgetary restrictions, when several Member States have chosen to exit entire sectors of cooperation and withdraw their support from certain countries, the EU is able to play an active role in promoting democracy, peace, stability, prosperity and poverty reduction in its Neighbourhood. In this context, it makes more sense than ever from a purely economic perspective to channel aid at EU level where a real difference can be made. Working with the EU is also cheaper. Administrative costs are lower than the average administrative costs of the principal donors for bilateral aid.”* EC 2011, Proposal for a regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, COM(2011) 839 final, p.4

### **Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific and joint survey)

Interviews – NEAR A, B, C, R; EEAS; ECFIN, AGRI, HOME; Field missions

### **Level of information and confidence**

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

#### 4.1.2 I-412. Recurrence of the cooperation areas where EUDs are lead in donor working groups (2014-2016)

##### Global analysis of the indicator

In some countries and/or sectors the EU has taken a pro-active role and has established itself as a major player in leading donor coordination. This role is indicated by all respondents of the ENI-specific survey as contributing to ENI added-value. It was confirmed in the five case studies (and the four field visits; see country notes in annex 2).

Good examples include e.g.: financial governance and agriculture in Azerbaijan “*The EUD has taken the lead in donor coordination in this area and coordinates all actions with the WB [...] In agriculture, the EU led the donor coordination group until the second semester of 2015, when the Ministry of Agriculture organized the first donor coordination meeting on their initiative, this being the only government-led donor coordination group.*” (EAMR Azerbaijan 2015, 25-26); Egypt “*The Delegation has taken a leading role in the DPG in Egypt, chairing and/or co-chairing several working groups (Natural Renewable Resources, Water, Transport, PFM, Democratic Governance and Human Resource Development and Education).*” (EAMR Egypt 2015, 31); Georgia “*The EU Delegation plays a leading role in the process, notably when it comes to taking the initiative for new coordination efforts, such as on border management or as regards chairing sectorial donor coordination meetings.*” (EAMR Georgia 2015, 32); Ukraine “*The aim is to shift to drawing these sectors together under regular, government-led review of the whole package of reforms to target blockages. In this process, starting from the design of the sector monitoring system, DEL has played a discrete advisory role with the NRC management and took a lead in promoting the integration of donor coordination with the work of the NRC.*” (EAMR Ukraine 2015, 33-34). A remarkable exception is found in Jordan “*The EU does not have much leverage to lead itself the process, primarily because the most important donors are non-EU (the Gulf Cooperation Council and the US) and secondarily because even amongst EU Member States this Delegation is facing difficulty to undertake joint analysis or joint policy dialogue.*” (EAMR Jordan 2015, 27).

##### Presentation of collected proof

“*In addition, the EU has a leading role in bringing together major actors outside the EU, including IFIs and other donors, to work together on providing a comprehensive response to challenges in the region including mutual ones.*” DG NEAR 2015, Strategic Plan 2016-2020, p.10

“*Finally, DG NEAR manages spending programmes (...) Under these programmes, DG NEAR works also hand in hand with International Financial Institutions (IFIs), in particular by blending EU grants and loans to support in particular infrastructure projects and SMEs development.*” DG NEAR 2015, Strategic Plan 2016-2020, p.18

“*[Lebanon] Coordination between the Lebanese authorities and the international response led by the UN agencies has increased, although better coordination and contingency planning are still required given the scale of the humanitarian crisis.*” EC 2014, Lebanon SSF 2014-2020, p.2

« *Il existe une coordination avec des groupes réduits sur les sujets les plus importants (environnement, justice, gouvernance économique, agriculture et pêche, justice et genre, société civile et gouvernance politique). Malgré des efforts de coordination et d'efficacité de l'aide soutenus en 2015, il est très difficile de mettre en oeuvre le GAP en Algérie dans la mesure où seules la DUE et la Belgique ont comme objectif spécifique le Genre dans leurs programmes de coopération. Une coopération étroite est cependant à l'oeuvre avec les deux seuls autres bailleurs (France et Allemagne) afin d'améliorer les efforts de coordination pour mettre en oeuvre le GAP.* » EAMR Algeria 2015, p. 32

“*Very few Member States (MS) are active in development cooperation in Armenia. The most prominent MS is Germany through a local representation of GIZ and of KfW, the latter also benefitting from NIF contributions. (...) The joint analysis will be based on the 2014-2025 Armenian Development Strategy (ADS) and will enable a more effective EU Division of Labour (DoL). Additionally the headquarters suggested strengthening the consultation with and participation of civil society and the private*

sector in the Joint Programming process. It is also noted that with a considerable proportion of programming being managed regionally and/or through MS headquarters, there is a need to involve regional offices and headquarters where applicable.” EAMR Armenia, 2015, p. 28-29

“The EUD has taken the lead in donor coordination in this area and coordinates all actions with the WB. The follow up to the PFM Action Plan 2015-2017 has been divided between the WB and the EU. The EU continues to be active in sectoral donor coordination meetings. The government’s role in the different groups varies from sector to sector. (...) However, with the notable exception of agriculture in which the Ministry of Agriculture has taken over the chairmanship of the sectoral donor coordination meetings, donor coordination on substance remains largely characterized by absence of the government, including an absence of clearly defined sector strategies to guide harmonized future donor interventions.” EAMR Azerbaijan, 2015, p. 25-26

“In the field of support to civil society, there is a high number of networking structures but hardly any deals with real coordination. This is especially the case due to the sensitive nature of the projects. The number of donors working in sectors not related to civil society is extremely limited and therefore there is no need for ‘dividing’ the labour or for a formalised coordination structure. Nevertheless, coordination happens on an informal basis. There is no specific coordination mechanism for gender issues.” EAMR Belarus, 2015, p. 18

“The main effort to foment efficient division of labour and coordination among donors was through the Development Partners Group (DPG). The Delegation has taken a leading role in the DPG in Egypt, chairing and/or co-chairing several working groups (Natural Renewable Resources, Water, Transport, PFM, Democratic Governance and Human Resource Development and Education).” EAMR Egypt, 2015, p. 31

“The concept of division of labour as such is not yet in place, but the community of donors – together with the donor coordination unit under the Administration of the Government of Georgia – is quite well coordinated in terms of information sharing process and communication between each other. The EU Delegation plays a leading role in the process, notably when it comes to taking the initiative for new coordination efforts, such as on border management or as regards chairing sectorial donor coordination meetings.” EAMR Georgia, 2015, p. 32

“As in 2014, division of labour in Jordan remains extremely challenging due to the circumstances. Jordan continues to be a donor darling and attracts interest from all kind of donors. The ongoing crisis in the region (Syria and Iraq) has contributed to convert Jordan in a hub for many organisations and donors exceeding the capacities of the Government for effective donor coordination. (...) The EU does not have much leverage to lead itself the process, primarily because the most important donors are non-EU (the Gulf Cooperation Council and the US) and secondarily because even amongst EU Member States this Delegation is facing difficulty to undertake joint analysis or joint policy dialogue. Staffing was clearly an issue until recently: it is only as a result of the Syrian crisis that some EU MS recruited staff with expertise in development cooperation.” EAMR Jordan, 2015, p. 27

“Synergies between EU Member States present in Moldova are being promoted and regular coordination meetings with Member States were organised by the EU Delegation. The Delegation also participates actively in the regular development partners meetings organized by United Nations.” EAMR Moldova, 2015, p. 28

“Coordination and division of labour between countries providing support to Syria is essential since needs are immense. The core donors’ group was put in place to ensure that coordination. It met twice in 2015 on 29/05 and 17/12. The group is working to establish a provisional division of labour (DoL) amongst donors. While a tentative DoL has arisen simply by a donor taking the lead in a certain sector a more comprehensive DoL is desirable but has so far proved elusive due to; i) the fast-moving pace of the crisis means that donors’ support is changing rapidly; ii) the high level of insecurity, the complex internal power struggles in opposition areas, and the sensitivity of some of the response measures means that donors are sometimes reluctant to share information regarding their activities; iii) that much support is coming from non-traditional donors (i.e. Gulf countries) who are often reluctant to share information, which may undermine the coordination efforts of others. And lastly, in both government and opposition held areas donors do not yet have a Syrian counterpart who can lead the DoL

process. In addition to this group there is an informal donor networking group regularly meeting in Gaziantep. It met 3 times in 2015 in January, June and November.” EAMR Syria, 2015, p. 25-26

“Au niveau de la mise en place du GAP 2016-2020, une coordination des actions est continue avec les Etats membres actifs dans le secteur. Cette coordination rentre dans le cadre de l'objectif choisi du GAP concernant "la cohérence et la coordination accrues entre les institutions de l'UE et les Etats Membres.” EAMR Tunisia, 2015, p. 25

“Sector by sector technical coordination and the division of labour slowly improves. However, Ukraine continues to lack an effective government-donor dialogue that can take stock of the overall picture and can raise key sectoral issues to be considered alongside each other as the priority needs. (...) In this process, starting from the design of the sector monitoring system, DEL has played a discrete advisory role with the NRC management and took a lead in promoting the integration of donor coordination with the work of the NRC. Similarly we worked closely with MEDT in reforming its role in being the principal coordinator of international assistance ensuring it takes on board and operationalises the approach of the NRC. Even if progress is not as fast as desired, there is a clearly growing understanding that advances from good-will to effective ownership.” EAMR Ukraine, 2015, p. 33-34

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EAMRs

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific and joint survey)

Interviews – EEAS, NEAR A, B and C, EUDs (HoOPs); Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

#### 4.1.3 I-123. Perception of key stakeholders at country level on the value added by the Commission in the indicated areas.

##### Global analysis of the indicator

The partner countries' contributions to the ENP review do not provide their perception of EU added value, in the understanding of these evaluation criteria by the EU (linked to subsidiarity and coordination with EU MS).

In all four field visits, national authorities and CSOs acknowledged a strong EU added-value in relation to EU MS and other donors. The extent to which their understanding of added-value fits to its definition as evaluation criteria is difficult to assess: added-value can be limited to a distinctive contribution to agreed priorities (for ministries) or activities (for CSOs). However, opinions expressed by local stakeholders (see also the country case studies in annex 2) are congruent with those collected with EUDs through face-to-face interviews and the ENI-specific survey.

##### Presentation of collected proof

See also country notes in annex 2.

“A common challenge for both policies is to give more visibility to the objectives and results achieved through EU funding in the partner countries and show the link between the funds invested and the political priorities behind them. Current communication activities both in DG NEAR and in EUDs already address the visibility of EU funds by a number of communication tools. However the streamlining and extension of these activities is essential in order to achieve better EU visibility. (...) In this regard, DG NEAR has prepared a Visibility Action Plan endorsed by Commissioner Hahn in January 2015, which will be integrated into a comprehensive DG NEAR communication and visibility strategy, to be developed in the course of 2015, based on the political and cooperation priorities for the Neighbourhood and enlargement regions.” DG NEAR 2015, Management Plan 2015, p.14

“NL said that the measure is based on needs and welcomed the fact that the EU is moving from pure emergency to resilience and early reconstruction [in Syria]. In this respect, a comprehensive framework is very important. There are not many donors who work on education, so there is a clear added value for the EU in this area.

(...) FR said that given the density of information an additional meeting would be advisable [for Madad trust fund]; moreover, FR wondered whether the trust fund really has an added value, since there are not many means and the targeted themes are not precisely defined.” EC 2014, 5<sup>th</sup> ENI Committee Minutes.



“FR further underlined that EUTF has an added value if it covers Lebanon and Jordan; it is also important that EUTF has a clear European identity, although it should be kept open to the participation of non-EU donors provided that they accept European leadership.” EC 2014, 6<sup>th</sup> ENI Committee Minutes.

### Sources of information used

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – Local stakeholders (See also country notes in annex 2).

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

#### 4.1.4 I-414. Overall advocacy has been improved where ENI operates together with other donors and EU MS

##### Global analysis of the indicator

From field visits, the situation regarding gaining strength in advocacy by joining hands with EU MS (and beyond with IFIs and other donors) is differentiated between the East and the South.

In the East, the EU (including EIB and EBRD) is typically the main (up to 70% of ODA) donor, few EU MS are active (mainly Sweden and Germany, Poland to a lesser extent) and only loans for middle-income countries are available from IMF and the World Bank [interviews DG NEAR C, field missions]. Looking for additional leeway in policy dialogue by joining forces is a common feature of the EU and the WB, due to shared international commitments on aid effectiveness agendas and mutual interests in blending operations. EU MS are more active at sector and project level, based mainly on the comparative advantages of their respective economies. They are not said to engage strongly in policy dialogue (interviews EEAS, DG NEAR C, EU MS during field missions). USAID/MCC are strongly oriented towards policy dialogue but often find limited incentives for joint programming and joint dialogue with the EU.

In the South, the state of play is more balanced. Besides the EU institutions, EU MS are more present and IFIs can propose concessional loans. Even if the potential for synergy is higher for consistency in dialogue on policy reforms, it is difficult to materialise due to the weakness of the coordination, notably by lack of leadership by governments. PFM and sector policy dialogues are mostly fuelled by the EU and the WB, the other donors presenting a lower profile.

The response to the ENI-specific survey do not provide a clear picture either. The situation appears different among countries and sectors as regards coordinated advocacy activities with EU MS.

It is therefore difficult to conclude on the added value expected from joint efforts in policy dialogue beyond a general statement by lack of recurrent features in ENI countries.

##### Presentation of collected proof

“However, there is a case to be made for the EU to explain better the concrete benefits of its initiatives. It will need to ensure that ongoing negotiations are conducted swiftly and that agreements can enter into force as soon as feasible and bring tangible benefits. At the same time, both EU and Member States need to ensure that the policy remains attractive and responds to the needs of their partners. In particular in areas where important policy competences rest with the Member States, the EU needs to work even more closely with its Member States to deliver on its commitment towards its partners.” EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.7



“Throughout 2014, EU Delegations in ENP countries will develop country roadmaps for engagement with civil society. The purpose of the roadmaps will be to develop a common strategic framework for EU Delegations and Member states engagement with civil society at country level.” EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.9

“The EU, and its Member States through bilateral efforts, have a strong role to play based on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, aimed at preventing and managing conflicts and their causes. (...) A more coherent, joined-up, use of the EU's instruments, including Member States' bilateral activities with partners in the Neighbourhood, will improve the EU's ability to address both short- and long-term challenges and needs in the region.” EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.16

“The central objective of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is stabilisation. In 2016, the roll-out of the revised ENP will be co-led by DG NEAR and the EEAS. It will include a new security dimension and a focus on economic development as a key tool for stabilisation. There will be close cooperation with Member States throughout the process.” DG NEAR 2016, Management Plan 2016, p.3

“Beyond bilateral channels, migration management in this region requires effective regional dialogue and cooperation frameworks able to address migration-related questions in a comprehensive way along the main migratory routes and to contribute to the reinforcement of a more effective and human rights-based migration management.” EC 2015, The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa – Strategic Orientation Document, p.8

“[Georgia] The prominent positioning of Georgia within the EaP countries, particularly in terms of progress on EU association and efforts on the promotion of its investment potential, creates increased attention and inflow of assistance, notably by IOs, IFIs, the US and increasingly China.” EC 2015, Georgia EAMR 2015, p.13

“[Lebanon] In 2014 numerous bilateral meetings allowed for exchanges on the Action Plan agenda in various sectors ranging from human rights, security, migration, economic and trade issues to social policies and education. In December the EU and Lebanon agreed to engage in a deeper dialogue on migration and mobility.” EC 2015, Lebanon ENP Progress report, p.2

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EAMRs

Interviews – NEAR A, B and C, EEAS, EUDs (HoOPs)

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Poor</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Limited</i>

Strong differences among countries and sectors impeding a global assessment.

## 4.2 JC42: ENI programming encourages Division of Labour (focus on the EU MS rather than other donors)

### 4.2.1 I-421. Degree of observance of the EU guiding principles (in the EU Code of Conduct, 2007) of the division of labour indicated in ENI programming documents

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The analysis of the 12 full<sup>44</sup> single support frameworks (SFFs) available to-date brings to the finding that only with Eastern partner the donors' matrix (annex 2 of the template SSF) is

<sup>44</sup> Excluding Lybia for which only a summary is available.

presented. The matrix being a precondition for implementing a division of labour (DoL) strategy, the degree of enforcement of this aspect of the aid effectiveness agenda is limited in the South: division of labour is indicated only once, in Morocco, and to justify the involvement in the support to basic services.

For the 5 Eastern countries, SSFs indicate that the choice of priority sectors has taken into account other donors' actions (Georgia, p.6). The statement is briefly substantiated at sector level. The next step would be to check if the general intent was operationalized in Action documents.

Joint programming was designed as an entry point to division of labour with EU MS. The four field visits came to the same finding: EU MS easily engage in coordination but do not consider going further with Joint Programming or entering in a division of labour approach led by EUDs.

Division of labour can be supported by EUTFs, at country but mainly at regional level. The two EU TFs are addressing issues shared by several ENI countries (Lebanon/Jordan/Egypt for MADAD; Egypt/Morocco/Tunisia for EU Emergency TF for Africa) and other countries, and because change can be achieved sustainably if shared by all countries. The two trust funds are however too recent to bring further evidences in terms of implementation.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“EU Member States and other donors that have committed to jointly programme their support with the EU will be partners in the programming process. The programming documents will also cover their contribution as appropriate.”* DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI – 2014-2020, p.5

*“Once the overall ENI envelope is set and broad divisions within it agreed (between South and East and bilateral : multi-country and Cross-Border Co-operation (CBC) etc.), the EEAS in agreement with the relevant Commission services will propose indicative allocations already reflecting the principle of differentiation (country, multi-country and CBC based on the agreed criteria) to the HR/VP and the Commissioner for the ENP.*

*Other envelopes for EU external and internal instruments and other donor support needs to be taken into account and co-ordinated to the extent possible. This process will determine an indicative base-line allocation.”* DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI – 2014-2020, p.5

*“Independently of the existence or not of an Action Plan, the EU and its Member States can decide to adopt a common multi-annual programming document for their support to a partner country. To maximise aid effectiveness, EU joint programming should be open to non-EU donors that are also committed to the exercise.*

*Joint programming will normally take as a starting point the Action Plan or equivalent document. It calls for joint analysis, in particular referring where possible to ENP Progress Reports, and will define the joint EU response with the priority sectors of intervention for the EU and the Member States involved, in-country division of labour and the indicative financial allocations per sector and donor. Both grants and concessional loans should be covered by the Joint Programming (JP) document.*

*JP documents will be prepared in-country by the EU, EU Member States and other possible donors under the guidance of Heads of Mission of participating donors, with regular headquarters consultations. The normal in-country consultation process should apply, including notably civil society. EU Member State not represented in country will be informed regularly by EEAS and DEVCO services about the progress on the JP exercise.*

*There is a need for close cooperation and dialogue between EU Delegations, the EEAS and DEVCO during this process. At Headquarters, the EEAS and DEVCO will also ensure the timely involvement of the other relevant Commission services and the EIB through the organisation of Country/Regional team meetings.”* DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI – 2014-2020, p.10

*“Numerous donors and international financial institutions (IFIs), notably the EU member states, other key bilateral donors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes, support projects in the sectors where NIF intervenes, requiring co-ordination in pursuit of policy objectives.”* DEVCO 2014, Neighbourhood Investment Facility – Strategic Orientations 2014-2020, p.2

*“The European Commission Decision on the establishment of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (the ‘Trust Fund’) was adopted on 20 October 2015. (...) More specifically, it will help address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience of vulnerable people, security and development. (...) The Trust Fund will enable the EU, its Member States and contributing donors to respond to the different dimensions of crisis situations by providing support jointly, flexibly and quickly. (...) The Trust Fund shall intervene in coordination with national and regional frameworks, the other EU instruments, the bilateral cooperation of Member States, and the instruments of other development partners. The actions identified in the Trust Fund shall feed into the future and ongoing joint programming actions/documents elaborated jointly by the Commission services, the EEAS, Member States, and the recipient countries.”* EC 2015, The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa – Strategic Orientation Document, pp.1-2

*“Complementarity with and subsidiarity to EU instruments and tools and/or donor interventions: The Trust Fund will cover the gaps, both in geographic and in thematic terms, not covered by other means or by other development partners (including EU Member States). This will need to be indicated for each project approved, for example by targeting actions in areas that are not under the control of the national authorities and/or by implementing activities that might fall outside of the scope of the signed National and Regional Indicative Programs and/or by implementing a ‘linking relief rehabilitation and development’ (LRRD) approach.”* EC 2015, The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa – Strategic Orientation Document, pp.1-2

*“Over the reporting period, significant efforts have been made to promote enhanced coordination and complementarity between donors (in particular EU Member States) in programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluations. Most importantly, the Administration of the Government of Georgia through its donor coordination unit took up very actively donor coordination around broad (grouped along related DAC codes) sectors such as rule of law and public administration through related meetings and a respective database. All relevant donors, including EU, EU MS and IFIs actively participated in these meetings and articulated their respective measures and plans leading to significant gains in terms of coordination and complementarity. These measures are complemented by active specific sectorial coordination such as in the field of agriculture by the Ministry of Agriculture.*

*In the field of programming the work on the joint programming agenda moved forward over the reporting period triggered notably by dedicated sessions at the annual DG NEAR days in January 2015, where a procedural roadmap had been further detailed together with involved EU MS. Further to that a study on the joint analysis has been drafted in the reporting period and discussed with EU MS. The perspective is to see this study further improved allowing to have not only a joint analysis but also a joint response and actions drafted and agreed in 2016.”* Georgia, EAMR 2015, p.4

*“The prominent positioning of Georgia within the EaP countries, particularly in terms of progress on EU association and efforts on the promotion of its investment potential, creates increased attention and inflow of assistance, notably by IOs, IFIs, the US and increasingly China. This development creates for sectors already well covered by assistance, such as private sector development, justice and agriculture, the risk of overburdening absorption capacities in light of the relatively weak institutions. While the Government of Georgia seeks to strengthen donor coordination at central level under the Prime Minister, the EUD is working actively on the introduction of joint programming from 2018 onwards so that the EU, EU Member States and CH would be grouped around a joint strategic programming framework allowing streamlining and simplifying coordination and implementation of programmes.”* Georgia, EAMR 2015, p.13

*“[Georgia] The first MFA tranche was disbursed in January (EUR 13 million in grants) and April 2015 (EUR 10 million in loans) on the basis that Georgia had a good track record of implementing the IMF programme (as attested by the successful first review under the Stand-by Arrangement in January).”* EC 2016, implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015; Background Analysis per beneficiary country, SWD(2016) 192 final, p.7

*“[Jordan] At the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference (London, 4 February 2016), the international community pledged around USD 10 billion to countries affected by the refugee crisis. This included a EUR 2.4 billion pledge by the European Commission, which in turn entailed a new MFA operation to Jordan subject to the relevant pre-conditions.” EC 2016, implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015; Background Analysis per beneficiary country, SWD(2016) 192 final, p.9*

*“[Lebanon] The EU will work with the Lebanese authorities to ensure ownership and reinforce donor coordination, taking into account also the national and international response to the Syrian refugee crisis.*

*For education and Vocational Training, the major donors have established a donor coordination group on education which has a rotating presidency. Meetings take place on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, there is close coordination of donors during formulation stages of programmes (shared meetings, shared formulation reports and documents). In the field of social protection, a number of donors and agencies such as the World Bank, the ILO or the EU (through the launching of intra-Lebanese fora and the formulation of the programme “promotion of social justice in Lebanon”) have been active and implemented activities. Nevertheless, donor coordination and a mechanism for genuine policy dialogue remains to be developed. In the field of rural development through land use planning, there has been no formal coordination among donors. The EU has funded a number of projects in this area and remains the major donor in local development and cooperation with municipalities. A donor coordination group has been put in place (e.g. water, environment). For the agriculture sector the EU and the USA, the principal donors, ensure complementarity at the operational level. Nevertheless, for this sector of intervention, genuine policy dialogue with the national authorities and an effective donor coordination mechanism led by the Government remains to be put in place.” EC 2014, Lebanon SSF 2014-2020, p.6; 13; 15*

*“The choice of sector has also been informed by the EU’s international commitment to the principles on aid effectiveness set out in the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda (2008), the Busan Outcome Declaration (2011) and by its own Development Policy (EU Agenda for Change). Although the EU is by far the largest donor, the choice of priority sectors has also been guided by a desire to complement and reinforce the interventions financed by other donors: most EU Member States are active in the chosen sectors as are Switzerland, USAID, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Council of Europe.” EC 2014, Georgia SSF 2014-2020, p. 6*

### **Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; SSFs, Partnership priorities

Surveys – (ENI-specific and joint survey)

Interviews – NEAR A, B and C, EEAS, EUDs (HoOPs); Field missions

### **Level of information and confidence**

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## **4.2.2 I-422. EU Member States and other non-EU donors recognize the EC’s value added in a given area(s) and operate appropriately (division of labour)**

### **Global analysis of the indicator**

As documented in I-421, EU MS do recognize EU added value in policy dialogue and in all its sector of intervention, particularly support to civil society. This was confirmed during field missions as well in interviewing EU MS representatives of the ENI Committee. The recognition of EU added-value does not however lead to an incentive for engaging in a division of labour approach. Interviews in the four countries visited would rather convey the message that division of labour is no longer on EU MS agenda.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

Country notes presented in Vol 3.

### **Sources of information used**

Interviews – EU MS representatives (4) in ENI Committee, Field missions

#### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

Information is limited in terms of quantity, but assessed as satisfactory due to congruence of interviews.

#### 4.2.3 I-423. Absence of conflicts or overlapping between actions of EU MS and the EC in the implementation of the division of labour

##### Global analysis of the indicator

The division of labour is nowhere implemented or even initiated. This indicator cannot be informed.

##### Presentation of collected proof

Country notes presented in annex 2

##### Sources of information used

See I-421, I-422.

#### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 5 EQ 5 on coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies

### 5.1 JC51: ENI programmes are coherent and complementary with one another

#### 5.1.1 I-511. ENI programming and implementation guidelines foresee procedures to ensure coherence and complementarity

##### Global analysis of the indicator

Coherence and complementarity of the ENI actions/programmes with all other actions/programmes implemented in a partner country or several partner countries (regional/multi country actions/programmes) are permanent concerns and targets of the programming processes of the Instrument. Instructions and guidelines exist not only in the general planning/programming guidance documents but also in the specific multi-annual and annual/sectoral programmes.

**ENI Programming instructions 2013** – The corner stone document for coherence/complementarity is the “Instructions for the Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2020”, adopted in 2013. The instructions aim at ensuring coherence within the ENP framework: “*The instructions set out how the programming process is organized and how the overarching policies and principles which will govern the programming for that period (in particular the proposals for a new European Neighbourhood policy, as laid down in the “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” Communication), are to be translated into the programming process and documents.*” This framework is applied to the three types of programmes mentioned in the ENI regulation.

Complementarity is developed in particular with regards to multi-country programmes and CBC: “*In addition, it also provides brief guidance for multi-country and CBC programmes, in particular to ensure the complementarity between these programmes from the start (see Annexes 4 and 5). Each type of multi-country programme and CBC will have a separate, more detailed strategy paper.*” Both before mentioned annexes to the programming instructions list the added values of multi-country and CBC programmes respectively, thus showing that the complementary nature of the different types of programmes has been understood and poten-

tial synergies have been clearly identified.

In addition, the programming instructions foresee that *“bilateral programming shall be used more proactively to identify areas of importance for reinforced regional cooperation and to inform the preparation of the regional strategies and Regional Indicative Programmes”*. In order to ensure that the parallel multi-country programmes complement and reinforce the bilateral programmes, issues and actions to be targeted or complemented by regional programmes have to be identified in the national programming documents. The template for the SSF/MIP (annex 2 of the programming instructions) reflects this under section 1.2 (Choice of sectors of intervention) and the analysis of the SSFs confirms that these instructions have been followed in ENI countries. The sectors identified in each country will help to build regional strategies alongside the priorities emerging from regional processes.

Programming instructions are complemented by templates presented in the annexes of the Single Support Framework (including Multiannual Indicative Programmes) and Country Strategy Papers. Indications on the strategy to strengthen coherence, complementarity and eventually synergy among ENI types of programmes are not requested. Programming documents are agreed priorities with partner countries, while multi-country programmes are managed centrally by a dedicated unit. Coherence and complementarity are also ensured – beyond instructions and templates – by the various layers of the programming process itself i.e. inside EUDs between technical staff and management, between operational and political sections, and the interactions between EUDs and HQ.

**Programming instruction 2017-2020** – The programming instructions were updated jointly by EEAS and EC in 2016. The revised version does not provide detailed guidance any more on coherence-complementarity among the three types of ENI programmes. The main corresponding instruction is *“In taking a comprehensive approach, the bilateral programming, whilst focusing mainly on the ENI, should also refer to other relevant external and internal instruments where possible, accepting that some instruments are not programmable. Bilateral programming shall also be more proactively coordinated with ENI multi-country programming (which is mostly HQ-based)”*. (p.6) The main thrust of the document is a presentation of the revised policy framework after the conclusion of the Council adopting the communication on the ENP Review (2015). The following guiding principles are at the core of the revised instructions:

- Comprehensive Approach: Linking the policy objectives of the EU and of the partner country to programming, notably by ensuring a close link between ENP Action Plan priorities or equivalent documents (such as Association Agendas and Partnership Priorities and compacts where relevant) and the programming documents is essential;
- Ownership by partner country authorities and other stakeholders, as emphasised in the ENP review. Programming shall be an inclusive process, involving national, regional and local authorities as well as civil society organisations and social partners, in order to strengthen mutual accountability;
- Focus/Concentration: The ENP review stresses the need to focus on a limited number of priorities;
- Coordination between the EU, its Member States and other donors including the International Financial Institutions, in particular through joint programming;
- Delegations should consider how the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, NIF, could be used to support or complement bilateral priorities;
- Proper integration of core issues with a cross-cutting dimension, and particularly gender;
- Continuity.

**Regional programmes** – Beyond the complementarity with bilateral programmes, Regional East/South Strategy Papers (2014-2020) and respective Multiannual Indicative Programmes (2014-2017) provide the broad regional framework and identify ENI regional programmes Required to *“promote coherent sectoral approaches across the region, thus supporting long term aid effectiveness”* (programming instructions, annex 4). NIF shares the same concern of coherence at Neighbourhood level (*“A “pipeline” of projects will be established by lead financiers under the NIF, in consultation with partner countries and the relevant EU bodies (including EU Delegations), p.11”*), as does TAEIX.

**CBC** – The ENI East Programming for Cross-border Cooperation 2014-2020 provides additional guidance on coherence and complementarity between the ENI CBC programmes and the national ENP Action Plans, ENI multi-country strategies and Single Support Frameworks (and relevant EU-Russia agreements) as well as other relevant EU instruments to be ensured through the programming process. CBC programmes must deliver real cross-border added value, i.e. they are jointly designed for mutual benefit on both sides of the border and their results are achievable and sustainable only through joint action. In addition, they should not cover elements which are already funded or could more suitably be funded from other ENI or EU programmes.

The programming guidance used for the programming and planning of both the bilateral and the multi-country/regional programmes and actions addresses specific features and includes procedures which contribute to this.

**EU Joint programming Guidance Pack** – The pack brings together all EU development partners and should guide them to work in a specific way which leads to the production of a programme based on a sound strategy and assessment of the sector/areas that is less fragmented.

Furthermore, the instructions and the implemented procedures for the structuring, negotiating and approval of **Sector Budget Support** programmes (content, system of assessment indicators, terms of payments (tranches), period of implementation, required technical assistance) are concretely contributing to the creation of coherence and complementarity of ENI actions in the sector and the country.

**Key findings** – Interviews at HQ and during field missions, as well as several responses to the ENI-specific survey acknowledge weaknesses in the coherence between bilateral and multi-country programmes, and even in rare cases overlaps. Multi-country programmes are in many cases not designed to be aligned on individual country needs and priorities. They are rather conceived as complementary, in some cases with a distinctive added value to agreed priorities in bilateral programmes. Several EUD staff indicated that the activities under multi-country programmes could be better targeted if they were more involved at programming stages.

Weak coherence is more rarely pinpointed for CBC programmes, due to the fact that CBC and bilateral programmes are hardly linked to one another. CBC programmes are addressing local development activities that are not impacted by the sector approach of bilateral programmes – and reciprocally.

Overall, the three types of programmes authorized by ENI regulation find their coherence in relation to the policy framework of the regulation (e.g. the strategic intent) rather than in operational linkages or synergies.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“As regards the interface with ENI multi-country programmes, the bilateral programming shall be used more proactively to identify areas of importance for reinforced regional cooperation and to inform the preparation of the regional strategies and Regional Indicative Programmes. Regional co-operation frameworks, notably the Eastern Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Synergy, need to be factored in.”* EEAS/DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI 2014-2020, p. 7.

*“Multi-country programmes run in parallel to the bilateral programmes, and should as far as possible complement and reinforce these. These consist of an inter-regional (ENP-wide), a Regional East and a Regional South programmes.*

*The value-added of multi-country programmes is that they allow the EU to:*

- *Foster dialogue and political co-operation between the countries and between the EU and partner countries multilaterally*
- *Promote coherent sectoral approaches across the region, thus supporting long term aid effectiveness;*
- *Promote regional economic integration by supporting regional market integration for goods and services;*

- Promote regional cooperation on themes which cannot be sufficiently addressed by countries individually ( common public goods );
- Raising awareness on, and catalysing activities in, new policy areas. Typically, regional programmes in the Neighbourhood have been a tool for enhanced dialogue with the EU on issues linked to the EU acquis.”

EEAS/DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI 2014-2020, p. 22.

“The 2014-2020 bilateral programming should include a reflection on the issues which would usefully be addressed at regional level, in particular linked to the concentration sectors identified for a country, but also beyond that. More precisely, the national programming documents must identify what actions should be complemented through a regional programme based on the above explained principles of: i) added value, ii) comparative advantage of EU intervention, iii) economies of scale, iv) subsidiary. The information will be used to help build regional strategies alongside of regional priorities emerging from regional processes (Union for the Mediterranean for the South, Eastern Partnership for the East) and other relevant EU policy documents.” EEAS/DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI 2014-2020, p. 22.

“CBC programmes run in parallel to the ENI bilateral and regional programmes, and should complement these. At the same time they should retain their specific, locally-focused objective of encouraging cooperation between the relevant Member States and partner countries local/regional authorities from regions located at the external border of the EU, and where appropriate between partner countries.

The important value-added of CBC programmes is that they allow the EU to:

- Address the issue of territorial cooperation on the external border, thus adding the cohesion and territorial cooperation dimension to EU relations with its neighbours;
- Promote direct cooperation between the local populations on both sides of the external border of the EU;
- Promote the local ownership and links between the local authorities located on both sides of the border by addressing the actions important for regional populations, usually of a practical and not political nature;
- Help economically and socially develop the regions, which may otherwise be peripheral from the viewpoint of their national governments;
- Create an important channel of building mutual trust between the populations living on both sides of the EU external border.”

EEAS/DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI 2014-2020, p. 23.

“The 2014-2020 programming should include a reflection on the experiences and lessons learnt from the current period of the CBC programmes, both successes and failures. The programmes should take into account the political circumstances and the level of cooperation with each partner country, but at the same time they should retain their impartiality focus on the benefit of the local population and their needs. CBC should still be able to address cooperation even in difficult partnerships and, except for extreme political situations, allow for cooperation with all EU neighbours. CBC should remain decentralised with true ownership belonging to local authorities, who should be responsible for preparing the joint operational programmes of cooperation. At the same time the programmes should stay complementary to all other types of regional cooperation and development of regional and macro-regional strategies, adding to the strengthening of the cooperation on the regional level with the Partner countries.” EEAS/DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI 2014-2020, p. 23.

#### “Guiding principles

- “Comprehensive Approach: Linking the policy objectives of the EU and of the partner country to programming, notably by ensuring a close link between ENP Action Plan priorities or equivalent documents (such as Association Agendas and Partnership Priorities and compacts where relevant) and the programming documents is essential. In taking a comprehensive approach, the bilateral programming, whilst focusing mainly on the ENI, should also refer to other relevant external and internal instruments where possible, accepting that some instruments are not programmable. Bilateral programming shall also be more proactively coordinated with ENI multi-country programming (which is mostly HQ-based);
- Ownership by partner country authorities and other stakeholders, as emphasised in the ENP review. Programming shall be an inclusive process, involving national, regional and local



authorities as well as civil society organisations and social partners, in order to strengthen mutual accountability;

- *Focus/Concentration: The ENP review stresses the need to focus on a limited number of priorities. Programming documents need to respond to this through a more focussed approach to financial assistance. Having a smaller number of sectors/areas will increase value for money, impact and leverage of EU assistance and will help to keep it manageable both for the recipient countries as well as for the HQ and EU Delegations;*
- *Coordination between the EU, its Member States and other donors including the International Financial Institutions, in particular through joint programming. The ENP review confirmed the importance of joint programming which should be pursued in line with the Council conclusions on stepping-up joint programming;*
- *Delegations should consider how the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, NIF, could be used to support or complement bilateral priorities;*
- *Proper integration of core issues with a cross-cutting dimension, and particularly gender, in line with the new Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, the Human Rights Action Plan, environment and climate change in the framework of the Paris agreement on COP21;*
- *Continuity. Due regard should be paid in programming to bringing past EU investments to an orderly completion or continuing them if necessary. Lessons from the evaluation of past support will be taken into account in selecting future priorities.”*

EEAS/DEVCO 2016, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI 2017-2020, pp. 6-7.

*“A process to ensure strategic and efficient interventions, in tandem with political dialogue. Strategies will be elaborated per window in order to frame the interventions. They will outline the particular challenges faced by the region; ongoing EU activities (incl. CSDP where applicable); objectives, priorities and actions that can be implemented in support of those objectives.”* EC 2015, The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa – Strategic Orientation Document, p.9

*“The ENP was updated in 2013, partly in response to the Arab Spring. The main objectives of the policy involve building deep and sustainable democracy, supporting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, strengthening the Eastern and Southern regional dimensions and providing mechanisms and instruments to support these objectives. The ENP is complemented by other important EU external policies including the Agenda for Change which updates the EU approach to development assistance.”* 2014 ENI East Programming for Cross-border Coop 2014-2020, p. 3

*“In addition to supporting the Euro-Mediterranean and Eastern Partnerships as set out above, CBC in the Neighbourhood also complements other important regional or sub-regional initiatives including the Northern Dimension, Black Sea Synergy and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.”* 2014 ENI East Programming for Cross-border Coop 2014-2020, p. 3

*“Coherence and complementarity between the ENI CBC programmes and the national ENP Action Plans, ENI multi-country strategies and Single Support Frameworks (and relevant EU-Russia agreements) and other relevant EU instruments are to be ensured through the programming process. CBC programmes must deliver real cross-border added value, ie they are jointly designed for mutual benefit on both sides of the border and their results are achievable and sustainable only through joint action. In addition, they should not cover elements which are already funded or could more suitably be funded from other ENI or EU programmes.”* 2014 ENI East Programming for Cross-border Coop 2014-2020, p. 4

*“The ENI Regional East programme will support regional co-operation of various kinds through the Eastern Partnership, Northern Dimension and Black Sea Synergy. The Regional South programme will do likewise, notably via the Union for the Mediterranean. Complementary investment may be provided by the European Investment Bank.”* 2014 ENI East Programming for Cross-border Coop 2014-2020, p. 10

#### **“4. PAST COOPERATION, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CONSISTENCY**

##### **4.1. Evaluation of past, ongoing cooperation and lessons learned**

*Lessons learned show that regional cooperation should focus on common challenges that can best be tackled through a regional approach and capitalize on the common goal of partner countries wishing to get closer to the European Union, while at the same time taking into account the re-*

*gional diversity. Proper communication between policy design and project implementation and between projects covering the same/similar areas, the choice of implementation modalities and the effective sequencing of the various stages of the project cycle have proved to be crucial for success. Due to the large number of stakeholders and the wide geographical coverage, strong and efficient coordination mechanisms, ownership by the countries and an adequate level of involvement of the various actors have proved to be indispensable in ensuring successful implementation of regional programmes.” 2014 ENI East RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 7*

#### *“4.2. EU policy mix and coherence with other EU policies*

*A number of EU policies in the “policy mix” have a bearing on the region, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), justice, freedom and security, trade, migration, energy, transport and environment. Issues related to Information and Communication Technology remain highly relevant. Given the specificities of each Eastern European country and its relations with the EU, the regional approach needs to take into account national specificities. A detailed discussion and presentation of the “policy mix” considerations for each country can be found in the respective ENI bilateral Single Support Frameworks. When ensuring coherence, the principle of policy joint ownership with the region will be fully respected.” 2014 ENI East RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 8*

*“1. EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack. What is Joint Programming? Joint programming means the joint planning of development cooperation by the EU development partners working in a partner country. It includes a joint analysis of the country situation followed by a joint response setting out how EU development partners will provide support and measure progress. Joint analysis and joint response together are hereinafter called 'joint strategy'. In Joint Programming, EU development partners develop together a joint strategy which responds to the partner country's national development plan and sets out the overall rationale and direction for their support. It also coordinates which sectors/areas each of them will work in, what the overall objectives for these sectors are, and gives provisional figures for their financing over the joint strategy period. The individual more detailed objectives, projects and programmes that each EU development partner will carry out in order to implement their contribution to the joint strategy are detailed in their own in-house programming and implementation plans. The timing of the joint strategy is synchronised to match the timing of the partner country's national plan so that EU development partners are planning and implementing at the same time and for the same period as the government and can therefore be more responsive to national needs. The joint strategy is developed at the partner country level by the EU Delegation, other EU Institutions field offices and EU Member States' staff to ensure that it provides the best possible response to the situation on the ground. This also allows close cooperation with the government, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders. Non-EU development partners who share the principles of joint programming are welcome to sign up to the strategy too. They will therefore need to agree to a division of labour, to synchronise their programming cycle if possible, and to provide indicative financial commitments for their support to each sector they will work in.” EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack, p. 1*

*“PT advised that previous experience is taken into consideration when it comes to migration flows. COM assured that it reviews every programme to strengthen the gender equality aspect. On the indirect management, COM said that it chose it after having analysed all the other options: the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) has the necessary experience and is the best organisation to ensure synergies and complementarity with other projects in the Mediterranean region; moreover, there are economies of scale compared to the service contract, without a lengthy process involving also substantial fees; finally, with indirect management, COM keeps certain flexibility to adapt the situation on the ground and can easily turn to direct management if needed.” 2nd ENI Committee meeting (24.06.2014) – Final minutes, p. 7*

*“The Chair then recalled that prior to the presentation to the ENI Committee, the proposed programmes and measures have to follow a detailed quality review process to ensure complementarity between all the EU related actions.” 8th ENI Draft minutes, p. 2*

*“In order to come across that difficulty, the EC has now defined an overarching strategy for this domain and, to ensure coordination, set up a working group on migration gathering colleagues from DG HOME, DG NEAR and DG DEVCO.” 8th ENI Draft minutes, p. 2*

#### **Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents;

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific and joint survey)

Interviews – NEAR A, B, C, EEAS, Field missions

#### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

#### 5.1.2 I-512. Evidence, in programming documents, of all ENI implementation modalities of (in a dedicated section):

- **A presentation of other ENI programmes foreseen or under implementation in the country or one of its subdivisions**
- **Measures taken for ensuring coherence and complementarity, in particular for cross-border programmes**

#### Global analysis of the indicator

In order to contribute to the simplification of the process, programming documents under the ENI regulation are requested to be comprehensive but short. The programming instructions foresee a record of EU development cooperation to be presented in a dedicated section of country strategy papers: “2.1. EU development cooperation and lessons learned – This section should cover all EU external aid instruments used for the country including regional cooperation, thematic programmes, global initiatives and humanitarian aid” (programming instructions, annex 3). The analysis done for country strategy papers is meant to inform other types of strategic and programming documents and therefore, similar dedicated sections can be found in most, if not all, relevant documents.

Indicatively such references are found in the following documents:

- the ENI strategic priorities and MIP 2014-2017,
- the ENI East/ South RSP & MIP 2014-2017,
- the Annual Action Programmes of all partner countries.

Even though these sections do not present explicit lists of programmes in implementation, the evaluation team has found no evidence to suggest that they do not cover the full range of EU actions in a country or region.

On the other hand, the SSF and CSP templates do not foresee a dedicated section on coherence measures and as a consequence, information on concrete measures to be taken remains scarce and vague. Nevertheless, the templates instruct EUDs to include several reflections on complementarity in various sections, as evidenced below.

In the annual action programmes, the above-mentioned section on lessons learnt is followed by a section including complementarity issues – both with other EU actions as well as with other donors. The regional strategies and MIPs each feature a dedicated section on coherence and complementarity as well as ways to ensure it. They refer however to the individual SSFs for a more detailed approach on these issues, in particular with regards to the “policy mix” considerations which are individual to each country (i.e. which policies and consequently which targets, objectives or modalities are relevant – and to what extent – for actions in a country).

Beyond these country-specific approaches to complementarity, the Regional South Strategy Paper and MIP 2014-2017 nonetheless identifies four principles to be respected in order to ensure coherence between policies and ENI programmes. The multi-country cooperation should thus provide added value, seek comparative advantages of EU regional intervention, ensure the economies of scale and comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The consultation with stakeholders (EU MS, authorities of partner countries and other donors) is seen as principal measure to ensure coherence beyond EU support.

Overall, the sections on complementarity and synergies among the three ENI types of programmes (four if counting umbrella programmes) remain relatively vague and very few strategies or measures are laid out. This relates to the fact that programming at country level is almost exclusively focused on bilateral programmes – multi-country programmes and CBC are managed centrally and coherence does not resort chiefly to the EUDs. Furthermore,

based on observations from the EAMRs and other reporting tools (see I-513), measures to ensure complementarity seem to be created more in an ad hoc fashion for individual cases (be it programmes or sectors).

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“In order to ensure coherence with other policies and ENI programming documents, in particular bilateral cooperation programmes, the multi-country cooperation should respect four principles: providing added value, seeking the comparative advantage of EU regional intervention, ensuring economies of scale, and subsidiarity. In line with these principles, this regional strategy will complement bilateral and thematic cooperation by focusing on areas where there is a need to:*

- *foster political dialogue and co-operation between the EU and partner countries multilaterally.*
- *facilitate regional and sub-regional economic integration through regional market integration for goods and services and improved sector cooperation in particular on infrastructure development.*
- *ensure coherent sectoral approaches across the region to improve long term aid effectiveness and impact as well as promote cost-effective provision of certain support (economies of scale).*
- *promote regional cooperation on themes which cannot be sufficiently addressed by countries individually (common public goods and cross-border issues) or impact on regional societal challenges such as marine resources, water issues and migration.*
- *raise awareness on, and catalyse activities in policy areas where sharing of experience and peer review are important for advancing reforms. Regional cooperation will provide tools for enhanced dialogue with the EU on progressive social, political and economic integration issues linked to the EU acquis and EU policies”*

EEAS/DEVCO 2014, Regional South Strategy Paper (2014-2020) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2017), p. 9-10.

*“The ENI Southern Mediterranean Regional Strategy has been developed in consultation with EU Member States, the authorities of the partner countries and other donors as well as stakeholders. Donor coordination, at bilateral and regional level, will ensure that shared objectives will create synergy for the desired impact on the ground. The EU is open to joint programming, when appropriate. The principle of policy joint ownership with the region will be respected and where appropriate the contribution of the partner countries will be ensured.”* EEAS/DEVCO 2014, Regional South Strategy Paper (2014-2020) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2017), p. 9.

*“S'agissant de projets régionaux on essaye toujours de trouver des synergies et éviter de doubles emplois avec les projets bilatéraux. Par exemple, le projet PADICA du AAP 2015 va contribuer à renforcer l'action des programmes de coopération régionale de l'UE tels que le programme de renforcement du climat des affaires dans la région Méditerranée du sud, le programme de développement du secteur privé, le programme de soutien au développement de la culture et des industries créatives et des clusters dans le sud de la Méditerranée et le programme de travail 2014-2016 sur la coopération industrielle euro-méditerranéenne. Le programme Justice III a un volet spécifique accès à la justice qui devrait renforcer les actions menées à terme dans le programme EuroMed Justice III et un volet "Indépendance de la Justice" qui devrait assurer /renforcer les synergies avec le nouveau Programme EuroMed Justice et Police IV. Le programme SPRING comprend aussi des actions complémentaires avec EuroMed Justice III et EuroMed Justice et Police IV. Le programme GEMM "Employabilité des jeunes et femmes en Méditerranée", mis en oeuvre par la Fondation Européenne de Formation (ETF), 2012-2017 pourra utilement s'inscrire dans une approche préparatoire au projet AFEQ. Ledit projet pourra aussi profiter des dynamiques de partenariat régional établis avec ERASMUS +. Le projet ENPARD sera aussi en synergie avec le le programme régional "Développement du secteur privé au sud de la Méditerranée". Ce programme appuie des formations euro-méditerranéennes et nationales sur des thèmes qui intéressent directement ENPARD Algérie (par exemple sur les processus de consultation public-privé). Le programme régional encouragera également les bonnes pratiques pour promouvoir les industries créatives et culturelles, secteurs qui intéressent également ENPARD Algérie dans une perspective de développement rural. Le projet PAPS est complémentaire du programme régional Horizon 2020. Le projet DIVECO II (Pêche) veille à la complémentarité et les synergies possibles avec le programme régional sur la Politique Maritime Intégrée (IMP-MED. Le projet PAJE a des articulations fortes avec le programme Euro-Med Jeunesse 4. Le projet "Patrimoine" assure la complémentarité avec Euromed Heritage IV et CIUDAD.*

*S'agissant de l'assistance au Commerce il est trop prématuré pour se prononcer sur l'assistance prévue au niveau régional. Il faut néanmoins noter que cette assistance est toujours prévue au niveau national dans le cadre du Projet P3A". EAMR Algeria 2015, p. 15-16*

*"[Lebanon] Complementarities and coherence will be sought with all other EU instruments, in particular with the Instrument for Stability (IfS), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and other thematic programmes under Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), humanitarian aid, regional programmes and facilities and loan operations of the European Investment Bank (EIB). (...) By the end of 2014, the EU had allocated EUR 459.4 million to support refugees from Syria and vulnerable communities in Lebanon, i.e. EUR 182.3 million in EU humanitarian aid, EUR 27.6 million through the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and EUR 249.5 million through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)." EC 2014, Lebanon SSF 2014-2020, p.6; 11*

*"Barcelona Process. Framework policy launched in 1995 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the then 15 EU members and 14 Mediterranean partners as the base for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which has evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean. The partnership was organised into three main dimensions: political and security dialogue; economic and financial partnership; social, cultural and human partnership. With the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the Barcelona Process essentially became the multilateral forum of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners while complementary bilateral relations are managed mainly under the ENP and through Association Agreements signed with each partner country." COM (2011) 200 – Partnership for Democracy with the South, p. 15*

*"A number of issues have emerged since the launch of the ENPI, related directly or indirectly to the design of the Instrument. A long programming process and incomplete alignment of the financial assistance with the policy and priorities specified in the ENP Action Plans and other relevant documents have often been pointed at as major challenges to be addressed in the future. Coordination and coherence with interventions under other instruments are important issues. Provisions allowing for joint activities with partners/regions outside the geographical scope of the ENPI have been instrumental to implement a number of activities and should be maintained. ENPI assistance has been used to leverage loans from financial institutions to finance infrastructure investment projects and to support the private sector through loans and risk capital operations. This is done with the European Investment Bank in the context of the FEMIP and with the EIB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other European financial institutions in the context of the NIF. The cooperation with IFIs should be further enhanced through the use of innovative tools, notably in the field of guarantees. The use of revolving funds could help strengthen the impact of this cooperation." COM (2011) 839 – EC proposal for establishing ENI, p. 35-36*

*"Enhanced dialogue on employment and social policies. DG EMPL – Starting from 2nd half 2011. This activity will build on and further develop Euro-Med dialogue on employment and social policy, cooperation within the Eastern Partnership, which will be complemented by bilateral activities as appropriate." SEC (2011) 650 – MT Programme for a renewed ENP (2011-2014), p. 9*

*"Complementarity of support is essential to ensure the best use of resources and the greatest results for the eligible regions and stakeholders. Beyond ensuring further consistency with other initiatives supported by the EU or at regional/national level during programme implementation, the BSB programme will also look for complementarities with other key cooperation frameworks within the BSB region and by other donors. ENI CBC Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Programme 2014-2020, p. 76*

*"The European Neighbourhood-wide programme contributes to the overall ENI objective of progress towards 'an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness' between EU Member States and their neighbours. The programme will pursue the following strategic objectives which will complement the bilateral and regional programmes:*

- *Building a partnership for inclusive and sustainable economic development and integration (55 %) Supporting investments and private sector development through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, a financing blending instrument used to leverage EU grant funding with loans from eligible Financial Institutions. Support will be provided in line with the Strategic Orientations of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility Expected results: higher level of investments in public infrastructure and productive sectors, job creation and private sector developments in line with the Neighbourhood Investment Facil-*

ity's Strategic Orientations will contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable economic, social and environmental development and progressive integration into the Union internal market. • Building a partnership between people (40 %) Contributing to Erasmus+ in the Neighbourhood and Russia to promote the international dimension of higher education in the ENP region. Expected results: increased mobility of students and university staff, enhanced people to people contacts and improved quality of the higher education systems. • Targeted capacity building for European Neighbourhood countries (5 %) Supporting the approximation of the regulatory framework to EU norms and standards and enhance public governance systems for example through the use of the TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information and Exchange) tool and the provision of EU public expertise in good governance. Expected results: Faster approximation of the regulatory framework to EU norms and standards and improved public administration capacities will contribute to public governance development and progressive integration into the Union internal market. The programme will serve as a framework for those instruments which are most effectively implemented across all countries of the Neighbourhood. It will support initiatives which by their nature or size would be less effectively supported through bilateral or regional programmes while enabling specific commitments towards particular areas of policy interest. By promoting cooperation on challenges which cannot be sufficiently addressed by countries individually and/or can be more effectively addressed at Neighbourhood-wide level, this approach has specific added value in that it will allow the EU to deploy common measures in all partner countries, while adapting the individual interventions to the particular needs they address ensuring economies of scale and more efficient delivery." 2014 ENI Summary of RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 2

"The TAIEX tool and SIGMA initiative have been instrumental in complementing support for partner countries in regulatory approximation with the EU, which is a key element for greater integration with the EU and for strengthening public governance systems. The high and growing demand for these services is expected to continue, in particular in the context of the new EU agreements with partner countries that will involve a greater element of regulatory convergence. The partner countries have started to participate in the work of EU's sectoral agencies including with the support of the previous Inter-Regional Programme 2007-2013." 2014 ENI strategic priorities and MIP 2014-2017, p. 4

"The EU has several tools that can provide targeted capacity building in support of regulatory approximation (including standardisation) needed for implementing Association Agreements with the EU, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, and for improving public governance systems more broadly. While most of this assistance is deployed and financed under the ENI bilateral and regional programmes, multi-country programmes such as the TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange) tool, and the SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) initiative, or any other similar future multi-country support to public governance, will continue to operate on the basis of pooled resources at Neighbourhood-wide level, made available upon demand." 2014 ENI strategic priorities and MIP 2014-2017, p. 7

"The activities and initiatives described in this Strategy and in the MIP 2014-2017 will be complemented by the European Neighbourhood-wide programme which will focus on activities that are best implemented at inter-regional level, for reasons of coherence or administrative efficiency. The EN-wide programme includes as priorities inter alia: a) Building a partnership for sustainable and inclusive economic development and integration, via the Neighbourhood Investment Facility; b) Building a partnership between people, via the "Erasmus+" programme for the activities relating to higher education and youth; c) Targeted capacity building, via TAIEX, SIGMA and other similar multi-country support to enhancing public governance systems." 2014 ENI East RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 12

## "2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT

The action is designed in response to urgent needs in different sub-sectors. Individual components are devised as complementary and mutually supportive measures in the wider context of the action, jointly enhancing capacities related to policymaking, strategic planning, coordination, management, development and delivery of education, and – at the level of higher education (HE) – research." Annual Action Programme Azerbaijan 2014, p. 6

"Education Support Programme in Azerbaijan. Action Document for Education Support Programme in Azerbaijan. 2.4. Complementary actions. There are many complementarities and synergies between the different components of the programme, as well as between the proposed programme and other interventions supported by the EU (Erasmus+, Regional Development) and/or by other donors. [...] The proposed programme will also complement the initiatives to be supported under the new Eras-

*mus+ programme. [...] The actions promoted by Erasmus+ take a bottom-up approach and will be complementary to the top-down assistance provided to the Ministry to guide and monitor the reform at institutional and system level. [...] The proposed action will be also complementary to other interventions in the field of regional and rural development, which is one of the priority sectors under the programming period 2014-2017. The action through the pilot projects will act as a catalyst for private sector involvement and social dialogue in the development of education and training programmes which will be tailored to the socioeconomic needs of the regions. This complementarity between education and regional development is also evident in the case of inclusive education, considering the specific competence of local authorities in this field. Also the objectives to promote more civil society participation and the social dialogue at the local level are mutually supportive.” Annual Action Programme Azerbaijan, p. 11-12*

*“South Programme II. Action Document for ‘Facility for Euromed dialogue and exchange of best practices*

*2.4*

*Complementary actions*

*All the thematic activities in the facility will be closely coordinated with EU policies in the respective fields through the strong implication of the concerned line Directorate General or other EU institutions in the steering of the activities. In addition to that, whenever relevant, the association of the Union for the Mediterranean will be sought, in order to give the thematic programmes of this facility additional political steering for the policies the UfM is involved in. This facility will be articulated with other regional and bilateral programmes in the respective domains. Particular attention will be paid to liaise with existing programmes dealing with audiovisual/media in the region, in order to avoid overlapping.” Aap-financing-regional-part-i-southern- Neighbourhood-action-fiches-c20145948-20140825\_en ANNEX 4, p. 7-8*

*“ANNEX 7 (p. 6)*

*South Programme II*

*Action Document for EU support to the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2015 2.4.*

*Complementary actions*

*The regular exchange of information between the UfM Secretariat, Commission services and EEAS staff and other donors and international financing institutions permits the Secretariat to fully account for all on-going actions in the design of projects to be given the UfM endorsement (so called labelling).” asap-financing-regional-part-i-southern- Neighbourhood-action-fiches-c20145948-20140825\_en ANNEX 8, p. 4*

### **Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### **Level of information and confidence**

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### **5.1.3 I-513. Evidence in monitoring reports (at project and country level) that the above measures (I-512) are implemented**

#### **Global analysis of the indicator**

With the only very recent implementation of ENI programmes, it is only possible to inform this indicator to a very limited extent based on documentary evidences.

In the East, the EaP provides a forum for exchange and cooperation through four thematic platforms (good governance, economic integration and growth, energy security and contacts between people). These platforms bring together representatives from governments, CSOs, international donors and private sector partners and thus serve the purpose of consultation with stakeholders (see I-512). In particular the platforms on good governance and contacts between people have helped to reinforce coordination, ensuring an improved overall coherence of activities in these fields. Additionally, the close cooperation with IFIs and EU MS ensured the complementarity of interventions in the support of the macroeconomic stabilisation of Ukraine in 2014 (2015 ENP regional report east).

In the South, the UfM, the Western Mediterranean Forum and frequent meetings with the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) fulfil a simi-

lar role in that they ensure improving complementarity by increasing the cooperation and consultation processes. Joint work programmes in the fields of human rights, election observation and energy are concrete results of these exchanges. (2015 ENP regional report south) In the EAMRs, overall complementarity is reported to be satisfactory, even though most of the countries do not provide examples. Furthermore, EAMRs indistinctly refer to complementarity between bilateral, thematic and regional programmes and with other EFIs. There are however several exceptions (in the EAMRs 2015) that nonetheless allow to gain a more differentiated, yet still limited, overview of ENI's internal coherence:

- **Complementarity between bilateral and regional programmes** – Egypt reports the positive effects of the sound mix of EU aid instruments and particularly highlights the synergy between bilateral and regional envelopes in the sectors of energy and water. Belarus cites the TAIEX facility as a good example. Algeria notes to be very active in identifying synergies and avoiding duplication of work, citing private development and justice sectors, ENPARD and ERASMUS+ as positive examples. Georgia highlights that bilateral and regional programmes do not cover the same topics and are as such naturally compatible. Palestine praises the high level of coordination which helped to avoid overlaps and to ensure complementarity. On the other hand, Armenia and Morocco (in particular with regards to migration) reported difficulties in the coordination between bilateral and regional programmes.
- **Complementarity between bilateral and thematic programmes** – Algeria reports efforts made to increase the complementarity, in particular in relation to the dialogue between national authorities and CSOs. Georgia states positively on complementarity, due to the high ration of thematic contracts (19%).
- **Complementarity between regional and thematic programmes** – Belarus assesses the complementarity as highly satisfactory, highlighting the fact that regional and thematic programmes allow the Delegation to be engaged in sectors which are not among the focal ones.

The ROM ENI Consolidated Annual Report from 2015 does not provide an assessment of coherence within ENI programmes. Assessing overall coherence at project level (for bilateral programmes) is difficult because their consistency is with the framework of priorities agreed with the partner country, not with the overall or regional ENI objectives or the ones of its policy framework.

The ENI survey delivered more in depth and updated views from the twelve EUD HoCs interviewed. First, it introduced a distinction between countries that signed an Association Agreement and others which didn't. In the countries (10) that signed an AA, the agreement is said to be more important than the framework set in the ENI regulation, and EC line DGs play an important role.

Second, the survey showed that all EUDs rank very high the coherence among bilateral programmes. Coherence between regional and bilateral programmes in a given country is considered lower, and this item is the one that received the most mixed comments. Coherence with EC line DGs is rarely emphasised.

### Presentation of collected proof

ENI Survey (n=12/12)

*What are the key areas where the EU Delegation was able in recent years to improve the coherence and consistency of EU actions within ENI programmes and across EU actions (among EFIs and with Union's sectorial policies/programmes)? (n=12/12)*

Not always easy to bring coherence between the regional component and the bilateral component of the ENI. The Association Agreement is more important than the ENI. There is extensive interaction with other EU line DGs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level: they are managed by HQs, we take them into account but we don't have a lot information about projects and their results. 4. For ENI programmes with intervention funded by other EFIs: we are informed and try to avoid overlap.



1. Amount ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border): yes with issues.
1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral).
1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border): there are some problems in some areas but overall it is very good. 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs but there are not many in the country.
1. Among ENI programmes in the same country. 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs: EIDHR, CSO/LA. 5. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs: DG EAC, DG Grow. But it was the same in recent years.
1. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 2. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level (e.g. between bilateral programmes and the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crises – Madad Fund – and Justice). 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs (e.g. DG Trade and Customs)
1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral): but we are not coherent in the sense that we are in many sectors because Morocco since 2011 has putting in place many reforms. Coordination is overall led by the government but there's not a development policy in the country and everything works at a sector level so it's a bit fragmented. 2. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs.
1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs.
1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs: EIDHR.
1. Among ENI programming in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs (DG Trade, DG Home, DG Research and Innovation, DG energy, DG Environment).

**Do you see EU instruments or programmes where coordination issues were faced since 2014?**

**If yes, please specify:**

**(n=12/12)**

NA
No
No.
We work with EFIs but there's room for improvement. Regional, multi-country programmes and CBC are managed by HQs and they not always follow the same strategy as bilateral programmes. It's more difficult to coordinate with people who are not in the country. Visibility when we work with other partners.
Yes but no major concerns. Sometimes EUD is not informed in advance about regional programmes.
Yes in migration with DG Home and DG EAC to some extent. On migration we have xx projects ongoing from different sources of financing and it's a real challenge. Line DGs sometimes don't understand how we work (we need approval from government) and it's a bit confusing. For instance, 2 weeks ago we had 3 seminars from different projects talking to the same people. There's a lot to do to improve coordination.
Yes. At regional level. With EFIs.
Yes. Around the EU4business programme.
Yes. Coordination between bilateral and regional programmes. Needs more coordination and better

communication.
Yes. Lack of proper donor coordination: though there are steps to improve donor coordination from government side. But we have consultations among ourselves when programming.
Yes. Regional programmes: there are many and sometimes it gets difficult.
Yes. We can improve coordination between what we do bilaterally and CBC.

### “3. STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

*The EaP multilateral dimension provides a forum for exchange and cooperation through four thematic platforms to exchange best practices on matters of mutual interest: good governance, economic integration and growth, energy security, and contacts between people. These continue to serve as forums for open discussion and include representatives from government ministries and agencies, parliaments, civil society, international organisations, international financial institutions, the private sector and economic and social partners. Supported financially by the European Commission, the four Eastern Partnership thematic platforms continued to meet twice a year to review and discuss next steps in the policy dialogue between the EU and EaP countries. The EaP platforms have seen good levels of engagement by the partner countries and the EU Member States. Panels and seminars on specific policy areas, within the framework of the four platforms, continued to deepen policy dialogue between the EU and eastern partner countries. A new set of 2014–17 work programmes has begun to be implemented. At the fourth informal EaP dialogue held in Baku on 11-12 September 2014 with energy as a sector component, the Foreign Ministers’ plenary session continued to reflect on some of the most important issues raised at the annual EaP Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 23 July 2014. The partner countries conveyed their views on the advancement of the partnership and their expectations for the EaP Summit in Riga.” 2015 ENP regional report east 2014, p. 11*

#### “3.1. Democracy, good governance and stability

*Platform 1 aims to promote democratic principles, good governance and stability by improving key sectors of governance. In 2014, the platform’s activities focused mainly on cooperation in the area of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), public administration reform, asylum and migration, improving the functioning of the judiciary and the safe management of state borders (integrated border management). Work on electoral standards, judicial reform, good governance, the fight against corruption and concerted action against cybercrime continued to benefit from the advice of the Council of Europe.*

*In 2014, the Panel on Common Security and Defence Policy cooperation agreed on a number of new activities and projects for 2015, in cooperation with the European Security and Defence College, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission and some EU Member States. The projects include joint CSDP courses and training programmes for officials from partner countries, a CSDP-related research study for several EaP countries, various workshops including on EU battle groups, a joint field visit to Georgia, and further outreach conferences with civil society.*

*Significant interest and engagement by EaP countries was shown in the Panel on migration and asylum. The work of the panel was devoted in 2014 to labour migration and migrants’ access to rights, detention, asylum and trafficking in human beings. An expert meeting on detention was held in Chişinău in March. EaP countries were keen to continue engaging with the panel. In 2015 for the first time there will be an expert meeting in Minsk. The EU and its partner countries continued their cooperation on the prevention and fight against corruption. The 6th meeting of the EaP Panel on the fight against corruption focused on preventing and fighting against corruption in public procurement, as well as training and exchanges of best practices. The activities under the Council of Europe Eastern Partnership Facility were discussed, including the ideas for the new Council of Europe/Eastern Partnership programmatic cooperation framework starting from 2015. The Panel on improved functioning of the judiciary held its third meeting in November 2014 in Kiev, focusing on councils for the judiciary, their composition, organisation, and powers. The panel took stock of the results of the 2014-17 work programme and of the cooperation under the Council of Europe Eastern Partnership Facility. The Panel on integrated border management continued to guide the implementation of the pilot projects under the integrated border management Flagship initiative. The partner countries continued to learn how to facilitate the movement of persons and goods across borders while at the same time maintaining secure borders. The panel focused on concrete practical case studies where the Military Staff of the European Union (EU MS), international organisations, the European Border Assistance Mission EUBAM and the partner countries exchanged best practices in areas such as joint border control, joint transit system or fast lane corridors. The Panel on public administration reform conducted substantial work on civil service reform, e-government, the transparency of asset declarations and on improving coopera-*

tion between governments and regional and local authorities. A new streamlined work programme began to be implemented, focusing more on improving value-based public administration legislation in line with European best practices. This was done in conjunction with the initiative on support for improvement in governance and management (SIGMA), and with the Council of Europe. In parallel, in 2014 the Commission launched a new programmatic cooperation framework with the Council of Europe for the period 2015-17. The three-year regional programme, which has financial resources of EUR 30.4 million, will provide substantial assistance to eastern partners on human rights, justice, rule of law, information society and democratic governance. The Eastern Partnership territorial cooperation support programme continued to conduct capacity building, advocacy, communication and awareness-raising activities in all the Eastern Partnership countries throughout the year. The aim was to lay the foundation for the territorial cooperation programmes established at four borders between Ukraine and Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, and Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively. The activities chiefly targeted local, regional and national authorities, civil society organisations, international donors and the media.” 2015 ENP regional report east, p. 12

#### “3.4. People-to-people contacts

Platform 4 supports interaction between EU citizens and citizens of partner countries. It focuses on students, teachers, researchers, young people, artists and cultural professionals. In 2014 the platform’s work continued to be organised in a number of EU international cooperation programmes on higher education, young people, culture and research. At the two platform meetings held in May and December, the partner countries were updated on the opportunities offered through programmes in the areas of education and youth (Erasmus+), culture and media (Creative Europe) and research (‘Horizon 2020’) and were encouraged to share good practices and reform agendas identifying areas for future cooperation.

There is strong interest in further strengthening cooperation over young people between the Eastern Partnership and EU Member States. The Eastern Partnership Youth Window has allowed more than 34 000 additional young people and youth workers from Eastern Partnership countries and ‘Youth in Action’ programme countries to participate in joint projects. Since 2014, support to activities in the field of youth and non-formal learning for young people, youth workers and organizations from Eastern Partnership countries has been made available through Erasmus+. Schools from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were actively involved in running joint projects with their European counterparts under E-Twinning Plus.

Support to the modernisation of higher education continued in 2014 within the framework of ongoing multiannual projects selected under Erasmus Mundus and Tempus. Building on these successes, the Erasmus+ programme, launched in 2014, reinforces the EU’s support for academic cooperation, and student and staff mobility by reaching out to more beneficiaries. Institutions of higher education, students and academic staff were able to apply to the call launched in October 2014.

Information days and country specific events on Erasmus+ for Eastern Partnership countries were organised by the national Erasmus+ offices in cooperation with EU Delegations to raise awareness of the opportunities afforded under the new programme.

The regional Torino Process meeting to assess progress in vocational education and training reform took place on 3-4 December 2014, giving all six EaP countries the opportunity to share their achievements in the field of vocational education and training. Stakeholders discussed achievements, challenges and priorities for vocational education and training and identified areas for potential regional cooperation.

On 23-24 October 2014 a Conference on Culture policy in Europe today: finance, management, audience development took place in Kiev, Ukraine, focusing on the strategic role of culture in the EaP countries and reviewing the experience and best practices of the European Union and Eastern Partnership countries on cultural policy development, particularly in the context of national and global transformation processes.

On research and innovation, participation by EaP researchers and research organisations increased in the final years of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, notably in the Marie Curie International Research Staff Exchange Scheme and in the second European Research Area-wide call, both of which target (in part) the EaP region. The support continued under the new Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (‘Horizon 2020’). All nominated national contact points for Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions from EaP countries participated in the first meeting of the network that took place in Athens in March 2014. The second meeting of the Eastern Partnership Panel on Research and Innovation was held on 21 May 2014.

An official launch event of ‘Horizon 2020’ was organised in March 2014 in Chişinău for researchers and innovators from EaP. Four EaP countries have demonstrated their interest through requests for

association to the 'Horizon 2020' programme. Moldova successfully completed negotiations and signed the agreement for its association to 'Horizon 2020' in June 2014 and negotiations with Ukraine were successfully completed by the end of 2014. Meanwhile, negotiations with Armenia are on-going and are due to be launched with Georgia.

A new project, E@P.Connect, was conceived by and agreed between the EU and the partner countries, aiming to provide high-capacity connectivity between the partner countries' research and education networks and with GEANT (the pan-European Research and Education Network). This EUR 13 million project will enable the entire research and education community in the partner countries (2 million people) to participate in collaborative research activities on an equal footing with their European and global peers." 2015 ENP regional report east, p. 14-15-16

### *"3.6. Cooperation with international financial institutions (IFIs)*

*In 2014 the EU decided on a more strategic focus and closer guidance at an early stage for projects implemented in cooperation and coordination with IFIs and Member State cooperation agencies. Special attention was given to projects financed under the NIF. Significant funds were mobilised in support of the macroeconomic stabilisation of Ukraine. This was done in record time and with high-impact on Ukraine's capacity to cope with the crisis it is facing. IFIs actively participated in several high-level dialogues with the EU in order to identify the main macroeconomic and strategic challenges faced by partner countries and to achieve better coordination of respective interventions and support.*

*IFIs actively participated in the Eastern Partnership's multilateral events, with a special focus on Platforms 2 (economic integration) and 3 (energy security). During panel and workshop meetings (for example on SMEs, transport and trade), IFIs presented the main results of Eastern Partnership projects implemented by blending EU and their own funds. The revised framework for strategic dialogue on the NIF and the operational board offered enhanced opportunities for dialogue with IFIs on macroeconomic development and on priority NIF projects. The aim was to better reflect the EU policy priorities and increase the impact of visibility of EU funding via an effective blending of the different sources of funding. The NIF Strategic meeting agreed upon the three strategic orientations for EU intervention: strategic infrastructure in transport and energy; support for environmental protection and mitigation of climate change effects; and sustainable and inclusive economic development, including support for the development of SMEs." 2015 ENP regional report east 2014, p. 18*

*"Many of the security, economic and social challenges in the Neighbourhood are directly linked to low levels of regional integration. Regional cooperation is essential in tackling complex common challenges such as irregular migration, terrorism and arms trafficking, or cross-border pollution, which require a coordinated response. The strengthening of regional cooperation in the region therefore remains high on the ENP's agenda. This applies to both the eastern dimension of the ENP, as embodied by the Eastern Partnership (EaP), and the southern dimension as conducted through the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity as well as in the context of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)." 2015 Joint communication on 2014 reports, p. 14*

*"The EU and southern partner countries continued to address the critical need for closer integration. Partners were eager to engage in regional activities with the EU, especially through the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the League of Arab States (LAS). The efforts for further cooperation of the EU with the Maghreb countries and with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) continued." 2015 Joint communication on 2014 reports, p. 15*

*"On the Eastern Partnership, significant progress was made on engaging relevant partner countries through the AA/ DCFTAs, which involve ambitious reform agendas in political, economic and social areas. The four Eastern Partnership thematic platforms have continued to meet twice a year to review and discuss next steps in the policy dialogue between the EU and EaP countries. The Eastern Partnership Summit in 2015 is expected to review implementation of agreed commitments and progress achieved." 2015 Joint communication on 2014 reports, p. 15*

*"The EU and some of the southern Mediterranean countries continued their mutual" engagement in regional activities, in particular through the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). EU cooperation with the Maghreb countries continued with limited results, while there was encouraging progress in relations both with the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC)." 2015 ENP regional report south 2014, p. 3*

#### “1.2.1. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

*The functioning and institutionalisation of the UfM under its EU and Jordan co-presidencies was consolidated in 2014. The UfM remained a unique forum of 43 partners,<sup>3</sup> offering a joint platform for coordinating sectoral activities, organising ministerial dialogues and promoting projects strengthening integration and economic growth in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Three UfM ministerial meetings took place in 2014. These covered industrial cooperation, the digital economy, and the environment and climate change. The UfM also held six Senior Official Meetings (SOMs). Of the 29 UfM projects which have been endorsed so far, 13 were approved in 2014. Eight (see note 1) of these projects were already being implemented in 2014. Further funding still needs to be secured for the other projects, meanwhile, and the Secretary General is continuing to manage this process. Note 1: Young women as job creators’, ‘Governance & financing for the Mediterranean water sector’, ‘LOGISMED training activities’, ‘Skills for success-Amideast’, ‘Tafila wind farm’, ‘Clusters and creative industries’, ‘Mobile financial services’ and ‘Euro Mediterranean Development Centre for MSMESs-EMDC’.” 2015 ENP regional report south 2014, p. 3*

#### “1.2.2. The 5+5 Dialogue/Western Mediterranean Forum 5

*The eleventh meeting of foreign ministers and the second Economic and Business Forum took place in Lisbon in May. Implementation of the Joint Communication on closer cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb continued. The areas for cooperation are security, energy/water, academic mobility, business networks and civil society. Note 1: The Western Mediterranean Forum, commonly referred to as the ‘5+5 Dialogue’, is an informal sub-regional forum comprising Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia from the southern shores of the Mediterranean and France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain from the northern shores.” 2015 ENP regional report south 2014, p. 3*

#### “1.2.3. The League of Arab States (LAS)

*The EU and the LAS held their third foreign affairs ministerial meeting in Athens in June 2014. The ministerial declaration covered cross-cutting issues (human rights, tolerance and terrorism) and political topics (the Middle East Peace Process, Syria and Libya). The establishment of an unprecedented strategic dialogue marked a positive development in relations between the two organisations. The aim of this dialogue was to introduce regular and institutionalised exchanges on political and security issues, including crisis management, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, transnational organised crime and weapons of mass destruction. The EU and LAS also undertook to reinforce dialogue and co-operation between respective business and other civil society organisations. Implementation of the EULAS joint work programme of cooperation continued with activities in the fields of human rights, election observation and energy. Two diplomatic training programmes were organised for the LAS under the EU regional project on EU-Arab diplomacy.” 2015 ENP regional report south 2014, p. 3-4*

#### “1.2.4. The Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

*High-level OIC-EU consultations took place in Brussels in September in the first meeting between the two organisations since the new OIC Secretary General, Iyad Madani of Saudi Arabia, took office in January. The OIC and the EU agreed to establish a common basis for partnerships in different areas of cooperation, including a dialogue between the Muslim world and the EU. The OIC-EU partnership aims to improve cooperation in a wide range of areas, from interreligious dialogue to economic and political matters. In November the OIC Independent Human Rights Commission Delegation made its first visit to the EU institutions to discuss human rights issues. This engagement with the OIC is potentially an effective way to improve mutual understanding. Joint operational exchanges addressing humanitarian crises in the region (including in Iraq and Syria) were set up. New contacts were made and work was done to promote tolerance and interreligious respect.” 2015 ENP regional report south 2014, p. 4*

*“After joining the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership, Armenia took steps towards finalising the investment agreement and preparing projects. In July, the Public Services Regulatory Commission increased electricity tariffs by 10 % on average. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources announced a new investment project for the construction of solar stations. A planned electrical interconnection between Georgia and Armenia will be supported by the EU’s Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). With regard to nuclear energy, the early closure and decommissioning of the Medzamor nuclear power plant remains a key objective for the EU and the ENP Action Plan.” 2015 Armenia ENP report, p. 13*

*“Azerbaijan’s law enforcement authorities participated in the bilateral workshop held by the Czech Police Academy on the fight against cross-border organised crime and also in the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) forum for public prosecutors. In July 2014, Azerbaijan approved the 2014-18 national action plan on combating human trafficking.” 2015 Azerbaijan ENP report, p. 11*

*“A solid waste management sector was set up under the authority of the Ministry for Environment, and a draft national solid waste management policy document was prepared. With the support of the EU, Egypt also launched further reforms in the water sector. The ‘integrated Lake Burullus’ project, which includes the construction of a waste water treatment plant in Kafr El Sheikh and which was supported by the EU Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), was one of the four leading projects selected by the Mediterranean Hot-Spot Identification Programme’s Project Preparation Implementation Facility under the ‘Horizon 2020’ Initiative for a cleaner Mediterranean Sea.” 2015 Egypt ENP report, p. 13*

*“The EU launched its new Framework Programme for Science, Research, Innovation and Technology, called ‘Horizon 2020’, for the South Med region in Cairo in February 2014. The ShERACA+ project, aiming to strengthen bi-lateral cooperation between the EU and Egypt in science, research, innovation and technology, was launched in January 2014. The RDI-II programme approved financing for 26 research and innovation projects.” 2015 Egypt ENP report, p. 13*

*“As regards technical and vocational education and training (TVET), the government created a National Human Resources Development Council (chaired by the Prime Minister) with two Executive Councils (for TVET and for skills development). The position of a Deputy Minister of Education in charge of Technical Education was created in spring. Egypt participated in the Tempus programme with 34 on-going projects out of which 7 are coordinated by an Egyptian higher education institution. 453 students and staff were selected in 2014 within partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus. Eight master students and five doctoral candidates received scholarships to participate in joint masters and doctoral programmes. Three organisations were selected for funding under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under ‘Horizon 2020’. Youth and youth organisations benefited from Erasmus+, with 346 participants in mobility projects and 41 in the action for young people and decision-makers in the field of youth.” 2015 Egypt ENP report, p. 14*

*“A ‘science screening’ to identify the most promising ‘research clusters’ was launched. In February 2014 an Innovation and Technology Agency was established by the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development to coordinate efforts to encourage innovation and technology development. In October Georgia formally requested association to the EU Horizon 2020 programme and negotiations are due to begin during 2015.” 2015 Georgia ENP report, p. 15*

*“The Ministry of Education and Science started an overall assessment of the education sector with a view to elaborating a new, holistic strategy to improve the quality of education. The implementation of the action plan for the 2014-20 national vocational education and training (VET) strategy continued. The development of new VET programmes using a modular approach and the evaluation of the National Qualification Framework continued. The National VET Council was not approved yet. The Ministry of Sports and Youth elaborated a youth strategy and action plan. Georgia participated in the Tempus programme with 35 ongoing projects out of which 5 are coordinated by a Georgian higher education institution. 491 students and staff were selected in 2014 for mobility within partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus and two students were selected for joint master's degree. 19 researchers and 132 staff members benefited from Marie Curie actions and two applications were selected for funding under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under ‘Horizon 2020’. Georgia also participated in the eTwinning plus action with 68 schools. Young people and youth organisations benefited from Erasmus+, with 2 111 participants in mobility projects and 145 taking part in the action for young people and decision-makers in the field of youth.” 2015 Georgia ENP report, p. 15*

*“Israel and the European Training Foundation maintained their strong relationship on vocational education and training. There was growing interest among Israeli authorities in participating in peer learning regional studies and activities related to the National Quality Framework, efficiency and quality of education and training. This resulted in more structural cooperation based on the Torino Process Reviews.*

Israel participated in the Tempus programme with 13 running projects, in six of those as coordinator. 270 Israeli students and staff were selected in 2014 within partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus. Four master students and one doctoral candidate received scholarships to participate in joint masters and doctoral programmes. 43 organisations were selected for funding under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under 'Horizon 2020'. Youth and youth organisations benefited from Erasmus +, with 283 participants in mobility projects and five in the action for young people and decision-makers in the field of youth." 2015 Israel ENP report, p. 13

"'Horizon 2020' and the 'support to research and technological development' programme were launched in Jordan in June, and focus on four key areas (water, energy, food and health), in line with national research priorities. A series of 'Horizon 2020' thematic brokerage events also took place in Jordan, promoting cooperation with EU partners. A project funded by the 7th EU Framework Research Programme resulted in the establishment of the first cancer biobank in Jordan and the whole Middle East region (KHCCBIO). With the support of the World Bank, the Higher Council for Science and Technology developed a national innovation strategy for 2014-17. In September the SESAME's 800-million-electron volt booster went into operation, making it the first high-energy accelerator in the Middle East. Jordan invested EUR 220,000 in the first joint call launched by the EU funded project for alignment of research programmes Euro-Mediterranean – ERANETMED." 2015 Jordan ENP report, p. 12

"Jordan participated in the Tempus programme with 23 on-going projects, eight of which were coordinated by Jordanian universities. 284 Jordanian students and staff were selected within partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus and one student received scholarships to participate in a joint master. One organisation was selected for funding under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under 'Horizon 2020'. Youth and youth organisations benefitted from Erasmus +, with 364 participants in mobility projects and 36 in a project for young people and decisionmakers in the youth field. In June the second Arab-Euro Conference on Higher Education took place in Amman, with the participation of 200 presidents of Arab and European universities." 2015 Jordan ENP report, p. 13

"The agriculture development strategy for 2010-2014 was credited with helping to increase that sector's share of GDP to 5 %, from 3.85 % in 2010. The agricultural strategy for 2015- 2019, elaborated with the help of the EU under the Lebanon ENPARD initiative, was signed in December 2014." 2015 Lebanon ENP report, p. 9

"Lebanon invested EUR 200,000 in the first joint call of the EU funded project for alignment of Euro-Mediterranean research programmes (ERANETMED). Lebanon is among the most active participants in the Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) and the Euro-Mediterranean Innovation Agenda as well as in the recently launched science diplomacy platform Middle East Research and Innovation Dialogue (MERID). It is important to increase public information so as to enhance Lebanon's participation in research cooperation, notably in the EU 'Horizon 2020' Programme, for which a newly set-up thematic network of national contact points and a dedicated web portal have been put in place." 2015 Lebanon ENP report, p. 13

"With regard to the reform of the vocational education and training (VET) system, the further deployment of the National Qualifications Framework was delayed. The work on introduction of entrepreneurship as a key competence in education continued, the validation of entrepreneurship modules and their introduction in the normal curricula is under way. A pilot project was set up to establish Guidance and Employment Offices in 11 VET schools.

Lebanon participated in the Tempus programme with 23 on-going projects out of which three are coordinated by a Lebanese higher education institution. 201 students and staff were selected within partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus and five master students and one doctoral candidate were awarded scholarship/fellowship under joint programmes. One organisation was selected for funding under the renamed Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under 'Horizon 2020'. Youth and youth organisations benefited from Erasmus+, with 118 participants in mobility projects." 2015 Lebanon ENP report, p. 14

"The government adopted the national agriculture and rural development strategy for 2014-20. An action plan to complement the strategy is currently passing through interministerial consideration. It will be paid for out of the national budget and from other external sources of funding, including the EU-

funded European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD) for Moldova (for which an agreement was signed in November) and the European Investment Bank.” 2015 Moldova ENP report, p. 11

“A new Science and Innovation Code was adopted. One of the main objectives was to stimulate innovation by fostering applied research and by encouraging closer cooperation between the academic and the research sectors. In March the Moldovan Academy of Sciences organised the official regional launch of the 'Horizon 2020' Programme, with the participation of representatives of the Eastern Partnership. During the preparatory phase, the Academy of Sciences, working on behalf of the Moldovan Government, drew up the necessary institutional framework so that Moldovan institutions can participate effectively in Horizon 2020 calls for tender. In July Moldova and the EU signed an agreement on Moldova's participation in the 'Horizon 2020' Programme. Moldova is the first Eastern Partnership country who signed up to the programme. A collaboration agreement on nuclear forensics was renewed in 2014 between the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities of Moldova. JRC was asked by Moldova to provide forensics support in a criminal case involving trading in radioactive substances.” 2015 Moldova ENP report, p. 17-18

“Moldova participated in the Tempus programme with 18 on-going projects. 314 students and staff were selected in 2014 for mobility within partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus and five students were selected for a joint master's degree. One application was selected for funding under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under 'Horizon 2020'. 47 Moldovan schools participated in the eTwinning plus project. Young people and youth organisations benefited from Erasmus +, with 868 participants in mobility projects and 96 in the action for young people and decision-makers in the field of youth. In January Moldova enacted its 'Culture 2020' national strategy for the development of culture. The strategy and its accompanying action plan for implementation are important steps towards modernising cultural policy.” 2015 Moldova ENP report, p. 18

“Moldova continued its technical cooperation with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) under an EU-funded regional project on preparatory measures to support the participation of ENP countries in ECDC activities. Moldova nominated a national correspondent for relations with the ECDC and the national correspondent carried out a shortterm expert secondment there. Moldova participated actively in the first 'National ECDC Correspondent meeting' in May 2014 and also attended technical workshops on HIV/AIDS and vaccine-preventable diseases and the annual European scientific conference on applied intervention epidemiology.” 2015 Moldova ENP report, p. 19

“Le Maroc a continué à participer au projet d'assistance technique de la Politique Maritime Intégrée (IMP-MED). Il a aussi participé à la réunion annuelle du Forum de la fonction de garde côte pour la Méditerranée (MedCGFF).” 2015 Morocco ENP report, p. 12

“Le Maroc est impliqué dans le programme Tempus avec 40 projets en cours dont 4 sont coordonnés par une université marocaine. 227 étudiants et personnel ont été sélectionnés au sein de partenariats soutenus par Erasmus Mundus et trois bourses ont été attribuées à des étudiants marocains afin de participer à des mastères conjoints. Six candidatures été sélectionnées pour les actions Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA) dans le cadre de Horizon 2020.

Les jeunes marocains, travailleurs de la jeunesse et organisations de jeunesse marocains ont pu bénéficier des opportunités offertes par le programme Erasmus+ avec 233 participants aux projets de mobilité des jeunes et travailleurs de la jeunesse et six à des rencontres avec des décideurs politiques.

Le Ministre de la culture a annoncé le lancement d'une stratégie Maroc Culturelle à l'horizon 2020. La coopération dans le cadre des programmes Euromed Audiovisuel et MedCulture continue.” 2015 Morocco ENP report, p. 15-16

“In the area of Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), Palestine participated in the EU-funded IMP-MED Project providing assistance on cross-sectorial marine and maritime issues.” 2015 Palestine ENP report, p. 9



*“In the area of research and innovation, two projects with Palestinian participation were selected for the first 'Horizon 2020' calls: the Middle East research and innovation dialogue, promoting science diplomacy and cooperation between the EU and the Middle East, and the Beyond Project, promoting space cooperation. A series of promotional 'Horizon 2020' events took place during the year in An-najah. The Scientific Research Council at the Ministry of Education and Higher Education launched an initiative on establishing research centres of excellence in Palestinian universities. As a result, 20 proposals from different universities in West Bank and Gaza were submitted (in fields ranging from health, water, energy, agriculture to nanotechnology, e-learning and others).” 2015 Palestine ENP report, p. 12*

*“Palestine participated in the Tempus programme with 14 on-going projects, five of which are coordinated by Palestinian universities. 205 Palestinian students and staff were selected in 2014 within partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus and two students received scholarships to participate in joint master's programme. In 2014 no candidates were selected for funding under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under 'Horizon 2020'.*

*Young people and youth organisations benefited from Erasmus +, with 532 people taking part in mobility projects. Cooperation on MedCulture and Euromed Audiovisual programmes continued.” 2015 Palestine ENP report, p. 12*

*“Palestine continued its technical cooperation with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) in the framework of an EU-funded regional project on preparatory measures to support participation by ENP countries in ECDC activities. Palestine nominated a national correspondent for relations with the ECDC.” 2015 Palestine ENP report, p. 13*

*“La Tunisie a entamé les démarches pour la définition d'une nouvelle stratégie agricole afin de renforcer le développement agricole et rural. Il s'agit d'augmenter l'attractivité des territoires ruraux en valorisant durablement les ressources locales agricoles et non agricoles, au bénéfice de l'insertion économique et sociale des groupes plus vulnérables. L'UE accompagnera ce processus par le biais d'un programme pilote de 10 millions d'euros dans le cadre de l'initiative ENPARD.” 2015 Tunisia ENP report, p. 10*

*“La Tunisie a continué sa participation active au Groupe de travail thématique sur la politique maritime intégrée (IMP) en Méditerranée et a bénéficié d'assistance technique dans le cadre du projet de l'UE IMP-MED.” 2015 Tunisia ENP report, p. 12*

*“Par ailleurs, dans ce contexte, un nouveau programme en matière de gestion intégrée des frontières et de mise en place d'un système national d'asile a été élaboré et sera financé à partir de 2015. La conception de ce programme répond aux recommandations formulées lors de la revue par les pairs « Gestion des frontières: contrôle et surveillance, fraude documentaire et protection des migrants » effectuée en avril 2013 dans le cadre d'un projet financé par l'UE. L'UE continue à soutenir plusieurs initiatives à caractère bilatéral et régional (Euromed Migration III, nouveau projet Frontex5 / European Asylum Support Office, EASO) dans le cadre desquelles les autorités tunisiennes participent activement.” 2015 Tunisia ENP report, p. 13*

*« La Tunisie prend part au programme Tempus avec 40 projets en cours. 315 étudiants et personnel ont été sélectionnés au sein de partenariats soutenus par Erasmus Mundus et une bourse a été attribuée à un étudiant afin de participer à un des masters conjoints. Deux candidatures ont été sélectionnées pour les actions Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA) dans le cadre d'Horizon 2020.*

*La Tunisie a participé au programme eTwinning Plus avec 34 écoles actives et 87 enseignants impliqués. Les jeunes tunisiens, travailleurs de la jeunesse et organisations de jeunesse ont pu bénéficier des opportunités offertes par le programme Erasmus+ avec 232 participants aux projets de mobilité des jeunes et travailleurs de la jeunesse et 33 à des rencontres avec des décideurs politiques. La coopération a continué dans le cadre des programmes d'Euromed Audiovisuel et de MedCulture.” 2015 Tunisia ENP report, p. 15-16*

*“ La Tunisie a également participé au développement du programme méditerranéen de formation à l'épidémiologie d'intervention (MediPIET), financé par l'UE et mis en oeuvre sous la direction scientifique du Centre européen de prévention et de contrôle des maladies (ECDC). Ce programme vise à renforcer les capacités nationales et régionales en matière de surveillance et de réaction aux me-*

naces transfrontières graves sur la santé au travers de la mise en place d'un réseau d'épidémiologistes. La Tunisie a accueilli la conférence de lancement de la seconde phase de ce programme en septembre et inscrit deux stagiaires au sein de la première promotion du programme." 2015 Tunisia ENP report, p. 16

"On research and innovation, the EU-Ukraine cooperation agreement on science and technology was renewed in 2014. Ukraine expressed its willingness to take part in the EUfunded 'Horizon 2020' research programme, and a bilateral agreement was successfully negotiated in November 2014. Ukrainian entities participate in several collaborative projects under the 7th EU Research Framework Programme and in the first Calls for Proposals under 'Horizon 2020'. Ukraine is also active in the Eastern Partnership Panel on Research and Innovation." 2015 Ukraine ENP report, p. 19

"Ukraine participated in the Tempus programme with 60 on-going projects. 786 students and staff were selected for mobility within partnership supported by Erasmus Mundus and 31 masters students and six PhD candidates were selected for joint master's degrees or joint doctoral programme. 11 applications were selected for funding under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (MSCA) under 'Horizon 2020'. Ukraine also participated in the eTwinning plus project with 86 schools. Young people and youth organisations benefited from the Youth in Action programme, with 2 349 people taking part in mobility projects and 264 in the project for young people and decision-makers in this field.

The Ministry of Culture expressed interest in Ukraine's participation in the Creative Europe programme. Ukraine hosted the conference "Cultural Policy in Europe Today: Finance, Management, Audience Development" on the strategic role of culture in the Eastern Partnership countries. Ukraine also participated as a leader or partner in 10 regional projects within the Eastern Partnership Culture programme." 2015 Ukraine ENP report, p. 19

EAMRs indistinctly refer to the complementarity between bilateral, thematic and regional programmes and with other EFIs. Overall, complementarity is reported to be satisfactory though most countries do not give examples. For instance Tunisia only reports "Bon mix d'instruments" (EAMR Tunisia 2013, 7).

Exceptions can be found in e.g. Israel and Libya where EU Delegations provide more detailed information and successful examples. Regarding complementarity amongst different financial instruments EIDHR, IcSP are the most commonly mentioned.

Some good practices can be found in:

- *Bilateral – regional complementarity:* Algeria "En ce qui concerne les synergies et la complémentarité entre la coopération bilatérale et la coopération régionale, elles sont bien présentes actuellement, grâce à la mise en place d'une répartition par thématique des portefeuilles au sein de la section opérationnelle." (EAMR Algeria 2013, 8); Armenia "There is, in particular, a positive contribution of regional projects to the bilateral portfolio in the field of private sector development and governance." (EAMR Armenia 2013, 14); Egypt "Also there is a large degree of synergy between bilateral and regional programmes for what concerns energy and water. Coordination between the FP7, TEMPUS, ERASMUS and RTD grants provided at bilateral level is especially successful." (EAMR Egypt 2013, 10); Jordan "In general there's good complementarity between national and regional instruments." (EAMR Jordan 2013, 8).

- *Bilateral- thematic complementarity:* Lebanon "La complémentarité entre l'enveloppe bilatérale ENFI et les lignes thématiques est particulièrement prise en compte pour assurer la cohérence de notre coopération." (EAMR Lebanon 2013, 8); Morocco "La Délégation renforce depuis quelques années la complémentarité entre les programmes bilatéraux et les programmes thématiques." (EAMR Morocco 2013, 12).

- *Thematic-regional:* Belarus "Simultaneously, regional and thematic programmes allow the delegation to be engaged in sectors which are not among the focal ones." (EAMR Belarus 2013, 7).

- *Thematic-bilateral:* Georgia "Thus the thematic support is in essence complementary to the main national instruments [...]" (EAMR Georgia 2013, 8)

Nevertheless, challenging examples are found in e.g.: Algeria "Le renforcement de la complémentarité entre les instruments bilatéraux et les instruments thématiques de la Commission demeure un objectif à améliorer, notamment via le renforcement du dialogue entre les autorités nationales et la société civile algérienne" (EAMR Algeria 2013, 8); Lebanon "A l'inverse, la cohérence entre coopération bilatérale et régionale (au Sud de la Méditerranée) nous semble insuffisante." (EAMR Lebanon 2013, 8); Libya "Regional programmes have been opened to Libya although Libyan participation is still scarce." (EAMR Libya 2013, 7); Syria "EU Bilateral (national) projects were suspended in May 2011. Syria's

participation in regional projects was subsequently suspended in September 2011.” (EAMR Syria 2013, 9); Ukraine “There is generally good complementarity between the national and regional programmes which complement the interventions in the focal sectors. However, some regional programmes (e.g. SME support, environment, energy efficiency, Support to Council of Europe) risked overlap with national programmes.” (EAMR Ukraine 2013, 8).

“Le renforcement de la complémentarité entre les instruments bilatéraux et les instruments thématiques de la Commission demeure un objectif à améliorer, notamment via le renforcement du dialogue entre les autorités nationales et la société civile algérienne. La DUE est en train de mieux structurer un dialogue déjà très riche avec la société civile (ONGs, syndicats, acteurs économiques). L'intégration de la société civile dans le nombre de bénéficiaires et d'acteurs de tous les grands programmes bilatéraux, qui est une réalité depuis 2012, devra contribuer beaucoup pour mieux intégrer les deux instruments, ainsi que la conclusion d'une cartographie de la société civile, qui est en train de se terminer et qui permettra d'élargir le nombre d'interlocuteurs sectoriels de la DUE. \En ce qui concerne les synergies et la complémentarité entre la coopération bilatérale et la coopération régionale, elles sont bien présentes actuellement, grâce à la mise en place d'une répartition par thématique des portefeuilles au sein de la section opérationnelle. Ainsi, les gestionnaires opérationnels qui ont la responsabilité d'un secteur de travail donné assument à la fois le suivi de la mise en oeuvre des activités sectorielles bilatérales et régionales, y compris dans le cadre des sous comités thématiques de suivi de la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord d'Association. Cette répartition des tâches contribue à renforcer la cohérence entre la gestion des programmes bilatéraux, la gestion des projets régionaux, la gestion de l'information sectorielle et la participation à des activités dans le secteur qui se déroulent en Algérie ou dans la région. Par contre, la coordination et les synergies entre les différents ministères et autres administrations impliquées dans une même problématique sectorielle demeurent difficiles. Le recours à l'appui budgétaire devrait permettre d'améliorer cet aspect et contribuer progressivement au décloisonnement sectoriel, ce qui constitue un problème majeur pour la coopération et en général pour la gestion sectorielle en Algérie.” EAMR Algeria 2013, p. 8

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific and joint survey)

Interviews – NEAR; EEAS, Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 5.2 JC52: ENI programmes are aligned with the evolving ENP policy and, where relevant, the EU development policy

### 5.2.1 I-521. Evidence that expected results of ENI programmes are consistent with ENI priorities indicated in Article 2 and in annex 2 of the ENI Regulation

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The ENI Regulation is the key document for the implementation of the instrument and is legally binding: no action/programme can be implemented or financed under the ENI if it is in contradiction to the Regulation. As a consequence, by design, all ENI actions/programmes have to follow the provisions of the Regulation, meaning that they have to present expected results consistent with the specific objectives of the Regulation in order to be eligible. In Article 2(4) the Regulation extends this definition of consistency from its specific objectives to the overall objectives of the ENI, thus allowing for more flexibility. In addition, the Regulation also provides mechanisms to respond to severe crises and emergencies with actions implemented by ENI funds even though this is not foreseen in its objectives (e.g. via “delegated act” or by reviewing the relevant programming documents in cases of emergencies).

As a consequence of the Regulation’s binding nature, its specific objectives have been directly translated into all other major programming documents (MIPs, SSFs, RSP) and are in turn taken up from there by individual action documents. Based on an analysis of Quality Review Documents, actions have indeed been found to be well aligned with ENI objectives to which they strive to contribute through various different means and strategies. Most pro-

grammes refer mainly to the first four specific objectives set in Article 2 of the Regulation, i.e. human rights/governance, economic integration, migration/mobility and inclusive development. Where necessary, the QSG has questioned the expected results and the implementation of the action, asking for a further clarification of its supposed contribution to the ENI objectives (e.g. PAR in Georgia), thus evidencing that the quality review contributes to ensuring coherence.

In light of the above, there is coherence between the Regulation and the actions implemented under ENI. However, the Neighbourhood has changed dramatically since the Regulation was adopted and its original objective of creating an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness by focusing on medium to long term support has somehow lost its purpose. In the present situation of rampant crises, urgent solutions have to be implemented effectively in the short to medium term. Although the Regulation is flexible enough and does not restrict the implementation of these emergency actions, it does not provide guiding principles and specific instructions.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“The objectives and results need to be clarified, streamlined and aligned with the SSF, ideally reducing the number of objectives and taking on board references to the PAR principles of the EU as well as the Georgian PAR Roadmap. The correspondence of the “budget support components” to the objectives/results needs to be clarified or they can be removed.”* Support to the Public Administration Reform in Georgia – Conclusions of the QSG2 meeting of 13 March 2015.

*“Horizontal issues that are of much relevance to the ENPI include flexibility and ability to react to crisis and unforeseen situations. In the Neighbourhood, addressing protracted crisis remains one of the key challenges. Any solution within the ENPI will need to be coherent with the political choices on the future Instrument for Stability (notably its scope and size) and its relationship with geographic instruments. The current mechanisms for rapid interventions in case of crises have functioned well and should be further strengthened.”* COM(2011) 839 – EC proposal for establishing ENI, p. 36

#### *“Specific objective 1: Accelerating political association*

##### *Expected Results:*

- Accelerated political association through well functioning Eastern partnership Platforms and panels in the respective sectors of cooperation
- Improved democracy and good governance throughout the region
- Strengthened cooperation on migration management systems, border management and law enforcement
- Strengthened Eastern European partner countries' capacity to participate in EU led missions and operations

#### *Specific objective 2: Deepening sustainable economic development and integration and sector cooperation, including environment and climate change*

##### *Expected Results:*

- Improved development of SMEs including the creation of a climate conducive to trade, investment and regional integration
- Fostering entrepreneurship, innovation, creativity
- Access to finance, public-private cooperation are promoted
- Convergence with EU policies and regulatory approximation
- Enhanced cooperation on environment issues among partner countries
- Enhanced cooperation on policy reforms, with priority on water management and green economy,
- Climate change adaptation and mitigation commitments are implemented at regional and national level
- Further integration of Eastern European partner countries and EU energy markets
- Improved transport links between the EU and the partner countries and between partner countries
- Improved convergence with EU norms and standards
- Transport related agreements between EU and partner countries are signed and implemented
- Specific measures taken to enhance trade facilitation
- Enhanced cooperation on Agriculture and Rural Development

#### *Specific objective 3: Enhancing support to civil society, local authorities and people to people contacts*

##### *Expected Results:*

##### *Increased people to people contacts*

- Strengthened cooperation on bridging the gap between research and innovation
- Strengthened capacity of regional civil society networks and organisations

- Local authorities, communities, civil society, business associations and representative employers' organisations and trade-unions are strengthened in developing solutions for municipal development

Specific objective 4: Flagship Initiatives

Expected Results:

- Improved integrated border management and mobility of – Number of mobility dialogues and visa – Ministries and agencies in charge of 23 citizens (see under objective 1)
- Enhanced sustainable municipal development, also encompassing the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (E5P)
- Promote Good Environmental Governance and Prevent Climate Change (see under objective 2)
- Improved prevention, preparedness and response to natural and man-made disasters

Sector 2: Priorities under the regional cooperation frameworks

Specific objective 1: Promote sustainable development and the improvement of the environment

Expected Results:

- Improved cooperation on environmental protection and energy efficiency in the Northern Dimension region
  - Improved environmental situation of the Black Sea
- Specific objective 2: Infrastructure development and interconnections
- Improved transport links between the TEN-T network and the network developed by the Northern Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics
  - Improved transport cooperation in the Black Sea region

Sector 3: Energy and transport initiatives involving the wide region

Expected Results:

- Improved energy markets convergence, energy security, development and efficiency
- Investment attraction towards energy projects is facilitated
- Improved development of the transport corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia and transport market convergence
- Investment attraction towards transport projects is facilitated

Sector 4: Horizontal and sectoral support

Expected Results:

- Support to the Eastern Partnership multilateral cooperation process -
- Supported Eastern Partnership multilateral cooperation process
- Supported Northern Dimension and Black Sea Synergy cooperation processes

Specific objective 2: Eastern Partnership visibility

Expected Results:

- Enhanced visibility of the Eastern Partnership
- Support for identification and formulation of programmes and information activities provided” 2014 ENI East RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 19-20-21-22-23-24-25

“Objective 1: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR LIBERTY, DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

Expected Results:

- a) Domestic reform efforts towards democratic transition, rule of law, peace are sustained and reinforced through cooperation at regional or sub regional level and enhanced capacity of stakeholders.

Objective 2: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Expected Results:

- b) Domestic reform efforts towards developing opportunities for private sector development and investments benefit from further encouragement through regional exchanges of best practices and political impetus
- c) Increased degree of convergence of domestic policies on environment, climate change, water, energy, and integrated maritime approach in the region

Objective 3: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE

Expected Results:

- d) Civil society in the region further empowered to participate in policy dialogue and policy making.

Objective 4: SUPPORT REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION

Expected Results:

- e) Closer regional or sub regional cooperation between EU and Mediterranean and between Mediterranean countries is enhanced” 2014 ENI South RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 17-18-19

“6.1 Building a partnership for sustainable and inclusive economic development and integration

Expected results: higher level of investments in public infrastructure and productive sectors, job creation and private sector development, in line with the Neighbourhood Investment Facility's Strategic Orientations. This will contribute to achieving EU political objectives under ENP (e. g. integration into

the EU's internal market), as well as poverty reduction and sustainable economic, social and environmental development. During the period 2008-2013, NIF provided EUR 753 million in grants and thereby leveraged an estimated EUR 8.1 billion of loans from the European Financing Institutions. For 2014- 2017, the EU has indicatively earmarked EUR 595 million for NIF, which may be complemented by funds from ENP regional and/or bilateral programmes, and by direct contributions from Member States to the NIF trust fund, which is managed by the European Investment Bank.

#### 6.3 Targeted capacity building

*Expected results: faster approximation of the regulatory framework to EU norms and standards and improved public administration capacity will contribute to public governance development and progressive integration into the EU internal market*

#### 6.4: Incentive-based approach

*Expected results: contributing to promote progress and reforms in the areas of deep and sustainable democracy and respect for human rights.*

#### ERASMUS

*Specific objective 1: Improve the skills and competences of students and staff, and the employability of graduates through mobility*

*The main expected results to be achieved are:*

1. Improved and diversified degrees that incorporate studies abroad
2. Enhanced skills and improved learning performance for students
3. Improved competences of staff in their field of expertise and understanding of education policies, practices and systems
4. Improved level of competences and skills of Master graduates
5. Increased employability and career prospects for students
6. Reinforced institutional capacities of higher education institutions
7. Significant participation of students and staff from the least developed regions of partner countries

*Specific objective 2: Support the modernisation, internationalisation, accessibility and of higher education in the Partner countries*

*Expected results:*

*The main expected results to be achieved are:*

1. Improved quality and access to higher education and enhanced relevance of higher education programmes for the labour market and society
2. Improved level of competences and skills in HEIs through the development of new and innovative education programmes
3. Enhanced management, governance and innovation capacities, as well as the internationalisation of HEIs
4. Increased capacities of national authorities to modernise their higher education systems, by supporting the definition, implementation and monitoring of reform policies
5. Regional integration and cooperation across different countries through joint initiatives, sharing of good practices and cooperation” 2014 ENI strategic priorities and MIP 2014-2017, p. 13-16

#### “Private Sector Development (indicative 35%)

*The overall objective will be to create employment opportunities by enhancing private sector development in Armenia.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To improve the national business and investment climate for the small and medium enterprises;*

*To improve the economic competitiveness of Armenian regions.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 1.1.1. Increased business opportunities and access to finance for small and medium enterprises*

*Result 1.1.2. Strengthened public private dialogue and partnership*

*Result 1.1.3. Improved labour market efficiency*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 1.2.1. Increased investment and business opportunities in targeted economic sectors and regions*

*Result 1.2.2. Strengthened capacity and performance of farmers associations and cooperatives*

#### Public Administration Reform

*The overall objective will be to improve transparency, accountability and efficiency of the public administration at central, regional and local levels.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To enhance public administration systems and professionalism of the civil service;*

*To improve the quality of public finance management;*

*To make public service delivery at central, regional and local levels more efficient and effective.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 2.1.1. Civil service reform implemented according to EU shared principles*

*Result 2.1.2. Strengthened statistical capacity in the economic, demographic, social and environmental fields at municipal and regional levels*

*Result 2.1.3. Reduced corruption in the public service*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 2.2.1. Improved budget credibility and transparency*

*For specific objective 3*

*Result 2.3.1. Citizen-oriented multifunctional service centres (one-stop shops) established for public service delivery*

*Result 2.3.2. Enhanced provision of e-governance services*

*Result 2.3.3. Optimised and strengthened municipal services, including integrated social services*

*Justice sector reform*

*The overall objective will be to improve the justice system in Armenia and to enhance protection of Human Rights.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To contribute to the development of a more independent, transparent, accountable, accessible and efficient justice system,*

*To promote effective and timely protection of human rights.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 3.1.1. Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, prosecution and lawyers*

*Result 3.1.2. More effective and regulated legal process*

*Result 3.1.3. Improved accountability and transparency of judicial proceedings and of nomination and performance assessment of judges*

*Result 3.1.4. Improved access to justice and free legal aid for citizens*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 3.2.1. Improved conditions and reduced ill-treatment in penitentiary institutions and police custody*

*Result 3.2.2. A justice system that fully safeguards the universal human right to a fair and impartial trial as established in international and European conventions*

*4. Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*5. Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three principal priority sectors.*

*This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative.*

*Capacity development and institution building activities – either through sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.” 2014 Armenia SSF 2014-2017, p. 8-11*

### *“3.1 Regional and Rural Development*

*3.1.1 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The overall objective is to support Government efforts in the diversification of the economy while promoting a balanced and inclusive growth, decrease regional disparities and improve rural livelihoods.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*Objective 1: To contribute to business development, investment promotion and employment generation across economic regions of Azerbaijan.*

*Objective 2: To enhance democratic participation, institutional capacity and efficiency in the field of local governance and regional development*

*Objective 3: To raise rural livelihoods and quality of life in rural areas.*

*3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*Increased competitiveness of regions and their enterprises;*

*Improved basic rural infrastructure and business services;*

*Community mobilisation ensured through strengthened rural institutions and organizations, such as producer organizations and cooperatives;*

*Market-driven pilot initiatives using a value-chain approach for employment generation in areas related to agriculture, agro-processing, handicraft and tourism implemented.*

*For Specific Objective 2:*

*Policy, legislative and institutional framework for the local self-governance in Azerbaijan is aligned to European Charter of Local-Self-Government;*

*Institutional capacity at national and regional level to plan, implement and administer programmes in the field of regional development and territorial planning strengthened;*

*Participatory and democratic approach to local development enhanced by fostering partnership, participation and bottom-up initiatives at local (and regional) level;*

*Improved efficiency, transparency, accountability and quality of service delivery at the local level.*

*For Specific Objective 3:*

*Improved infrastructure and access to social services for the rural population;*

*Improved environmental sustainability and land management of rural areas;*

*Increased diversification of economic activity and employment opportunities.*

*3.2 Justice Sector reform*

*3.2.2 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The expected long term impact will be the strengthening of the rule of law, including the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, transparency and accountability, full access to justice by all citizenry, and the right to a fair trial.*

*Objective 1: Ensure the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability of the justice system and respect for human rights;*

*Objective 2: Ensure the independence, impartiality, integrity and transparency of the judiciary;*

*Objective 3: Enhance citizens' access to justice.*

*3.2.3. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*An effective and efficient justice system fully safeguarding human rights is established ensuring a fair and impartial trial;*

*Improved capacity, knowledge and integrity of the main actors of the justice system;*

*Juvenile justice reform implemented in accordance with European and international standards;*

*Improved accountability and transparency of the justice system;*

*Custodial conditions including respect of human rights in penitentiary institutions improved. For Specific Objective 2:*

*Judicial independence and impartiality is guaranteed in law and practice (inamovibility, career, disciplinary actions, judicial inspection, budget);*

*Anticorruption measures implemented throughout the justice system.*

*For Specific Objective 3:*

*Effective legal system of legal aid including free legal aid for indigent persons established;*

*Improved awareness and access to justice (including Alternative Dispute Resolution – ADR) for citizens and economic operators including at provincial level.*

*Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*



*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three principal priority sectors.*

*This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative.*

*Capacity development and institution building activities – either through sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.*

### *3.3 Education and skills development*

*The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The expected long-term impact will be the strengthening of the education and training sector, taking into consideration its high priority for sustainable socio-economic development, competitiveness and employment.*

*Specific objectives are:*

*Objective 1 To modernize of the education and training systems by enhancing quality, equality, relevance, governance and access in line with European standards and practices.*

*Objective 2: To build bridges between the world of work and VET providers in order to match skills provision to the needs of enterprises.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*Coverage of education improved (including equality and equity) in a life-long learning perspective;*

*Competence-based education approach applied;*

*Quality and efficiency of education providers enhanced, including for science in the higher education;*

*Financing, efficiency, management and transparency of the education system improved.*

*For Specific Objective 2:*

*Increased relevance of the VET system to the labour market needs;*

*New VET system established activating participation of employers;*

*Increased coordination between labour policies and the education sector;*

*Functioning multi-level governance of VET (national, sectoral, regional and local level).” 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 9-16*

### *“3.1 Social Inclusion (indicative 30%)*

*3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*(I) Enhanced skills and knowledge of civil society organisations and local authorities to address the needs of socially vulnerable groups, such as people with special needs, persons with disabilities, elderly people, women, mothers and children, minorities, including through the launch and implementation of social contracting mechanisms, while ensuring equal quality of service delivery across the country; functioning mechanisms of dialogue concerning policy formulation and programme implementation in the field of social inclusion involving government institutions, civil society organisations and local and regional authorities. The mechanisms will also ensure an equal quality of delivery through the whole territory of the country. (II) Increased capacity of the government to meet commitments under international conventions related to the rights of socially vulnerable groups, including but not limited to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Convention on the Rights of the Child; improved access to justice for socially vulnerable groups; (III) Improved employment potential through human capital development, dedicated trainings and life-long learning, with specific focus on the disadvantaged.*

### *3.2 Environment (indicative 25%)*

*3.2.2. The main expected results are:*

*(I) Improved legislation and environmental management on biodiversity;(II) Improved legislation and environmental management on quality of air, waste water with new waste water treatment standards effectively enforced; Improved environmental management landfills and hazardous waste, shifting to green economy patterns of production and consumption; (III) Public awareness is raised; (IV) Increased role of civil society as monitors of environmental activities and reforms.*

### *3.3 Local / Regional economic development (indicative 25%)*

*3.3.2. The main expected results are:*

*1. Improved people's welfare in the regions, better life conditions for local communities; Improved business enabling environment, active development of local entrepreneurship and SMEs.*

*2. Private business has become a peer partner in achieving social and economic development priorities on regional and local level; Developed human capital, new valuable social and economic competences acquired by local actors.*

3. Systemic and effective policy mix to support SMEs on regional and local is developed and applied; SMEs contribute to an increasing part of the country's welfare.

4. COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY (INDICATIVE 10%)

The Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit which took place on 28-29 November 2013 welcomed the increased involvement of parliamentarians, civil society, local and regional authorities, business community and other relevant stakeholders to implement goals of the Eastern Partnership agenda. Increased involvement of Civil Society at large is also consistent with the NSSD 2020 which mentions specifically NGOs, trade unions, business and science as organisations and sectors that are necessary for sustainable development in Belarus. The proposed additional measures will complement the support included in the focal areas. Main specific objectives: i) to complement the direct assistance to support civil society provided by other thematic instruments; ii) to provide targeted support to students not covered by the EU educational programmes; iii) to promote people to people contacts; iv) to promote good democratic practice.

5. COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary support will provide specific assistance for the implementation of priority commitments deriving from future possible EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration." 2014 Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 19-24

"6.4 Expected results

The most crucial general area for expected results is in terms of cross-border impact. A clear CBC impact added value needs to be demonstrated in this regard and projects will not be funded under CBC if this is not the case. This is built into the 3 strategic objectives of CBC, but also needs to be fully reflected in the results defined against the selected thematic objectives for each programme.

Given the decentralised nature of the programming and implementation process for ENI- CBC, it will be the responsibility of the programme partners to specify in detail the expected results of the specific programme which they will propose. The following examples are therefore intended to be illustrative.

The expected results should be defined and measured in the following areas (not exhaustive): the efficient and timely implementation of joint CBC programmes; addressing effectively the general objectives set out here, meeting the specific priorities of local partners in each border region and allowing for increased ownership by the local stakeholders; providing means for improved co-ordination between local, regional and national level development plans; providing for the implementation of relevant and effective CBC projects of benefit to both sides of the EU's external borders; contributing in the medium and long-term to enhanced prosperity, stability and security along the external borders of the Union through strengthened co-operation and contacts across borders. In relation to the 3 strategic objectives, as an illustration, it is expected that the programmes, in the border areas, could provide for:

- strengthened sustainable economic and social development;
- increased focus on good administrative practices and governance;
- identification of and sustainable remedy to environmental and climate change challenges;
- joint measures in the areas of emergency prevention and fight against crime as well as social and health issues;

- improved mobility, border passage and border operability;

For the land-border and sea-crossing programmes, it is expected that the programmes may inter alia create:

- long-term co-operation ties between the partners through joint addressing of issues relating to the key overarching objectives;

- effective and balanced joint project actions on both sides of the borders;

- improved potential to address local priority issues;

- increased ownership and commitment among partners from both sides of the borders in the implementation of cross-border activities;

- reduced isolation of border regions with improved socio-economic development of the border area.

For the sea-basin programmes the above are also valid. In addition, it is expected that the programmes may inter alia create

- improved contacts between the regional and subnational partners in the programme area;

- increased regional involvement and ownership in the addressing of regional and sub-national priorities of common concern;

- establishment or strengthening of sustainable networks and co-operation platforms, capable of providing a real contribution to the issues they address." 2014 CBC SSF 2014-2020

"3.1 Poverty Alleviation, Local Socio-Economic Development and Social Protection

For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

*For specific objective 1: To enhance the delivery of basic services, notably to combat illiteracy and improve access to education, in particular at community level:*

*Community based schools are established and teacher's capacity strengthened to provide quality basic education.*

*Access of disabled children to basic education has improved in target communities.*

*For specific objective 2: To support socio-economic development at the local level targeting those most in need through generating and strengthening sustainable economic activities:*

*The capacity of the targeted communities (authorities and stakeholders) to identify and plan sustainable integrated economic activities including climate change considerations, is enhanced.*

*Sustainable economic activities with a focus on strengthening social inclusion and the creation of decent jobs are financed.*

*For specific objective 3: To increase employment and decent work and improve entrepreneurship and self-employment, with a focus on youth and women.*

*The skillset and employability of the targeted population are improved.*

*The entrepreneurship culture in the targeted areas is strengthened. For specific objective 4: Improve social protection systems and instruments:*

*Domestic co-ordination mechanisms for social protection are put in place and safety net mechanisms are rationalized and targeting improved.*

*Collaboration between the government, social partners and civil society working on social protection at the ground level is strengthened.*

*Access to public health and other basic services is improved.*

### *3.2 Governance, Transparency and Business Environment*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1: Facilitate access of citizens to public services, particularly of women, youth and disabled citizens*

*Child Protection Committees and Sub-Committees as per Child Law 2006 are in place and functioning and protection services by Care Centres for Children are improved.*

*The legislative and regulatory framework to ensure service delivery to the most vulnerable, including women, children and disabled is reformed.*

*Increased numbers of women are provided with ID cards.*

*Mechanisms to address citizen's concerns on public services and access to these services are strengthened.*

*For specific objective 2: Cooperate in combating and preventing corruption:*

*The National anti-corruption strategy (foreseen in Art 218 of the 2014 Constitution) is finalised and its implementation is supported.*

*Institution building measures are implemented in support of selected institutions, such as for example the National Committee for Combating Corruption (NCCC), the prosecutor's office, the central audit agency, economic courts or other bodies involved in public finances management.*

*For specific objective 3: Improve the legal and regulatory framework for conducting business and investment:*

*Business enabling environment is improved and is more conducive to business creation and economic development.*

*Investment climate is improved through the creation of a business friendly institutional and regulatory environment.*

*Capacity of the private sector, in particular SMEs, to compete at local and international markets enhanced.*

*For specific objective 4: Support the implementation of the Association Agreement:*

*Competencies of Egyptian administrations and upgraded legislative and regulatory reforms in agreed-upon priorities areas through relevant approximations with the EU legislation and regulation (acquis communautaire) are enhanced and improved.*

*Public administrations responsible for the service delivery to citizens in agreed-upon priorities areas are reformed and modernised.*

*Possibly, capacity of Egyptian authorities to manage mobility and migration related issues.*

### *3.3 Improved quality of life and the environment*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1: Improving waste-water management (WWM) and citizens' access to sanitation, including participatory measures at local level and income generating activities:*

*Relevant stakeholders have increased capacities to establish and operate a demand-oriented, sustainable and climate-friendly WWM and Solid Waste Management (SWM) systems.*

*Access to sanitation services at the level of rural areas is increased improving quality of life of citizens.*

*The rehabilitation, extension and management of the WWM and SWM are oriented to maximise employment and related income generating activities.*

*For specific objective 2: Improving access to clean energy:*

*The use of technologies relying on renewable energy sources is increased.  
Efficiency measures to save energy are in place.  
Household awareness of energy efficiency is enhanced and their access to natural gas is increased.”*  
2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015

### *“3.1. Public Administration Reform*

*The overall objective is to improve efficiency, accountability and transparency of the public administration at central, regional and local levels. This will be done in harmonisation with European principles and best practice.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To assist the Government to enhance the Civil Service’s capacities and independence, to introduce a modern results oriented management approach and improve transparency, accessibility and the quality of services;*

*To enhance accountability of the executive branch and to combat elite corruption;*

*To strengthen the capacity of the legislative, judiciary, statutory bodies (Parliament, Ombudsman, Constitutional Court, State Audit Office) and mass media to maintain oversight of the executive branch of Government*

*To strengthen the structures and processes of local governance through the decentralisation of powers;*

*To strengthen public finance policy processes in public institutions through the introduction of improved budget forecasting and modelling, cost management techniques and other public finance policy-related reforms including public procurement.*

*The main expected results:*

*The Civil Service is professionalised and independent;*

*Results-oriented management introduced into all public bodies;*

*Improved e-governance, efficiency and cost effectiveness of the delivery of public services;*

*Increased decision-making powers and budgetary resources devolved to local authorities;*

*Enhanced capacity of line Ministries and State Agencies to model costs and benefits of policy options and to monitor and control expenditures;*

*Improved reforms of public finance and fiscal policy;*

*Improved transparency, efficiency and integrity of the public procurement system;*

*Corruption amongst the political elite is reduced;*

*Accountability of the Executive branch of Government is enhanced.*

### *3.2. Agriculture and Rural development*

*The overall objective is to ensure sustainable agricultural and rural development in Georgia with a view to poverty alleviation in rural areas*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To improve the effectiveness and competitiveness of the agricultural sector in an environmentally sustainable manner;*

*To improve employment and living conditions in rural areas through the diversification of the rural economy; creating green and decent jobs;*

*To support environment sustainability in rural areas ensuring agro-biodiversity conservation with the sustainable use of natural resources through the identification and implementation of climate change adaptation and mitigation measures including disaster risk reduction and water basin management.*

*The main expected results:*

*Increased volume and value of outputs in the Agriculture Sector;*

*Availability of financial resources for capital investment by small farmers is increased;*

*Access to knowledge on improved agriculture technologies by small farmers is increased;*

*Percentage of small farmers in commercial farming increased;*

*Reduction in poverty in the rural areas including around and across the administrative boundary lines (ABLs) contributing to confidence building where politically feasible;*

*Employment patterns in rural areas are diversified;*

*Coherent rural development policy, approximated with EU standards, is approved*

*Pilot rural development demand-driven actions implemented;*

*Reduction in vulnerability of agro-systems and improvement in the resilience of the eco- system to climate change;*

*Improved management of natural resources in rural areas and in the agri-food sector, including sustainable agricultural land tenure practices, environmentally friendly production technologies and products;*

*Improved sustainable management of water resources.*

### *3.3. Justice Sector Reform*

*The overall objective is a fair and efficient justice system in line with principles of Rule of Law and the protection of Human Rights with increased access to justice for Georgian citizens.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To improve the criminal justice sector with due attention to human rights protection;*

*To implement a zero- tolerance policy against ill-treatment and to promote Human Rights in the justice sector;*

*To assist the Georgian Government to reform its civil and administrative justice system and to bring it into line with international standards and conventions;*

*To strengthen the institutional and human resource capacities of the judiciary and to ensure training;*

*To ensure the independence, efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary and of Prosecution ;*

*To increase access to justice and legal aid for vulnerable people.*

*The main expected results are:*

*Increased independence, efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary and the Prosecutor office.*

*Increased application of the principles of restorative principles in the Criminal Justice;*

*Improved conditions in prisons and other places of restriction of liberty and implementation of zero-tolerance against ill-treatment;*

*Capacity building of Criminal Justice/Human Rights institutions and Parliament relevant Committees;*

*Range of support services to victims, accused and offenders increased;*

*Administrative and civil justice systems are consistent with international standards and conventions;*

*Vulnerable persons have access to high quality legal services*

*Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance, additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development, institution building activities and other agreements-related support will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU-Georgia agreements ( such as for example the social and employment cooperation chapter of the AA) and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration.*

*This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative. Capacity development and institution building activities – either from sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.” 2014 Georgia SSF 2014-2017*

### *“3.1. Reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery*

*Specific objectives:*

*To support Jordan's reform process towards consolidation of deep democracy, the application of the rule of law and human rights protection and enforcement;*

*To promote inclusiveness of national policy and decision making processes (notably to reinforce civil society participation) leading to a stronger democratic political culture;*

*To support continuing reform of public financial management to achieve long-term fiscal sustainability;*

*To support public sector reform and improving public service delivery;*

*To support policies for inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth and in particular to improve social and environmental protection including building resilience to climate change to reduce inequalities and poverty and to promote green and low- carbon development.*

*3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*Enhanced judicial independence, reduced levels of corruption, increased public confidence in the democratic institutions and increased protection and enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms;*

*Improved debt management, public funds planning and allocation, accountability and modernization of control of public funds for further alignment to international best practices, and modernisation of legislations and tax policies*

*Improved quality, efficiency and accountability in public services delivery at all levels;*

*More efficient and better targeted social protection systems ensuring sustainable access to vulnerable populations and supporting sustainable local development measures.*

*Increased access to improved basic services (water and waste management) and improved capacity of both public institutions and civil society to support good environmental governance,*

### *3.3. Renewable energies and energy efficiency*

*Specific objectives:*

*To complement the relevant institutional, legislative and fiscal reforms, creating the enabling environment to mobilise public and private actors (SMEs in particular), in order to achieve the goals of 10% renewable energy and 20% of energy savings by 2020;*

*Contributing to full scale implementation of activities to enhance sustainable production and consumption patterns and induce behavioural changes, including water and resource demand management, adoption of best available technologies, research & development and to work on promoting investments towards green and low carbon economy.*

#### *3.3.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*Enhanced legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, and regular updated strategic planning, for the implementation of RE and EE investments and applications, including the set up of needed fiscal and financial incentives, as well as required infrastructure conducive to the private sector involvement in the and low carbon green economy;*

*Jordanian public is more aware of REEE issues and required changes; R&D capacity increased to demonstrate the feasibility, audit, benefits and sustainability of new technical solutions;*

*REEE policy implementation creates incentives for private sector development and increased involvement.” 2014 Jordan SSF 2014-2017*

### *“3.1 Justice and Security System Reform (15%)*

#### *3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*Reinforce the independence and the efficiency of the Judiciary:*

*The necessary modifications to render the Judiciary independent of the executive power are prepared and legislation is amended.*

*The capacities of judicial institutions are reinforced.*

*The Judiciary is modernised.*

*Reform the penitentiary administration in line with international standards*

*Administrative steps towards the transfer of prison management from Ministry of Interior (MoI) to Ministry of Justice (MoJ) are accomplished;*

*The conduct of prison and detention centre staff is in line with international standards.*

*Improve law enforcement and the competence of security agencies in the full respect of citizens' rights and liberties.*

*Cooperation and information sharing between security agencies and the Judiciary is systemised, institutionalised and effective;*

*The professionalism of security agencies and the cooperation amongst them improved;*

*Oversight and accountability of the overall security system are promoted.*

*Put in place an effective border management system:*

*An integrated border management strategy is formulated and implemented;*

*Capacities of border management staff are reinforced, including in dealing with refugee population flows in line with international standards.*

### *3.2 Reinforcing social cohesion, promoting sustainable economic development and protecting vulnerable groups (40%)*

#### *3.2.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*Promote an enabling environment for business and SMEs development, investment and innovation and spur entrepreneurship*

*Expected results:*

*a) Improved, simplified legislative and regulatory framework for operation of business in particular of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises [MSMEs] (application of Think Small First principle, regulatory impact assessment and other guidelines of the Small Business Act for Europe) and results from the assessment on the implementation of the “Small Business Act” for Europe in the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa 2014;*

*b) Improved structured dialogue between business associations/private sector organisations and relevant ministries, revival of a constructive social dialogue (tripartite and bipartite), and enhanced and effective coordination among the ministries aiming at promoting private sector development on one hand and generating quality jobs for the target population on the other;*

*c) Increased and sustained access to finance for Lebanese MSMEs;*

*d) Improved business support services;*

*e) Increased competitiveness of Lebanese private sector to access regional and international markets.*

2. Adapt the skills provided by the public education system to the needs of labour market

Expected results:

- f) The public education system is needs-orientated and a strategy is defined for vocational training strengthening the links with private sector;
- g) General education and vocational training and education systems are more efficient in allowing closer match of skills and job opportunities from a lifelong learning perspective;
- h) Social partners participate increasingly in employment training policies and coordination mechanisms; school to work transition programmes are scaled up.

3. Increase the participation of Lebanon's population in the formal labour market, improve working conditions and respect for labour rights, with special attention to women and youth:

Expected results:

- i) Labour market participation rates are increasing in particular those of women and the youth.

4. Enhance social protection

Expected results:

- j) The capacities of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) are strengthened and social security coverage is increasingly extended to all Lebanese;

- k) Tripartite dialogue, in particular in the field of social protection, is improved.

5. Address the needs of the most vulnerable areas and populations in Lebanon

Expected results:

- l) Rehabilitated and extended basic infrastructure;

- m) Economic recovery and creation of decent jobs;

- n) Education and health services;

- o) A national resilience approach is developed to withstand, adapt and recover from the crisis;

- p) The capacity of the public Lebanese institutions to deal with crisis situation and to coordinate the response is improved.

6. Legal rights and living conditions of refugees, in particular of Palestine refugees in Lebanon have improved, in particular because:

- q) Employment opportunities and access to property, health and education are improved;

- r) Infrastructure in the camps is rehabilitated and upgraded;

- s) Dialogue between Lebanese authorities and Palestine refugees is improved including dialogue on legal status and human rights issues and governance mechanisms in the camps.

3.3 Promotion of sustainable and transparent management of energy and natural resources (20%)

3.3.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

1. Secure sustainable energy supply and manage energy demand and diversify energy sources while promoting green energy in particular:

- a) Law 462/2002 and relevant bylaws are enforced and allow for the restructuring of the sector (in particular the reform of the electricity tariff scheme).;

- b) Energy infrastructure is maintained and upgraded (soft);

- c) Energy efficiency aims are mainstreamed into the policies and programmes of the main energy consuming sectors (industry, transport, residential and tertiary);

- d) Low carbon energy (including renewable energy) plans are developed and under implementation; Assistance to foster regional cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas, including on carbon/fossil fuel taxation and emissions reduction in the energy sector has been successfully utilised.

2. Preserve the environment and mainstream environmental management and protection of natural resources:

Expected results:

- e) Capacities, and the re-organisation of environmental monitoring authorities (including inter-ministerial consultation) have been supported;

- f) Environmental protection and safeguard measures are mainstreamed into national sector policies and programs, in particular the adoption of the water code;

- g) The climate change and biodiversity agenda of Lebanon has made progress."

3. Develop a competitive agriculture sector and promote a sustainable rural economy:

Expected results:

- h) The regulatory/policy framework is updated;

- i) Agricultural infrastructure is upgraded;

- j) Quality/safety control over all agriculture products and inputs is in place;

- k) Agricultural value chains which focus on better quality, production, marketing and export are developed;

- l) Sustainable use of natural resources (e.g. water, soils conservation, green energies) is evident;

- m) Lebanon's integration within the European/regional agricultural market has improved.

4. Measures in favour of civil society

A specific financial provision to support to civil society (15% of the financial resources of this Framework) and an EU Roadmap of Engagement with Civil Society is foreseen for the active engagement

with civil society. This provision is additional to resources from thematic programmes and from programmes identified under the three intervention sectors.

Through this provision civil society can receive support for

- a) Their involvement supporting Lebanese host communities and mitigating the consequences of the Syrian conflict in Lebanon;
- b) Developing the non-state actors' "watchdog" function in monitoring state reform implementation;
- c) Seizing windows of opportunity for interventions in the fields of human rights, gender equality, youth and children rights;
- d) Providing support to MSMEs;
- e) Peace building and reconciliation activities;
- f) Their involvement in environmental monitoring and advocacy." 2014 Lebanon SSF 2014-2016

### *"3.1 Public administration reform (indicative 30%)*

*3.1.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*Improved relationship and clarity (including policy, regulatory and service functions in all sectors of the State's administration) established in central public administration and in regional and local authorities; Results-oriented management introduced in all public bodies at the national, regional and local levels, including Regional Development Agencies, in particular strengthened institutional and human resource capacities and e-governance tools;*

*Strengthened policy-making, management and monitoring processes in public institutions through improved planning, implementation and reporting of the budget;*

*Increased decision-making powers and budgetary resources devolved to regional and local authorities;*

*Improved availability, effectiveness and cost efficiency of the delivery of public services at national and sub-national levels.*

*Decentralisation reform and development policies implemented in Moldova's regions, including regions with special status*

### *3.2 Agriculture and rural development (indicative 30%)*

*3.2.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*Strengthened policy, legal and institutional framework;*

*Increased investment in the modernisation of the agri-food and feed chains meeting EU food safety and quality requirements;*

*Improved education, research and extension services in the agri-food sector, including facilitating information systems and improved access to capital, input and output markets for producers;*

*Reduced poverty in rural areas;*

*Improved social and technical infrastructure in rural areas and increased domestic and foreign investments;*

*Reduction in unemployment rates in rural areas;*

*Reduction in the rates of internal and external labour migration;*

*Reduction of the rural areas affected by natural disasters (floods and droughts);*

*Improved management of natural resources in rural areas and in agri-food sector, including sustainable agricultural land tenure practices, environmentally friendly production technologies and products, climate mitigation and disaster risk-reduction measures;*

*Increased economic exchanges between the two sides of the Nistru River; local entrepreneurship in Transnistria and in regions with special status promoted in partnership with Moldovan counterparts; technical approximation in the prospect of an EU-Moldova DCFTA is conducted.*

### *3.3 Police reform and border management (indicative 20%)*

*3.3.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*The police force is well-trained and equipped, accountable, efficient and professional;*

*The demilitarisation of the police and border guards is completed;*

*The process of pre-trial investigation and prosecution is streamlined;*

*The human rights of suspects are respected;*

*Moldova's borders are secured and there is a substantial reduction in organised and cross-border crime;*

*The achievements of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan are sustained over time;*

*Corruption in the police and border management sector is significantly reduced.*

## *4. Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013. Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to*



*promote an enabling environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*5. Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration. This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance provided under the Eastern Partnership "Comprehensive Institution Building" (CIB) initiative. Capacity development and institution building activities – either from sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies." 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017*

*"Secteur d'Intervention 1 : Réforme de la justice et renforcement de la participation citoyenne*

*1*

*a) L'état de droit est renforcé par l'amélioration et l'application effective des dispositions législatives et administratives inhérentes (rôle du Parlement, indépendance des partis politiques, etc.).*

*b) Les capacités des institutions et des acteurs démocratiques sont renforcées (Parlement, partis politiques, Organe national de la prévention et de la lutte contre la corruption (ONPLC), Conseil de la Nation etc.).*

*c) Les modalités et les instances de concertation/conseil sont renforcées afin de favoriser l'association des acteurs de la société civile et des parties prenantes dans l'élaboration des projets de lois, la mise en oeuvre et l'évaluation des politiques publiques.*

*2*

*a) Les réformes nécessaires visant à garantir l'indépendance des magistrats sont mises en oeuvre.*

*b) Les capacités des professionnels de la justice sont renforcées, y compris dans les domaines des droits de l'homme, conventions internationales, droits des prévenus, etc.*

*c) Les réformes nécessaires afin de garantir à tout justiciable le droit à un procès équitable sont mises en oeuvre, notamment en matière de respect de la présomption d'innocence, du droit à un recours effectif, et du droit à la défense et à l'assistance juridique.*

*d) L'accès à la justice est amélioré*

*3*

*a) Le secteur des media en tant que plateforme d'information des citoyens est renforcé*

*b) Les vecteurs de citoyenneté active sont développés et renforcés (associations, formations citoyennes, milieu scolaire...)*

*Secteur d'Intervention 2 : Marché du travail – emploi*

*1*

*a) Une stratégie nationale intégrée de l'emploi est développée, adoptée et mise en oeuvre et la problématique de l'emploi est prise en compte dans les politiques sectorielles*

*b) Les capacités des acteurs impliqués dans la mise en oeuvre de la politique de l'emploi (acteurs publics, représentants des employeurs, syndicats, associations professionnelles, secteur privé...) sont améliorées et le dialogue social est renforcé*

*c) La connaissance du marché du travail est amélioré et exploitée en impliquant les partenaires économiques et sociaux concernés*

*2*

*a) Le système éducatif (éducation, enseignement supérieur) est mieux adapté aux enjeux économiques et sociaux*

*b) Le système de formation professionnelle est mieux adapté aux enjeux économiques et sociaux*

*3*

*a) L'efficacité des programmes d'appui à l'auto-emploi est renforcée.*

*b) Accessibilité accrue du marché du travail aux groupes/segments fragiles de la population active (ex: femmes/jeunes/ chômeurs sans qualifications et primodemandeurs d'emploi).*

*c) Le marché du travail dans des zones défavorisées pilotes est développé*

*Secteur d'intervention 3 : Appui à la gestion et à la diversification de l'économie*

*1.*

*a) Gestion performante de la politique budgétaire et du Fonds de Régulation de Recettes (FRR) basée sur des hypothèses réalistes concernant l'évolution du prix des hydrocarbures*

*b) Réforme dans la gestion des Finances Publiques impliquant une plus grande performance et transparence*

*c) Croissance inclusive: rationalisation et efficacité des dépenses de transferts sociaux renforcées par un meilleur ciblage des populations vulnérables*

2.

- a) Une stratégie de diversification économique intégrée et durable est développée en partenariat avec les acteurs économiques et sociaux.
- b) 2 à 3 secteurs à haut niveau de valeur ajoutée sont renforcés et développés (approche filière ou territoriale) de manière durable
- c) Appui à une stratégie de privatisation et au développement du marché de capitaux
- d) Amélioration du climat des affaires en vue de contribuer au développement économique durable, par l'amélioration de l'encadrement institutionnel du marché et des mécanismes de contrôle et de régulation
- e) Renforcement du secteur privé, par l'appui aux associations sectorielles et la vulgarisation de projets-pilote de mise à niveau." 2014 Algeria SSF 2014-2017

### *"3.2 Soutenir la gouvernance démocratique, l'Etat de droit et la mobilité*

#### *3.2.2 Résultats attendus*

*En matière judiciaire, l'indépendance et l'efficacité du pouvoir judiciaire est garantie, la capacité professionnelle du secteur est renforcée la confiance des citoyens dans la justice est renforcée, et plus particulièrement l'intervention contribue à: une magistrature indépendante; une meilleure qualification professionnelle des acteurs du système judiciaire; un système judiciaire mieux organisé, efficace, efficient et performant; un système judiciaire plus transparent et plus accessible;- une population mieux informée sur ses droits et devoirs.*

*En matière pénitentiaire: les programmes de réinsertion des détenus sont améliorés ; des peines alternatives à la privation de liberté sont mises en œuvre ; les programmes de formation du personnel de l'administration pénitentiaire sont améliorés; les conditions de détention sont améliorées.*

*En matière de gouvernance démocratique et économique, réforme des finances et de l'administration publiques: appui aux institutions clés du système démocratique et de la gouvernance publique dont les prérogatives ont été renforcées dans le cadre de la réforme constitutionnelle; une plus grande intégration de la réforme des finances de l'Etat et des collectivités locales contribuant à une bonne organisation et une durabilité du système financier public; le fonctionnement et la transparence de gestion des collectivités territoriales sont améliorés et les capacités de leurs ressources humaines renforcées en lien avec les exigences de leurs compétences et mandat; la qualité et l'accès des citoyens aux services publics au niveau territorial sont améliorés; la coordination entre les parties prenantes au niveau décentralisé est renforcée; l'efficacité, l'efficience et la crédibilité des institutions de contrôle, de reddition des comptes et e lutte contre la corruption sont renforcées et la coordination entre elles améliorées.*

*Dans le domaine de la migration et mobilité : les résultats escomptés sont la protection des droits fondamentaux des migrants, la réinsertion économique et sociale de migrants rentrés volontairement au Maroc ou, depuis le Maroc vers leur pays d'origine, une meilleure gestion de la migration pour raison de travail ou d'études, la diminution de la prévalence du phénomène de traite des êtres humains et un cadre juridique de protection internationale et d'asile renforcé, une mobilité accrue, une migration irrégulière maîtrisée et une diminution des réseaux de trafic des migrants, un développement de l'investissement productif des migrants au Maroc et la réduction des coûts de transfert de fonds, une meilleure intégration de la migration dans les politiques publiques afin d'en optimiser les impacts positifs..*

*Dans le domaine de la promotion des droits des femmes et de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, en continuité et complémentarité avec les interventions précédentes: la protection juridique des femmes est renforcée, une culture de l'égalité est promue, l'institutionnalisation de la perspective de genre est consolidée et la participation des femmes à la vie politique, sociale, économique et culturelle est renforcée.*

#### *3.3 Emploi et croissance durable et inclusive*

##### *Résultats attendus*

*Les résultats escomptés des interventions dans ce secteur sont les suivants :*

- le potentiel de croissance durable de l'économie marocaine est dynamisé;*
- la compétitivité des PME marocaines est renforcée, les TPE sont renforcées et formalisées, et l'environnement des affaires est rendu plus attractif pour les investisseurs;*
- la qualité de la formation et l'employabilité des actifs marocains, et particulièrement les jeunes est améliorée;*
- la création d'emplois dans les secteurs clés, y compris les secteurs innovants et l'économie verte et sobre en carbone, est stimulée;*
- la coordination entre les parties prenantes au niveau local et central est renforcée;*
- le dialogue social est renforcé;*
- les écarts de développement économique entre les régions sont réduits.*

#### *4 Mesures en faveur de la société civile*

*Le soutien à la société civile se poursuivra et sera intégré dans la mesure du possible dans les différentes composantes de ce cadre stratégique d'appui, et ceci sera particulièrement pertinent dans le domaine de la bonne gouvernance et le développement du capital humain.*

*Il s'agira de poursuivre l'appui de l'UE au renforcement des capacités institutionnelles et organisationnelles de la société civile marocaine, en matière soit de fourniture de services, soit de plaidoyer ou de suivi et évaluation des politiques publiques. La consolidation et le bon fonctionnement des espaces de dialogue entre la société civile, les acteurs institutionnels (gouvernement, Conseil économique, social et environnemental, etc.) et les partenaires techniques et financiers, pourra également être soutenu. Une attention particulière sera accordée, à cet égard, à la participation des partenaires sociaux ainsi que des femmes, des jeunes et des organisations qui les représentent aux différents mécanismes de consultation.*

*En outre, l'appui aux organisations de la société civile se poursuivra par le biais des différents programmes thématiques dont le Maroc bénéficie. La mise en œuvre de la Facilité société civile qui démarrera en 2014, permettra, au cours de la période, d'apporter un appui spécifique en termes de consolidation et renforcement des capacités des principales organisations de la société civile afin de promouvoir une culture de participation démocratique et gouvernance locale et de surmonter la défiance parfois existante entre Etat et société civile." 2014 Morocco SSF 2014-2017*

### *3. Soutien de l'UE par secteur*

#### *3.1.2. Résultats attendus*

*En lien avec l'OS1*

*La création d'emplois (hommes/femmes) est stimulée dans les secteurs clés.*

*La mise en œuvre d'une nouvelle stratégie intégrée d'emploi qui prend en compte l'analyse des besoins et le développement de compétences sur la base d'une collecte régulière et structurée des données.*

*Les secteurs économiques clés à fort potentiel d'employabilité et haut niveau d'innovation et de valeur ajoutée sont renforcés et développés de manière durable.*

*La qualité de la formation et de l'employabilité des actifs tunisiens est améliorée, en particulier pour les jeunes et les femmes. La politique de l'emploi et du marché du travail est devenue plus efficace.*

*La participation active des partenaires sociaux à la formulation et mise en œuvre des réformes et politiques d'emploi;*

*Le volume d'activité des secteurs de la microfinance, du capital – investissement a augmenté*

*En lien avec l'OS2*

*Les obstacles réglementaires à l'investissement et à l'activité économique sont réduits.*

*La transparence est améliorée et la liberté d'entreprendre est facilitée par la réforme du code des incitations à l'investissement.*

*Les partenariats entre les secteurs publics et privés, sont développés, en attachant une attention particulière au soutien à apporter aux femmes entrepreneurs*

*La coordination entre les différentes institutions et les fonds apportant un soutien au secteur des PME sera amélioré*

*En lien avec l'OS3*

*La modernisation de l'administration devient effective grâce notamment à la généralisation progressive des principes de la gestion budgétaire par objectifs*

*La dépense publique est mieux exécutée, et la réalisation effective du budget d'investissement a augmenté.*

*Le fonctionnement de l'administration douanière s'est amélioré tant sur le plan des recouvrements que de la facilitation des échanges.*

*Une réforme fiscale est engagée, visant à simplifier/moderniser les procédures en vue d'améliorer le recouvrement d'une part et l'équité d'autre part.*

### *3.2 Consolidation des éléments constitutifs de la démocratie*

#### *3.2.2. Résultats attendus*

*Les capacités des structures électorales (ISIE) sont renforcées et le processus électoral se déroule conformément aux règles démocratiques et de l'état de droit.*

*Les conventions internationales relatives aux Droits de l'Homme ainsi que les conventions fondamentales de l'Organisation internationale du travail sont effectivement mises en œuvre*

*Le cadre juridique et les procédures administratives/judiciaires sont harmonisés avec les standards internationaux*

*Des mécanismes et des actions en matière de justice transitionnelle sont mis en œuvre*

*Une stratégie nationale de réforme du système de la sécurité est mise en œuvre*

*Les capacités des parties prenantes concernées dans la réforme du secteur de la sécurité sont renforcées et leur coordination améliorée*

*L'implication citoyenne de la société civile est renforcée dans la dynamique démocratique, notamment par la mise en place du cadre nécessaire pour garantir l'exercice des droits et libertés des citoyens. Une attention particulière sera accordée aux droits des femmes et des enfants, ainsi qu'à la liberté de presse et d'expression et la diversité culturelle et aux questions environnementales et de changement climatique.*

*Participation effective des femmes à la vie publique et politique et diminution de la violence et de la discrimination basées sur le genre.*

**3.3. Développement régional et local durable**

**3.3.2 Résultats attendus**

*Pour l'OS1:*

*les réformes juridiques et institutionnelles pour la déconcentration, la décentralisation et l'amélioration de la gouvernance locale sont préparées,*

*une politique et stratégie de développement régional et local durable est préparée et mise en œuvre, le rôle des structures régionales sur les deux plans institutionnel et opérationnel en matière de prospective territoriale, de diagnostics stratégiques de territoires et d'exercices d'évaluation des politiques régionales, est amélioré,*

*Pour l'OS2:*

*l'accès aux services publics au niveau local et la qualité de ces services sont améliorés et assurés de façon égale pour tous.*

*des actions pilotes de développement local sont conçues et réalisées avec la participation de la société civile et des populations locales, notamment des femmes.*

*les capacités humaines, financières, institutionnelles et techniques des collectivités territoriales et locales sont mises à niveau afin de soutenir pleinement le processus de décentralisation.*

*Pour l'OS3 :*

*les capacités humaines, financières, institutionnelles et techniques dans les collectivités territoriales sont mises à niveau afin de soutenir pleinement les principes opérationnels de bonne gouvernance environnementale (y compris changement climatique) et de préservation des ressources naturelles et leurs diffusions dans les autres politiques sectorielles.*

*l'adaptation au changement climatique est prise en compte à tous les niveaux de la prise de décision en matière de développement : politiques, plans, programmes et projets.*

*D'un point de vue opérationnel, ces résultats seront plus efficaces si l'appui de l'UE est déployé en bonne coordination, voire en coopération directe lorsque possible, avec les partenaires internationaux de la Tunisie actifs dans les secteurs d'intervention. Une synergie sera recherchée avec les Etats-membres de l'UE, la Banque européenne de reconstruction et de développement et la Banque européenne d'investissement ainsi qu'avec les autres instruments financiers de l'UE, notamment la facilité d'investissement pour le voisinage (FIV) et la composante régionale de l'instrument européen de voisinage." 2014 Tunisia SSF 2014-2015*

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews –NEAR; EEAS, EUDs during Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 5.2.2 I-522. Evidence that expected results of ENI programmes (where relevant) are consistent with ENP policy priorities

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The ENP policy priorities were recently modified (a revised ENP was issued in late 2015), in an effort to better reflect the new political and social development in the Neighbourhood and to closer align the EU's response to the partner countries' current needs. Unsurprisingly, the changes in the priorities have been quite substantial but there have also been modifications to the approach of dealing with existing needs and developing the new policy. As a consequence, ENI programmes originating from the first period of the instrument's cycle, i.e. until the review of the ENP, diverge to some extent from the modified ENP. The new programming documents which will be implemented as of 2018 are expected to be again fully aligned to the new policy (interview EEAS, NEAR B). The updated programming instructions were issued in 2016.

That being said, in practice the expected results of typical ongoing ENI programmes (those

not dealing with emergency issues or the management of crises) are not expected to be radically incoherent with the new ENP. The majority of them will have followed a bottom-up process, meaning that the analyses undertaken to define their intervention logics and own priorities had been based on the needs of partner countries in the first place. In addition, the quality review process during the identification of programmes and actions guarantees that inconsistencies with the ENP, as well as with other EU policies for external cooperation or specific sectors, are spotted early on and corrected. The analysis of quality review documents showed that since 2014 roughly 25% of the reviewed actions were criticised by the QSG for not showing clear enough coherence with the ENP or/and other policies and had been subsequently corrected (see also I-521).

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“The objectives and results need to be clarified, streamlined and aligned with the SSF, ideally reducing the number of objectives and taking on board references to the PAR principles of the EU as well as the Georgian PAR Roadmap. The correspondence of the “budget support components” to the objectives/results needs to be clarified or they can be removed.”* Support to the Public Administration Reform in Georgia – Conclusions of the QSG2 meeting of 13 March 2015.

*“EU regional programmes are the result of consensual agreements reached in regional meetings with the partner countries. They are relevant with regard to the problems and priorities of the two regions and there is no doubt that they focus on critical issues for the partners. However, they often suffer from little involvement on the part of the regional partners in the design and identification stages, as well as from variable actual ownership at implementation level. There is generally no evidence that the selected interventions do respond to the actual priorities of the individual countries involved. Because of political tensions between some of the countries within each region and their narrow economic and functional integration, and despite the establishment of regional fora, Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to two European Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South) the two ENP “regions” have a limited capacity to engage the participating countries in the formulation of common regional priorities and in regional initiatives. As a first consequence, regional programmes generally reflect areas where a common interest can be found between the countries, which may differ from the partners’ national priorities. Secondly, while regional programmes are based on a consensual identification by the EU and the ENP partners, generally at high level, the decision process is led by the EU. Thirdly, to address this particular context, EU regional cooperation has focused on the establishment of regional networks or organisations. This approach benefited from the adhesion and support of the partner countries, because it has stimulated regional exchanges. However, the sustainability of these regional networks remains fragile. Finally, the EU’s flexible approach in the two regions has been consistent with the main objectives of the ENP. EU regional interventions and practices have clearly built on lessons learnt from past cooperation in a number of cases. However, horizontal transfer of best practices and exchange of experiences and lessons learnt between the two ENP regions have been rare. Coordination mechanisms between the EU regional interventions and the EU MS activities are – at best – weak. As a result, EU regional interventions add value to EU MS and other donors’ assistance mainly because there are few significant regional programmes carried out by other donors, but not because of systematic coordination and complementarity efforts.”* 2013 EC – Evaluation of the EU’s support to ENP Regions 2004-2010, p. 22

*“The analysis of strategic and programming documents on the one hand, and the reconstruction and presentation of the inventory on the other hand, indicate that there is a clear correspondence between the areas of focus identified by the ENP Strategy paper, the areas of intervention defined in ENP Regional Strategy Papers and Indicative programmes and the projects implemented in the two regions. In the 24 interventions examined, the ENP strategy is clearly referenced to as the umbrella under which the cooperation takes place. Reference to one or several ENP objectives is clearly made in the programming documents and the interventions are in line with the strategy documents. However, the documentation reviewed does not show nor explain in an explicit manner how the objectives will be achieved through the specific interventions, and how the interventions programmed will contribute to achieve the results. In the two ENP regions, regional strategies address similar areas but with a different level of attention. The priority areas of intervention identified in the regional indicative programmes for the two regions present a different distribution and level of prioritization between them and in relation to the ENP. The ENP South region privileges the Economic sector, through the FEMIP support, while the ENP East region presents a more homogeneous distribution of allocation throughout the sectors (in particular environment, political & security dimension and infrastructures). In the ENP South*

region, the allocation structure closely reflects the programming objectives for both periods. However, as in the case of the Eastern region, the infrastructures sector received significantly higher amounts of funds and the political & security dimension sector was underfunded in respect of what foreseen in the RIPs.” 2013 EC – Evaluation of the EU's support to ENP Regions 2004-2010, p. 24

#### “5.1 OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Commission’s flexible approach in the two regions has been rather effective and consistent with the main cooperation objectives. In most sectors, the Commission interventions have been adequately differentiated in the two ENP regions and programmes have been designed according to a satisfactory mix between countries/regions needs and effectiveness. The value added of the regional programmes has been firstly linked to their capacity to promote regional cooperation, for which the main instrument has been the establishment of regional networks. These network building activities have been rather successful. However, the sustainability of these regional networks remains fragile. Thus, the Commission’s support contributed to strengthening and creating regional capacities and cooperation mechanisms in various areas, notably trade integration, migration management, justice sector, energy sector reforms. Secondly, an advantage of regional activities has been their ability to target directly and more efficiently stakeholders at micro or meso levels and to stimulate exchanges and cooperation between them, most notably when addressing civil society. Thirdly, regional interventions acted as a catalyst for the mobilisation of funding, ensuring access to the FEMIP funds in the South and through the NIF inter-regional programme in both regions. Finally, positive changes have been observed in terms of investment and trade growth, notably in the South, although in most cases it is not possible to neither quantify nor qualify the specific contribution of regional interventions to this progress.” 2013 EC – Evaluation of the EU's support to ENP Regions 2004-2010, p. 74

“The expected results should be defined and measured in the following areas (not exhaustive):  
the efficient and timely implementation of joint CBC programmes;  
addressing effectively the general objectives set out here, meeting the specific priorities of local partners in each border region and allowing for increased ownership by the local stakeholders;  
providing means for improved co-ordination between local, regional and national level development plans;  
providing for the implementation of relevant and effective CBC projects of benefit to both sides of the EU’s external borders;  
contributing in the medium and long-term to enhanced prosperity, stability and security along the external borders of the Union through strengthened co-operation and contacts across borders.  
In relation to the 3 strategic objectives, as an illustration, it is expected that the programmes, in the border areas, could provide for:  
strengthened sustainable economic and social development;  
increased focus on good administrative practices and governance;  
identification of and sustainable remedy to environmental and climate change challenges;  
joint measures in the areas of emergency prevention and fight against crime as well as social and health issues;  
improved mobility, border passage and border operability;  
For the land-border and sea-crossing programmes, it is expected that the programmes may inter alia create:  
long-term co-operation ties between the partners through joint addressing of issues relating to the key overarching objectives;  
effective and balanced joint project actions on both sides of the borders;  
improved potential to address local priority issues;  
increased ownership and commitment among partners from both sides of the borders in the implementation of cross-border activities;  
reduced isolation of border regions with improved socio-economic development of the border area.  
For the sea-basin programmes the above are also valid. In addition, it is expected that the programmes may inter alia create  
improved contacts between the regional and subnational partners in the programme area;  
increased regional involvement and ownership in the addressing of regional and sub-national priorities of common concern;  
establishment or strengthening of sustainable networks and co-operation platforms, capable of providing a real contribution to the issues they address.” 2013 EC – Evaluation of the EU's support to ENP Regions 2004-2010

“Specific objective 1: Accelerating political association

*Expected Results:*

- Accelerated political association through well functioning Eastern partnership Platforms and panels in the respective sectors of cooperation
- Improved democracy and good governance throughout the region
- Strengthened cooperation on migration management systems, border management and law enforcement
- Strengthened Eastern European partner countries' capacity to participate in EU led missions and operations

*Specific objective 2: Deepening sustainable economic development and integration and sector cooperation, including environment and climate change*

*Expected Results:*

- Improved development of SMEs including the creation of a climate conducive to trade, investment and regional integration
- Fostering entrepreneurship, innovation, creativity
- Access to finance, public-private cooperation are promoted
- Convergence with EU policies and regulatory approximation
- Enhanced cooperation on environment issues among partner countries
- Enhanced cooperation on policy reforms, with priority on water management and green economy,
- Climate change adaptation and mitigation commitments are implemented at regional and national level
- Further integration of Eastern European partner countries and EU energy markets
- Improved transport links between the EU and the partner countries and between partner countries
- Improved convergence with EU norms and standards
- Transport related agreements between EU and partner countries are signed and implemented
- Specific measures taken to enhance trade facilitation
- Enhanced cooperation on Agriculture and Rural Development

*Specific objective 3: Enhancing support to civil society, local authorities and people to people contacts*

*Expected Results:*

*Increased people to people contacts*

- Strengthened cooperation on bridging the gap between research and innovation
- Strengthened capacity of regional civil society networks and organisations
- Local authorities, communities, civil society, business associations and representative employers' organisations and trade-unions are strengthened in developing solutions for municipal development

*Specific objective 4: Flagship Initiatives*

*Expected Results:*

- Improved integrated border management and mobility of – Number of mobility dialogues and visa – Ministries and agencies in charge of 23 citizens (see under objective 1)
- Enhanced sustainable municipal development, also encompassing the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (E5P)
- Promote Good Environmental Governance and Prevent Climate Change (see under objective 2)
- Improved prevention, preparedness and response to natural and man-made disasters

*Sector 2: Priorities under the regional cooperation frameworks*

*Specific objective 1: Promote sustainable development and the improvement of the environment*

*Expected Results:*

- Improved cooperation on environmental protection and energy efficiency in the Northern Dimension region
  - Improved environmental situation of the Black Sea
- Specific objective 2: Infrastructure development and interconnections*
- Improved transport links between the TEN-T network and the network developed by the Northern Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics
  - Improved transport cooperation in the Black Sea region

*Sector 3: Energy and transport initiatives involving the wide region*

*Expected Results:*

- Improved energy markets convergence, energy security, development and efficiency
- Investment attraction towards energy projects is facilitated
- Improved development of the transport corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia and transport market convergence
- Investment attraction towards transport projects is facilitated

*Sector 4: Horizontal and sectoral support*

*Expected Results:*

- Support to the Eastern Partnership multilateral cooperation process -
- Supported Eastern Partnership multilateral cooperation process
- Supported Northern Dimension and Black Sea Synergy cooperation processes

*Specific objective 2: Eastern Partnership visibility*

*Expected Results:*

- *Enhanced visibility of the Eastern Partnership*
- *Support for identification and formulation of programmes and information activities provided” 2014 ENI East RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 19-20-21-22-23-24-25*

*“Objective 1: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR LIBERTY, DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY*

*Expected Results:*

- a) *Domestic reform efforts towards democratic transition, rule of law, peace are sustained and reinforced through cooperation at regional or sub regional level and enhanced capacity of stakeholders.*

*Objective 2: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*

*Expected Results:*

- b) *Domestic reform efforts towards developing opportunities for private sector development and investments benefit from further encouragement through regional exchanges of best practices and political impetus*

- c) *Increased degree of convergence of domestic policies on environment, climate change, water, energy, and integrated maritime approach in the region*

*Objective 3: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE*

*Expected Results:*

- d) *Civil society in the region further empowered to participate in policy dialogue and policy making.*

*Objective 4: SUPPORT REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION*

*Expected Results:*

- e) *Closer regional or sub regional cooperation between EU and Mediterranean and between Mediterranean countries is enhanced” 2014 ENI South RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 17-18-19*

*“6.1 Building a partnership for sustainable and inclusive economic development and integration*

*Expected results: higher level of investments in public infrastructure and productive sectors, job creation and private sector development, in line with the Neighbourhood Investment Facility’s Strategic Orientations. This will contribute to achieving EU political objectives under ENP (e. g. integration into the EU’s internal market), as well as poverty reduction and sustainable economic, social and environmental development. During the period 2008-2013, NIF provided EUR 753 million in grants and thereby leveraged an estimated EUR 8.1 billion of loans from the European Financing Institutions. For 2014- 2017, the EU has indicatively earmarked EUR 595 million for NIF, which may be complemented by funds from ENP regional and/or bilateral programmes, and by direct contributions from Member States to the NIF trust fund, which is managed by the European Investment Bank.*

*6.3 Targeted capacity building*

*Expected results: faster approximation of the regulatory framework to EU norms and standards and improved public administration capacity will contribute to public governance development and progressive integration into the EU internal market*

*6.4: Incentive-based approach*

*Expected results: contributing to promote progress and reforms in the areas of deep and sustainable democracy and respect for human rights.*

*ERASMUS*

*Specific objective 1: Improve the skills and competences of students and staff, and the employability of graduates through mobility*

*The main expected results to be achieved are:*

1. *Improved and diversified degrees that incorporate studies abroad*
2. *Enhanced skills and improved learning performance for students*
3. *Improved competences of staff in their field of expertise and understanding of education policies, practices and systems*
4. *Improved level of competences and skills of Master graduates*
5. *Increased employability and career prospects for students*
6. *Reinforced institutional capacities of higher education institutions*
7. *Significant participation of students and staff from the least developed regions of partner countries*

*Specific objective 2: Support the modernisation, internationalisation, accessibility and of higher education in the Partner countries*

*Expected results:*

*The main expected results to be achieved are:*

1. *Improved quality and access to higher education and enhanced relevance of higher education programmes for the labour market and society*



2. Improved level of competences and skills in HEIs through the development of new and innovative education programmes
3. Enhanced management, governance and innovation capacities, as well as the internationalisation of HEIs
4. Increased capacities of national authorities to modernise their higher education systems, by supporting the definition, implementation and monitoring of reform policies
5. Regional integration and cooperation across different countries through joint initiatives, sharing of good practices and cooperation” 2014 ENI strategic priorities and MIP 2014-2017, p. 13-16

*“Private Sector Development (indicative 35%)*

*The overall objective will be to create employment opportunities by enhancing private sector development in Armenia.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To improve the national business and investment climate for the small and medium enterprises;*

*To improve the economic competitiveness of Armenian regions.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 1.1.1. Increased business opportunities and access to finance for small and medium enterprises*

*Result 1.1.2. Strengthened public private dialogue and partnership*

*Result 1.1.3. Improved labour market efficiency*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 1.2.1. Increased investment and business opportunities in targeted economic sectors and regions*

*Result 1.2.2. Strengthened capacity and performance of farmers associations and cooperatives*

*Public Administration Reform*

*The overall objective will be to improve transparency, accountability and efficiency of the public administration at central, regional and local levels.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To enhance public administration systems and professionalism of the civil service;*

*To improve the quality of public finance management;*

*To make public service delivery at central, regional and local levels more efficient and effective.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 2.1.1. Civil service reform implemented according to EU shared principles*

*Result 2.1.2. Strengthened statistical capacity in the economic, demographic, social and environmental fields at municipal and regional levels*

*Result 2.1.3. Reduced corruption in the public service*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 2.2.1. Improved budget credibility and transparency*

*For specific objective 3*

*Result 2.3.1. Citizen-oriented multifunctional service centres (one-stop shops) established for public service delivery*

*Result 2.3.2. Enhanced provision of e-governance services*

*Result 2.3.3. Optimised and strengthened municipal services, including integrated social services*

*Justice sector reform*

*The overall objective will be to improve the justice system in Armenia and to enhance protection of Human Rights.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To contribute to the development of a more independent, transparent, accountable, accessible and efficient justice system,*

*To promote effective and timely protection of human rights.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 3.1.1. Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, prosecution and lawyers*

*Result 3.1.2. More effective and regulated legal process*

*Result 3.1.3. Improved accountability and transparency of judicial proceedings and of nomination and performance assessment of judges*

*Result 3.1.4. Improved access to justice and free legal aid for citizens*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 3.2.1. Improved conditions and reduced ill-treatment in penitentiary institutions and police custody*

*Result 3.2.2. A justice system that fully safeguards the universal human right to a fair and impartial trial as established in international and European conventions*

#### *4. Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

#### *5. Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three principal priority sectors.*

*This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative.*

*Capacity development and institution building activities – either through sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.” 2014 Armenia SSF 2014-2017, p. 8-11*

### *“3.1 Regional and Rural Development*

#### *3.1.1 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The overall objective is to support Government efforts in the diversification of the economy while promoting a balanced and inclusive growth, decrease regional disparities and improve rural livelihoods.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*Objective 1: To contribute to business development, investment promotion and employment generation across economic regions of Azerbaijan.*

*Objective 2: To enhance democratic participation, institutional capacity and efficiency in the field of local governance and regional development*

*Objective 3: To raise rural livelihoods and quality of life in rural areas.*

#### *3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*Increased competitiveness of regions and their enterprises;*

*Improved basic rural infrastructure and business services;*

*Community mobilisation ensured through strengthened rural institutions and organizations, such as producer organizations and cooperatives;*

*Market-driven pilot initiatives using a value-chain approach for employment generation in areas related to agriculture, agro-processing, handicraft and tourism implemented.*

*For Specific Objective 2:*

*Policy, legislative and institutional framework for the local self-governance in Azerbaijan is aligned to European Charter of Local-Self-Government;*

*Institutional capacity at national and regional level to plan, implement and administer programmes in the field of regional development and territorial planning strengthened;*

*Participatory and democratic approach to local development enhanced by fostering partnership, participation and bottom-up initiatives at local (and regional) level;*

*Improved efficiency, transparency, accountability and quality of service delivery at the local level.*

*For Specific Objective 3:*

*Improved infrastructure and access to social services for the rural population;*

*Improved environmental sustainability and land management of rural areas;*

*Increased diversification of economic activity and employment opportunities.*

### *3.2 Justice Sector reform*

#### *3.2.2 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The expected long term impact will be the strengthening of the rule of law, including the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, transparency and accountability, full access to justice by all citizenry, and the right to a fair trial.*

*Objective 1: Ensure the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability of the justice system and respect for human rights;*

*Objective 2: Ensure the independence, impartiality, integrity and transparency of the judiciary;*

*Objective 3: Enhance citizens' access to justice.*

*3.2.3. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*An effective and efficient justice system fully safeguarding human rights is established ensuring a fair and impartial trial;*

*Improved capacity, knowledge and integrity of the main actors of the justice system;*

*Juvenile justice reform implemented in accordance with European and international standards;*

*Improved accountability and transparency of the justice system;*

*Custodial conditions including respect of human rights in penitentiary institutions improved. For Specific Objective 2:*

*Judicial independence and impartiality is guaranteed in law and practice (inamovibility, career, disciplinary actions, judicial inspection, budget);*

*Anticorruption measures implemented throughout the justice system.*

*For Specific Objective 3:*

*Effective legal system of legal aid including free legal aid for indigent persons established;*

*Improved awareness and access to justice (including Alternative Dispute Resolution – ADR) for citizens and economic operators including at provincial level.*

*Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three principal priority sectors.*

*This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative.*

*Capacity development and institution building activities – either through sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.*

### *3.3 Education and skills development*

*The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The expected long-term impact will be the strengthening of the education and training sector, taking into consideration its high priority for sustainable socio-economic development, competitiveness and employment.*

*Specific objectives are:*

*Objective 1 To modernize of the education and training systems by enhancing quality, equality, relevance, governance and access in line with European standards and practices.*

*Objective 2: To build bridges between the world of work and VET providers in order to match skills provision to the needs of enterprises.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*Coverage of education improved (including equality and equity) in a life-long learning perspective;*

*Competence-based education approach applied;*

*Quality and efficiency of education providers enhanced, including for science in the higher education;*

*Financing, efficiency, management and transparency of the education system improved.*

*For Specific Objective 2:*

*Increased relevance of the VET system to the labour market needs;*

*New VET system established activating participation of employers;*

*Increased coordination between labour policies and the education sector;*

*Functioning multi-level governance of VET (national, sectoral, regional and local level).” 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 9-16*

*“3.1 Social Inclusion (indicative 30%)*

*3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*(I) Enhanced skills and knowledge of civil society organisations and local authorities to address the needs of socially vulnerable groups, such as people with special needs, persons with disabilities, elderly people, women, mothers and children, minorities, including through the launch and implementation of social contracting mechanisms, while ensuring equal quality of service delivery across the country; functioning mechanisms of dialogue concerning policy formulation and programme implementation in the field of social inclusion involving government institutions, civil society organisations and local and regional authorities. The mechanisms will also ensure an equal quality of delivery through the whole territory of the country. (II) Increased capacity of the government to meet commitments under international conventions related to the rights of socially vulnerable groups, including but not limited to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Convention on the Rights of the Child; improved access to justice for socially vulnerable groups; (III) Improved employment potential through human capital development, dedicated trainings and life-long learning, with specific focus on the disadvantaged.*

*3.2 Environment (indicative 25%)*

*3.2.2. The main expected results are:*

*(I) Improved legislation and environmental management on biodiversity; (II) Improved legislation and environmental management on quality of air, waste water with new waste water treatment standards effectively enforced; Improved environmental management landfills and hazardous waste, shifting to green economy patterns of production and consumption; (III) Public awareness is raised; (IV) Increased role of civil society as monitors of environmental activities and reforms.*

*3.3 Local / Regional economic development (indicative 25%)*

*3.3.2. The main expected results are:*

*1. Improved people's welfare in the regions, better life conditions for local communities; Improved business enabling environment, active development of local entrepreneurship and SMEs.*

*2. Private business has become a peer partner in achieving social and economic development priorities on regional and local level; Developed human capital, new valuable social and economic competences acquired by local actors.*

*3. Systemic and effective policy mix to support SMEs on regional and local is developed and applied; SMEs contribute to an increasing part of the country's welfare.*

**4. COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY (INDICATIVE 10%)**

*The Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit which took place on 28-29 November 2013 welcomed the increased involvement of parliamentarians, civil society, local and regional authorities, business community and other relevant stakeholders to implement goals of the Eastern Partnership agenda. Increased involvement of Civil Society at large is also consistent with the NSSD 2020 which mentions specifically NGOs, trade unions, business and science as organisations and sectors that are necessary for sustainable development in Belarus. The proposed additional measures will complement the support included in the focal areas. Main specific objectives: i) to complement the direct assistance to support civil society provided by other thematic instruments; ii) to provide targeted support to students not covered by the EU educational programmes; iii) to promote people to people contacts; iv) to promote good democratic practice.*

**5. COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT**

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary support will provide specific assistance for the implementation of priority commitments deriving from future possible EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration.” 2014 Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 19-24*

**“6.4 Expected results**

*The most crucial general area for expected results is in terms of cross-border impact. A clear CBC impact added value needs to be demonstrated in this regard and projects will not be funded under CBC if this is not the case. This is built into the 3 strategic objectives of CBC, but also needs to be fully reflected in the results defined against the selected thematic objectives for each programme.*

*Given the decentralised nature of the programming and implementation process for ENI- CBC, it will be the responsibility of the programme partners to specify in detail the expected results of the specific programme which they will propose. The following examples are therefore intended to be illustrative.*

*The expected results should be defined and measured in the following areas (not exhaustive): the efficient and timely implementation of joint CBC programmes; addressing effectively the general objectives set out here, meeting the specific priorities of local partners in each border region and allowing for increased ownership by the local stakeholders; providing means for improved co-ordination between local, regional and national level development plans; providing for the implementation of relevant and effective CBC projects of benefit to both sides of the EU's external borders; contributing in*

*the medium and long-term to enhanced prosperity, stability and security along the external borders of the Union through strengthened co-operation and contacts across borders. In relation to the 3 strategic objectives, as an illustration, it is expected that the programmes, in the border areas, could provide for:*

*strengthened sustainable economic and social development;*

*increased focus on good administrative practices and governance;*

*identification of and sustainable remedy to environmental and climate change challenges;*

*joint measures in the areas of emergency prevention and fight against crime as well as social and health issues;*

*improved mobility, border passage and border operability;*

*For the land-border and sea-crossing programmes, it is expected that the programmes may inter alia create:*

*long-term co-operation ties between the partners through joint addressing of issues relating to the key overarching objectives;*

*effective and balanced joint project actions on both sides of the borders;*

*improved potential to address local priority issues;*

*increased ownership and commitment among partners from both sides of the borders in the implementation of cross-border activities;*

*reduced isolation of border regions with improved socio-economic development of the border area.*

*For the sea-basin programmes the above are also valid. In addition, it is expected that the programmes may inter alia create*

*improved contacts between the regional and subnational partners in the programme area;*

*increased regional involvement and ownership in the addressing of regional and sub-national priorities of common concern;*

*establishment or strengthening of sustainable networks and co-operation platforms, capable of providing a real contribution to the issues they address.” 2014 CBC SSF 2014-2020*

### *“3.1 Poverty Alleviation, Local Socio-Economic Development and Social Protection*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1: To enhance the delivery of basic services, notably to combat illiteracy and improve access to education, in particular at community level:*

*Community based schools are established and teacher’s capacity strengthened to provide quality basic education.*

*Access of disabled children to basic education has improved in target communities.*

*For specific objective 2: To support socio-economic development at the local level targeting those most in need through generating and strengthening sustainable economic activities:*

*The capacity of the targeted communities (authorities and stakeholders) to identify and plan sustainable integrated economic activities including climate change considerations, is enhanced.*

*Sustainable economic activities with a focus on strengthening social inclusion and the creation of decent jobs are financed.*

*For specific objective 3: To increase employment and decent work and improve entrepreneurship and self-employment, with a focus on youth and women.*

*The skillset and employability of the targeted population are improved.*

*The entrepreneurship culture in the targeted areas is strengthened. For specific objective 4: Improve social protection systems and instruments:*

*Domestic co-ordination mechanisms for social protection are put in place and safety net mechanisms are rationalized and targeting improved.*

*Collaboration between the government, social partners and civil society working on social protection at the ground level is strengthened.*

*Access to public health and other basic services is improved.*

### *3.2 Governance, Transparency and Business Environment*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1: Facilitate access of citizens to public services, particularly of women, youth and disabled citizens*

*Child Protection Committees and Sub-Committees as per Child Law 2006 are in place and functioning and protection services by Care Centres for Children are improved.*

*The legislative and regulatory framework to ensure service delivery to the most vulnerable, including women, children and disabled is reformed.*

*Increased numbers of women are provided with ID cards.*

*Mechanisms to address citizen's concerns on public services and access to these services are strengthened.*

*For specific objective 2: Cooperate in combating and preventing corruption:*

*The National anti-corruption strategy (foreseen in Art 218 of the 2014 Constitution) is finalised and its implementation is supported.*

*Institution building measures are implemented in support of selected institutions, such as for example the National Committee for Combating Corruption (NCCC), the prosecutor's office, the central audit agency, economic courts or other bodies involved in public finances management.*

*For specific objective 3: Improve the legal and regulatory framework for conducting business and investment:*

*Business enabling environment is improved and is more conducive to business creation and economic development.*

*Investment climate is improved through the creation of a business friendly institutional and regulatory environment.*

*Capacity of the private sector, in particular SMEs, to compete at local and international markets enhanced.*

*For specific objective 4: Support the implementation of the Association Agreement:*

*Competencies of Egyptian administrations and upgraded legislative and regulatory reforms in agreed-upon priorities areas through relevant approximations with the EU legislation and regulation (acquis communautaire) are enhanced and improved.*

*Public administrations responsible for the service delivery to citizens in agreed-upon priorities areas are reformed and modernised.*

*Possibly, capacity of Egyptian authorities to manage mobility and migration related issues.*

### *3.3 Improved quality of life and the environment*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1: Improving waste-water management (WWM) and citizens' access to sanitation, including participatory measures at local level and income generating activities:*

*Relevant stakeholders have increased capacities to establish and operate a demand-oriented, sustainable and climate-friendly WWM and Solid Waste Management (SWM) systems.*

*Access to sanitation services at the level of rural areas is increased improving quality of life of citizens.*

*The rehabilitation, extension and management of the WWM and SWM are oriented to maximise employment and related income generating activities.*

*For specific objective 2: Improving access to clean energy:*

*The use of technologies relying on renewable energy sources is increased.*

*Efficiency measures to save energy are in place.*

*Household awareness of energy efficiency is enhanced and their access to natural gas is increased.”*

2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015

### *“3.1. Public Administration Reform*

*The overall objective is to improve efficiency, accountability and transparency of the public administration at central, regional and local levels. This will be done in harmonisation with European principles and best practice.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To assist the Government to enhance the Civil Service's capacities and independence, to introduce a modern results oriented management approach and improve transparency, accessibility and the quality of services;*

*To enhance accountability of the executive branch and to combat elite corruption;*

*To strengthen the capacity of the legislative, judiciary, statutory bodies (Parliament, Ombudsman, Constitutional Court, State Audit Office) and mass media to maintain oversight of the executive branch of Government*

*To strengthen the structures and processes of local governance through the decentralisation of powers;*

*To strengthen public finance policy processes in public institutions through the introduction of improved budget forecasting and modelling, cost management techniques and other public finance policy-related reforms including public procurement.*

*The main expected results:*

*The Civil Service is professionalised and independent;*

*Results-oriented management introduced into all public bodies;*

*Improved e-governance, efficiency and cost effectiveness of the delivery of public services;*

*Increased decision-making powers and budgetary resources devolved to local authorities;*

*Enhanced capacity of line Ministries and State Agencies to model costs and benefits of policy options and to monitor and control expenditures;*

*Improved reforms of public finance and fiscal policy;*

*Improved transparency, efficiency and integrity of the public procurement system;*

*Corruption amongst the political elite is reduced;*

*Accountability of the Executive branch of Government is enhanced.*

### *3.2. Agriculture and Rural development*

*The overall objective is to ensure sustainable agricultural and rural development in Georgia with a view to poverty alleviation in rural areas*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To improve the effectiveness and competitiveness of the agricultural sector in an environmentally sustainable manner;*

*To improve employment and living conditions in rural areas through the diversification of the rural economy; creating green and decent jobs;*

*To support environment sustainability in rural areas ensuring agro-biodiversity conservation with the sustainable use of natural resources through the identification and implementation of climate change adaptation and mitigation measures including disaster risk reduction and water basin management.*

*The main expected results:*

*Increased volume and value of outputs in the Agriculture Sector;*

*Availability of financial resources for capital investment by small farmers is increased;*

*Access to knowledge on improved agriculture technologies by small farmers is increased;*

*Percentage of small farmers in commercial farming increased;*

*Reduction in poverty in the rural areas including around and across the administrative boundary lines (ABLs) contributing to confidence building where politically feasible;*

*Employment patterns in rural areas are diversified;*

*Coherent rural development policy, approximated with EU standards, is approved*

*Pilot rural development demand-driven actions implemented;*

*Reduction in vulnerability of agro-systems and improvement in the resilience of the eco- system to climate change;*

*Improved management of natural resources in rural areas and in the agri-food sector, including sustainable agricultural land tenure practices, environmentally friendly production technologies and products;*

*Improved sustainable management of water resources.*

### *3.3. Justice Sector Reform*

*The overall objective is a fair and efficient justice system in line with principles of Rule of Law and the protection of Human Rights with increased access to justice for Georgian citizens.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To improve the criminal justice sector with due attention to human rights protection;*

*To implement a zero- tolerance policy against ill-treatment and to promote Human Rights in the justice sector;*

*To assist the Georgian Government to reform its civil and administrative justice system and to bring it into line with international standards and conventions;*

*To strengthen the institutional and human resource capacities of the judiciary and to ensure training;*

*To ensure the independence, efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary and of Prosecution ;*

*To increase access to justice and legal aid for vulnerable people.*

*The main expected results are:*

*Increased independence, efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary and the Prosecutor office.*

*Increased application of the principles of restorative principles in the Criminal Justice;*

*Improved conditions in prisons and other places of restriction of liberty and implementation of zero-tolerance against ill-treatment;*

*Capacity building of Criminal Justice/Human Rights institutions and Parliament relevant Committees;*

*Range of support services to victims, accused and offenders increased;*

*Administrative and civil justice systems are consistent with international standards and conventions;*

*Vulnerable persons have access to high quality legal services*

*Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance, additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development, institution building activities and other agreements-related support will address the implementation of prior-*

ity commitments deriving from EU-Georgia agreements ( such as for example the social and employment cooperation chapter of the AA) and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration.

This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative. Capacity development and institution building activities – either from sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.” 2014 Georgia SSF 2014-2017

### “3.1. Reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery

Specific objectives:

To support Jordan's reform process towards consolidation of deep democracy, the application of the rule of law and human rights protection and enforcement;

To promote inclusiveness of national policy and decision making processes (notably to reinforce civil society participation) leading to a stronger democratic political culture;

To support continuing reform of public financial management to achieve long-term fiscal sustainability;

To support public sector reform and improving public service delivery;

To support policies for inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth and in particular to improve social and environmental protection including building resilience to climate change to reduce inequalities and poverty and to promote green and low- carbon development.

3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

Enhanced judicial independence, reduced levels of corruption, increased public confidence in the democratic institutions and increased protection and enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

Improved debt management, public funds planning and allocation, accountability and modernization of control of public funds for further alignment to international best practices, and modernisation of legislations and tax policies

Improved quality, efficiency and accountability in public services delivery at all levels;

More efficient and better targeted social protection systems ensuring sustainable access to vulnerable populations and supporting sustainable local development measures.

Increased access to improved basic services (water and waste management) and improved capacity of both public institutions and civil society to support good environmental governance,

### 3.3. Renewable energies and energy efficiency

Specific objectives:

To complement the relevant institutional, legislative and fiscal reforms, creating the enabling environment to mobilise public and private actors (SMEs in particular), in order to achieve the goals of 10% renewable energy and 20% of energy savings by 2020;

Contributing to full scale implementation of activities to enhance sustainable production and consumption patterns and induce behavioural changes, including water and resource demand management, adoption of best available technologies, research & development and to work on promoting investments towards green and low carbon economy.

3.3.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

Enhanced legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, and regular updated strategic planning, for the implementation of RE and EE investments and applications, including the set up of needed fiscal and financial incentives, as well as required infrastructure conducive to the private sector involvement in the and low carbon green economy;

Jordanian public is more aware of REEE issues and required changes; R&D capacity increased to demonstrate the feasibility, audit, benefits and sustainability of new technical solutions;

REEE policy implementation creates incentives for private sector development and increased involvement.” 2014 Jordan SSF 2014-2017

### “3.1 Justice and Security System Reform (15%)

3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

Reinforce the independence and the efficiency of the Judiciary:

The necessary modifications to render the Judiciary independent of the executive power are prepared and legislation is amended.

The capacities of judicial institutions are reinforced.

The Judiciary is modernised.

Reform the penitentiary administration in line with international standards

Administrative steps towards the transfer of prison management from Ministry of Interior (MoI) to Ministry of Justice (MoJ) are accomplished;

The conduct of prison and detention centre staff is in line with international standards.



*Improve law enforcement and the competence of security agencies in the full respect of citizens' rights and liberties.*

*Cooperation and information sharing between security agencies and the Judiciary is systemised, institutionalised and effective;*

*The professionalism of security agencies and the cooperation amongst them improved;*

*Oversight and accountability of the overall security system are promoted.*

*Put in place an effective border management system:*

*An integrated border management strategy is formulated and implemented;*

*Capacities of border management staff are reinforced, including in dealing with refugee population flows in line with international standards.*

*3.2 Reinforcing social cohesion, promoting sustainable economic development and protecting vulnerable groups (40%)*

*3.2.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*Promote an enabling environment for business and SMEs development, investment and innovation and spur entrepreneurship*

*Expected results:*

*a) Improved, simplified legislative and regulatory framework for operation of business in particular of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises [MSMEs] (application of Think Small First principle, regulatory impact assessment and other guidelines of the Small Business Act for Europe) and results from the assessment on the implementation of the "Small Business Act" for Europe in the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa 2014;*

*b) Improved structured dialogue between business associations/private sector organisations and relevant ministries, revival of a constructive social dialogue (tripartite and bipartite), and enhanced and effective coordination among the ministries aiming at promoting private sector development on one hand and generating quality jobs for the target population on the other;*

*c) Increased and sustained access to finance for Lebanese MSMEs;*

*d) Improved business support services;*

*e) Increased competitiveness of Lebanese private sector to access regional and international markets.*

*2. Adapt the skills provided by the public education system to the needs of labour market*

*Expected results:*

*f) The public education system is needs-orientated and a strategy is defined for vocational training strengthening the links with private sector;*

*g) General education and vocational training and education systems are more efficient in allowing closer match of skills and job opportunities from a lifelong learning perspective;*

*h) Social partners participate increasingly in employment training policies and coordination mechanisms; school to work transition programmes are scaled up.*

*3. Increase the participation of Lebanon's population in the formal labour market, improve working conditions and respect for labour rights, with special attention to women and youth:*

*Expected results:*

*i) Labour market participation rates are increasing in particular those of women and the youth.*

*4. Enhance social protection*

*Expected results:*

*j) The capacities of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) are strengthened and social security coverage is increasingly extended to all Lebanese;*

*k) Tripartite dialogue, in particular in the field of social protection, is improved.*

*5. Address the needs of the most vulnerable areas and populations in Lebanon*

*Expected results:*

*l) Rehabilitated and extended basic infrastructure;*

*m) Economic recovery and creation of decent jobs;*

*n) Education and health services;*

*o) A national resilience approach is developed to withstand, adapt and recover from the crisis;*

*p) The capacity of the public Lebanese institutions to deal with crisis situation and to coordinate the response is improved.*

*6. Legal rights and living conditions of refugees, in particular of Palestine refugees in Lebanon have improved, in particular because:*

*q) Employment opportunities and access to property, health and education are improved;*

*r) Infrastructure in the camps is rehabilitated and upgraded;*

*s) Dialogue between Lebanese authorities and Palestine refugees is improved including dialogue on legal status and human rights issues and governance mechanisms in the camps.*

*3.3 Promotion of sustainable and transparent management of energy and natural resources (20%)*

*3.3.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*1. Secure sustainable energy supply and manage energy demand and diversify energy sources while promoting green energy in particular:*

- a) Law 462/2002 and relevant bylaws are enforced and allow for the restructuring of the sector (in particular the reform of the electricity tariff scheme).;
- b) Energy infrastructure is maintained and upgraded (soft);
- c) Energy efficiency aims are mainstreamed into the policies and programmes of the main energy consuming sectors (industry, transport, residential and tertiary);
- d) Low carbon energy (including renewable energy) plans are developed and under implementation; Assistance to foster regional cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas, including on carbon/fossil fuel taxation and emissions reduction in the energy sector has been successfully utilised.

2. Preserve the environment and mainstream environmental management and protection of natural resources:

Expected results:

- e) Capacities, and the re-organisation of environmental monitoring authorities (including inter-ministerial consultation) have been supported;
- f) Environmental protection and safeguard measures are mainstreamed into national sector policies and programs, in particular the adoption of the water code;
- g) The climate change and biodiversity agenda of Lebanon has made progress."

3. Develop a competitive agriculture sector and promote a sustainable rural economy:

Expected results:

- h) The regulatory/policy framework is updated;
- i) Agricultural infrastructure is upgraded;
- j) Quality/safety control over all agriculture products and inputs is in place;
- k) Agricultural value chains which focus on better quality, production, marketing and export are developed;
- l) Sustainable use of natural resources (e.g. water, soils conservation, green energies) is evident;
- m) Lebanon's integration within the European/regional agricultural market has improved.

4. Measures in favour of civil society

A specific financial provision to support to civil society (15% of the financial resources of this Framework) and an EU Roadmap of Engagement with Civil Society is foreseen for the active engagement with civil society. This provision is additional to resources from thematic programmes and from programmes identified under the three intervention sectors.

Through this provision civil society can receive support for

- a) Their involvement supporting Lebanese host communities and mitigating the consequences of the Syrian conflict in Lebanon;
- b) Developing the non-state actors' "watchdog" function in monitoring state reform implementation;
- c) Seizing windows of opportunity for interventions in the fields of human rights, gender equality, youth and children rights;
- d) Providing support to MSMEs;
- e) Peace building and reconciliation activities;
- f) Their involvement in environmental monitoring and advocacy." 2014 Lebanon SSF 2014-2016

"3.1 Public administration reform (indicative 30%)

3.1.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

Improved relationship and clarity (including policy, regulatory and service functions in all sectors of the State's administration) established in central public administration and in regional and local authorities; Results-oriented management introduced in all public bodies at the national, regional and local levels, including Regional Development Agencies, in particular strengthened institutional and human resource capacities and e-governance tools;

Strengthened policy-making, management and monitoring processes in public institutions through improved planning, implementation and reporting of the budget;

Increased decision-making powers and budgetary resources devolved to regional and local authorities;

Improved availability, effectiveness and cost efficiency of the delivery of public services at national and sub-national levels.

Decentralisation reform and development policies implemented in Moldova's regions, including regions with special status

3.2 Agriculture and rural development (indicative 30%)

3.2.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

Strengthened policy, legal and institutional framework;

Increased investment in the modernisation of the agri-food and feed chains meeting EU food safety and quality requirements;

Improved education, research and extension services in the agri-food sector, including facilitating information systems and improved access to capital, input and output markets for producers;

*Reduced poverty in rural areas;*

*Improved social and technical infrastructure in rural areas and increased domestic and foreign investments;*

*Reduction in unemployment rates in rural areas;*

*Reduction in the rates of internal and external labour migration;*

*Reduction of the rural areas affected by natural disasters (floods and droughts);*

*Improved management of natural resources in rural areas and in agri-food sector, including sustainable agricultural land tenure practices, environmentally friendly production technologies and products, climate mitigation and disaster risk-reduction measures;*

*Increased economic exchanges between the two sides of the Nistru River; local entrepreneurship in Transnistria and in regions with special status promoted in partnership with Moldovan counterparts; technical approximation in the prospect of an EU-Moldova DCFTA is conducted.*

*3.3 Police reform and border management (indicative 20%)*

*3.3.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*The police force is well-trained and equipped, accountable, efficient and professional;*

*The demilitarisation of the police and border guards is completed;*

*The process of pre-trial investigation and prosecution is streamlined;*

*The human rights of suspects are respected;*

*Moldova's borders are secured and there is a substantial reduction in organised and cross-border crime;*

*The achievements of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan are sustained over time;*

*Corruption in the police and border management sector is significantly reduced.*

*4. Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013. Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote an enabling environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*5. Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration. This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance provided under the Eastern Partnership "Comprehensive Institution Building" (CIB) initiative. Capacity development and institution building activities – either from sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies." 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017*

*"Secteur d'Intervention 1 : Réforme de la justice et renforcement de la participation citoyenne*

*1*

*a) L'état de droit est renforcé par l'amélioration et l'application effective des dispositions législatives et administratives inhérentes (rôle du Parlement, indépendance des partis politiques, etc.).*

*b) Les capacités des institutions et des acteurs démocratiques sont renforcées (Parlement, partis politiques, Organe national de la prévention et de la lutte contre la corruption (ONPLC), Conseil de la Nation etc.).*

*c) Les modalités et les instances de concertation/conseil sont renforcées afin de favoriser l'association des acteurs de la société civile et des parties prenantes dans l'élaboration des projets de lois, la mise en oeuvre et l'évaluation des politiques publiques.*

*2*

*a) Les réformes nécessaires visant à garantir l'indépendance des magistrats sont mises en oeuvre.*

*b) Les capacités des professionnels de la justice sont renforcées, y compris dans les domaines des droits de l'homme, conventions internationales, droits des prévenus, etc.*

*c) Les réformes nécessaires afin de garantir à tout justiciable le droit à un procès équitable sont mises en oeuvre, notamment en matière de respect de la présomption d'innocence, du droit à un recours effectif, et du droit à la défense et à l'assistance juridique.*

*d) L'accès à la justice est amélioré*

*3*

*a) Le secteur des media en tant que plateforme d'information des citoyens est renforcé*

b) Les vecteurs de citoyenneté active sont développés et renforcés (associations, formations citoyennes, milieu scolaire...)

Secteur d'Intervention 2 : Marché du travail – emploi

1

a) Une stratégie nationale intégrée de l'emploi est développée, adoptée et mise en oeuvre et la problématique de l'emploi est prise en compte dans les politiques sectorielles

b) Les capacités des acteurs impliqués dans la mise en oeuvre de la politique de l'emploi (acteurs publics, représentants des employeurs, syndicats, associations professionnelles, secteur privé...) sont améliorées et le dialogue social est renforcé

c) La connaissance du marché du travail est améliorée et exploitée en impliquant les partenaires économiques et sociaux concernés

2

a) Le système éducatif (éducation, enseignement supérieur) est mieux adapté aux enjeux économiques et sociaux

b) Le système de formation professionnelle est mieux adapté aux enjeux économiques et sociaux

3

a) L'efficacité des programmes d'appui à l'auto-emploi est renforcée.

b) Accessibilité accrue du marché du travail aux groupes/segments fragiles de la population active (ex: femmes/jeunes/ chômeurs sans qualifications et primodemandeurs d'emploi).

c) Le marché du travail dans des zones défavorisées pilotes est développé

Secteur d'intervention 3 : Appui à la gestion et à la diversification de l'économie

1.

a) Gestion performante de la politique budgétaire et du Fonds de Régulation de Recettes (FRR) basée sur des hypothèses réalistes concernant l'évolution du prix des hydrocarbures

b) Réforme dans la gestion des Finances Publiques impliquant une plus grande performance et transparence

c) Croissance inclusive: rationalisation et efficacité des dépenses de transferts sociaux renforcées par un meilleur ciblage des populations vulnérables

2.

a) Une stratégie de diversification économique intégrée et durable est développée en partenariat avec les acteurs économiques et sociaux.

b) 2 à 3 secteurs à haut niveau de valeur ajoutée sont renforcés et développés (approche filière ou territoriale) de manière durable

c) Appui à une stratégie de privatisation et au développement du marché de capitaux

d) Amélioration du climat des affaires en vue de contribuer au développement économique durable, par l'amélioration de l'encadrement institutionnel du marché et des mécanismes de contrôle et de régulation

e) Renforcement du secteur privé, par l'appui aux associations sectorielles et la vulgarisation de projets-pilote de mise à niveau." 2014 Algeria SSF 2014-2017

"3.2 Soutenir la gouvernance démocratique, l'Etat de droit et la mobilité

3.2.2 Résultats attendus

En matière judiciaire, l'indépendance et l'efficacité du pouvoir judiciaire est garantie, la capacité professionnelle du secteur est renforcée la confiance des citoyens dans la justice est renforcée, et plus particulièrement l'intervention contribue à: une magistrature indépendante; une meilleure qualification professionnelle des acteurs du système judiciaire; un système judiciaire mieux organisé, efficace, efficient et performant; un système judiciaire plus transparent et plus accessible;- une population mieux informée sur ses droits et devoirs.

En matière pénitentiaire: les programmes de réinsertion des détenus sont améliorés ; des peines alternatives à la privation de liberté sont mises en œuvre ; les programmes de formation du personnel de l'administration pénitentiaire sont améliorés; les conditions de détention sont améliorées.

En matière de gouvernance démocratique et économique, réforme des finances et de l'administration publiques: appui aux institutions clés du système démocratique et de la gouvernance publique dont les prérogatives ont été renforcées dans le cadre de la réforme constitutionnelle; une plus grande intégration de la réforme des finances de l'Etat et des collectivités locales contribuant à une bonne organisation et une durabilité du système financier public; le fonctionnement et la transparence de gestion des collectivités territoriales sont améliorés et les capacités de leurs ressources humaines renforcées en lien avec les exigences de leurs compétences et mandat; la qualité et l'accès des citoyens aux services publics au niveau territorial sont améliorés; la coordination entre les parties prenantes au niveau décentralisé est renforcée; l'efficacité, l'efficience et la crédibilité des institutions de contrôle, de reddition des comptes et e lutte contre la corruption sont renforcées et la coordination entre elles améliorées.

*Dans le domaine de la migration et mobilité : les résultats escomptés sont la protection des droits fondamentaux des migrants, la réinsertion économique et sociale de migrants rentrés volontairement au Maroc ou, depuis le Maroc vers leur pays d'origine, une meilleure gestion de la migration pour raison de travail ou d'études, la diminution de la prévalence du phénomène de traite des êtres humains et un cadre juridique de protection internationale et d'asile renforcé, une mobilité accrue, une migration irrégulière maîtrisée et une diminution des réseaux de trafic des migrants, un développement de l'investissement productif des migrants au Maroc et la réduction des coûts de transfert de fonds, une meilleure intégration de la migration dans les politiques publiques afin d'en optimiser les impacts positifs..*

*Dans le domaine de la promotion des droits des femmes et de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, en continuité et complémentarité avec les interventions précédentes: la protection juridique des femmes est renforcée, une culture de l'égalité est promue, l'institutionnalisation de la perspective de genre est consolidée et la participation des femmes à la vie politique, sociale, économique et culturelle est renforcée.*

### **3.3 Emploi et croissance durable et inclusive**

#### **Résultats attendus**

*Les résultats escomptés des interventions dans ce secteur sont les suivants :*

*le potentiel de croissance durable de l'économie marocaine est dynamisé;*

*la compétitivité des PME marocaines est renforcée, les TPE sont renforcées et formalisées, et l'environnement des affaires est rendu plus attractif pour les investisseurs;*

*la qualité de la formation et l'employabilité des actifs marocains, et particulièrement les jeunes est améliorée;*

*la création d'emplois dans les secteurs clés, y compris les secteurs innovants et l'économie verte et sobre en carbone, est stimulée;*

*la coordination entre les parties prenantes au niveau local et central est renforcée;*

*le dialogue social est renforcé;*

*les écarts de développement économique entre les régions sont réduits.*

#### **4 Mesures en faveur de la société civile**

*Le soutien à la société civile se poursuivra et sera intégré dans la mesure du possible dans les différentes composantes de ce cadre stratégique d'appui, et ceci sera particulièrement pertinent dans le domaine de la bonne gouvernance et le développement du capital humain.*

*Il s'agira de poursuivre l'appui de l'UE au renforcement des capacités institutionnelles et organisationnelles de la société civile marocaine, en matière soit de fourniture de services, soit de plaidoyer ou de suivi et évaluation des politiques publiques. La consolidation et le bon fonctionnement des espaces de dialogue entre la société civile, les acteurs institutionnels (gouvernement, Conseil économique, social et environnemental, etc.) et les partenaires techniques et financiers, pourra également être soutenu. Une attention particulière sera accordée, à cet égard, à la participation des partenaires sociaux ainsi que des femmes, des jeunes et des organisations qui les représentent aux différents mécanismes de consultation.*

*En outre, l'appui aux organisations de la société civile se poursuivra par le biais des différents programmes thématiques dont le Maroc bénéficie. La mise en œuvre de la Facilité société civile qui démarrera en 2014, permettra, au cours de la période, d'apporter un appui spécifique en termes de consolidation et renforcement des capacités des principales organisations de la société civile afin de promouvoir une culture de participation démocratique et gouvernance locale et de surmonter la défiance parfois existante entre Etat et société civile." 2014 Morocco SSF 2014-2017*

### **3. Soutien de l'UE par secteur**

#### **3.1.2. Résultats attendus**

*En lien avec l'OS1*

*La création d'emplois (hommes/femmes) est stimulée dans les secteurs clés.*

*La mise en œuvre d'une nouvelle stratégie intégrée d'emploi qui prend en compte l'analyse des besoins et le développement de compétences sur la base d'une collecte régulière et structurée des données.*

*Les secteurs économiques clés à fort potentiel d'employabilité et haut niveau d'innovation et de valeur ajoutée sont renforcés et développés de manière durable.*

*La qualité de la formation et de l'employabilité des actifs tunisiens est améliorée, en particulier pour les jeunes et les femmes. La politique de l'emploi et du marché du travail est devenue plus efficace.*

*La participation active des partenaires sociaux à la formulation et mise en œuvre des réformes et politiques d'emploi;*

*Le volume d'activité des secteurs de la microfinance, du capital – investissement a augmenté*

*En lien avec l'OS2*

*Les obstacles réglementaires à l'investissement et à l'activité économique sont réduits.*

*La transparence est améliorée et la liberté d'entreprendre est facilitée par la réforme du code des incitations à l'investissement.*

*Les partenariats entre les secteurs publics et privés, sont développés, en attachant une attention particulière au soutien à apporter aux femmes entrepreneurs*

*La coordination entre les différentes institutions et les fonds apportant un soutien au secteur des PME sera amélioré*

*En lien avec l'OS3*

*La modernisation de l'administration devient effective grâce notamment à la généralisation progressive des principes de la gestion budgétaire par objectifs*

*La dépense publique est mieux exécutée, et la réalisation effective du budget d'investissement a augmenté.*

*Le fonctionnement de l'administration douanière s'est amélioré tant sur le plan des recouvrements que de la facilitation des échanges.*

*Une réforme fiscale est engagée, visant à simplifier/moderniser les procédures en vue d'améliorer le recouvrement d'une part et l'équité d'autre part.*

### *3.2 Consolidation des éléments constitutifs de la démocratie*

#### *3.2.2. Résultats attendus*

*Les capacités des structures électorales (ISIE) sont renforcées et le processus électoral se déroule conformément aux règles démocratiques et de l'état de droit.*

*Les conventions internationales relatives aux Droits de l'Homme ainsi que les conventions fondamentales de l'Organisation internationale du travail sont effectivement mises en œuvre*

*Le cadre juridique et les procédures administratives/judiciaires sont harmonisés avec les standards internationaux*

*Des mécanismes et des actions en matière de justice transitionnelle sont mis en œuvre*

*Une stratégie nationale de réforme du système de la sécurité est mise en œuvre*

*Les capacités des parties prenantes concernées dans la réforme du secteur de la sécurité sont renforcées et leur coordination améliorée*

*L'implication citoyenne de la société civile est renforcée dans la dynamique démocratique, notamment par la mise en place du cadre nécessaire pour garantir l'exercice des droits et libertés des citoyens.*

*Une attention particulière sera accordée aux droits des femmes et des enfants, ainsi qu'à la liberté de presse et d'expression et la diversité culturelle et aux questions environnementales et de changement climatique.*

*Participation effective des femmes à la vie publique et politique et diminution de la violence et de la discrimination basées sur le genre.*

### *3.3. Développement régional et local durable*

#### *3.3.2 Résultats attendus*

*Pour l'OS1:*

*les réformes juridiques et institutionnelles pour la déconcentration, la décentralisation et l'amélioration de la gouvernance locale sont préparées,*

*une politique et stratégie de développement régional et local durable est préparée et mise en œuvre,*

*le rôle des structures régionales sur les deux plans institutionnel et opérationnel en matière de prospective territoriale, de diagnostics stratégiques de territoires et d'exercices d'évaluation des politiques régionales, est amélioré,*

*Pour l'OS2:*

*l'accès aux services publics au niveau local et la qualité de ces services sont améliorés et assurés de façon égale pour tous.*

*des actions pilotes de développement local sont conçues et réalisées avec la participation de la société civile et des populations locales, notamment des femmes.*

*les capacités humaines, financières, institutionnelles et techniques des collectivités territoriales et locales sont mises à niveau afin de soutenir pleinement le processus de décentralisation.*

*Pour l'OS3 :*

*les capacités humaines, financières, institutionnelles et techniques dans les collectivités territoriales sont mises à niveau afin de soutenir pleinement les principes opérationnels de bonne gouvernance environnementale (y compris changement climatique) et de préservation des ressources naturelles et leurs diffusions dans les autres politiques sectorielles.*

*l'adaptation au changement climatique est prise en compte à tous les niveaux de la prise de décision en matière de développement : politiques, plans, programmes et projets.*

*D'un point de vue opérationnel, ces résultats seront plus efficaces si l'appui de l'UE est déployé en bonne coordination, voire en coopération directe lorsque possible, avec les partenaires internationaux de la Tunisie actifs dans les secteurs d'intervention. Une synergie sera recherchée avec les Etats-membres de l'UE, la Banque européenne de reconstruction et de développement et la Banque européenne d'investissement ainsi qu'avec les autres instruments financiers de l'UE, notamment la facilité*

*d'investissement pour le voisinage (FIV) et la composante régionale de l'instrument européen de voisinage.*” 2014 Tunisia SSF 2014-2015

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews –NEAR, EEAS, EUDs

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 5.2.3 I-523. Evidence that expected results of ENI programmes (where relevant) are consistent with EU development policy priorities

#### Global analysis of the indicator

EU development policy seeks to eradicate poverty in a context of sustainable development and is one of the corner stones of EU relations with the outside world – alongside the foreign, security and trade policies. It is constituted by a framework of several different documents, e.g. the “Lisbon Treaty”, European Consensus on Development, Agenda for Change, Policy Coherence for Development and others. In their entirety, they constitute the policy package to which ENI has to be aligned. It is listed in the programming instructions updated in 2016 (Annex 2). As a consequence, this package works as guiding instructions for the identification and approval of actions and programmes financed under ENI and in parallel as restrictions in case any of its components are violated by the partner country.

In view of the drastic changes in the Neighbourhood (social, political and economical), the needs in the partner countries, in particular in the South, have become so-called “basic needs for survival”. As a consequence, actions responding to these needs are almost automatically expected to produce results consistent with EU development policy priorities. The decision on the implementation of these actions therefore mostly depends on the availability of funds and their coherence – presumed as inherent – seen as a critical issue during the review process.

In the East, the ENI programmes’ expected results are departing from the EU development policy priorities *stricto sensu*. Association agreements, DCFTAs, and Action plans somehow prevail for the programming process. As the underlying rationale of those agreements is inspired by EU values and priorities, divergences are however limited.

#### Presentation of collected proof

*“Specific objective 1: Accelerating political association*

*Expected Results:*

- *Accelerated political association through well functioning Eastern partnership Platforms and panels in the respective sectors of cooperation*
- *Improved democracy and good governance throughout the region*
- *Strengthened cooperation on migration management systems, border management and law enforcement*
- *Strengthened Eastern European partner countries' capacity to participate in EU led missions and operations*

*Specific objective 2: Deepening sustainable economic development and integration and sector cooperation, including environment and climate change*

*Expected Results:*

- *Improved development of SMEs including the creation of a climate conducive to trade, investment and regional integration*
- *Fostering entrepreneurship, innovation, creativity*
- *Access to finance, public-private cooperation are promoted*
- *Convergence with EU policies and regulatory approximation*
- *Enhanced cooperation on environment issues among partner countries*
- *Enhanced cooperation on policy reforms, with priority on water management and green economy,*
- *Climate change adaptation and mitigation commitments are implemented at regional and national level*

- Further integration of Eastern European partner countries and EU energy markets
- Improved transport links between the EU and the partner countries and between partner countries
- Improved convergence with EU norms and standards
- Transport related agreements between EU and partner countries are signed and implemented
- Specific measures taken to enhance trade facilitation
- Enhanced cooperation on Agriculture and Rural Development

Specific objective 3: Enhancing support to civil society, local authorities and people to people contacts  
Expected Results:

Increased people to people contacts

- Strengthened cooperation on bridging the gap between research and innovation
- Strengthened capacity of regional civil society networks and organisations
- Local authorities, communities, civil society, business associations and representative employers' organisations and trade-unions are strengthened in developing solutions for municipal development

Specific objective 4: Flagship Initiatives

Expected Results:

- Improved integrated border management and mobility of – Number of mobility dialogues and visa – Ministries and agencies in charge of 23 citizens (see under objective 1)
- Enhanced sustainable municipal development, also encompassing the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (E5P)
- Promote Good Environmental Governance and Prevent Climate Change (see under objective 2)
- Improved prevention, preparedness and response to natural and man-made disasters

Sector 2: Priorities under the regional cooperation frameworks

Specific objective 1: Promote sustainable development and the improvement of the environment

Expected Results:

- Improved cooperation on environmental protection and energy efficiency in the Northern Dimension region
  - Improved environmental situation of the Black Sea
- Specific objective 2: Infrastructure development and interconnections
- Improved transport links between the TEN-T network and the network developed by the Northern Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics
  - Improved transport cooperation in the Black Sea region

Sector 3: Energy and transport initiatives involving the wide region

Expected Results:

- Improved energy markets convergence, energy security, development and efficiency
- Investment attraction towards energy projects is facilitated
- Improved development of the transport corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia and transport market convergence
- Investment attraction towards transport projects is facilitated

Sector 4: Horizontal and sectoral support

Expected Results:

- Support to the Eastern Partnership multilateral cooperation process -
- Supported Eastern Partnership multilateral cooperation process
- Supported Northern Dimension and Black Sea Synergy cooperation processes

Specific objective 2: Eastern Partnership visibility

Expected Results:

- Enhanced visibility of the Eastern Partnership
- Support for identification and formulation of programmes and information activities provided” 2014 ENI East RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 19-20-21-22-23-24-25

“Objective 1: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR LIBERTY, DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

Expected Results:

a) Domestic reform efforts towards democratic transition, rule of law, peace are sustained and reinforced through cooperation at regional or sub regional level and enhanced capacity of stakeholders.

Objective 2: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Expected Results:

b) Domestic reform efforts towards developing opportunities for private sector development and investments benefit from further encouragement through regional exchanges of best practices and political impetus

c) Increased degree of convergence of domestic policies on environment, climate change, water, energy, and integrated maritime approach in the region

Objective 3: BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE



*Expected Results:*

d) *Civil society in the region further empowered to participate in policy dialogue and policy making.*

*Objective 4: SUPPORT REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION**Expected Results:*

e) *“Closer regional or sub regional cooperation between EU and Mediterranean and between Mediterranean countries is enhanced” 2014 ENI South RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 17-18-19*

*“6.1 Building a partnership for sustainable and inclusive economic development and integration*

*Expected results: higher level of investments in public infrastructure and productive sectors, job creation and private sector development, in line with the Neighbourhood Investment Facility’s Strategic Orientations. This will contribute to achieving EU political objectives under ENP (e. g. integration into the EU’s internal market), as well as poverty reduction and sustainable economic, social and environmental development. During the period 2008-2013, NIF provided EUR 753 million in grants and thereby leveraged an estimated EUR 8.1 billion of loans from the European Financing Institutions. For 2014- 2017, the EU has indicatively earmarked EUR 595 million for NIF, which may be complemented by funds from ENP regional and/or bilateral programmes, and by direct contributions from Member States to the NIF trust fund, which is managed by the European Investment Bank.*

*6.3 Targeted capacity building*

*Expected results: faster approximation of the regulatory framework to EU norms and standards and improved public administration capacity will contribute to public governance development and progressive integration into the EU internal market*

*6.4: Incentive-based approach*

*Expected results: contributing to promote progress and reforms in the areas of deep and sustainable democracy and respect for human rights.*

*ERASMUS*

*Specific objective 1: Improve the skills and competences of students and staff, and the employability of graduates through mobility*

*The main expected results to be achieved are:*

- 1. Improved and diversified degrees that incorporate studies abroad*
- 2. Enhanced skills and improved learning performance for students*
- 3. Improved competences of staff in their field of expertise and understanding of education policies, practices and systems*
- 4. Improved level of competences and skills of Master graduates*
- 5. Increased employability and career prospects for students*
- 6. Reinforced institutional capacities of higher education institutions*
- 7. Significant participation of students and staff from the least developed regions of partner countries*

*Specific objective 2: Support the modernisation, internationalisation, accessibility and of higher education in the Partner countries*

*Expected results:*

*The main expected results to be achieved are:*

- 1. Improved quality and access to higher education and enhanced relevance of higher education programmes for the labour market and society*
- 2. Improved level of competences and skills in HEIs through the development of new and innovative education programmes*
- 3. Enhanced management, governance and innovation capacities, as well as the internationalisation of HEIs*
- 4. Increased capacities of national authorities to modernise their higher education systems, by supporting the definition, implementation and monitoring of reform policies*
- 5. Regional integration and cooperation across different countries through joint initiatives, sharing of good practices and cooperation” 2014 ENI strategic priorities and MIP 2014-2017, p. 13-16*

*“Private Sector Development (indicative 35%)*

*The overall objective will be to create employment opportunities by enhancing private sector development in Armenia.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To improve the national business and investment climate for the small and medium enterprises;*

*To improve the economic competitiveness of Armenian regions.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 1.1.1. Increased business opportunities and access to finance for small and medium enterprises*

*Result 1.1.2. Strengthened public private dialogue and partnership*

*Result 1.1.3. Improved labour market efficiency*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 1.2.1. Increased investment and business opportunities in targeted economic sectors and regions*

*Result 1.2.2. Strengthened capacity and performance of farmers associations and cooperatives*

*Public Administration Reform*

*The overall objective will be to improve transparency, accountability and efficiency of the public administration at central, regional and local levels.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To enhance public administration systems and professionalism of the civil service;*

*To improve the quality of public finance management;*

*To make public service delivery at central, regional and local levels more efficient and effective.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 2.1.1. Civil service reform implemented according to EU shared principles*

*Result 2.1.2. Strengthened statistical capacity in the economic, demographic, social and environmental fields at municipal and regional levels*

*Result 2.1.3. Reduced corruption in the public service*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 2.2.1. Improved budget credibility and transparency*

*For specific objective 3*

*Result 2.3.1. Citizen-oriented multifunctional service centres (one-stop shops) established for public service delivery*

*Result 2.3.2. Enhanced provision of e-governance services*

*Result 2.3.3. Optimised and strengthened municipal services, including integrated social services*

*Justice sector reform*

*The overall objective will be to improve the justice system in Armenia and to enhance protection of Human Rights.*

*The specific objectives will be:*

*To contribute to the development of a more independent, transparent, accountable, accessible and efficient justice system,*

*To promote effective and timely protection of human rights.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1*

*Result 3.1.1. Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, prosecution and lawyers*

*Result 3.1.2. More effective and regulated legal process*

*Result 3.1.3. Improved accountability and transparency of judicial proceedings and of nomination and performance assessment of judges*

*Result 3.1.4. Improved access to justice and free legal aid for citizens*

*For specific objective 2*

*Result 3.2.1. Improved conditions and reduced ill-treatment in penitentiary institutions and police custody*

*Result 3.2.2. A justice system that fully safeguards the universal human right to a fair and impartial trial as established in international and European conventions*

*4. Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*5. Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three principal priority sectors.*

*This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative.*

*Capacity development and institution building activities – either through sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.” 2014 Armenia SSF 2014-2017, p. 8-11*

### *“3.1 Regional and Rural Development*

*3.1.1 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The overall objective is to support Government efforts in the diversification of the economy while promoting a balanced and inclusive growth, decrease regional disparities and improve rural livelihoods.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*Objective 1: To contribute to business development, investment promotion and employment generation across economic regions of Azerbaijan.*

*Objective 2: To enhance democratic participation, institutional capacity and efficiency in the field of local governance and regional development*

*Objective 3: To raise rural livelihoods and quality of life in rural areas.*

*3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*Increased competitiveness of regions and their enterprises;*

*Improved basic rural infrastructure and business services;*

*Community mobilisation ensured through strengthened rural institutions and organizations, such as producer organizations and cooperatives;*

*Market-driven pilot initiatives using a value-chain approach for employment generation in areas related to agriculture, agro-processing, handicraft and tourism implemented.*

*For Specific Objective 2:*

*Policy, legislative and institutional framework for the local self-governance in Azerbaijan is aligned to European Charter of Local-Self-Government;*

*Institutional capacity at national and regional level to plan, implement and administer programmes in the field of regional development and territorial planning strengthened;*

*Participatory and democratic approach to local development enhanced by fostering partnership, participation and bottom-up initiatives at local (and regional) level;*

*Improved efficiency, transparency, accountability and quality of service delivery at the local level.*

*For Specific Objective 3:*

*Improved infrastructure and access to social services for the rural population;*

*Improved environmental sustainability and land management of rural areas;*

*Increased diversification of economic activity and employment opportunities.*

### *3.2 Justice Sector reform*

*3.2.2 The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The expected long term impact will be the strengthening of the rule of law, including the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, transparency and accountability, full access to justice by all citizenry, and the right to a fair trial.*

*Objective 1: Ensure the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability of the justice system and respect for human rights;*

*Objective 2: Ensure the independence, impartiality, integrity and transparency of the judiciary;*

*Objective 3: Enhance citizens' access to justice.*

*3.2.3. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*An effective and efficient justice system fully safeguarding human rights is established ensuring a fair and impartial trial;*

*Improved capacity, knowledge and integrity of the main actors of the justice system;*

*Juvenile justice reform implemented in accordance with European and international standards;*

*Improved accountability and transparency of the justice system;*

*Custodial conditions including respect of human rights in penitentiary institutions improved. For Specific Objective 2:*

*Judicial independence and impartiality is guaranteed in law and practice (inamovibility, career, disciplinary actions, judicial inspection, budget);*

*Anticorruption measures implemented throughout the justice system.*

*For Specific Objective 3:*

*Effective legal system of legal aid including free legal aid for indigent persons established;*

*Improved awareness and access to justice (including Alternative Dispute Resolution – ADR) for citizens and economic operators including at provincial level.*

*Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three principal priority sectors.*

*This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative.*

*Capacity development and institution building activities – either through sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.*

### *3.3 Education and skills development*

*The following overall and specific objectives will be pursued:*

*The expected long-term impact will be the strengthening of the education and training sector, taking into consideration its high priority for sustainable socio-economic development, competitiveness and employment.*

*Specific objectives are:*

*Objective 1 To modernize of the education and training systems by enhancing quality, equality, relevance, governance and access in line with European standards and practices.*

*Objective 2: To build bridges between the world of work and VET providers in order to match skills provision to the needs of enterprises.*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For Specific Objective 1:*

*Coverage of education improved (including equality and equity) in a life-long learning perspective;*

*Competence-based education approach applied;*

*Quality and efficiency of education providers enhanced, including for science in the higher education;*

*Financing, efficiency, management and transparency of the education system improved.*

*For Specific Objective 2:*

*Increased relevance of the VET system to the labour market needs;*

*New VET system established activating participation of employers;*

*Increased coordination between labour policies and the education sector;*

*Functioning multi-level governance of VET (national, sectoral, regional and local level).” 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 9-16*

### *“3.1 Social Inclusion (indicative 30%)*

*3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*(I) Enhanced skills and knowledge of civil society organisations and local authorities to address the needs of socially vulnerable groups, such as people with special needs, persons with disabilities, elderly people, women, mothers and children, minorities, including through the launch and implementation of social contracting mechanisms, while ensuring equal quality of service delivery across the country; functioning mechanisms of dialogue concerning policy formulation and programme implementation in the field of social inclusion involving government institutions, civil society organisations and local and regional authorities. The mechanisms will also ensure an equal quality of delivery through the whole territory of the country. (II) Increased capacity of the government to meet commitments under international conventions related to the rights of socially vulnerable groups, including but not limited to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Convention on the Rights of the Child; improved access to justice for socially vulnerable groups; (III) Improved employment potential through human capital development, dedicated trainings and life-long learning, with specific focus on the disadvantaged.*

### *3.2 Environment (indicative 25%)*

*3.2.2. The main expected results are:*

(I) Improved legislation and environmental management on biodiversity; (II) Improved legislation and environmental management on quality of air, waste water with new waste water treatment standards effectively enforced; Improved environmental management landfills and hazardous waste, shifting to green economy patterns of production and consumption; (III) Public awareness is raised; (IV) Increased role of civil society as monitors of environmental activities and reforms.

3.3 Local / Regional economic development (indicative 25%)

3.3.2. The main expected results are:

1. Improved people's welfare in the regions, better life conditions for local communities; Improved business enabling environment, active development of local entrepreneurship and SMEs.

2. Private business has become a peer partner in achieving social and economic development priorities on regional and local level; Developed human capital, new valuable social and economic competences acquired by local actors.

3. Systemic and effective policy mix to support SMEs on regional and local is developed and applied; SMEs contribute to an increasing part of the country's welfare.

4. COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY (INDICATIVE 10%)

The Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit which took place on 28-29 November 2013 welcomed the increased involvement of parliamentarians, civil society, local and regional authorities, business community and other relevant stakeholders to implement goals of the Eastern Partnership agenda. Increased involvement of Civil Society at large is also consistent with the NSSD 2020 which mentions specifically NGOs, trade unions, business and science as organisations and sectors that are necessary for sustainable development in Belarus. The proposed additional measures will complement the support included in the focal areas. Main specific objectives: i) to complement the direct assistance to support civil society provided by other thematic instruments; ii) to provide targeted support to students not covered by the EU educational programmes; iii) to promote people to people contacts; iv) to promote good democratic practice.

5. COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary support will provide specific assistance for the implementation of priority commitments deriving from future possible EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration." 2014 Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 19-24

#### "6.4 Expected results

The most crucial general area for expected results is in terms of cross-border impact. A clear CBC impact added value needs to be demonstrated in this regard and projects will not be funded under CBC if this is not the case. This is built into the 3 strategic objectives of CBC, but also needs to be fully reflected in the results defined against the selected thematic objectives for each programme.

Given the decentralised nature of the programming and implementation process for ENI- CBC, it will be the responsibility of the programme partners to specify in detail the expected results of the specific programme which they will propose. The following examples are therefore intended to be illustrative.

The expected results should be defined and measured in the following areas (not exhaustive): the efficient and timely implementation of joint CBC programmes; addressing effectively the general objectives set out here, meeting the specific priorities of local partners in each border region and allowing for increased ownership by the local stakeholders; providing means for improved co-ordination between local, regional and national level development plans; providing for the implementation of relevant and effective CBC projects of benefit to both sides of the EU's external borders; contributing in the medium and long-term to enhanced prosperity, stability and security along the external borders of the Union through strengthened co-operation and contacts across borders. In relation to the 3 strategic objectives, as an illustration, it is expected that the programmes, in the border areas, could provide for:

strengthened sustainable economic and social development;

increased focus on good administrative practices and governance;

identification of and sustainable remedy to environmental and climate change challenges;

joint measures in the areas of emergency prevention and fight against crime as well as social and health issues;

improved mobility, border passage and border operability;

For the land-border and sea-crossing programmes, it is expected that the programmes may inter alia create:

long-term co-operation ties between the partners through joint addressing of issues relating to the key overarching objectives;

effective and balanced joint project actions on both sides of the borders;

improved potential to address local priority issues;

increased ownership and commitment among partners from both sides of the borders in the implementation of cross-border activities;  
 reduced isolation of border regions with improved socio-economic development of the border area.  
 For the sea-basin programmes the above are also valid. In addition, it is expected that the programmes may inter alia create  
 improved contacts between the regional and subnational partners in the programme area;  
 increased regional involvement and ownership in the addressing of regional and sub-national priorities of common concern;  
 establishment or strengthening of sustainable networks and co-operation platforms, capable of providing a real contribution to the issues they address.” 2014 CBC SSF 2014-2020

### *“3.1 Poverty Alleviation, Local Socio-Economic Development and Social Protection*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1: To enhance the delivery of basic services, notably to combat illiteracy and improve access to education, in particular at community level:*

*Community based schools are established and teacher’s capacity strengthened to provide quality basic education.*

*Access of disabled children to basic education has improved in target communities.*

*For specific objective 2: To support socio-economic development at the local level targeting those most in need through generating and strengthening sustainable economic activities:*

*The capacity of the targeted communities (authorities and stakeholders) to identify and plan sustainable integrated economic activities including climate change considerations, is enhanced.*

*Sustainable economic activities with a focus on strengthening social inclusion and the creation of decent jobs are financed.*

*For specific objective 3: To increase employment and decent work and improve entrepreneurship and self-employment, with a focus on youth and women.*

*The skillset and employability of the targeted population are improved.*

*The entrepreneurship culture in the targeted areas is strengthened. For specific objective 4: Improve social protection systems and instruments:*

*Domestic co-ordination mechanisms for social protection are put in place and safety net mechanisms are rationalized and targeting improved.*

*Collaboration between the government, social partners and civil society working on social protection at the ground level is strengthened.*

*Access to public health and other basic services is improved.*

### *3.2 Governance, Transparency and Business Environment*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1: Facilitate access of citizens to public services, particularly of women, youth and disabled citizens*

*Child Protection Committees and Sub-Committees as per Child Law 2006 are in place and functioning and protection services by Care Centres for Children are improved.*

*The legislative and regulatory framework to ensure service delivery to the most vulnerable, including women, children and disabled is reformed.*

*Increased numbers of women are provided with ID cards.*

*Mechanisms to address citizen's concerns on public services and access to these services are strengthened.*

*For specific objective 2: Cooperate in combating and preventing corruption:*

*The National anti-corruption strategy (foreseen in Art 218 of the 2014 Constitution) is finalised and its implementation is supported.*

*Institution building measures are implemented in support of selected institutions, such as for example the National Committee for Combating Corruption (NCCC), the prosecutor's office, the central audit agency, economic courts or other bodies involved in public finances management.*

*For specific objective 3: Improve the legal and regulatory framework for conducting business and investment:*

*Business enabling environment is improved and is more conducive to business creation and economic development.*

*Investment climate is improved through the creation of a business friendly institutional and regulatory environment.*

*Capacity of the private sector, in particular SMEs, to compete at local and international markets enhanced.*

*For specific objective 4: Support the implementation of the Association Agreement:*

*Competencies of Egyptian administrations and upgraded legislative and regulatory reforms in agreed-upon priorities areas through relevant approximations with the EU legislation and regulation (acquis communautaire) are enhanced and improved.*

*Public administrations responsible for the service delivery to citizens in agreed-upon priorities areas are reformed and modernised.*

*Possibly, capacity of Egyptian authorities to manage mobility and migration related issues.*

### *3.3 Improved quality of life and the environment*

*For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*For specific objective 1: Improving waste-water management (WWM) and citizens' access to sanitation, including participatory measures at local level and income generating activities:*

*Relevant stakeholders have increased capacities to establish and operate a demand-oriented, sustainable and climate-friendly WWM and Solid Waste Management (SWM) systems.*

*Access to sanitation services at the level of rural areas is increased improving quality of life of citizens. The rehabilitation, extension and management of the WWM and SWM are oriented to maximise employment and related income generating activities.*

*For specific objective 2: Improving access to clean energy:*

*The use of technologies relying on renewable energy sources is increased.*

*Efficiency measures to save energy are in place.*

*Household awareness of energy efficiency is enhanced and their access to natural gas is increased.”*

*2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015*

### *“3.1. Public Administration Reform*

*The overall objective is to improve efficiency, accountability and transparency of the public administration at central, regional and local levels. This will be done in harmonisation with European principles and best practice.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To assist the Government to enhance the Civil Service's capacities and independence, to introduce a modern results oriented management approach and improve transparency, accessibility and the quality of services;*

*To enhance accountability of the executive branch and to combat elite corruption;*

*To strengthen the capacity of the legislative, judiciary, statutory bodies (Parliament, Ombudsman, Constitutional Court, State Audit Office) and mass media to maintain oversight of the executive branch of Government*

*To strengthen the structures and processes of local governance through the decentralisation of powers;*

*To strengthen public finance policy processes in public institutions through the introduction of improved budget forecasting and modelling, cost management techniques and other public finance policy-related reforms including public procurement.*

*The main expected results:*

*The Civil Service is professionalised and independent;*

*Results-oriented management introduced into all public bodies;*

*Improved e-governance, efficiency and cost effectiveness of the delivery of public services;*

*Increased decision-making powers and budgetary resources devolved to local authorities;*

*Enhanced capacity of line Ministries and State Agencies to model costs and benefits of policy options and to monitor and control expenditures;*

*Improved reforms of public finance and fiscal policy;*

*Improved transparency, efficiency and integrity of the public procurement system;*

*Corruption amongst the political elite is reduced;*

*Accountability of the Executive branch of Government is enhanced.*

### *3.2. Agriculture and Rural development*

*The overall objective is to ensure sustainable agricultural and rural development in Georgia with a view to poverty alleviation in rural areas*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To improve the effectiveness and competitiveness of the agricultural sector in an environmentally sustainable manner;*

*To improve employment and living conditions in rural areas through the diversification of the rural economy; creating green and decent jobs;*

*To support environment sustainability in rural areas ensuring agro-biodiversity conservation with the sustainable use of natural resources through the identification and implementation of climate change adaptation and mitigation measures including disaster risk reduction and water basin management.*

*The main expected results:*

*Increased volume and value of outputs in the Agriculture Sector;*

*Availability of financial resources for capital investment by small farmers is increased;*  
*Access to knowledge on improved agriculture technologies by small farmers is increased;*  
*Percentage of small farmers in commercial farming increased;*  
*Reduction in poverty in the rural areas including around and across the administrative boundary lines (ABLs) contributing to confidence building where politically feasible;*  
*Employment patterns in rural areas are diversified;*  
*Coherent rural development policy, approximated with EU standards, is approved*  
*Pilot rural development demand-driven actions implemented;*  
*Reduction in vulnerability of agro-systems and improvement in the resilience of the eco- system to climate change;*  
*Improved management of natural resources in rural areas and in the agri-food sector, including sustainable agricultural land tenure practices, environmentally friendly production technologies and products;*  
*Improved sustainable management of water resources.*

### 3.3. Justice Sector Reform

*The overall objective is a fair and efficient justice system in line with principles of Rule of Law and the protection of Human Rights with increased access to justice for Georgian citizens.*

*The specific objectives are:*

*To improve the criminal justice sector with due attention to human rights protection;*

*To implement a zero- tolerance policy against ill-treatment and to promote Human Rights in the justice sector;*

*To assist the Georgian Government to reform its civil and administrative justice system and to bring it into line with international standards and conventions;*

*To strengthen the institutional and human resource capacities of the judiciary and to ensure training;*

*To ensure the independence, efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary and of Prosecution ;*

*To increase access to justice and legal aid for vulnerable people.*

*The main expected results are:*

*Increased independence, efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary and the Prosecutor office.*

*Increased application of the principles of restorative principles in the Criminal Justice;*

*Improved conditions in prisons and other places of restriction of liberty and implementation of zero-tolerance against ill-treatment;*

*Capacity building of Criminal Justice/Human Rights institutions and Parliament relevant Committees;*

*Range of support services to victims, accused and offenders increased;*

*Administrative and civil justice systems are consistent with international standards and conventions;*

*Vulnerable persons have access to high quality legal services*

*Complementary support in favour of civil society*

*In addition to sector specific assistance, additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013.*

*Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote a conducive environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

*Complementary support for capacity development and institution building*

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development, institution building activities and other agreements-related support will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU-Georgia agreements ( such as for example the social and employment cooperation chapter of the AA) and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration.*

*This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards and complement assistance under the Eastern Partnership “Comprehensive Institution Building” (CIB) initiative. Capacity development and institution building activities – either from sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies.” 2014 Georgia SSF 2014-2017*

#### *“3.1. Reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery*

*Specific objectives:*

*To support Jordan's reform process towards consolidation of deep democracy, the application of the rule of law and human rights protection and enforcement;*



*To promote inclusiveness of national policy and decision making processes (notably to reinforce civil society participation) leading to a stronger democratic political culture;*  
*To support continuing reform of public financial management to achieve long-term fiscal sustainability;*  
*To support public sector reform and improving public service delivery;*  
*To support policies for inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth and in particular to improve social and environmental protection including building resilience to climate change to reduce inequalities and poverty and to promote green and low- carbon development.*

3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

*Enhanced judicial independence, reduced levels of corruption, increased public confidence in the democratic institutions and increased protection and enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms;*

*Improved debt management, public funds planning and allocation, accountability and modernization of control of public funds for further alignment to international best practices, and modernisation of legislations and tax policies*

*Improved quality, efficiency and accountability in public services delivery at all levels;*

*More efficient and better targeted social protection systems ensuring sustainable access to vulnerable populations and supporting sustainable local development measures.*

*Increased access to improved basic services (water and waste management) and improved capacity of both public institutions and civil society to support good environmental governance,*

3.3. Renewable energies and energy efficiency

*Specific objectives:*

*To complement the relevant institutional, legislative and fiscal reforms, creating the enabling environment to mobilise public and private actors (SMEs in particular), in order to achieve the goals of 10% renewable energy and 20% of energy savings by 2020;*

*Contributing to full scale implementation of activities to enhance sustainable production and consumption patterns and induce behavioural changes, including water and resource demand management, adoption of best available technologies, research & development and to work on promoting investments towards green and low carbon economy.*

3.3.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

*Enhanced legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, and regular updated strategic planning, for the implementation of RE and EE investments and applications, including the set up of needed fiscal and financial incentives, as well as required infrastructure conducive to the private sector involvement in the and low carbon green economy;*

*Jordanian public is more aware of REEE issues and required changes; R&D capacity increased to demonstrate the feasibility, audit, benefits and sustainability of new technical solutions;*

*REEE policy implementation creates incentives for private sector development and increased involvement.” 2014 Jordan SSF 2014-2017*

“3.1 Justice and Security System Reform (15%)

3.1.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

*Reinforce the independence and the efficiency of the Judiciary:*

*The necessary modifications to render the Judiciary independent of the executive power are prepared and legislation is amended.*

*The capacities of judicial institutions are reinforced.*

*The Judiciary is modernised.*

*Reform the penitentiary administration in line with international standards*

*Administrative steps towards the transfer of prison management from Ministry of Interior (MoI) to Ministry of Justice (MoJ) are accomplished;*

*The conduct of prison and detention centre staff is in line with international standards.*

*Improve law enforcement and the competence of security agencies in the full respect of citizens’ rights and liberties.*

*Cooperation and information sharing between security agencies and the Judiciary is systemised, institutionalised and effective;*

*The professionalism of security agencies and the cooperation amongst them improved;*

*Oversight and accountability of the overall security system are promoted.*

*Put in place an effective border management system:*

*An integrated border management strategy is formulated and implemented;*

*Capacities of border management staff are reinforced, including in dealing with refugee population flows in line with international standards.*

3.2 Reinforcing social cohesion, promoting sustainable economic development and protecting vulnerable groups (40%)

3.2.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

*Promote an enabling environment for business and SMEs development, investment and innovation and spur entrepreneurship*

*Expected results:*

- a) Improved, simplified legislative and regulatory framework for operation of business in particular of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises [MSMEs] (application of Think Small First principle, regulatory impact assessment and other guidelines of the Small Business Act for Europe) and results from the assessment on the implementation of the "Small Business Act" for Europe in the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa 2014;*
- b) Improved structured dialogue between business associations/private sector organisations and relevant ministries, revival of a constructive social dialogue (tripartite and bipartite), and enhanced and effective coordination among the ministries aiming at promoting private sector development on one hand and generating quality jobs for the target population on the other;*
- c) Increased and sustained access to finance for Lebanese MSMEs;*
- d) Improved business support services;*
- e) Increased competitiveness of Lebanese private sector to access regional and international markets.*

*2. Adapt the skills provided by the public education system to the needs of labour market*

*Expected results:*

- f) The public education system is needs-orientated and a strategy is defined for vocational training strengthening the links with private sector;*
- g) General education and vocational training and education systems are more efficient in allowing closer match of skills and job opportunities from a lifelong learning perspective;*
- h) Social partners participate increasingly in employment training policies and coordination mechanisms; school to work transition programmes are scaled up.*

*3. Increase the participation of Lebanon's population in the formal labour market, improve working conditions and respect for labour rights, with special attention to women and youth:*

*Expected results:*

- i) Labour market participation rates are increasing in particular those of women and the youth.*

*4. Enhance social protection*

*Expected results:*

- j) The capacities of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) are strengthened and social security coverage is increasingly extended to all Lebanese;*
- k) Tripartite dialogue, in particular in the field of social protection, is improved.*

*5. Address the needs of the most vulnerable areas and populations in Lebanon*

*Expected results:*

- l) Rehabilitated and extended basic infrastructure;*
- m) Economic recovery and creation of decent jobs;*
- n) Education and health services;*
- o) A national resilience approach is developed to withstand, adapt and recover from the crisis;*
- p) The capacity of the public Lebanese institutions to deal with crisis situation and to coordinate the response is improved.*

*6. Legal rights and living conditions of refugees, in particular of Palestine refugees in Lebanon have improved, in particular because:*

- q) Employment opportunities and access to property, health and education are improved;*
- r) Infrastructure in the camps is rehabilitated and upgraded;*
- s) Dialogue between Lebanese authorities and Palestine refugees is improved including dialogue on legal status and human rights issues and governance mechanisms in the camps.*

*3.3 Promotion of sustainable and transparent management of energy and natural resources (20%)*

*3.3.2. For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:*

*1. Secure sustainable energy supply and manage energy demand and diversify energy sources while promoting green energy in particular:*

- a) Law 462/2002 and relevant bylaws are enforced and allow for the restructuring of the sector (in particular the reform of the electricity tariff scheme).;*
- b) Energy infrastructure is maintained and upgraded (soft);*
- c) Energy efficiency aims are mainstreamed into the policies and programmes of the main energy consuming sectors (industry, transport, residential and tertiary);*
- d) Low carbon energy (including renewable energy) plans are developed and under implementation; Assistance to foster regional cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas, including on carbon/fossil fuel taxation and emissions reduction in the energy sector has been successfully utilised.*

*2. Preserve the environment and mainstream environmental management and protection of natural resources:*

*Expected results:*

- e) Capacities, and the re-organisation of environmental monitoring authorities (including inter-ministerial consultation) have been supported;*

f) Environmental protection and safeguard measures are mainstreamed into national sector policies and programs, in particular the adoption of the water code;

g) The climate change and biodiversity agenda of Lebanon has made progress."

3. Develop a competitive agriculture sector and promote a sustainable rural economy:

Expected results:

h) The regulatory/policy framework is updated;

i) Agricultural infrastructure is upgraded;

j) Quality/safety control over all agriculture products and inputs is in place;

k) Agricultural value chains which focus on better quality, production, marketing and export are developed;

l) Sustainable use of natural resources (e.g. water, soils conservation, green energies) is evident;

m) Lebanon's integration within the European/regional agricultural market has improved.

4. Measures in favour of civil society

A specific financial provision to support to civil society (15% of the financial resources of this Framework) and an EU Roadmap of Engagement with Civil Society is foreseen for the active engagement with civil society. This provision is additional to resources from thematic programmes and from programmes identified under the three intervention sectors.

Through this provision civil society can receive support for

a) Their involvement supporting Lebanese host communities and mitigating the consequences of the Syrian conflict in Lebanon;

b) Developing the non-state actors' "watchdog" function in monitoring state reform implementation;

c) Seizing windows of opportunity for interventions in the fields of human rights, gender equality, youth and children rights;

d) Providing support to MSMEs;

e) Peace building and reconciliation activities;

f) Their involvement in environmental monitoring and advocacy." 2014 Lebanon SSF 2014-2016

"3.1 Public administration reform (indicative 30%)

3.1.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

Improved relationship and clarity (including policy, regulatory and service functions in all sectors of the State's administration) established in central public administration and in regional and local authorities; Results-oriented management introduced in all public bodies at the national, regional and local levels, including Regional Development Agencies, in particular strengthened institutional and human resource capacities and e-governance tools;

Strengthened policy-making, management and monitoring processes in public institutions through improved planning, implementation and reporting of the budget;

Increased decision-making powers and budgetary resources devolved to regional and local authorities;

Improved availability, effectiveness and cost efficiency of the delivery of public services at national and sub-national levels.

Decentralisation reform and development policies implemented in Moldova's regions, including regions with special status

3.2 Agriculture and rural development (indicative 30%)

3.2.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

Strengthened policy, legal and institutional framework;

Increased investment in the modernisation of the agri-food and feed chains meeting EU food safety and quality requirements;

Improved education, research and extension services in the agri-food sector, including facilitating information systems and improved access to capital, input and output markets for producers;

Reduced poverty in rural areas;

Improved social and technical infrastructure in rural areas and increased domestic and foreign investments;

Reduction in unemployment rates in rural areas;

Reduction in the rates of internal and external labour migration;

Reduction of the rural areas affected by natural disasters (floods and droughts);

Improved management of natural resources in rural areas and in agri-food sector, including sustainable agricultural land tenure practices, environmentally friendly production technologies and products, climate mitigation and disaster risk-reduction measures;

Increased economic exchanges between the two sides of the Nistru River; local entrepreneurship in Transnistria and in regions with special status promoted in partnership with Moldovan counterparts; technical approximation in the prospect of an EU-Moldova DCFTA is conducted.

3.3 Police reform and border management (indicative 20%)

3.3.2 For each of the specific objectives the main expected results are:

*The police force is well-trained and equipped, accountable, efficient and professional;*

*The demilitarisation of the police and border guards is completed;*

*The process of pre-trial investigation and prosecution is streamlined;*

*The human rights of suspects are respected;*

*Moldova's borders are secured and there is a substantial reduction in organised and cross-border crime;*

*The achievements of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan are sustained over time;*

*Corruption in the police and border management sector is significantly reduced.*

#### 4. Complementary support in favour of civil society

*In addition to sector specific assistance additional measures in favour of civil society will be made available under this complementary envelope, through a continuation at country level of the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013. Funding from this component will be geared towards supporting the role of civil society in building credible and inclusive policy processes, stronger democratic processes and accountability systems, in other sectors than the priority sectors. This can include measures aiming to promote an enabling environment at all levels for civil society participation in public life, measures to boost domestic transparency and accountability, including of the budgetary process. The development of civil society internal professionalism and capacities, including their capacity to form national associations and networks, and improving the delivery of services will also be targeted.*

#### 5. Complementary support for capacity development and institution building

*In addition to sector-related assistance, this complementary provision for capacity development and institution building activities will address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility that are not already covered under the three sectors of concentration. This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, and complement assistance provided under the Eastern Partnership "Comprehensive Institution Building" (CIB) initiative. Capacity development and institution building activities – either from sector-related assistance or from this complementary provision – may also address participation in EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies." 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017*

*"Secteur d'Intervention 1 : Réforme de la justice et renforcement de la participation citoyenne*

*1*

*a) L'état de droit est renforcé par l'amélioration et l'application effective des dispositions législatives et administratives inhérentes (rôle du Parlement, indépendance des partis politiques, etc.).*

*b) Les capacités des institutions et des acteurs démocratiques sont renforcées (Parlement, partis politiques, Organe national de la prévention et de la lutte contre la corruption (ONPLC), Conseil de la Nation etc.).*

*c) Les modalités et les instances de concertation/conseil sont renforcées afin de favoriser l'association des acteurs de la société civile et des parties prenantes dans l'élaboration des projets de lois, la mise en oeuvre et l'évaluation des politiques publiques.*

*2*

*a) Les réformes nécessaires visant à garantir l'indépendance des magistrats sont mises en oeuvre.*

*b) Les capacités des professionnels de la justice sont renforcées, y compris dans les domaines des droits de l'homme, conventions internationales, droits des prévenus, etc.*

*c) Les réformes nécessaires afin de garantir à tout justiciable le droit à un procès équitable sont mises en oeuvre, notamment en matière de respect de la présomption d'innocence, du droit à un recours effectif, et du droit à la défense et à l'assistance juridique.*

*d) L'accès à la justice est amélioré*

*3*

*a) Le secteur des media en tant que plateforme d'information des citoyens est renforcé*

*b) Les vecteurs de citoyenneté active sont développés et renforcés (associations, formations citoyennes, milieu scolaire...)*

*Secteur d'Intervention 2 : Marché du travail – emploi*

*1*

*a) Une stratégie nationale intégrée de l'emploi est développée, adoptée et mise en oeuvre et la problématique de l'emploi est prise en compte dans les politiques sectorielles*

*b) Les capacités des acteurs impliqués dans la mise en oeuvre de la politique de l'emploi (acteurs publics, représentants des employeurs, syndicats, associations professionnelles, secteur privé...) sont améliorées et le dialogue social est renforcé*

*c) La connaissance du marché du travail est amélioré et exploitée en impliquant les partenaires économiques et sociaux concernés*

*2*

- a) Le système éducatif (éducation, enseignement supérieur) est mieux adapté aux enjeux économiques et sociaux
  - b) Le système de formation professionnelle est mieux adapté aux enjeux économiques et sociaux
- 3
- a) L'efficacité des programmes d'appui à l'auto-emploi est renforcée.
  - b) Accessibilité accrue du marché du travail aux groupes/segments fragiles de la population active (ex: femmes/jeunes/ chômeurs sans qualifications et primodemandeurs d'emploi).
  - c) Le marché du travail dans des zones défavorisées pilotes est développé
- Secteur d'intervention 3 : Appui à la gestion et à la diversification de l'économie
- 1.
- a) Gestion performante de la politique budgétaire et du Fonds de Régulation de Recettes (FRR) basée sur des hypothèses réalistes concernant l'évolution du prix des hydrocarbures
  - b) Réforme dans la gestion des Finances Publiques impliquant une plus grande performance et transparence
  - c) Croissance inclusive: rationalisation et efficacité des dépenses de transferts sociaux renforcées par un meilleur ciblage des populations vulnérables
- 2.
- a) Une stratégie de diversification économique intégrée et durable est développée en partenariat avec les acteurs économiques et sociaux.
  - b) 2 à 3 secteurs à haut niveau de valeur ajoutée sont renforcés et développés (approche filière ou territoriale) de manière durable
  - c) Appui à une stratégie de privatisation et au développement du marché de capitaux
  - d) Amélioration du climat des affaires en vue de contribuer au développement économique durable, par l'amélioration de l'encadrement institutionnel du marché et des mécanismes de contrôle et de régulation
  - e) Renforcement du secteur privé, par l'appui aux associations sectorielles et la vulgarisation de projets-pilote de mise à niveau." 2014 Algeria SSF 2014-2017

### *"3.2 Soutenir la gouvernance démocratique, l'Etat de droit et la mobilité*

#### *3.2.2 Résultats attendus*

*En matière judiciaire, l'indépendance et l'efficacité du pouvoir judiciaire est garantie, la capacité professionnelle du secteur est renforcée la confiance des citoyens dans la justice est renforcée, et plus particulièrement l'intervention contribue à: une magistrature indépendante; une meilleure qualification professionnelle des acteurs du système judiciaire; un système judiciaire mieux organisé, efficace, efficient et performant; un système judiciaire plus transparent et plus accessible;- une population mieux informée sur ses droits et devoirs.*

*En matière pénitentiaire: les programmes de réinsertion des détenus sont améliorés ; des peines alternatives à la privation de liberté sont mises en œuvre ; les programmes de formation du personnel de l'administration pénitentiaire sont améliorés; les conditions de détention sont améliorées.*

*En matière de gouvernance démocratique et économique, réforme des finances et de l'administration publiques: appui aux institutions clés du système démocratique et de la gouvernance publique dont les prérogatives ont été renforcées dans le cadre de la réforme constitutionnelle; une plus grande intégration de la réforme des finances de l'Etat et des collectivités locales contribuant à une bonne organisation et une durabilité du système financier public; le fonctionnement et la transparence de gestion des collectivités territoriales sont améliorés et les capacités de leurs ressources humaines renforcées en lien avec les exigences de leurs compétences et mandat; la qualité et l'accès des citoyens aux services publics au niveau territorial sont améliorés; la coordination entre les parties prenantes au niveau décentralisé est renforcée; l'efficacité, l'efficience et la crédibilité des institutions de contrôle, de reddition des comptes et e lutte contre la corruption sont renforcées et la coordination entre elles améliorées.*

*Dans le domaine de la migration et mobilité : les résultats escomptés sont la protection des droits fondamentaux des migrants, la réinsertion économique et sociale de migrants rentrés volontairement au Maroc ou, depuis le Maroc vers leur pays d'origine, une meilleure gestion de la migration pour raison de travail ou d'études, la diminution de la prévalence du phénomène de traite des êtres humains et un cadre juridique de protection internationale et d'asile renforcé, une mobilité accrue, une migration irrégulière maîtrisée et une diminution des réseaux de trafic des migrants, un développement de l'investissement productif des migrants au Maroc et la réduction des coûts de transfert de fonds, une meilleure intégration de la migration dans les politiques publiques afin d'en optimiser les impacts positifs..*

*Dans le domaine de la promotion des droits des femmes et de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, en continuité et complémentarité avec les interventions précédentes: la protection juridique des femmes est renforcée, une culture de l'égalité est promue, l'institutionnalisation de la perspective*

*de genre est consolidée et la participation des femmes à la vie politique, sociale, économique et culturelle est renforcée.*

### *3.3 Emploi et croissance durable et inclusive*

#### *Résultats attendus*

*Les résultats escomptés des interventions dans ce secteur sont les suivants :*

*le potentiel de croissance durable de l'économie marocaine est dynamisé;*

*la compétitivité des PME marocaines est renforcée, les TPE sont renforcées et formalisées, et l'environnement des affaires est rendu plus attractif pour les investisseurs;*

*la qualité de la formation et l'employabilité des actifs marocains, et particulièrement les jeunes est améliorée;*

*la création d'emplois dans les secteurs clés, y compris les secteurs innovants et l'économie verte et sobre en carbone, est stimulée;*

*la coordination entre les parties prenantes au niveau local et central est renforcée;*

*le dialogue social est renforcé;*

*les écarts de développement économique entre les régions sont réduits.*

#### *4 Mesures en faveur de la société civile*

*Le soutien à la société civile se poursuivra et sera intégré dans la mesure du possible dans les différentes composantes de ce cadre stratégique d'appui, et ceci sera particulièrement pertinent dans le domaine de la bonne gouvernance et le développement du capital humain.*

*Il s'agira de poursuivre l'appui de l'UE au renforcement des capacités institutionnelles et organisationnelles de la société civile marocaine, en matière soit de fourniture de services, soit de plaidoyer ou de suivi et évaluation des politiques publiques. La consolidation et le bon fonctionnement des espaces de dialogue entre la société civile, les acteurs institutionnels (gouvernement, Conseil économique, social et environnemental, etc.) et les partenaires techniques et financiers, pourra également être soutenu. Une attention particulière sera accordée, à cet égard, à la participation des partenaires sociaux ainsi que des femmes, des jeunes et des organisations qui les représentent aux différents mécanismes de consultation.*

*En outre, l'appui aux organisations de la société civile se poursuivra par le biais des différents programmes thématiques dont le Maroc bénéficie. La mise en œuvre de la Facilité société civile qui démarrera en 2014, permettra, au cours de la période, d'apporter un appui spécifique en termes de consolidation et renforcement des capacités des principales organisations de la société civile afin de promouvoir une culture de participation démocratique et gouvernance locale et de surmonter la défiance parfois existante entre Etat et société civile." 2014 Morocco SSF 2014-2017*

### *3. Soutien de l'UE par secteur*

#### *3.1.2. Résultats attendus*

##### *En lien avec l'OS1*

*La création d'emplois (hommes/femmes) est stimulée dans les secteurs clés.*

*La mise en œuvre d'une nouvelle stratégie intégrée d'emploi qui prend en compte l'analyse des besoins et le développement de compétences sur la base d'une collecte régulière et structurée des données.*

*Les secteurs économiques clés à fort potentiel d'employabilité et haut niveau d'innovation et de valeur ajoutée sont renforcés et développés de manière durable.*

*La qualité de la formation et de l'employabilité des actifs tunisiens est améliorée, en particulier pour les jeunes et les femmes. La politique de l'emploi et du marché du travail est devenue plus efficace.*

*La participation active des partenaires sociaux à la formulation et mise en œuvre des réformes et politiques d'emploi;*

*Le volume d'activité des secteurs de la microfinance, du capital – investissement a augmenté*

##### *En lien avec l'OS2*

*Les obstacles réglementaires à l'investissement et à l'activité économique sont réduits.*

*La transparence est améliorée et la liberté d'entreprendre est facilitée par la réforme du code des incitations à l'investissement.*

*Les partenariats entre les secteurs publics et privés, sont développés, en attachant une attention particulière au soutien à apporter aux femmes entrepreneurs*

*La coordination entre les différentes institutions et les fonds apportant un soutien au secteur des PME sera amélioré*

##### *En lien avec l'OS3*

*La modernisation de l'administration devient effective grâce notamment à la généralisation progressive des principes de la gestion budgétaire par objectifs*

*La dépense publique est mieux exécutée, et la réalisation effective du budget d'investissement a augmenté.*

*Le fonctionnement de l'administration douanière s'est amélioré tant sur le plan des recouvrements que de la facilitation des échanges.*

*Une réforme fiscale est engagée, visant à simplifier/moderniser les procédures en vue d'améliorer le recouvrement d'une part et l'équité d'autre part.*

### *3.2 Consolidation des éléments constitutifs de la démocratie*

#### *3.2.2. Résultats attendus*

*Les capacités des structures électorales (ISIE) sont renforcées et le processus électoral se déroule conformément aux règles démocratiques et de l'état de droit.*

*Les conventions internationales relatives aux Droits de l'Homme ainsi que les conventions fondamentales de l'Organisation internationale du travail sont effectivement mises en œuvre*

*Le cadre juridique et les procédures administratives/judiciaires sont harmonisés avec les standards internationaux*

*Des mécanismes et des actions en matière de justice transitionnelle sont mis en œuvre*

*Une stratégie nationale de réforme du système de la sécurité est mise en œuvre*

*Les capacités des parties prenantes concernées dans la réforme du secteur de la sécurité sont renforcées et leur coordination améliorée*

*L'implication citoyenne de la société civile est renforcée dans la dynamique démocratique, notamment par la mise en place du cadre nécessaire pour garantir l'exercice des droits et libertés des citoyens.*

*Une attention particulière sera accordée aux droits des femmes et des enfants, ainsi qu'à la liberté de presse et d'expression et la diversité culturelle et aux questions environnementales et de changement climatique.*

*Participation effective des femmes à la vie publique et politique et diminution de la violence et de la discrimination basées sur le genre.*

### *3.3. Développement régional et local durable*

#### *3.3.2 Résultats attendus*

*Pour l'OS1:*

*les réformes juridiques et institutionnelles pour la déconcentration, la décentralisation et l'amélioration de la gouvernance locale sont préparées,*

*une politique et stratégie de développement régional et local durable est préparée et mise en œuvre,*

*le rôle des structures régionales sur les deux plans institutionnel et opérationnel en matière de prospective territoriale, de diagnostics stratégiques de territoires et d'exercices d'évaluation des politiques régionales, est amélioré,*

*Pour l'OS2:*

*l'accès aux services publics au niveau local et la qualité de ces services sont améliorés et assurés de façon égale pour tous.*

*des actions pilotes de développement local sont conçues et réalisées avec la participation de la société civile et des populations locales, notamment des femmes.*

*les capacités humaines, financières, institutionnelles et techniques des collectivités territoriales et locales sont mises à niveau afin de soutenir pleinement le processus de décentralisation.*

*Pour l'OS3 :*

*les capacités humaines, financières, institutionnelles et techniques dans les collectivités territoriales sont mises à niveau afin de soutenir pleinement les principes opérationnels de bonne gouvernance environnementale (y compris changement climatique) et de préservation des ressources naturelles et leurs diffusions dans les autres politiques sectorielles.*

*l'adaptation au changement climatique est prise en compte à tous les niveaux de la prise de décision en matière de développement : politiques, plans, programmes et projets.*

*D'un point de vue opérationnel, ces résultats seront plus efficaces si l'appui de l'UE est déployé en bonne coordination, voire en coopération directe lorsque possible, avec les partenaires internationaux de la Tunisie actifs dans les secteurs d'intervention. Une synergie sera recherchée avec les Etats-membres de l'UE, la Banque européenne de reconstruction et de développement et la Banque européenne d'investissement ainsi qu'avec les autres instruments financiers de l'UE, notamment la facilité d'investissement pour le voisinage (FIV) et la composante régionale de l'instrument européen de voisinage." 2014 Tunisia SSF 2014-2015*

*"The 2030 Agenda is applicable to all countries, including the EU and its Member States. The EU is committed to implementing it through both internal and external action. Thus the proposed Consensus is intended as part of a broader EU response and fits within the plan on "Next steps for a Sustainable European Future", as laid down in the Communication also published today. It is also fully consistent with the Global Strategy on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS). The EUGS focuses on enhancing resilience of states and societies at all levels – starting from Africa, the EU's Neighbourhood and Central Asia. It includes multiple links to the 2030 Agenda. The SDGs will be a cross-cutting dimension for the implementation of the EUGS. The new Consensus will also be consistent and coordinated with the implementation of the Paris climate change agreement. The Consensus will guide ac-*

tions in the context of regional agreements, strategies and policies in relation to developing countries. The future frameworks for relations with countries including in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, will promote concrete implementation of the 2030 Agenda at regional level.” [Communication on a new European Consensus on development](#)” MEMO/16/3884/22-11-2016

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 5.3 JC53: ENI programmes are consistent with other (than ENP and development policy) EU external action policies (EFIs and EU sectorial policies)

### 5.3.1 I-531. Evidence in programming documents that coherence with all areas of the Union's external action is ensured {Art. 5}

#### Global analysis of the indicator

EU external action priorities are defined by the policy package presented in the analysis of indicator I-523. ENI high level planning and programming documents have been found to frequently refer to these priorities, mainly because (i) they are referred to in the ENI Regulation (Art. 5), but also because (ii) they provide a sound basis for the development of key axes of the ENI programming.

In lower programming documents, the specific needs of partners replace the overall framework of EU external action priorities as key reference for the development of actions. Nevertheless, the EU external action priorities remain present through the compliance of these documents to the ENI regulation and the quality review process of DG NEAR successfully ensures that overall coherence is guaranteed (also see I-521).

#### Presentation of collected proof

*“Other EU external instruments will complement EU support to the region. The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and other thematic instruments like the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) are particularly important. The activities funded under thematic programmes must be fully consistent with the implementation of the present Multiannual Indicative Programme. Within the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the “Global public goods and challenges” thematic programme and the “Civil Society and Local Authorities” programme are of particular relevance. Certain measures, particularly in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management and resolution, may also be supported under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which aims at providing an effective, timely, flexible and integrated response to situations of crisis, emerging crisis or continued political instability. The IcSP may also support preventive long-term actions to build capacity both to address specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilizing effect and to ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations. The Partnership Instrument (PI) will also be of relevance to regional cooperation activities under this Strategy involving the Russian Federation. In addition, EU internal instruments and programmes with external cooperation windows will also complement activities supported by this Strategy, namely Home Affairs Funds (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and Internal Security Fund), Connecting Europe, Creative Europe, COSME, Horizon 2020 and Erasmus +, the EU programme for education, training, youth and sport.”* 2014 ENI East RSP & MIP 2014-2017. p. 12

*“Other important areas of cooperation, identified in the ENP AP and Association Agreement, such as safeguarding human rights and soft security (borders, migration, anti-trafficking), sustainable energy, transport, environmental protection and people-to-people contacts will be addressed through regional programmes and/or horizontal budget lines, which fall outside the scope of the bilateral envelope.”* 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 7

*“Azerbaijan is also eligible for support under a number of other EU instruments, such as the Instrument Contributing to Peace and Stability, Humanitarian Aid, the Partnership Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation, Macro-Financial Assistance, Development Co-operation Instrument thematic programmes and external actions under EU internal programmes for e.g research and innovation, energy, transport, education and*



youth (in particular Erasmus+) and culture (Creative Europe). Where possible, Member States political action and assistance will also be coordinated with EU action, as a way of achieving political leverage and as part of a coherent foreign policy approach. Azerbaijan may also be targeted for specific diplomatic action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, depending on the specific political circumstances.” 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 8

#### “2.1. EU development cooperation and lessons learned

There is a wide range of instruments in use for projects in Belarus:

ENPI Bilateral; DCI-NSA-LA; DCI-MIGRATION; DCI-SANTE; DCI-ENV; NUCLEAR SAFETY; EIDHR; ENPI-CBC; ENPI-REGIONAL: CLIMA, YOUTH, CULTURE, IBM, SME, ENERGY (INOGATE, MAYORS CONVENTION), CUIDAD, LAND MINES DESTRUCTION, DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, ENVIRONMENT; ENPI-INTER REGIONAL: TAIEX; TEMPUS; ERASMUS MUNDUS.

Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 12

“Complementarities and coherence will be sought with all other EU instruments, in particular with the thematic and regional programmes such as research and innovation, energy, transport, education, youth, culture and media” 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 7

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Satisfactory
Degree of confidence		Satisfactory

#### 5.3.2 I-532. Degree of consistency of ENI programmes at specific objectives level with the policy framework of IPA, DCI, EIDHR, INSC and IcSP priorities

- At specific objectives level
- For measures ensuring consistency

### Global analysis of the indicator

As has been already established in indicators I-523 and I-531, the EFIs all share a common policy framework, the EU external action priorities, which in turn define the broader overall objectives of each individual instrument. As a result, overall consistency between the EFIs is not questioned. However, each EFI has a different geographic or thematic focus and therefore specific objectives vary naturally.

Special efforts are thus required to ensure the complementarity of these specific objectives across EFIs active in the same region or thematic sector. The EU disposes of a number of exchange platforms and communication channels to ensure coordination on that matter (see I-533). As a result of frequent coordination, the individual EFIs are well aligned to each other (in terms of their objectives) and being governed by the same overall priorities, no major discrepancies could be identified.

Due to the binding nature of the ENI regulation, this coherence automatically reaches down to its programming documents and no evidence has been found on contradicting programmes. However, there have been cases where ENI country programming does not always reflect sufficiently priorities indicated under other EFIs or policy issues of high importance to other line DGs (e.g. the SSFs of Lebanon and Jordan did not consider migration even though it is a focal area of DCI and also several DGs (HOME, ECHO). When the Syrian crisis led to a massive influx of refugees to this country, this lack of consistency became problematic).

In general, it is possible to state that consistency problems are most likely to arise in cases where not all interested parties (such as DG NEAR and other line DGs, EEAS, EUDs) are involved in the development of basic programming documents or where information on context, needs and capacity is only available at an aggregated level and not directly collected from the ground.

Crisis prevention is identified as an ENI objective and has gained substantial weight due to the current situation in the Neighbourhood and through the reviewed ENP’s focus on stabilisation. Most actions under ENI encompassing a crisis prevention or tensions alleviation component are related to acute crisis and post-crisis situations and rather contribute to miti-

gate a potential deepening of the crisis.

This is certainly a key aspect for stabilisation, for instance, through short-term (budget) support to Tunisia to help the country maintain its macro-economic stability or the support to host and refugee communities in Lebanon and Jordan, but support is delivered widely in the context of **response to an outbreak of crisis**. The share of ENI resources dedicated to the **actual prevention of crisis**, acknowledged as being the most cost-effective approach to stabilisation, is rather low. Even though quite a number of actions include measures to potentially prevent (further) crises, none of them actually target pre-crisis situations specifically (see below list of projects for examples). This is not a big limitation per se, as there is a dedicated thematic instrument for crisis response and prevention, the IcSP, which works to complement ENI programmes.

IcSP has adapted procedures to act swiftly, outside a programmed approach and a formal agreement with the partner countries. As its actions last a maximum duration of 18 months, a follow-up by ENI is looked at for sustainable results. To ensure better coordination, FPI/IcSP is in constant discussions with the EUDs and usually has people at the delegations. DG NEAR can also use the IcSP for pilot projects or approaches but too rarely makes use of this possibility due to limited funds. As a matter of fact, 70% of IcSP funds are dedicated to crisis response and are only available in a crisis situation (Article 3 of the IcSP Regulation), even though no formal declaration of crisis is required. Peace-building and conflict prevention only represent 9% of the resources, parts of which are also reserved for capacity building of local actors to strengthen their early warning and response capabilities. This is the programmed part of IcSP, relating to Article 4 in the IcSP regulation. A list of these Article 4 actions in the Neighbourhood – excluding several global projects which are also providing support to ENI countries – can be found below. It shows that the total amount allocated to this thematic (just slightly above EUR 4 million) is extremely low compared to the challenges faced.

## Presentation of collected proof

Table 28 List of potential “crisis prevention” measures in ENI (based on a list provided by NEAR B3)

<i>Contract title</i>	<i>CRIS decision/ contract number</i>	<i>Amount of EU contribution</i>	<i>Crisis Prevention measures foreseen in the Action Document</i>	<i>Re- gion</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Type of Cri- sis</i>	<i>Time Horizon</i>
Building National Stability (BNS)	ENI/2014/025-057	12.000.000	To strengthen the resilience of Lebanon's security institutions to withstand internal and external pressures and shocks, and to reinforce the role they can play as drivers of stability and national cohesion. Focusing its support in areas of immediate relevance in the current context (such as Integrated Border Management (IBM), emergency preparedness and crisis management/response). Strengthening the Lebanese security sector for conflict prevention purposes and as a vector of national cohesion and unity.	South	Lebanon	Conflict, Disasters	medium
Access to basic services for the vulnerable population in Lebanon – Economic recovery and basic infrastructures (ABS-ECOINF)	ENI/2014/037-715	15.000.000	To reduce the risk of tension and to support the resilience and social cohesion in most affected areas efforts to empower local communities through employment and income generating activities are essential. Supporting the resilience and social cohesion of displaced and host communities by mobilising and empowering them through employment and income generating activities.	South	Lebanon	Conflict, Social	medium
Upgrading Informal Areas Infrastructures	ENI/2015/038-272	26.000.000	Informal areas can be a fertile terrain for social protest. This was evidenced during the 2011 events, which were triggered in cities. Inhabitants of informal areas played a seminal role, revealing the deficiencies of governmental policies in these areas. There are fears that the situation in some areas could lead to a radicalisation of groups of the population living there if the many promises made in the last few years on social justice and the improvement of living standards for the poorest are not fulfilled. The overall objective is to contribute to the local socio-economic development in the informal areas of the GCR by enhancing the delivery of	South	Egypt	Conflict, Social	medium

<b>Contract title</b>	<b>CRIS decision/ contract number</b>	<b>Amount of EU contribution</b>	<b>Crisis Prevention measures foreseen in the Action Document</b>	<b>Re- gion</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Type of Cri- sis</b>	<b>Time Horizon</b>
			basic services.				
Support to the democratic transition at national and local level	ENI/2014/37-555	8.000.000	Processes of transitional justice and national reconciliation may be needed to overcome the social divisions that were allowed to build up under the previous non-democratic regime. Reinforcing the transition process through strengthening institutions of democratic governance: improving the ability of national institutions to respond to citizens' needs, ensure respect of the rule of law, and implement government programmes in line with national priorities. Encourage inclusive, nationally owned and participatory political decision-making processes related to the democratic transition.	South	Libya	Conflict	long
Support to the democratic transition in Libya in the fields of Finance Management and Media development.	ENI/2016/039-371	6.400.000	The proposed activities are intended to support the process of national reconciliation by strengthening the institutions of democratic governance with a focus on Public Finance institutions, and to promote independent media in line with the needs and requirements of the continuing democratic transition.	South	Libya	Conflict	long
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) – EU Peacebuilding Initiative 2015 (EU Pbl)	ENI/2015/038-321	5.000.000	In alignment with the EU Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the overall objective of the programme is to support and promote the conditions for a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict through civil society and citizens' positive engagement.	South	Regional	Conflict	medium
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) – EU Peacebuilding Initiative 2016	ENI/2016/039-476	5.000.000	In alignment with the EU Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the overall objective of the programme is to support and promote the conditions for a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through civil society and citizens' positive engagement.	South	Regional	Conflict	medium

<b>Contract title</b>	<b>CRIS decision/ contract number</b>	<b>Amount of EU contribution</b>	<b>Crisis Prevention measures foreseen in the Action Document</b>	<b>Re- gion</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Type of Cri- sis</b>	<b>Time Horizon</b>
Countering radicalisation and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF)	ENI/2015/038-160	10.000.000	Preventing and countering terrorist recruitment in the enlarged Neighbourhood; Preventing and countering radicalisation in the Sahel-Maghreb region; Contribute to best practices in the field of countering radicalisation and violent extremism (CRVE).	South	Regional	Conflict, Terrorism	short
2016 Security Package	ENI/2016/039-362	11.000.000	All components of this action are priorities set out in the security chapter of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Review. (i) PPRD South III (Prevention, Preparedness and Response to natural and man-made Disasters, Region South, Phase III): To strengthen partner countries' capacity to develop and implement strategies that build societal resilience against all hazards and threats through capacity building activities, legislative and institutional advice, support to cross-border co-operation frameworks, direct cooperation with the UCPM. (iii) INTERPOL South: To intensify and accelerate exchange of operational information in the Neighbourhood South, and with EU, on issues related to organised crime, terrorism, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of human beings and trafficking of small arms, and, to this effect, to increase data collection (Foreign Fighters database, Stolen and Lost Documents, iArms and iTrace, notices, Stolen Art Works, etc) from the Neighbourhood South.	South	Regional	Disasters, Terrorism	short
<b>Total</b>		<b>98.400.000<sup>45</sup></b>					

Source: NEAR B3

<sup>45</sup> Roughly 2% in relation to the total ENI commitments of EUR 4.7 billion.

Table 29 Overview of IcSP actions related to crisis prevention in the Neighbourhood (Article 4 of the IcSP regulation)

Contract year	Contract number	Contract title	Delegation in charge	Planned amount	Sector code
2012	305322	Peace Puzzle: Community Theatre and Capacity building towards Community Conflict Prevention	Lebanon	189.314,12	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
2012	305331	Grassroots in action for peace building	Lebanon	199.884,60	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
2012	305423	Towards an inclusive and responsible Media in Lebanon	Lebanon	199.889,02	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
2012	305471	Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities in the North of Lebanon	Lebanon	198.792,00	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
2012	305475	Harnessing Local Capacities for Resilience in the face of the Syrian Crisis	Lebanon	159.217,86	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
2012	305478	Building Community Capacity for Dispute Resolution and Reconciliation in Lebanon	Lebanon	303.428,96	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution

2012	309515	Policy Lab on mediation and dialogue to address violence in Jordanian universities	Jordan	123.992,00	Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security
2012	309516	Conflict sensitivity, prevention and peace building in Jordan	Jordan	126.018,20	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
2015	364435	Strengthening the capability in the League of Arab States Secretariat and its Member States to provide early warning and effective responses to impending regional crises, conflicts and post conflict situations	Egypt	2.500.000,00	Disaster prevention and preparedness

Source: FPI 2

*“Over the last two years the EU has continued to pursue efforts to mainstream biodiversity objectives into development policy enhancing the consistency and their mutual supportiveness.*

*The same goes for the integration of environmental protection requirements into EU policies and activities, in particular to promote sustainable development. For instance, in development cooperation programmes the EU continues to promote high levels of environmental protection and sustainable use of natural resources by including these areas as focal sectors or integrating elements of environment protection into actions that address other policy sectors. This is also the case for the three main geographic instruments for EU development policy: the Development Cooperation Instrument<sup>14</sup> (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Instrument<sup>15</sup> (ENI under the EU General Budget and the European Development Fund<sup>16</sup> (EDF).” Policy Coherence for Development 2015 EU REPORT EN, p. 8*

*“The mainstreaming of environmental concerns into development policy is embedded in the 2005 European Consensus on Development and the 2006 Sustainable Development Strategy. The three geographic instruments of greatest relevance to the EU development policy (the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the European Development Fund (EDF)) are all subject to mainstreaming efforts. Moreover, the DCI contains an explicit requirement to mainstream “environmental sustainability, including addressing climate change” as a cross-cutting issue in all programmes.” Policy Coherence for Development 2015 EU REPORT EN, p. 71*

lcSP regulation quotes (relevant with the objectives)

*The specific objectives of this Regulation shall be:*

*in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute swiftly to stability by providing an effective response designed to help preserve, establish or reestablish the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the Union's external policies and actions in accordance with Article 21 TEU;*

*to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to ensuring capacity and preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations and build peace; and to address specific global and transregional threats to peace, international security and stability.*

*The following cross-cutting issues shall be included, where possible, including in programming:*

- (a) promotion of democracy and good governance;*
- (b) human rights and humanitarian law, including children's rights and the rights of indigenous peoples;*
- (c) non-discrimination;*
- (d) gender equality and the empowerment of women;*
- (e) conflict prevention; and*
- (f) climate change.*

*6. In order to enhance the effectiveness and complementarity of Union and national assistance measures and to prevent double funding, the Commission shall promote close coordination among Union activities and with those of the Member States, both at decision-making level and on the ground. To that end, the Member States and the Commission shall operate a system for exchanging information. The Commission may take initiatives to promote such coordination. In addition, the Commission shall ensure coordination and cooperation with multilateral, regional and sub-regional organisations and other donors.*

*(a) support, through the provision of technical and logistical assistance, for the efforts undertaken by international and regional organisations and by State and civil society actors in promoting confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation;*

*support for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security, in particular in fragile, conflict and post-conflict countries;*

*support for the establishment and functioning of interim administrations mandated in accordance with international law;*

*support for the development of democratic, pluralistic State institutions, including measures to enhance the role of women in such institutions, effective civilian administration and civilian oversight over the security system, as well as measures to strengthen the capacity of law-enforcement and judicial authorities involved in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and all forms of illicit trafficking;*

*(f) support for measures necessary to start the rehabilitation*

*and reconstruction of key infrastructure, housing, public buildings and economic assets, and essential productive capacity, as well as other measures for the re-starting of economic activity, the generation of employment and the establishment of the minimum conditions necessary for sustainable social development;*

*(m) support for measures to promote and defend respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law, and the related international instruments;*



(o) support for measures to address the potential impact of sudden population movements with relevance to the political and security situation, including measures addressing the needs of host communities in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, including peace-building;

(p) support for measures to promote the development and organisation of civil society and its participation in the political process, including measures to enhance the role of women in such processes and measures to promote independent, pluralist and professional media;

(b) shall contribute to the further development of a structural dialogue on peace-building issues;

1. The Union shall provide technical and financial assistance in pursuit of the specific objectives set out in point (c) of Article 1(4) in the following areas: threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health; mitigation of and preparedness against risks, whether of an intentional, accidental or natural origin, related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents.

(d) addressing global and trans-regional effects of climate change having a potentially destabilising impact on peace and security.

(c) with regard to assistance to authorities involved in the fight against terrorism, priority shall be given to supporting measures concerning the development and strengthening of counter-terrorism legislation, the implementation and practice of financial law, of customs law and of immigration law, the development of law-enforcement procedures which are aligned with the highest international standards and which comply with international law, the strengthening of democratic control and institutional oversight mechanisms, and the prevention of violent radicalism;

*Human rights*

The Commission shall ensure that measures adopted under this Regulation in relation to the fight against terrorism and organised crime are implemented in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law.

In accordance with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, the Commission shall develop operational guidance to ensure that human rights are taken into consideration in the design and implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1, in particular as regards the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and respect for due process, including the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial and rights of defence. A clear human rights perspective shall also be present in measures addressing cyber-security and the fight against cybercrime.

The Commission shall carefully monitor the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 in order to ensure compliance with human rights obligations. The Commission shall include information in this respect in its regular reporting. – IcSP regulation quotes

EIDHR regulation quotes (relevant with the objectives)

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (3),

Whereas:

Within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action, the promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and of inclusive and sustainable growth, constitute two basic pillars of the Union's development policy. A commitment to respect, promote and protect human rights and democratic principles is an essential element

of the Union's contractual relations with third countries.

(7)

The instrument hereby established is intended to contribute to achieving the objectives of the Union's external action, including those of its development policy, in particular the objectives set out in the Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy entitled 'The European Consensus' and in the Commission Communication of 13 October 2011 entitled 'Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change', and the Union's policies relating to human rights, including the objectives outlined in the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted by the Council on 25 June 2012.

(9)

The Union's contribution to democracy and the rule of law and to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is rooted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and other human rights instruments adopted within the framework of the United Nations (UN), as well as relevant regional human rights instruments.

(10) Gender equality, women's rights, including the empowerment of women, and non-discrimination are fundamental human rights and are essential for social justice as well as for fighting against inequalities. Their promotion should be a cross-cutting priority of this Regulation.

(11)

Democracy and human rights are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing, as recalled in the Council Conclusions of 18 November 2009 on democracy support in the EU's external relations. The fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience and religion or belief, expression, assembly and association are the preconditions for political pluralism, democratic process and an open society, whereas democratic control, domestic accountability and the separation of powers are essential to sustain an independent judiciary and the rule of law which in turn are required for effective protection of human rights.

1. Union assistance shall focus on the following:

support to and enhancement, in line with the overall democratic cycle approach, of participatory and representative democracy, including parliamentary democracy, and the processes of democratisation, mainly through civil society organisations at the local, national and international levels, inter alia by:

promoting freedom of association and assembly, unhindered movement of persons, freedom of opinion and expression, including political, artistic and cultural expression, unimpeded access to information, a free press and independent pluralistic media, both traditional and ICT-based, internet freedom and measures to combat administrative obstacles to the exercise of these freedoms, including the fight against censorship, particularly through the adoption and implementation of relevant legislation;

strengthening the rule of law, promoting the independence of the judiciary and of the legislature, supporting and evaluating legal and institutional reforms and their implementation, and promoting access to justice, as well as supporting national human rights institutions;

promoting and strengthening the International Criminal Court, ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the processes of transitional justice and truth and reconciliation mechanisms;

supporting the transition to democracy and reforms to achieve effective and transparent democratic and domestic accountability and oversight, including in the security and justice sectors, and strengthening measures against corruption; measures against corruption;

promoting political pluralism and democratic political representation, and encouraging political participation by women and men, in particular members of marginalised and vulnerable groups, both as voters and as candidates, in democratic reform processes at local, regional and national level;

reinforcing local democracy by ensuring better cooperation between civil society organisations and local authorities, thus strengthening political representation at the level closest to the citizens;

promoting the equal participation of women and men in social, economic and political life, and supporting gender equality, the participation of women in decision-making processes and political representation of women, in particular in processes of political transition, democratisation and state-building;

promoting the equal participation of people with disabilities in social, economic and political life, including measures to facilitate their exercise of related freedoms, and supporting equality of opportunity, non-discrimination and political representation;

supporting measures to facilitate peaceful conciliation between segments of societies, including support for confidence-building measures relating to human rights and democratisation;

Coordination, coherence and complementarity of Union assistance"

1. Union assistance under this Regulation shall be consistent with the overall framework of the Union's external action, and complementary to that provided by other instruments or agreements for external assistance.

2. In order to enhance the effectiveness, coherence and consistency of the Union's external action, the Union and the Member States shall seek regular exchanges of information and consult each other at an early stage of the programming process in order to promote complementarity and coherence among their respective activities both at decision-making level and on the ground. Such consultations may lead to joint programming and joint activities between the Union and Member States. The Union shall also consult other donors and actors.

3. The Commission and the EEAS shall, as appropriate, hold regular exchanges of views and information with the European Parliament.

4. The Union shall seek regular exchanges of information with, and consult, civil society at all levels, including in third countries. In particular, the Union shall provide, whenever possible and in accordance with relevant procedures, technical guidance and support in relation to application procedure. – EIDHR regulation quotes

DCI regulation quotes (relevant with the objectives)

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (2),

Whereas:

*The Union's action on the international scene is to be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world, namely democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union is to seek to develop and consolidate commitment to those principles in partner countries, territories and regions through dialogue and cooperation. In pursuing those principles, the Union proves its added value as an actor in development policies.*

(7)

*Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, the promotion of the rule of law, democratic principles, transparency, good governance, peace and stability and gender equality are essential for the development of partner countries, and those issues should be main-streamed in the Union's development policy, particularly in programming and in agreements with partner countries.*

(8)

*Aid effectiveness, greater transparency, cooperation and complementarity and better harmonisation, alignment with partner countries, as well as coordination of procedures, both between the Union and the Member States and in relations with other donors and development actors, are essential for ensuring the consistency and relevance of aid whilst at the same time reducing the costs borne by partner countries. Through its development policy, the Union is committed to implementing the conclusions of the Declaration on Aid Effectiveness adopted by the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Paris on 2 March 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action adopted on 4 September 2008 and their follow-up Declaration adopted in Busan on 1 December 2011. Those commitments have led to a number of conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council,*

(19)

*A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, i.e. involving growth patterns that enhance social, economic and territorial cohesion and enable the poor to increase their contribution to, and benefit from, national wealth, underlines the commitment of the Union to promote, in its internal and external policies, smart, inclusive and sustainable growth bringing together three pillars: economic, social and environmental.*

*(a) the primary objective of cooperation under this Regulation shall be the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty;*

*(i) fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development, and*

*(ii) consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law. – DCI regulation quotes*

*“Le renforcement de la complémentarité entre les instruments bilatéraux et les instruments thématiques de la Commission demeure un objectif à améliorer, notamment via le renforcement du dialogue entre les autorités nationales et la société civile algérienne. La DUE est en train de mieux structurer un dialogue déjà très riche avec la société civile (ONGs, syndicats, acteurs économiques). L'intégration de la société civile dans le nombre de bénéficiaires et d'acteurs de tous les grands programmes bilatéraux, qui est une réalité depuis 2012, devra contribuer beaucoup pour mieux intégrer les deux instruments, ainsi que la conclusion d'une cartographie de la société civile, qui est en train de se terminer et qui permettra d'élargir le nombre d'interlocuteurs sectoriels de la DUE. En ce qui concerne les synergies et la complémentarité entre la coopération bilatérale et la coopération régionale, elles sont bien présentes actuellement, grâce à la mise en place d'une répartition par thématique des portefeuilles au sein de la section opérationnelle. Ainsi, les gestionnaires opérationnels qui ont la responsabilité d'un secteur de travail donné assument à la fois le suivi de la mise en oeuvre des activités sectorielles bilatérales et régionales, y compris dans le cadre des sous comités thématiques de suivi de la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord d'Association. Cette répartition des tâches contribue à renforcer la cohérence entre la gestion des programmes bilatéraux, la gestion des projets régionaux, la gestion de l'information sectorielle et la participation à des activités dans le secteur qui se déroulent en Algérie ou dans la région. Par contre, la coordination et les synergies entre les différents ministères et autres administrations impliquées dans une même problématique sectorielle demeurent difficiles. Le recours à l'appui budgétaire devrait permettre d'améliorer cet aspect et contribuer progressivement au décloisonnement sectoriel, ce qui constitue un problème majeur pour la coopération et en général pour la gestion sectorielle en Algérie.” EAMR Algeria 2013, p. 8*

*“The NIP 2011-2013 of 157.1 MEUR is being reduced by 53 MEUR following an instruction by the Head of Cabinet of 30 September, following Armenia’s decision not to initial the AA/DCFTA, leaving a NIP of 104.1 MEUR. In addition, 15 projects are financed by the EIDHR instrument and 18 projects by the NSA-LA instrument, which total 5.1 MEUR. Finally, through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, the Commission contributes, or is planning to contribute, grant financing of about 90 MEUR.*

*There are also a number of regional projects managed by headquarters, with activities in Armenia. There is, in particular, a positive contribution of regional projects to the bilateral portfolio in the field of private sector development and governance. Furthermore, EIDHR and NSA-LA budget lines contribute to deepen EU-Armenia collaboration in relevant fields of EU interest.”* EAMR Armenia 2013, p. 14

*“Through the projects implemented in 2013, there were significant complementarities between national, regional and thematic instruments. Most notably, the Delegation has actively promoted complementarity between sector interventions targeting the central government (funded through the bilateral envelope) and the support provided to civil society. Specific examples include the grant contracts funded through the 2012 call for proposals on PFM, those funded in 2013 on regional development, and the call for proposals on justice/rule of law, which was published last December. Complementarity between regional and bilateral projects is also present in the area of migration and border management (Twinning with State Migration Service and Regional projects), transport (Twinning on Maritime Safety and TRACECA), energy (INOGATE and Energy Budget Support), civil service reform (IRP3 and Sigma).”* EAMR Azerbaijan, 2013, p. 8

*“Under the ongoing programmes, the mix of different instruments is largely satisfactory as several complementarities are created (e.g. in the field of environment.) Simultaneously, regional and thematic programmes allow the delegation to be engaged in sectors which are not among the focal ones. The TAIEX facility deserves to be mentioned separately, as this rapid reaction mechanism is very much appreciated by the different line ministries and can form the basis for ideas for future cooperation. Furthermore, there is a didactic policy of encouraging the participation of Belarus in EAP/ENPI regional programmes, where so far the greatest beneficiaries have been the Border guard and Customs services. For the future, the delegation aspires to maintain this balance and search for further complementarities. Yet, this is not an easy task as it is not always possible to plan the involvement of Belarus on certain regional programmes.”* EAMR Belarus, 2013, p. 7

*“The complementarity of aid instruments is good in Egypt: for instance, Human Rights issues are in a synergetic way addressed both by bilateral and thematic instruments, while regional programmes cover sectors not addressed by country-level ones (e.g. Heritage, Audiovisual). Also there is a large degree of synergy between bilateral and regional programmes for what concerns energy and water. Coordination between the FP7, TEMPUs, ERASMUS and RTD grants provided at bilateral level is especially successful. The Delegation’s recent effort to chart all projects and programmes concerning Egypt provided important input to assess and contribute to further improve complementarity of aid. For instance, CBC projects are brought under the radar screen of the Delegation, since they have an important impact in some regions of the country. The range of regional programmes is also quite broad, therefore, the Delegation can ensure a close follow up only of those managed directly.”* EAMR Egypt, 2013, p. 10

*“Within the Delegation portfolio around 10 % are at present thematic contracts. This comprises notably the large thematic portfolio of migration related contracts as well as human rights contracts. This high ratio is to a large extent due to the high degree of state structures in support of implementing migration policies as well as due to the high degree of related needs. Thus the thematic support is in essence complementary to the main national instruments, that are not conceived towards that strong of targeted support towards these thematic instruments. Also with regards to regional programs, the Delegation sees a reflection of its important position among EaP countries in the Southern Caucasus when it comes to coordinate, monitor and support regional instruments, including INNOGATE and TRACECA. The number of contracts in which the Delegation is currently involved is close to 40 representing approximately 20% of the current bilateral portfolio.*

*Given that the themes of the latter ones are not part of the national, i.e. bilateral cooperation there is certainly enough grounds to state positively on the complementarity in this regards. Also, in the field of SME support the absence of national policies, including strategies or action plans definitively proves complementarity of the ongoing regional SME flagship initiative. For the future the regional SME de-*

velopment support project will likely still remain complementary to national activities as the policy situation is likely going to persist for the foreseeable future.

Projects that are becoming increasingly relevant are those financed through the NIF. The infrastructure investment linked to those operations and the way they are implemented require increasing attention from the side of the Delegation both during the design and the implementation stages to ensure the adequate fit within the Delegation programmes and Commission procedures." EAMR Georgia, 2013, p. 8

*"\* Given the small size of the Operations Section, it is possible to ensure complementarity and to avoid overlap between instruments and projects. For example, the EIDHR/CSF Call for Proposals increasingly clarified the differences between this programme and EUPfP, taking into account the comments made by NGOs through the December 2012 Consultations. This issue will be further explored through the EIDHR and EUPfP Programme external evaluations.*

*\*Twinning projects were identified in ways that are complementary to regional programmes. For example, Statistics Twinning is complementary to MedStat III, Rural Development twinning to ENPARD.*

*\*The Delegation regularly coordinates with EUREP (Jerusalem) regarding similar programmes, and assessment of global CfP applications. In the Framework of EU Partnership for Peace, all activities including CfP and service contracts are jointly developed, implemented and evaluated.*

*\*The pooling of EIDHR and CSF allocations in a single call proved successful.*

*\*Thematic Program for Environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy with Heschel Centre, this is complementary to regional environment programme/projects and in general. On Energy and Environment there is no bilateral aid for Israel. Israel is, however, eligible to participate in regional and thematic programmes in these fields as well as to benefit from TAIEX and Twinning. The relevant thematic programmes are Thematic Programme for Environment, ENRTP some of whose lots are open to Israel and MEDEUWI. The regional programmes are Med Enec II, Med Emip, Paving the Way for the MSP, Horizon 2020, SWIM, SEIS, CIUDAD, PPRD, Integrated Maritime Policy in the Mediterranean, CLIMA South and "Cleaner, energy-saving Mediterranean Cities", CIVITAS.*

*\*Some of the programmes are addressed to the national authorities while others provide for funding of civil society implemented projects. The Delegation through meetings with the relevant consultants, national and civil society representatives tries to help ensure that there is no duplication in activities carried out under the different programmes. It is, however, often difficult both for the Delegation and the local stakeholders to distinguish between the goals and activities of the different initiatives when the same issues, for example water and waste management as well as climate change, are addressed by different programmes. The Delegation, civil society and the national authorities often find themselves providing identical briefings to consultants from the different programmes.*

*\* Complementarity exist also with CBC under which Israel is very active and the delegation has very close contact with the Management Authority. Those are the figures for the country participation in the program:*

*Israeli organizations involved in submitted proposals: Call Number of Actors (applicants or partners)*

*1st Standard 170 Strategic 128*

*2nd Standard 341*

*Israeli organizations participating in FUNDED PROJECTS:*

*Call Number of Actors (applicants or partners) ENPI Contribution (Million EURO 1st Standard (7 running projects) 9 3.83*

*Strategic (2 running projects) 6 3.18*

*2nd Standard (3 projects under negotiation) 3 1.37" EAMR Israel, 2013, p. 8*

*"In general there's good complementarity between national and regional instruments. The portion of thematic contracts is higher in terms of contracts (~20% of all contracts) than in terms of value. This mobilises extra management efforts by the EUD.*

*Jordan as a new co-chair of UfM has become an active partner in this structure and is eager to benefit from regional interventions and programmes." EAMR Jordan, 2013, p. 8*

*"La complémentarité entre l'enveloppe bilatérale ENFI et les lignes thématiques est particulièrement prise en compte pour assurer la cohérence de notre coopération. Sur les droits de l'homme, les projets thématiques permettent de financer des activités via la société civile sur des questions sensibles*

(travailleurs migrants, torture,...) alors que les projets signés avec le gouvernement visent plutôt le partenariat société civile-gouvernement (projet Afkar) ou à l'appui à des réformes. De même, dans le domaine de l'environnement, les lignes thématiques peuvent offrir une valeur ajoutée pour développer des initiatives pilotes (par exemple un projet en cours sur le thème "Waste to Energy") alors que notre appui institutionnel (StREG) vise plutôt la réforme de la gouvernance environnementale. A l'inverse, la cohérence entre coopération bilatérale et régionale (au Sud de la Méditerranée) nous semble insuffisante. Tel que soulevé dans des précédents rapports EAMR la Délégation est d'avis que si la consultation des Délégations par les services de DEVCO sur la coopération régionale s'est beaucoup améliorée, c'est au stade de la programmation du RIP qu'une réflexion stratégique devrait être engagée, associant les Délégations.

La coopération régionale reste peu visible et les moyens mis à disposition pour chaque projet ne permettent pas d'avoir un réel impact. Par ailleurs, lorsque les projets régionaux tendent à identifier quelques activités à mettre en œuvre dans chaque pays séparément, la valeur ajoutée par rapport au bilatéral n'est aucunement démontrée. Une coopération régionale recentrée sur quelques thèmes et sur les réseaux (comme certains projets dans le secteur de l'eau et de l'énergie qui sont généralement positivement perçus) gagnerait en efficacité et en visibilité." EAMR Lebanon, 2013, p. 8

"Funds under relevant thematic lines (EIDHR, DCI/NSA/LAs) have been utilised to provide immediate support to both civil society and local authorities. In two cases (EUNIDA and ACTED programmes) the interventions have been complemented with funds from ENPI. This has allowed the mobilisation of further technical assistance in favour of civil society and local authorities. Activities complement support provided through ENPI in particular in the area of the constitutional process. ENPI and SPRING funds are used to support the process at the GNC and HNEC levels, whereas thematic budget lines are used to raise public awareness and promote dialogue between CSO's and national authorities (central and local). In the field of support to protection and support to vulnerable groups full complementarity is ensured between ENPI funding and IfS funding. Additional, the IfS proved to be particularly needed to ensure a rapid response to the country needs in terms of stabilization and conflict prevention. Council Decision "Support of physical security and stockpile management activities to reduce the risk of the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition in Libya and its region" compliments the support by the Instrument for Stability?s on UXO clearance and increased risk awareness of SALW and ERW among the civilian population. The deployment of a CSDP mission in Libya (EUBAM) would benefit the EU general approach on security and migration management.

The migration support shows a great complementarity among different EU instruments (ENPI ? MIGR ? IFS) both in terms of national and regional funding. Regional programmes have been opened to Libya although Libyan participation is still scarce. Complementarities between regional and national programmes will be further developed in parallel with Libya's participation to regional programmes.

A preliminary proposal has also been developed to review the remit and functions of the National Centre of Disease Control (NCDC) and explore opportunities for developing a partnership with the European Centre of Disease Control (ECDC). The proposal will be complementary to IfS-funded activities already ongoing in Libya such as the Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MediPIET) which supports training in intervention epidemiology and a regional network of trainers/supervisors." EAMR Libya, 2013, p. 7

"There are several examples of complementarity between the instruments. In 2013 a bilateral programme on energy efficiency (Budget Support and Technical Assistance) continued, which is complemented by the Energy Efficiency (biomass) project from AP 2010. Also, Moldova received from the global call under the thematic programme on environment one Renewable Energy project. These projects have a complementarity with the regional INOGATE programme on energy efficiency and with the Inter-regional NIF grants for the energy sector. The Justice Budget Support is complemented by a grant from EIDHR to monitor the implementation of the Justice reform by the Government." EAMR Moldova, 2013, p. 6

"La Délégation renforce depuis quelques années la complémentarité entre les programmes bilatéraux et les programmes thématiques (ciblage des mêmes secteurs par différents instruments afin de renforcer, d'une part et par le biais de la coopération bilatérale, les institutions sectorielles et en vue, d'autre part et par le biais des programmes thématiques, de permettre à la société civile de jouer son rôle de plaidoyer pour faire avancer les réformes au niveau de ces mêmes secteurs). Cela concerne notamment les domaines des droits de l'homme et de la démocratisation, mais aussi l'éducation, la réforme de la justice, le suivi de la politique de voisinage, la réforme budgétaire, l'égalité entre les genres, l'énergie, le secteur forestier.

A titre d'exemples:

*-le mapping de la société civile active dans le secteur forestier, qui sera réalisé dans le cadre de la Facilité, constituera une base pour le déploiement des activités prévues dans le programme sectoriel Forêts (subventions, mise en place d'instances de concertation sur le secteur).*

*-un projet a été signé en 2013 sous l'IEDDH visant au suivi, par la société civile, de la mise en oeuvre du Plan gouvernemental pour l'égalité. Ce projet sera complémentaire au programme d'appui à la promotion de l'équité et de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes; le suivi enrichira celui déjà réalisé par la Délégation à travers le dialogue sectoriel mené autour de cette aide budgétaire.” EAMR Morocco, 2013, p. 12*

*“EU Bilateral (national) projects were suspended in May 2011. Syria's participation in regional projects was subsequently suspended in September 2011. The management of regional programmes previously managed by Damascus have since been transferred to other Delegations in the region.*

*With regard to the complementarity of the instruments, the EU response since 2011 to the Syrian crisis – covering SY, JO, LB, TK, IQ and EG – has mobilised funds under: ECHO (EUR 515 million); FPI (EUR 98 million); IPA (EUR 13 million); DCI (EUR 17 million); EIDHR (EUR 5.5 million) and; ENPI (EUR 337 million).*

*Significant efforts have been made to ensure coordination and complementarity between the various instruments – each of which has their own comparative advantage – as set out in the Joint Communication 'Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to the Syrian Crisis'.*

*In its note of October 2013 on the programming of the CSO-LA and the EIDHR 2014-2020 for Syria, the Delegation highlighted that since the suspension of bilateral assistance – and in the absence of any agreed strategy – ENPI funds have been programmed through a series of annual Special Measures of increasing amounts under centralised management (EUR 10 million in 2011; EUR 12.6 million in 2012 and EUR 40 million in 2013). The ENPI Special Measures for SY have been coordinated with significant country allocations under both FPI and ECHO (EUR 21.7 million and EUR 124.3 million respectively) and EIDHR (EUR 3 million).” EAMR Syria, 2013, p. 9*

*“Bon mix d'instruments” EAMR Tunisia, 2013, p. 7*

*“There is generally good complementarity between the national and regional programmes which complement the interventions in the focal sectors. However, some regional programmes (e.g. SME support, environment, energy efficiency, Support to Council of Europe) risked overlap with national programmes.*

*The NSA-LA programme country allocations managed by the Delegation were merged with the ENPI Civil Society Facility funds in a joint call for proposal. The EIDHR call for proposals was coordinated accordingly to avoid overlap with the other thematic instruments, ensure complementarity with the national and regional programmes and support the political priorities in Ukraine.” EAMR Ukraine, 2013, p. 8*

*“ENPI bilateral cooperation is addressing PA gaps and challenges for state building in the three focal sectors and provides support to ensure the delivery of basic services to Palestinian through the implementation of temporary measures (PEGASE DFS and UNRWA interventions for Palestinian refugees), in addition to the special multi-sector programme in East Jerusalem Programme.*

*EIDHR and NSA programmes are used in this context to focus on needs in the most affected conflict areas, namely Gaza Strip, Seam Zones and Area C. EIDHR complements in this manner efforts provided to the rule of law sector while NSA is mainly develops civil society capacities to participate in policy-making processes especially at local level while providing basic services to the most vulnerable. At the national level this late objective is pursued through the CSF interventions through four main CS platforms.*

*PfP regional programme promotes at the civil society level the overarching EU objective of supporting a negotiated resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Other regional civil society programmes (MED-NET in particular) are requested not only to promote regional integration of Palestinian civil society but also to respond to the internal fragmentation of the Palestinian territories. Cultural programme and Investing in People interventions boost EU efforts to promote gender equality and democratic values.*

*EUREP has constantly promoted LRRD approach with previous ECHO operations in support of herders' communities. This successful approach will be further promoted in other areas such as the land and water development.*

*The Instrument for Stability (projects under decisions pre-2011) reinforced the EU's support for the Middle East Peace process through civil society initiatives promoting either the Arab Peace Initiative or*

*the resumption of the peace talks or Israeli-Palestinian development actions. In the case of Gaza, the 2011 IfS decisions provide added value to other instruments (such as ECHO or ENPI) with actions leading to early recovery and rehabilitation.*

*A regional grant-programme, approved by HQs, designed to improve the participation of Bedouin communities in three countries, including Palestine, in policy decision processes, is working in a fully coordinated way with three similar national projects, being implemented in the Palestine. The coordination of all four projects supporting the livestock sector is chaired by the Palestinian MoA and facilitated by EUREP.” EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2013, p. 14*

## Global Public Goods and Challenges

NA

### Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities

*Concernant les lignes thématiques EIDHR et OSC-AL qui s'adressent toutes à la société civile, les obstacles récurrents rencontrés par les bénéficiaires ont continué: notamment les organisations actives sur le territoire national ou dans le domaine des droits de l'homme ont rencontré des problèmes pour obtenir l'autorisation d'organiser des activités ou recevoir les fonds de l'UE sur leurs comptes bancaires. De nombreuses organisations de la société civile, y compris des organisations non gouvernementales internationales (CISP, Médecins du Monde, Handicap International, OXFAM Belgique) qui opèrent pourtant en partenariat avec certains services du Gouvernement, n'ont toujours pas eu de réponse à leur demande d'agrément. L'impossibilité pour des organisations européennes, notamment dans le domaine culturel ou des droits de l'homme d'avoir accès au territoire algérien ou d'acheminer des fonds rend très difficile la possibilité de prêter une assistance technique in situ aux nombreuses organisations de la société civile présentes sur le territoire algérien, ou d'acheminer des fonds, ce qui rend la possibilité de recourir à des subventions en cascade très difficile, et donc revient à engendrer la gestion directe d'une nombre très élevé de projets à faible montant (100,000 à 150,000 EUR) sur les lignes thématiques puisqu'aucune organisation n'est en mesure de remplir le rôle de plateforme qui permettrait de financer des tiers. Ceci a un impact sérieux sur les ressources humaines de la délégation qui continue de maintenir un engagement fort à la société civile mais n'a qu'un agent contractuel et un agent local à mi-temps affectés à la gestion des multiples projets, disséminés sur l'ensemble du territoire algérien).*

*La difficulté pour comprendre les règles de l'UE par des organisations de petite taille et souvent situées à dans des zones isolées et désertiques ou montagneuses qu'il est impossible de visiter pour des raisons logistiques et sécuritaires rendent la soumission de rapports conformes très difficile et l'organisation de sessions de formations assez complexes. La Délégation de l'UE a obtenu des fonds en 2015 sous la facilité société civile ENI qui permettront la mise en place d'une "facilité société civile" via contrat cadre qui pourrait prêter assistance aux organisations les plus faibles, en faisant des formations ciblées afin d'améliorer le reporting et réduire le nombre d'ordres de recouvrement.*

*L'indisponibilité de CRIS pour les lignes thématiques jusqu'en milieu d'année 2015 a généré de nombreuses demandes de paiements d'intérêts de retard, ce qui a entraîné de nouvelles lourdeurs administratives générant la création de 10 nouveaux contrats de paiement d'intérêts de retard et leur clôture, en sus des 50 contrats gérés par le GESTOPE sur les lignes thématiques.*

### Human Rights/EIDHR

*Le Gouvernement a continué de se montrer très pointilleux avec les bénéficiaires actifs dans le domaine des droits de l'homme. Aucune des organisations de droits de l'homme nationales n'ont reçu de réponse à leur demande d'agrément. Les organisations internationales qui appuient les défenseurs de droits de l'homme et avec lesquelles la Commission a des projets thématiques ou régionaux sont très peu actifs en Algérie et se sont à nouveau vu refuser un accès au territoire (Human Rights Watch, NOVA, Frontline, FIDH). Ceci rend la mise en œuvre de projets à impact fort particulièrement difficile. Les organisations régionales prêtant appui aux OSC algériennes, notamment dans le domaine des Droits de l'Homme, se sont systématiquement vu refuser un visa d'accès au territoire, ce qui rend quasiment impossible une assistance technique par les programmes régionaux en Algérie. 5 bénéficiaires ont vu leurs comptes en banque bloqués par le Ministère de l'Intérieur. 10 bénéficiaires ont vu leurs activités interdites, ce qui a généré de nombreux avenants et réaffectations budgétaires. La situation est à présent résolue (temporairement) mais cela rend le travail dans le domaine de la société civile très fastidieux et incertain pour la DEL UE. Le GESTOPE n'a pas pu assister à la commémoration de la journée internationale des droits de l'homme organisée par le bénéficiaire d'un projet de la DUE en dehors d'Alger dans la mesure où le Gouvernement n'a pas accordé d'autorisation de déplacement.*

### Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

NA” EAMR Algeria 2015, p. 9-11



*“Global Public Goods and Challenges*

*Nothing to report.*

*Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities*

*The CSO and LA in development 2014 programme in Armenia has been launch to support the ongoing territorial-administrative reform aimed at consolidation of local communities/municipalities and reducing their number. Consultations were held with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Emergency Situations to ensure coherence of the Call for Proposals with the pace of the reform while safeguarding the principles of thematic programmes on independence of the process. The restricted call for proposals was based on the study on 14 community clusters to be consolidated in 2015-2016 with the objective to create incentives for the inter-community cooperation. The specific objectives of the call were to contribute to poverty alleviation in the pilot community clusters in Armenia as well as improve efficiency and effectiveness of services delivered by the consolidated communities. As a result of the call 4 contracts were signed for different community clusters for a total of EUR 1.9 mln.*

*Human Rights/EIDHR*

*Under the EIDHR instrument, there was a 2013-2014 (pooled budget) call of EUR1.75 million in Armenia, which granted six projects, targeting youth rights, rights of refugees (Syrian-Armenians), rule of law and citizen journalism. Two projects specifically address women's rights: "Advancing Gender Equality and the Rights of Survivors of Gender-Based Violence in Armenia" and "Your Future Looks Great" with the objective to empower women to overcome current unfavourable social trends and poverty, and live full and productive lives, as well as improve the lives of their children, family and community. Under the EIDHR Global Call, the project "Combating Gender-Based Sex Selection in Armenia". started in December 2014 targeting reduction of gender-biased sex selection in Armenia. As a result of project activities, at least 15% positive change in knowledge, attitude and perception of target population groups toward gender-biased sex selection is expected and at least a 10% reduction in the number of sex-selective abortions is foreseen.*

*Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

*Nothing to report.” EAMR Armenia, 2015, p. 11-12*

*“Global Public Goods and Challenges*

*Not applicable*

*Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities*

*(valid also for the EIDHR instrument) The adoption in December 2015 of rules requiring donors to obtain the right to provide grants by the authorities before contract signature led to the cancellation of EUR 6 million worth of calls for proposals for support to civil society under ENI, EIDHR and CSO-LA. Most of the EIDHR and the CSO-LA funds were reallocated to other countries before the deadline for contracting expired. In this context, the programming of the CSO-LA funds every two years (CSO-LA allocation for 2014 was EUR 3 million) reduced the EUD's flexibility in reacting to the environmental constraints.*

*Human Rights/EIDHR*

*(valid also for the CSO-LA instrument) The adoption in December 2015 of rules requiring donors to obtain the right to provide grants by the authorities before contract signature led to the cancellation of EUR 6 million worth of calls for proposals for support to civil society under ENI, EIDHR and CSO-LA. Most of the EIDHR and the CSO-LA funds were reallocated to other countries before the deadline for contracting expired. In this context, the programming of the CSO-LA funds every two years (CSO-LA allocation for 2014 was EUR 3 million) reduced the EUD's flexibility in reacting to the environmental constraints.*

*Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

*Not applicable” EAMR Azerbaijan, 2015, p. 8*

*“Global Public Goods and Challenges*

*n/a*

*Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities*

*One Call for Proposals was organised which resulted in 5 grants (4 for CSO and one for LA). It is clear that LAs have major problems in applying in English, which is probably the explanation why the number of applications is limited.*

*Human Rights/EIDHR*

One Call for Proposals was organised which resulted in 5 grants.

*Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

*The implementation of one IFS-contract ended in November 2015. The project was very successful and a follow-up project is now financed under the EIDHR-instrument.” EAMR Belarus, 2015, p. 4-5*

*“During the reporting period, the Delegation managed 66 contracts supporting CSOs initiatives in the framework of Thematic Programmes (total contract amount: EUR 12.26 million, EU contribution: EUR 9.58 million), the Civil Society Facility (total contract amount: EUR 6.16 million; EU contribution: EUR 4.9 million) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (total contract amount: EUR 8.1 million; EU contribution: EUR 6.88 million). In 2015, two local Call for Proposals were launched under the "European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights" (EIDHR) and the "Support to Cultural Diversity and Creativity in Egypt (ENI)" respectively, leading to the signature of 13 grant contracts with CSOs for a total of EUR 1,79 million of EU contribution and of 2,29 million of total contracts. 66% of the beneficiaries of these contracts are Egyptian CSOs. In addition to the thematic instruments and EIDHR, the Delegation continued its collaboration with civil society under bilateral programmes, where part of EU funds are directly benefiting CSOs, including Community Development Associations and Community Based Organisations, and their initiatives.*

*Global Public Goods and Challenges:*

*Children (Children's participation): Empowerment of Egypt's Children to take action in schools and communities (contract 258-392 – EU contribution: 729.536 EUR): under closure Gender (Promotion of women's social and economic empowerment and rights): Women's Empowerment and Participation in Egyptian Squatter Areas (contract 233-179 – EU contribution: 272.584 EUR) and Agricultural Service Centre (contract 301-097 – EU contribution: 234.520 EUR): under closure Empowering Women to claim their inheritance rights (contract 301-176 – EU contribution: 739.868,80 EUR) has been extended up to end of June 2016 Migration: Providing Alternatives to Irregular Migration for Unaccompanied Children in Egypt (contract 259-528 – EU contribution: 1.015.606 EUR) and Supporting Governmental and Non-Governmental partners to protect migrant's human rights along the East African Road (contract 282-851 – EU contribution: 2.000.000): under closure Skills Development (Empowerment for better livelihoods, including skills development and Vocational Education and Training, for marginalised and vulnerable persons and people dependent on the informal economy) : Improving livelihoods of urban and rural poor women dependent on informal sector in Egypt (contract 340-234 – EU contribution: 1.500.000 EUR) started 1st of June 2015.*

*Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities*

*23 EU co-financed Actions implemented by CSOs are funded under the NSA Programme and the Civil Society Facility aiming at strengthening the capacities of civil society to engage in more structured, visible and inclusive dialogue(s), improving their participation in policy-making processes and policy dialogue at national and local level, and facilitating their participation in defining, implementing and monitoring poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies. No new contracts were signed in 2015. Due to the absence of an actual decentralization process in Egypt, LA Programme has not yet been implemented in Egypt. 2 FWC have also been signed under the SCF: An evaluation study on EU engagement with Civil Society in Egypt in the framework of bilateral cooperation and thematic programmes over the period 2007-2013, under closure, and a mapping study of Civil Society in Egypt (suspended).*

*Human Rights/EIDHR*

*29 EU co-financed Actions implemented by CSOs are funded under the EIDHR aiming at promoting and protecting civil, social, economic and cultural rights, especially groups particularly vulnerable to discrimination and promoting an inclusive/active citizenship and a culture of tolerance and pluralism. A call for proposal has been launched and 6 contracts were signed in 2015. The shrinking space for the promotion of an open society in Egypt observed in 2015 increases the fragmentation of the civil society and limits significantly EUD interventions in this sector.*

*Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

*There is currently 1 ongoing project implemented with UNDP and involving the League of Araba States. It was signed 2015. An earlier contract was closed in January 2015.” EAMR Egypt, 2015, p. 9-11*

*“Global Public Goods and Challenges*

*The Delegation remains to be prominently placed in the southern Caucasus as a regional hub for thematic contracts as well as for EaP flagship initiatives. This has even been reinforced for the entire EaP, given the situation in Ukraine, resulting in a number of projects and events being rolled out or*

held in Georgia. Also, given the relatively well supported national policies notably in the fields of migration and human rights, a number of thematic projects in these fields have been deconcentrated to the Delegation for management. Most of these thematic instruments complement well the bilateral cooperation allowing providing a more comprehensive response to well identified needs, thus also completing the EU response. From the experience with the first wave of EaP cultural projects that are at present phasing out, the Delegation was able to see quite mixed results, notably in terms of coordination and impact owing particularly to complex management challenges and quite divergent implementation environment.

#### *Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities*

With regard to the work with Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities the Delegation suggests the involvement of CSOs/NGOs, notably on the basis of the strategic document EU-Georgia Roadmap for the Engagement of Civil Society 2014 – 2017 (as adopted by the EU HoMs on 21 July 2014) on all relevant levels. The earlier document has been subject of a consultation process with stakeholders towards a potential need for updating during the reporting period. Also, the systematic inclusion of civil society elements in the governance structure of and the mix of instruments within a programme has become an established best practise such as in the case of the programmes on criminal justice (e.g. in the criminal justice coordination council), employment and VET (the national VET council), migration and border management et al. This approach is further sustained by the 6 MEUR civil society programme under the AAP 2015 that will promote notably advocacy, sustainability and capacities of CSOs across the board. A similar set-up is envisaged for the upcoming PAR programme under the AAP 2015.

#### *Human Rights/EIDHR*

The EIDHR has been implemented by the Delegation to Georgia since 2003. Implementing 160 projects with the total amount EUR13 081 189 (2014 and 2015 projects included) The Country allocation under EIDHR for Georgia for the years 2016-2017 is EUR 1 600 000 (800 000 EUR per year). In previous years, the country allocation for Georgia was 1 mln EUR per year. In terms of actual implementation under EIDHR there are currently ongoing 12 projects and 5 were newly contracted during the reporting period. In addition thereto, the Delegation is contracting the EaPIC 2014 top up entitled "Human Rights for All" to help the implementation of the Georgian Human Rights Action Plan, elaborated notably in response to the report drafted by the EU Special Advisor for Human Rights and transitional justice entitled "Georgia in transition".

#### *Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

With regard to the IcSP, the following three COM decisions were adopted during the reporting period: (i) Further support to the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh C(2015)9093 of 17/12 financial envelope EUR 6.5 million (ii) Further support to confidence-building measures in Georgia (Georgia VI) financial envelope: EUR 7.5 million as well as (iii) Further support to the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey; financial envelope EUR 1.5 million. These COM decisions allow pursuing actively the following three programmes: (i) IcSP VI Georgia: To contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the prevention of further violence, in particular by promoting confidence building across the conflict divide at grass-roots level, strengthening civil society and facilitating de-isolation of the breakaway regions thereby pursuing EU policy of engagement and non-recognition. (ii) EPNK III – Peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: To contribute to the peaceful settlement of the conflict and the prevention of further violence, in particular by strengthening the capacity of the civil society and grass-root communities to undertake peacebuilding activities and to better inform about the official peace process. and (iii) Armenia-Turkey-Normalization Process. To further empower and engage civil societies of Armenia and Turkey to act in support of normalisation of relations between the two societies." EAMR Georgia, 2015, p. 14-15

#### *"Global Public Goods and Challenges*

NA

#### *Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities*

The Delegation had no CSO/LA allocation to implement in 2015. Two old projects ended successfully during 2015. In 2016, a CSO allocation for Jordan is planned.

#### *Human Rights/EIDHR*

Projects under EIDHR are progressing well and a few have been given a non-cost extension.

#### *Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

The Delegation has closely monitored two projects funded under the IcSP to alleviate the burden of Jordan in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis. An additional €10,000,000 programme has also been formulated in 2015, to help the country prevent and counter violent extremism (CVE). The constantly

evolving security context and troubled environment along the Syrian/ Iraqi borders caused by the expansion of ISIS has led the authorities to decrease the number of entering refugees. As a result, a main challenge has been to maintain our support to the refugees while advocating for an open-border policy. Another main difficulty that has delayed the implementation of the CVE programme has been the need to build effective trust with the relevant national authorities, which required the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding as a prerequisite for any activity in this field. As for the long-term component of IcSP, the Delegation has continued to follow-up closely on these programs managed centrally in Brussels by DG DEVCO.B.5. In particular, the Delegation has been closely involved with the Regional Secretariat for the Middle East of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE) Initiative, based in Amman, and has actively participated in the design and monitoring of projects under this Initiative covering Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Furthermore, the Delegation has also followed up closely on projects under the Fight Against Global Threats component, in particular, the REPT Falsified Medicines and the formulation of CT MENA.” EAMR Jordan, 2015, p. 10

#### “Global Public Goods and Challenges

All thematic contracts subject to N+1 deadline by 31.12.2015 have been committed in due time. Moreover funds not committed by other Delegation were allocated to Lebanon so to be able to sign an additional CSO project. Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities. Following an "EU Roadmap on engagement with Civil Society in Lebanon" that was endorsed in 2014 by the Delegation and EU Members States, and the findings of a mapping exercise carried on on civil society organisations in Lebanon, the Delegation continued its Structured dialogue with civil society organisations and local authorities. Various consultation meetings were organized which provided a good opportunity to listen to the views of the civil society regarding EU's approach and encourage them to contribute to the ongoing ENP review. Feedback was also received from CSO's on their own role and on how future programming can integrate their opinions, the findings of the Mapping and the priorities of the Roadmap. Human Rights/EIDHR. Under the EIDHR, some 10 projects continued to be implemented by civil society organisations totalling over 4.1 million €. These projects focused on pressing longstanding challenges ranging from the limitation of military jurisdiction over civilians and the right to a fair trial, to the prevention of torture and arbitrary detention, the need to align prison conditions with international standards, address the issue of the disappeared, and raise awareness about the LGTB issue. Further human rights-related interventions will be supported during the course of 2016 through thematic and bilateral funds. In this respect, a call for proposals under the EIDHR (Country Based Support Scheme) was launched in 2015 with a view to support projects working on the human rights aspects of de-radicalisation. In December 2015 two new projects were signed focusing on the use of social media, sports and arts initiatives as ways to prevent and address vulnerable youth radicalisation. Bilateral funds were also channeled through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to strengthen the capacity of governmental institutions to uphold international human rights obligations as indicated in recommendations approved during the 2010 and 2015 UPR reviews. In addition, the project also focuses on enhancing the Lebanese civil society actors' capacity to monitor the implementation of UPR recommendations as well as to lobby on "not accepted" UPR recommendations. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). In 2015, IFS interventions have targeted politically sensitive areas in a context marked by the deterioration of the security situation in Lebanon, in relation to the Syria crisis and to an unprecedented influx of refugees in Lebanon. While this context has generated non-substantial delays in the implementation of some interventions, it highlighted once again the key added-value of the Instrument for Stability in fostering the stability of the country. Further IcSP interventions have been adopted in September 2015 to step up efforts to counter violent extremism, in the framework in particular of the dialogue on Counter-terrorism initiated between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon.” EAMR Lebanon, 2015, p. 5

#### “Global Public Goods and Challenges

Under the Sustainable Urban Demonstration Projects (SUDeP), 3 projects of a total amount of EUR 2 M are implemented through partnerships with of local authorities and civil society organisations to improve energy efficiency at municipal level. . In addition, Moldova is benefitting from 7 regional projects which include the strengthening of the capacities of the EaP National CSO Platform, technical assistance to strengthen the capacities of CSOs, CLEEN Local Energy Efficiency, increased public accountability towards sustainable development, the role of CSO in grass-roots decision-making processes in the housing sector and environment.

Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities. In 2014 the allocation for CSO-LA was EUR 1.25 M, Two projects have been approved with the themes support to improving access to community-based early years and pre-school support services for vulnerable children with special needs in Moldova and investigative journalism. The Delegation introduced the condition of mandatory application

with at least two co-applicants and strongly recommended sub-granting. Therefore the reach out to a wider range of civil society organisations, most of all smaller organisations was encouraged.

*Human Rights/EIDHR*

The EIDHR allocations for 2015 were EUR 0.7 M, The Delegation has currently 10 projects on-going under the EIDHR instrument for EUR 2.5 M. Themes addressed include the following : 'Monitoring of Human Rights of persons with disabilities, Improving the social economic situation of young people in Moldova by empowering Moldovan youth and Moldovan civil society, Strengthening the Capacity of Law Enforcement, Inter-Agency Coordination and Civil Society Organisations to Address Discrimination and Ill-Treatment of Children within the Justice System in the Republic of Moldova, Strengthening National Capacities to protect the most vulnerable from Torture in Moldova, Combating Discrimination in the Republic of Moldova, including the Transnistrian Region, Promoting Equality – Strengthening the Agents of Change, Empowering Civil Society in Moldova and Transnistria to combat discrimination through documentation, litigation and advocacy, Strengthening the capacity of CSOs for inclusive participation in society of the most marginalised parents and children, Consolidate capacity of the national anti-discrimination system in the Republic of Moldova through inclusive society participation and Rights for me and you – Children's participation in education and society'. The EIDHR 2015 country-based support scheme for Moldova includes the women civic participation through specific activities encouraging their awareness and abilities in participation in political life. To increase the awareness raising of gender equality topics, the EUD publishes systematically on its website and on social media public statements for international days (such as International Day of Human Trafficking, International Women's Day, International Day of Victims of Torture).

*Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

No activities to report on 2015." EAMR Moldova, 2015, p. 10-11

*"Global Public Goods and Challenges*

*Non applicable pour la Délégation Maroc*

*Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities*

*L'instrument thématique OSC-AL 2015 n'a concerné que les OSC en 2015, la Délégation ayant préféré ne pas faire d'appel à propositions pour les autorités locales en raison des échéances électorales de l'automne 2015.*

*Human Rights/EIDHR*

*La difficulté principale réside dans le manque de maîtrise de nos procédures d'appels à propositions par certaines organisations marocaines ce qui limite la participation des organisations marocaines aux Appels à Propositions.*

*Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

*Non applicable pour la Délégation Maroc" EAMR Morocco, 2015, p. 13*

*"Biens Publics Mondiaux et Défis*

*NA*

*Organisations de la Société Civile et Autorités Locales*

*NA*

*Droits de l'Homme/IEDDH*

*Three contracts were signed in 2015 in the framework of the EIDHR thematic line. The selection and negotiations for 2 of these contracts were initiated by DEVCO. Although fully relevant, DG NEAR and the delegation (to which the management of these contracts was devolved) were involved at too late a stage thus constraining our say on their design. It is to be noted that we also work with another thematic instrument (no box foreseen in the EAMR template): Pro-Act: Pro resilience action, food security and nutrition. The collaboration with DEVCO C1 was very smooth and no particular difficulty was met with the € 6 Mio grant about to be signed with FAO at the beginning of 2016.*

*L'Instrument contribuant à la Stabilité et à la Paix (IcSP)*

*Collaboration with IcSP functions well. There are regular consultations and exchanges of information. The situation has improved when the operational CA moved from Amman to Beirut where the IcSP CA is based. The delegation workshop held in Beirut end of November 2015 should contribute to further improvement with the resolutions taken on coordination. Co-ordination with Tahdir programme, managed by FPI/HQ has also improved in 2015." EAMR Syria, 2015, p. 8*

*"Biens Publics Mondiaux et Défis*

De façon générale, les appels à propositions sont très time-consuming et mobilisateurs d'énergie. Le foisonnement des OSC tunisiennes et la mobilisation importante des ONG internationales pour la Tunisie se traduisent en pratique par un grand nombre de notes succinctes et de formulaires complets à évaluer, ainsi que de sessions d'information à organiser, mobilisant tant les sections opérationnelles que la section FCA. Il est important de rappeler qu'en Tunisie, la plupart des CF comportent une « fenêtre » appels à propositions (emploi, médias, genre, justice, culture), en plus des AAP liés aux lignes thématiques. Par ailleurs, l'inexpérience de certaines organisations tunisiennes entraîne inévitablement un surcroît conséquent de travail de la DUE qui doit souvent suppléer à ces carences.

Biens Publics Mondiaux et Défis :

N.A.

Organisations de la Société Civile et Autorités Locales

Organisations de la Société Civile et Autorités Locales : en l'attente d'élections locales qui permettront d'élire et mettre en place des autorités locales légitimes et redevables (prévues fin 2016-début 2017), le choix a été fait par la Délégation de renoncer aux 600.000 euros prévus sur l'allocation 2014 pour lancer un AAP en faveur des AL.

Droits de l'Homme/IEDDH

Droits de l'Homme/IEDDH : RAS

L'Instrument contribuant à la Stabilité et à la Paix (IcSP)

Instruments contribuant à la Stabilité et à la Paix : au cours de 2015, il n'y a pas eu de problème à relever du fait qu'une seule subvention était encore ouverte fin 2015 en attente de clôture. Plusieurs nouvelles actions sont actuellement en préparation, en particulier dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme et l'extrémisme religieux, y compris un possible appel à proposition en faveur de "in-country civil society actors". Cela ne pourra être mené efficacement qu'avec l'arrivée d'un AC FPI annoncé qui se partagera entre la Lybie et le Tunisie." EAMR Tunisia, 2015, p. 6-7

"Global Public Goods and Challenges

Not in operation in this Delegation

Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities

To ensure complementarity with bilateral instruments, it was decided in 2013 that country allocations under CSO-LA would be every second year. The 2 mio euros LA 2014 country allocation was contracted in 2015 for 2 projects, to complement the regional development and decentralisation programmes in ensuring an active role of LA in the decentralisation process, in particular for the implementation of the reforms of local budget (with the association of Ukrainian cities) and of administrative services, building on the achievements of the 13 projects funded under NSA-LA 2012. It was initially planned to merge the CSO 2015 country allocation with AAP 2014 bilateral civil society support programme in the joint call for proposal to be launched beginning of 2015, as per Delegation strategy to ensure a critical amount and synergies between instruments. However this could not be done due to administrative delays in adoption of CSO 2015 (adopted summer 2015) and reservations expressed by DG BUDG the previous year concerning the use of prior approvals. As soon as the call is administratively closed, as per DEVCO B2 suggestion, part of the CSO 2015 allocation will be used to support the proposals in the reserve list.

Human Rights/EIDHR

Recognising the urgency of the situation in Ukraine and the need to respond to the growing number of human rights concerns, it was decided to use flexible procedures, applicable in crisis situations, in order to provide targeted support to local civil society in its work on human rights and democratisation. The following four themes were identified as critical where greater involvement of civil society organisations was seen as most appropriate and instrumental: 1) Civil society participation in policy making, implementation and monitoring on human rights; 2) Support to local human rights defenders; 3) Gender equality and women's human rights; and 4) Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for internally displaced children. In order to increase the level of competition, given the high number of civil society actors in Ukraine, potential applicants were invited to submit short applications in response to a call for the expression of interest published on the DEL website on 6 March 2015. The call also included a list of evaluation criteria in order to ensure the transparency of the selection procedure. 150 submissions in the concept note format were screened against the relevance criteria and a shortlist of 44 relevant expressions was established. These 44 applications were then scored on the five evaluation criteria set out in the announcement of the call. Given the available budget of around EUR 2 000 000 and the evaluation scores, nine applications, addressing the above four themes, were proposed for negotiation of direct awards. They were invited to submit full applications and after rounds of negotiations, the first five contracts were signed, with the remaining four to be signed in first quarter of

2016. The use of direct awards based on the results of the call for expression of interest allowed the EUD to focus its assistance to civil society on specific priorities and issues. Negotiation rounds were an appropriate mechanism to fine-tune the design of each project proposal. And while this was also a lengthy procedure, it would not be possible to achieve the same result using a call for proposals mechanism in this case.

#### *Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

*IcSP continued to play a key role in supporting initiatives which underpinned the EU's political commitment to Ukraine. The use of the IcSP was complementary to interventions under other instruments, including ENPI/ENI, EIDHR and ECHO actions, as well as complementary with other institutions' activities, such as the EIB Early Recovery Loan. New funding allocations under IcSP (€37.5 million in 2015) has enabled an adequate EU response to the most urgently identified needs arising from the conflict. Given size and quality of the IcSP support towards the UA crisis in general, and the objectives of the regional media programme in particular, more use can be made of the ongoing activities and achievements in the context of strategic communication about EU action in the country." EAMR Ukraine, 2015, p. 12-13*

#### *"Global Public Goods and Challenges*

*The implementation of the Food Security budget line facilitated the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) between previous ECHO operations supporting herders in Palestine with a sustainable long term programme complementing field level activities with policy development at ministry level. An important activity is the establishing of the first national animal identification system that will support the development of the Palestinian Sanitary and Phytosanitary & food safety measures. Three projects financed under the Food Security budget line ended during the year. The interventions were successful in introducing new agriculture practices amongst beneficiaries, in building capacity in producer's associations and in facilitating access to both local and international markets. The projects assisted in the preparation of the first Olive and Olive Oil Sub-sector Strategy (also financed by the EU). The National Animal Identification System (NAIS), a registration system of all small ruminants and cattle in Palestine, funded under the "livestock based livelihood programme" is on schedule and will be completed during the first quarter of the year. The NAIS will both enable local animal products to meet international trade standards and to enhance Palestinian food safety. The same programme has also financed the "Livestock Sub Sector Strategy for the period 2015-2019".*

#### *Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities*

*Implementation of actions continued under a good path, with most of the projects ended during the reporting period. A call for proposals under the new Instrument CSO-LA was launched with the aim of encouraging Civil Society Organizations involvement as key actors in green and inclusive growth. The call for proposals has triggered a lot interest has demonstrated by the number of applications received (100). Local Authorities have not been targeted by the call as they benefit from the Municipal Development Programme funded under the SSF framework. In addition to the governmental NGO Affairs Commission established in December 2012 by a Presidential decree to control the work of CSOs, the Cabinet issued a regulation on not-for-profit corporations, stating that "there should be prior approval from the Council of Ministers in order to accept grants, donations, assistance and funding along with stating the purpose of such funding". This would hamper the work of many cooperatives and NGOs. The work of civil society organizations in Gaza continued to be impeded by officials by de facto authorities. The additional requirements in terms of financial reporting and taxing of income, if implemented, will put a heavy burden on CSOs and limit their operational space.*

#### *Human Rights/EIDHR*

*Within the framework of the 2014-2015 EIDHR-Country Based Support Scheme (CBSS) programme, a local call for proposals was concluded in November with the selection of 6 projects (one on the reserve list) out of which 4 contracts were signed by the end of the year with a total amount of €2.2 million out of €3.2 million. The projects aim at promoting the rights of workers, the rights of persons with disability (PwDs), strengthening support as regards implementation of UNCAT & OPCAT by the PA and protecting the rights of women victims of Gender-Based Violence (GBV). The other contracts will be contracted and signed during the first semester of 2016. They will focus on promoting the right of freedom of association and monitoring/advocating on violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Additionally, capacity building workshops/ trainings for EIDHR beneficiaries on results-oriented reporting were delivered as part of the technical facility for human rights organizations. In addition to the governmental NGO Affairs Commission established in December 2012 by a Presidential decree to control the work of CSOs, the Cabinet issued a regulation on not-for-profit corporations, stating that "there should be prior approval from the Council of Ministers in order to accept grants, donations, assistance and funding along with stating the purpose of such funding". This would hamper the work of many cooperatives and NGOs. The work of civil society organizations in Gaza continued to be impeded*

ed by officials by de facto authorities. The additional requirements in terms of financial reporting and taxing of income, if implemented, will put a heavy burden on CSOs and limit their operational space.

*Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*

The instrument allows relatively quick reply to sudden changes. The focus has been on Gaza. Under the socio-economic stabilization support package for the Gaza Strip, the UNRWA Emergency Job Creation Programme signed in 2012 was topped by €5 million. This intervention of around €19.3 million ended in November 2015 and an evaluation will be carried out in early 2016. The implementation of the Instrument for Stability to fund the Small Scale Low Volume desalinisation plant (1st phase) in Gaza, implemented by UNICEF has been – so far – easy to manage. Three out of four infrastructure components were finalized in 2015. One component suffered delays due to lengthy discussions about the detailed design; the works were initiated in July but then further postponed due to delays in authorizations from the Israeli side to enter part of the material. A six month no cost extension was approved to allow completion of the works. The subsequent phase will be funded under the ENI bilateral envelope. The project with UNRoD (United Nations Register of Damage) allowed it to carry out part of its mandate in 2015 by implementing outreach activities, reaching some 900,000 persons and increasing the number of claim intake from the Palestinian communities affected by the construction of the wall. New contracts were signed with UNRWA (€5.2 million for Building Resilience and reducing tensions in Gaza) and UNMAS (€0.8 million to mitigate the threat posed by explosives hazards), the latter suspended until the security situation improves, following the Gaza conflict.” EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2015, p. 26-27

*La délégation travaille pour le renforcement de la complémentarité entre les instruments bilatéraux et les instruments thématiques. Le renforcement du dialogue entre les autorités nationales et la société civile algérienne est un défi, surtout après les dispositions législatives de 2012 qui ont laissé une grande partie des acteurs de la société civile dans un limbo légal (agrément ni accordé ni refusé).*

*Dans ce contexte, la DUE maintient un dialogue très riche avec la société civile (ONGs, syndicats, acteurs économiques) et l'intégration de la société civile dans les grands programmes bilatéraux, qui est une réalité depuis 2012 (Ex. Projet patrimoine, Projet PAJE, Projet ENPARD), devra contribuer fortement à mieux intégrer les deux instruments. Une révision de la feuille de route Société civile de l'Union européenne en Algérie est prévue pour 2016 (un contrat a été lancé en 2015 pour l'appui à cette révision),. Ceci nous permettra de mieux définir les priorités et indicateurs de la coopération et de la politique de l'UE envers la société civile pour les prochaines années. L'Union européenne soutient également, depuis 2014, le centre de ressources pour les organisations de la société civile (300,000 EUR via ENI-Facilité société civile) qui vise à renforcer les capacités de la société civile en Algérie.*

*S'agissant de projets régionaux on essaye toujours de trouver des synergies et éviter de doubles emplois avec les projets bilatéraux. Par exemple, le projet PADICA du AAP 2015 va contribuer à renforcer l'action des programmes de coopération régionale de l'UE tels que le programme de renforcement du climat des affaires dans la région Méditerranée du sud, le programme de développement du secteur privé, le programme de soutien au développement de la culture et des industries créatives et des clusters dans le sud de la Méditerranée et le programme de travail 2014-2016 sur la coopération industrielle euro-méditerranéenne. Le programme Justice III a un volet spécifique accès à la justice qui devrait renforcer les actions menées à terme dans le programme EuroMed Justice III et un volet "Indépendance de la Justice" qui devrait assurer /renforcer les synergies avec le nouveau Programme EuroMed Justice et Police IV. Le programme SPRING comprend aussi des actions complémentaires avec EuroMed Justice III et EuroMed Justice et Police IV. Le programme GEMM "Employabilité des jeunes et femmes en Méditerranée", mis en œuvre par la Fondation Européenne de Formation (ETF), 2012-2017 pourra utilement s'inscrire dans une approche préparatoire au projet AFEQ. Ledit projet pourra aussi profiter des dynamiques de partenariat régional établis avec ERASMUS +. Le projet ENPARD sera aussi en synergie avec le le programme régional "Développement du secteur privé au sud de la Méditerranée". Ce programme appuie des formations euro-méditerranéennes et nationales sur des thèmes qui intéressent directement ENPARD Algérie (par exemple sur les processus de consultation public-privé). Le programme régional encouragera également les bonnes pratiques pour promouvoir les industries créatives et culturelles, secteurs qui intéressent également ENPARD Algérie dans une perspective de développement rural. Le projet PAPS est complémentaire du programme régional Horizon 2020. Le projet DIVECO II (Pêche) veille à la complémentarité et les synergies possibles avec le programme régional sur la Politique Maritime Intégrée (IMP-MED. Le projet PAJE a des articulations fortes avec le programme Euro-Med Jeunesse 4. Le projet "Patrimoine" assure la complémentarité avec Euromed Heritage IV et CIUDAD.*



*S'agissant de l'assistance au Commerce il est trop prématuré pour se prononcer sur l'assistance prévue au niveau régional. Il faut néanmoins noter que cette assistance est toujours prévue au niveau national dans le cadre du Projet P3A. EAMR Algeria 2015, p. 15-16*

*“The final EU bilateral assistance to Armenia in the 2011-2013 NIP amounted to €144.1 million, including the EaPIC 2012 and 2013 allocations, minus the cut in assistance relating to Armenia's non-signature of the AA/DCFTA proposed in 2013. AAP 2014 stood at EUR 30 million, whereas AAP 2015 stood at EUR 25 million. In addition to the four budget support operations ongoing in 2015, a further budget support programme was signed in December 2015, to which will be added another two programmes to be signed in 2016. With these additional programmes in mind, the total committed under budget support in Armenia stands at EUR 172 million. Armenia also benefits from thematic instruments which are mainly addressed to non-state actors such as NGOs and local authorities on topics such as democracy and human rights, sustainable development, migration and asylum, as well as from the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility – CSF (ENPI). Since 2008, the EU has pledged over € 10 million to these projects. Armenia also benefits from a number of regional projects – although the exact funding figure allocated to Armenia is difficult to assess – in sectors such as border management via the follow-up to the Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management Flagship initiative for the modernisation of Armenia's key border crossing points with Georgia; transport via TRACECA (particularly in civil aviation); energy via INOGATE (particularly in the field of electricity and gas standards, and sustainable energy) and via the Covenant of Mayors; entrepreneurship via the SME Flagship initiative, East Invest and Enterprise Growth Programme and Business Advisory Services; environment via EAP Green, the EU Water Initiative EECCA, environment information systems (SEIS), forest law enforcement (FLEG) and air quality; and elections via the EaP Council of Europe facility, among others. However, coordination between national and regional projects remained problematic in 2015. Although the Delegation noticed certain improvement in some projects, examples of last minutes request for meetings or information about events organized by regional projects was substantial in 2015. Many regional projects still consider that Headquarters is to be informed and that they can independently carry out their activities. The efficiency of activities implemented by contractors or partner not having any staff based in the country could also be questioned. The Delegation is now trying to develop coordination at sector level. Armenia is also an important beneficiary of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) with commitments to projects in fields as varied as water and wastewater management, solid waste management, border management, roads, and energy efficiency and energy interconnectivity. Recently, the Commission announced a major increase in regional projects in the ENI region. All Trade Related Assistance (TRA) has been discontinued in Armenia and to EU delegation's knowledge no regional TRA is active in Armenia.” EAMR Armenia, 2015, p. 15-16*

*“Justice AAP 2016 programme on justice envisages assistance through civil society especially in the context of provision of legal aid. The same area could be among the objectives of the thematic calls envisioned in 2016-2017, which could pave the way for interventions resulting from the AAP 2016. Special attention was given in 2015 to the coordination of bilateral assistance under IRP2 and the activities carried out under the Programmatic Cooperation framework with the CoE. This was notably the case for the component supporting the efficiency of the justice system, where numerous coordination meetings took place to avoid overlap – notably as regards the foreseen support to the Judicial Legal Council. In the same vein, the currently implemented PCF support project to good governance reforms in the field of anti-corruption has to prove that it can deliver results and is truly complementary to other initiatives in the sector. Finally, in the area of freedom of expression/media, it has to be tested to which extent meaningful work can be done in an increasingly adverse context. Ensuring complementarity between bilateral and regional projects is equally essential in the area of migration and border management (projects on Mobility Partnership, Migration and Border Management). Regional / Rural Development On regional development the EUD continued to promote complementarity between sector interventions targeting the government (funded through the bilateral envelope) and the support provided to civil society. Following up grant projects resulting from the combined NSA-LA and CS Facility call for proposal launched in 2013 and implemented by seven different organizations that supplemented activities foreseen under AAP 2013 – Support to rural and regional development programme, a component of EUR 4.3 million for similar type of actions to be implemented by CSOs was for the first time introduced on a bigger scale under the AAP 2013 bilateral programme on regional development, signed in December 2014. The call is planned to be launched in March of 2016 and will target small scale grass root level initiatives. In the area of regional/rural development, the TAIEX instrument has been also frequently mobilised in order to target key areas of reforms complementary to what is foreseen under the bilateral envelope. On environment, following the recommendations of the final report of the regional ENPI East Waste Governance project, to enlarge the scope of the feasibility study developed for the city of Lankaran, the Delegation launched a technical assistance project funded from*

the bilateral envelope. The new project is studying the feasibility of regionalized waste management in the Southern Region of Azerbaijan and through this will contribute to the development of the Country Solid Waste Strategy of Azerbaijan to be finalized in 2016 with WB support. It has also been developing a new Twinning Program in support of the Ministry of Ecology that is complementing EU funded regional programs. Education The Education Support Programme (AAP 2014) set to start implementation in 2016 complements the initiatives supported under the Erasmus+, which seeks to support knowledge alliances of HEIs and enterprises, as well as strategic partnerships for cross-sectorial co-operation and international mobility schemes for HE students. These actions promoted by Erasmus+ take an essential bottom-up approach for knowledge sharing and capacity development and will be complementary to the top-down assistance provided to the Ministry to guide and monitor the reform at institutional and system level. The programme on Education is also highly complementary to other interventions already on-going or in the pipeline in the field of regional and rural development, which is one of the priority sectors under the programming period 2014-2017. The programme through the pilot projects will act as a catalyst for private sector involvement and social dialogue in the development of education and training programmes which will be tailored to the socioeconomic needs of the regions. Trade Facilitation Complementarity between regional and bilateral projects is also present in the area of trade facilitation and border management, where UNDP will start to implement in 2016 the EU funded project on support to the development of Red Bridge Border crossing point between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Following the discussions on EU-support to the Red Bridge Border Crossing Point, the EUD has been able to open discussions with the (previously completely off-limit) customs authorities to support trade facilitation. Complementarity with the regional East Invest project was ensured regarding the planned organisation in 2016 of an EU-Azerbaijan Business Forum, supported by EU MS Economic Counsellors, locally based EU companies, GovAz (AZPROMO, ADA etc.), as well as EU companies outside of AZE." EAMR Azerbaijan, 2015, p. 11-12

"Under the ongoing programmes, the mix of different instruments is largely satisfactory as several complementarities are created (e.g. in the field of environment.) Simultaneously, regional and thematic programmes allow the Delegation to be engaged in sectors which are not among the focal ones. The TAIEX facility deserves to be mentioned separately, as this rapid reaction mechanism is very much appreciated by the different line ministries and can form the basis for ideas for future cooperation. Furthermore, there is a didactic policy of encouraging the participation of Belarus in EAP/ENI regional programmes, where so far the greatest beneficiaries have been the Border guard and Customs services. For the future, the Delegation aspires to maintain this balance and search for further complementarities. Yet, this is not an easy task as it is not always possible to plan the involvement of Belarus on certain regional programmes." EAMR Belarus, 2015, p. 8

"In 2015, Egypt benefited from the use of a sound mix of EU aid instruments: bilateral, regional and thematic. In terms of complementarity there was, for instance, a large degree of synergy between bilateral and regional envelopes in the strategic sectors of energy and water, notably for blending operations for which it is common that EU grants are provided combining NIF and national/bilateral funding. When working with NGOs in Egypt, thematic and national funds, and to some extent regional funding was effectively combined and tailored as well. In our experience, sensitive areas such as Human Rights are generally better addressed through thematic instruments, whereas involving civil society in addressing socioeconomic challenges are more suited for the use of bilateral funding.

The coordination between RTD grants provided at bilateral level and the FP7, ERASMUS etc. was ensured as well. In addition, certain regional programmes complement the aid portfolio by covering sectors that currently are not being addressed at country-level (e.g. Audiovisual). Major efforts to ensure coordination and exchange of information between the bilateral "Trade and Domestic Market Enhancement programme" and regional trade-related EU initiatives, or other instruments like TAIEX, involving Egyptian institutions or beneficiaries were made by the Delegation. Amid the volume and variety of initiatives, a renewed effort by all actors will be necessary to unleash the combined potential of EU instruments active in Egypt in this strategic sector. In sum, a sound, timely and regular flow of communication between the Delegation, competent HQ-services and implementing entities with regard to all EU-financed operations involving Egypt is required for the Delegation to be able to ensure aid complementarity." EAMR Egypt, 2015, p. 15-16

"Within the Delegation portfolio, around 19 % are at present thematic contracts. This comprises notably the large thematic portfolio of migration related contracts as well as human rights contracts. The relatively high ratio is to a large extent due to the high degree of state structures in support of implementing migration policies as well as to the high degree of related needs. Thus the thematic support is in essence complementary to the main instruments. Also with regards to regional programs, the Dele-

gation sees a reflection of its important position among EaP countries in the Southern Caucasus when it comes to coordinate, monitor and support regional instruments, including INNOGATE and TRACECA. The number of contracts in which the Delegation is currently involved is at a value of 42 representing approximately 5,8 % of the bilateral portfolio. Given that the themes of the latter ones are not part of the national, i.e. bilateral cooperation, there is certainly enough ground to state positively on the complementarity in this regards." EAMR Georgia, 2015, p. 18

"In general there's good complementarity between national and regional instruments. The portion of thematic contracts is higher in terms of contracts (~9% of all contracts) than in terms of value. This mobilises extra management efforts by the EUD. Jordan is very active in regional programmes and in CBC (Med basin) initiative. Jordan is hosting the secretariat of the Agadir Trade Agreement ,which is supported by an EU regional programme." EAMR Jordan, 2015, p. 13

"National and thematic instruments are complementary to the current SSF and to the response to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. The Delegation appreciates that during Regional programming Southern Mediterranean, DG NEAR specifically asked for comments to ensure coherence and complementarity with bi-lateral programmes." EAMR Lebanon, 2015, p. 9

"In 2013, a bilateral programme on energy efficiency (Budget Support and Technical Assistance) continued, which is complemented by the Energy Efficiency (biomass) project from AAP 2010. Moldova received from the global call under the thematic programme on environment one renewable energy project. These projects have a complementarity with the regional INOGATE programme on energy efficiency and with the inter-regional NIF grants for the energy sector. Moldova benefits of the regional trade programme supporting SME competitiveness reforms, DCFTA facilitation programme, SME facility and SME finance facility leveraging support with the ongoing activities of the DCFTA policy reform programme. The regional support is expected to strategic position Moldova within the Eastern Partnership and increase trade facilitation with the European Union. The EU is currently the main trade partner of Moldova notwithstanding the difficulty in immediately re-directing trade away from traditional trade partners. Over the period January to August 2015, exports to the EU accounted for 61.9 % of total exports, while imports from the EU accounted for 49.1 % of total imports." EAMR Moldova, 2015, p. 14

"Comme souligné dans la réponse à la question 5 de la section 1, compte tenu de la multiplicité des instruments financiers de l'UE dans le domaine de la migration et l'importance du Maroc pour les différentes DG concernées, la réponse de l'UE au Maroc apparaît très fragmentée et pas toujours lisible pour les partenaires et le public (32 projets différents sont en cours, y compris les composantes Maroc des projets régionaux gérés par DEVCO, HOME, NEAR, et les Agences exécutives). Malgré ceci demande un effort de coordination intense, les différents instruments d'aide extérieure peuvent offrir des opportunités de synergies intéressantes, mais pour cela il est indispensable que la Délégation puisse être informée dès la phase de conception de toute nouvelle initiative pour éviter des financements redondants et/ou inutiles. Le même raisonnement s'applique au domaine de la sécurité ou la multiplicité des intervenants et leur coordination limitée avec la Délégation est source de duplication et nuit à la pertinence des actions et à leur impact. Une lecture plus ouverte des règles de mise en oeuvre de l'instrument TAIEX de la part de l'Unité C3 devrait permettre le financement d'actions TAIEX en complément d'actions projets en cours (assistances techniques ou jumelage). Il est évident que nous cherchons systématiquement à éviter des risques de double financement, cependant nous estimons utile d'assurer que les actions complémentaires TAIEX (flexibles par nature) puissent contribuer à l'atteinte de résultats des projets de convergence règlementaire en cours de mise en oeuvre. Par ailleurs, cette vision nous semble en ligne avec les ambitions du siège de concilier d'avantage le caractère "à la demande" de l'instrument avec une utilisation plus "stratégique" de celui-ci. En effet, sans cette approche les actions TAIEX risquent une paralysie totale au Maroc à partir de 2016 du fait qu'une cinquantaine de projets d'assistance technique et de jumelages dans un nombre très important de secteurs feront l'objet de financement sur le programme RSA II. Aussi, la Délégation renforce depuis plusieurs années la complémentarité entre les programmes bilatéraux et les programmes thématiques (ciblage des mêmes secteurs par différents instruments afin de renforcer, d'une part et par le biais de la coopération bilatérale, les institutions sectorielles et en vue, d'autre part et par le biais des programmes thématiques, de permettre à la société civile de jouer son rôle de plaidoyer pour faire avancer les réformes au niveau de ces mêmes secteurs). Cela concerne notamment les domaines des droits de l'homme et de la démocratisation, mais aussi l'éducation, la réforme de la justice, les prisons, l'égalité entre les genres, l'énergie, l'eau et l'assainissement, le secteur forestier. A titre d'exemple: – le mapping de la société civile active dans le secteur forestier, réalisé dans le cadre de la Facilité «

*Société Civile », a constitué la base pour la mise en place par le Haut-Commissariat des Eaux et Forêts d'instances de concertation sur le secteur conformément à la cible du programme d'appui budgétaire à la politique forestière du Maroc. Ces instances provinciale et nationale constituent désormais l'enceinte du dialogue et de la concertation du département avec la Société Civile; – Le plan national de l'assainissement a été appuyé par un appui budgétaire et un projet AT dans le cadre duquel les travaux sont financés par l'aide complémentaire du programme PNA et des projets de subvention d'intérêts de la BEI financés par l'enveloppe régionale (FIV) ; – En ce qui concerne le commerce, des projets régionaux (EuroMed Invest, Enhancement of the business environment in South Med, Euro-Mediterranean Trade and Investment Facilitation Mechanism (Euro-Med TIFM, Support to regional trade integration d' Agadir agreement) ont été pris en considération pendant la phase d'identification et formulation du programme Croissance et Compétitivité (PACC) et l'enveloppe dédiée aux jumelages et assistance technique comprend des activités complémentaires. En ce sens aussi, 30 millions EUR du programme Croissance et Compétitivité ont été transférés en 2015 à la FIV pour bénéficier de son expertise dans l'établissement d'une facilité ALECA.” EAMR Morocco, 2015, p. 17-18*

*“EU bilateral cooperation with Syria was suspended in May 2011. There is no participation of the Syrian Arab Republic in any regional projects since then either. However, the crisis spreads at regional level with the massive refugees' flow in the neighbouring countries and towards Europe. Its prolongation and deepening require more funds as well as more coherent and better coordinated interventions every day. The regional EU trust fund “Madad” was created in 2014 and operationalised in 2015 to respond to these acute problems (the first 2 contracts were signed in 2015). Since 2011, the EU has been supporting actions inside Syria mainly through humanitarian assistance (ECHO with ± € 465 Mio). This has been complemented by close to € 145 Mio of actions supported through annual special measures of the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI/ENI), and ± € 50 Mio through the Instrument for Stability (IfS). On top of this, the EU also provides ± € 20 Mio support to local actors and media through the CSO-LA, EIDHR and PRO-ACT thematic budget lines since the beginning of the crisis. Syria also continues to benefit from Erasmus +, addressed to higher education institutions and students. The Programme is managed by EACEA, in close cooperation with the delegation. The delegation attaches a great importance to the complementarity of interventions through the different funding instruments that are managed by different Commission services, especially between ENI, IcSP and ECHO. For this it has started working on a Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework which should be finalised early 2016.” EAMR Syria, 2015, p. 11*

*“La Délégation met en place, lorsque c'est possible, une politique de complémentarité entre les programmes bilatéraux et les programmes thématiques dans le domaine de la justice, de l'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes, dans le domaine de droits de l'Homme et de la gouvernance démocratique principalement. La stratégie vise à renforcer les institutions nationales par le biais des programmes bilatéraux et à renforcer la société civile dans son activité de plaidoyer pour faire avancer les réformes dans les domaines ciblés. Concernant l'assistance au commerce, la Délégation a contractualisé rapidement après le lancement officiel des négociations ALECA, une mission d'assistance technique chargée d'appuyer les autorités tunisiennes à définir les besoins en études, analyse de législation, communication, implication de la société civile pour mener à bien ces négociations. La Délégation a également prévu que le programme d'appui à l'accord d'association et à l'intégration (P3AI) adopté en 2015 puisse être utilisé prioritairement à cet effet.” EAMR Tunisia, 2015, p. 10*

*“There is a good complementarity across the UA programme. All contracts pertaining to a particular (sub-)sector are managed by the concerned programme managers for that (sub-) sector independent of the source of funding. Where possible new interventions are planned building on earlier initiatives. Regarding private sector development the new programme builds on an existing NIF funding and seeks close involvement with further NIF support as also its link to the wider credit support programmes for SMEs from EBRD and EIB. The initiative by the regional support to label all EU support on trade as EU4Business shall be followed in all public communication about EU support to private sector development independent of the source of funding. The expanding response to the crisis in the East combines ENI, IcSP and ECHO resources and design and contracting is closely coordinated between respective entities in charge. The to be contracted €10 million support for re-enforcement of local governance in government controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk by UNDP, is a fully integrated component of EU support for decentralization across the country. Expectation is that after 18 – 24 months ENI funding may take over this initiative assuming a degree of normality returns permitting this.*

*Support for EU integration comprises a combination of ENI services and thematic budget granting. In border management a multitude of actors and projects materialized in 2015 (SGUA, EUAM experts on*

customs, EUBAM phase 10 and 11, customs related twinning projects) , but potential overlaps were mitigated between ‘bilateral’ regional projects and projects generated under regional programmatic platforms (EaP IBM Panel) via consultation and coordination between project teams. Similar with regard to support in the rule of law and anti-corruption sector where besides a directly contracted ENI TA, several other EU funded entities are active, including Council of Europe and EU-AM.” EAMR Ukraine, 2015, p. 17-18

“Complementing the work under Focal Sector 1 (Governance at local and national levels), within the framework of support to civil society, regional and national programmes and activities were much coordinated to avoid overlaps and ensure complementarity and coherence. In the field of EIDHR, contracts were signed for projects to promote rights of workers, disabled, women victims of violence, and adherence to international law and conventions. Networking and coordination among the grantees themselves are also envisaged during the implementation process of the projects. Joint meetings are carried out for all awarded beneficiaries under the different thematic budget line to exchange best practices, scope of their project, harmonize efforts and avoid overlapping. As a complement to work under Focal Sector 2 (Private sector/economic development), Regional Scale Trade assistance is relevant in the case of Palestine. Interventions could support the implementation of the package of measures to facilitate Palestinian trade endorsed by the EUROMED partners in 2010. Potential complementarity is certainly there but still needs to be more effectively structured. EUREP provided comments the regional ENI Innovation for growth programme (on the action fiche during the formulation stage and subsequently on the guidelines for applicants) with a view to improving complementarity. As regards complementarity with Focal Sector 3 (Water and Land Development) the water sector benefited of several trainings provided under several regional projects (mainly the SWIM – Sustainable Water -Integrated management). EUREP has provided HQ with comments and opinions on the design of a SWIM II. In the area of support to the agriculture sector in Palestine, EUREP has utilized the thematic lines (i.e. food security) and the ENI bilateral envelope funding complementary interventions. Furthermore IfS funds have financed the first phase of the Short Term Low Volume (STLV) desalination plant in Gaza. The second phase will be funded under the 2015 AAP and the third and final phase is being considered for the third and final phase under 2016 programming. The energy (non-focal) sector is complemented by the CESMED and SUDEP Regional Projects mainly addressing renewable energies and energy efficiency measures. Some Palestinian municipalities, i.e. Hebron, Nablus and Tulkarim, Tubas and Abasan-Al Kabira (Gaza Strip) are targeted. IfS/lcSP is mobilized to respond to rapid needs following violent conflict, for which no other instrument can be mobilized. In 2015 the focus of lcSP continued to be in Gaza after the 2014 war with the approval of a €8 million package to support job creation and support to mental health in Gaza. The regional Partnership for Peace programme continues to address peacebuilding civil society actions.” EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2015, p. 30-31

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Satisfactory
Degree of confidence		Satisfactory

### 5.3.3 I-533. Existence of platforms or exchanges shared by ENI with IPA, DCI, EIDHR, INSC and lcSP

#### Global analysis of the indicator

There exist many platforms, fora and channels enabling the exchange between the many stakeholders in the ENI region for a better coordination of their policy objectives and actions. Some of these are permanent and meet regularly according to precise regulatory frameworks, others are more ad hoc or informal:

- The EUDs in the ENI partner countries through their responsibility of programming bilateral actions;
- The corresponding authorities of partner governments through their responsibility for coordination all donor activities in their country;
- The DG NEAR Geographical Units through their responsibility to coordinate the overall EU financing activity in the ENI countries, in close cooperation with the corresponding EUDs;

- The DG NEAR Multi-country Unit and the DG NEAR Unit through their responsibility for the CBC programmes;
- The ENI Committee and the QSGs (Quality Support Groups) controlling the quality of the actions to be financed at their identification/structuring phase;
- The DG DEVCO, FPI and ECHO Units which are responsible to manage the EDF, DCI, EIDHR, IfSP and HACP/EAR Instruments/ programmes;
- The DG DEVCO 01 Unit which has been assigned the role of the overall coordination of all External Financing Instruments of the EU;
- The Managing Authorities of the Multi-lateral Territorial Programmes where ENI countries are participating ;
- The Managing Authorities of the CBC programmes between ENI and IPA countries (e.g. CBC Turkey-Georgia) and the ENI countries and the EU MS;
- Committees for the discussion of interventions concerning Democracy and Human Rights (including Civil Society), as well as Security and Peace with the Council of Europe and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe);
- The Boards of the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (“Madad Fund”) and the EU Trust Fund for Africa; the EFIs contributing to these Funds are ENI, DCI and IPA II for the Madad TF and EDF, ENI and DCI for the TF for Africa, together with a big number of EU MS funds (Madad) and International Organisations & IFIs (Madad & Africa).
- EU Development Counsellors platform (Commission and Member States – MS);
- Development Partners Group (Government-led coordination platform, organised by thematic sub-groups, which includes all development agencies – bilateral and multi-lateral – including Commission and MS)
- NIF Operational Board (European Commission, EEAS, EU Member States as voting Members, and European Finance Institutions as observers); The NIF Operational Board is an important platform for strategic prioritisation of NIF funded projects, effective coordination of investments and joint-financing of operations. In the framework of its strategic dialogue, it is also a powerful instrument to enrich the policy dialogue and strategically orient and coordinate investments;
- Organisations/ fora promoting strategic dialogue with beneficiary countries and relevant regional organisations (e.g. UFM).
- The Committee of the EIB Facility for the Mediterranean Partnership – FEMIP (EU-funded) which has as objective to promote economic development and financial co-operation in the Mediterranean – with the EIB as a key investor and facilitator; The FEMIP Committee is composed of representatives from Partner countries, EU Member States, the European Commission and EIB.
- The FEMIP Ministerial Council, which meets annually and provides a unique forum for high-level dialogue, where EU Finance Ministers meet their counterparts from the Mediterranean countries to discuss policy reforms and investments priorities;
- G7 Deauville Partnership (G7, GCC1, 6 Mediterranean partner countries, regional and multilateral international organizations) and, in particular the IFI coordination Platform (African Development Bank, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Monetary Fund, EIB, EBRD, IFC, IMF, Islamic Development Bank – IsDB, OECD, OPEC Fund for International Development – OFID , WB). The Deauville Partnership is an important tool to promote dialogue and coordination among key actors in the region, with a strong political weight and catalytic role;
- Coordination Secretariat of the Arab Funds (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Saudi Fund for Development, Abu Dhabi Fund for development, Arab Fund for economic and social development, IsDB, OFID, Arab Bank for Economic development in Africa, AGFUND and the Arab Monetary Fund);
- Luxembourg Group (EU – including European Commission; EEAS; EIB; EBRD; WB Group – including IFC; IMF);
- Secretariat of the “Union for the Mediterranean” (MS; European Commission; Partner Countries). The Union for the Mediterranean aims to enhance regional cooperation and partnership between the two shores of the Mediterranean through the implemen-

tation of specific projects. The governance of the UfM is based on equitable functioning and shared responsibility. A co-presidency shared between the North and South ensures that countries from both shores are placed on equal footing

The above mentioned platforms and channels are used by the EU services and other ENI stakeholders for developing common policy approaches, common (joint) or coordinated interventions, synergies, complementarity and coherence for enhanced results and impact and finally for achieving the EFIs' objectives. The degree of their success varies, but a more profound assessment of their individual strengths and weaknesses would surpass the scope of this evaluation.

#### **Presentation of collected proof**

NA

#### **Sources of information used**

Interviews – NEAR, EEAS, EIB and web-sites of above mentioned Organisations/ bodies.

#### **Level of information and confidence**

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### **5.3.4 I-534. Evidence of presence of EEAS and sector DGs staff dealing with IPA, DCI, EIDHR, INSC and IcSP in ENI QSG meetings**

#### **Global analysis of the indicator**

It is a general practice that EEAS and sector DGs are present in the ENI Quality Support Group meetings. This is further evidenced by the QSG checklists which foresee a dedicated section to comments from the Geographical Coordinator, the Finance and Contract Department, from the EEAS and from other relevant DGs. The analysis of these QSG documents has shown that all above-mentioned actors make frequent use of their possibilities to comment on programmes during the identification phase and actively participate in the quality review process.

#### **Presentation of collected proof**

NA

#### **Sources of information used**

QSG documents (meetings, checklists)

#### **Level of information and confidence**

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### **5.4 JC54: ENI programmes complement and stimulate synergies with other external action financing instruments**

#### **5.4.1 I-541. Level of coordination of ENI resources and pooling of contributions with other external instruments of the Union budget**

#### **Global analysis of the indicator**

DG NEAR is demonstrating an appreciable capacity of coordinating ENI resources with other EU external instruments to provide a coordinated response to partner countries needs, even if unforeseen. Nevertheless, the level of coordination of ENI resources and pooling of contributions with other external instruments was found to be relatively limited. Only for projects with other EFIs were ENI resources pooled. The rare examples mentioned during interviews are with EIDHR and CSO/LA (DCI), thus linked to the support to the civil society (Facility). This support is foreseen specifically in ENI regulation in several articles.

The Table below presents which of the EFIs or ECHO are active in the partner countries of the ENI area. EIDHR, IcSP and DCI are quite active in most of the countries; ECHO was

found to be active mainly in Syria and Ukraine (with a big portfolio in each of them) and in West Bank & Gaza Strip, Libya and Algeria (minor activities in a number of other countries).

Table 30 *EFIs active in the Neighbourhood region*<sup>46</sup>

Country	EIDHR	IcSP	DCI (CSO/LA)	ENI <sup>47</sup>	ECHO <sup>48</sup>	Other
ALGERIA <sup>49</sup>				✓	✓	
EGYPT	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
ISRAEL	✓					ENV, ENE
JORDAN	✓	✓		✓		
LEBANON	✓	✓		✓		
LIBYA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
MOROCCO	✓		✓	✓	✓	
SYRIA	✓	✓		✓	✓	
TUNISIA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
W.BANK&GS	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
<b>Total South</b>	<b>9/10</b>	<b>7/10</b>	<b>5/10</b>	<b>9/10</b>	<b>2/10</b>	<b>1/10</b>
ARMENIA	✓		✓	✓	✓	
AZERBAIJAN <sup>50</sup>				✓		
BELARUS	✓	✓	✓	✓		
GEORGIA	✓	✓	✓	✓		
MOLDOVA	✓		✓			
UKRAINE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
<b>Total East</b>	<b>5/6</b>	<b>3/6</b>	<b>5/6</b>	<b>5/6</b>	<b>1/6</b>	<b>0/6</b>
<b>Total Neibhd</b>	<b>14/16</b>	<b>10/16</b>	<b>10/16</b>	<b>14/16</b>	<b>3/16</b>	<b>1/16</b>

The complementarity between them stems from:

- the specific focus of the EFIs (thematic sub-areas), the character of the activities (e.g. emergency actions), the specific categories of the recipients/ beneficiaries (mainly CSOs and Local Authorities),
- the coordination activities implemented at both the HQ level (of the competent DGs managing the Instruments) and (most importantly) at the EUD level.

Examples of coordination at HQ level:

- Elaboration of a joint humanitarian & development framework for Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, by ENI, ECHO and IcSP (at HQ level).
- The activity of all Instruments in Ukraine is coordinated by the SGUA (DG NEAR), supported by the competent COTEs with the contribution of the competent other DGs/ EEAS.
- The coordination of the activities in WB&GS is implemented mainly at HQ level.

ENI resources were pooled within the EU family as well, mainly through blending operations. The Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) is fully operational and financing infrastructure

<sup>46</sup> The information for this Table is sourcing from the EAMRS 2015 & 2014 of EUDs of ENI partner countries

<sup>47</sup> Active with actions relevant to those of the other EFIs (CS, etc.)

<sup>48</sup> Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, focusing mainly on Disaster risk reduction and man-made humanitarian emergencies – Relevant info has been taken from the web-site of the ECHO.

<sup>49</sup> The Government has not decided yet whether they will allow direct cooperation of the EFIs with the CSOs/Las.

<sup>50</sup> By a recent law the Government has forbidden any action with the CSOs/LA outside the control of the Government.



projects in the transport, energy, social and environment sectors as well as private sector initiatives (in particular SMEs) in the EU Neighbourhood region by pooling funds of European Commission (ENI), and the EU Member States (Grants), as well as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) and EU MS bilateral development financing institutions from one of the Member States (loans). Blending is also utilised for individual projects with EBRD.

MFA by ECFIN is another instrument coordinated with ENI programmes (for a more detailed analysis of MFA see I-543).

The Trust Funds for Syria and for Africa (which have been created in 2014 and 2015 respectively) because *“the ENI is not suitable or sufficient for all needs, especially where a crisis response requires substantial additional funding at short notice. ENI funding is therefore complemented by support from other instruments, such as the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), EU humanitarian funding (ECHO) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Additional funds may need to be mobilised, through these or other instruments, as required by the evolving situation in the region — the responses in Syria and Ukraine are examples of this.”*<sup>51</sup> They have been found to perform well and have secured pooling of funds from four EFIs, namely ENI, DCI, EDF and IPA II, as well as from a large number (22) of EU MS.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*“The delegation attaches a great importance to the complementarity of interventions through the different funding instruments that are managed by different Commission services, especially between ENI, IcSP and ECHO.”* EAMR Syria 2015, 11

*“The expanding response to the crisis in the East combines ENI, IcSP and ECHO resources and design and contracting is closely coordinated between respective entities in charge.”* EAMR Ukraine 2015, 17-18

*“Under the ongoing programmes, the mix of different instruments is largely satisfactory as several complementarities are created (e.g. in the field of environment.). Simultaneously, regional and thematic programmes allow the Delegation to be engaged in sectors which are not among the focal ones.”* EAMR Belarus 2015, 8

*“In 2015, Egypt benefited from the use of a sound mix of EU aid instruments: bilateral, regional and thematic. In terms of complementarity there was, for instance, a large degree of synergy between bilateral and regional envelopes in the strategic sectors of energy and water [...]”* EAMR Egypt 2015, 15-16

*“The CSO and LA in development 2014 programme in Armenia has been launch to support the ongoing territorial-administrative reform aimed at consolidation of local communities/municipalities and reducing their number. Consultations were held with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Emergency Situations to ensure coherence of the Call for Proposals with the pace of the reform while safeguarding the principles of thematic programmes on independence of the process.”* EAMR Armenia 2015, 11-12

*“Most of these thematic instruments complement well the bilateral cooperation allowing providing a more comprehensive response to well identified needs, thus also completing the EU response.”* EAMR Georgia 2015, 14-15

*“Three contracts were signed in 2015 in the framework of the EIDHR thematic line. The selection and negotiations for 2 of these contracts were initiated by DEVCO. Although fully relevant, DG NEAR and the delegation (to which the management of these contracts was devolved) were involved at too late a*

<sup>51</sup> 2015 Joint communication on 2014 reports, p. 14.

stage thus constraining our say on their design [...] Collaboration with IcSP functions well. There are regular consultations and exchanges of information.” EAMR Syria 2015, 8

“To ensure complementarity with bilateral instruments, it was decided in 2013 that country allocations under CSO-LA would be every second year. The 2 mio euros LA 2014 country allocation was contracted in 2015 for 2 projects, to complement the regional development and decentralisation programmes in ensuring an active role of LA in the decentralisation process, in particular for the implementation of the reforms of local budget (with the association of Ukrainian cities) and of administrative services, building on the achievements of the 13 projects funded under NSA-LA 2012. It was initially planned to merge the CSO 2015 country allocation with AAP 2014 bilateral civil society support programme in the joint call for proposal to be launched beginning of 2015, as per Delegation strategy to ensure a critical amount and synergies between instruments. However this could not be done due to administrative delays in adoption of CSO 2015 (adopted summer 2015) and reservations expressed by DG BUDG the previous year concerning the use of prior approvals.” EAMR Ukraine 2015, 12-13

“The use of the IcSP was complementary to interventions under other instruments, including ENPI/ENI, EIDHR and ECHO actions [...]” EAMR Ukraine 2015, 12-13

“[...] compte tenu de la multiplicité des instruments financiers de l'UE dans le domaine de la migration et l'importance du Maroc pour les différentes DG concernées, la réponse de l'UE au Maroc apparaît très fragmentée et pas toujours lisible pour les partenaires et le public (32 projets différents sont en cours, y compris les composantes Maroc des projets régionaux gérés par DEVCO, HOME, NEAR, et les Agences exécutives). Malgré ceci demande un effort de coordination intense, les différents instruments d'aide extérieure peuvent offrir des opportunités de synergies intéressantes, mais pour cela il est indispensable que la Délégation puisse être informée dès la phase de conception de toute nouvelle initiative pour éviter des financements redondants et/ou inutiles.” EAMR Morocco 2015, 17-18

Throughout the Syrian crisis, the EU has been at the forefront of the international humanitarian response, acting in close coordination with other donors and international organisations to ensure that needs were promptly identified and aid delivered rapidly and effectively. In 2012, EUR 150 million in humanitarian assistance has been provided in Syria and in the neighbouring countries, complemented by a EUR 208 million contribution from the EU Member States. Around EUR 80 million has been provided under the ENPI and under thematic instruments to address longer term needs of the Syrian population (support to civil society, Human Rights defenders, refugees...) and to help neighbouring countries to cope with the influx of refugees.” JOIN (2013) 4 – ENP Working towards a stronger partnership, p. 19

“During the period 2008-2013, NIF provided EUR 753 million in grants and thereby leveraged an estimated EUR 8.1 billion of loans from the European Financing Institutions. For 2014- 2017, the EU has indicatively earmarked EUR 595 million for NIF, which may be complemented by funds from ENP regional and/or bilateral programmes, and by direct contributions from Member States to the NIF trust fund, which is managed by the European Investment Bank.” 2014 ENI strategic priorities and MIP 2014-2017, p. 6

“Special Measure – Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme / Action Document for Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme

#### 2.4. Complementary actions

The EU Delegation to Ukraine ensures the complementarity and synergies with other EU instruments. In the implementation of this Programme complementarity will be ensured with ongoing projects funded under EIDHR, CSO-LA and other thematic programmes, regarding the objectives and types of projects, both at country and regional level. While the EIDHR will clearly focus on the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy, the CSO-LA programme will focus on areas not covered under this programme, such as social sectors, multi-actor partnerships and cooperation with local authorities.

The present programme also complements and accompanies the State Building Contract by supporting civil society's role in monitoring the implementation of the related specific reforms (public administration reform, public finance management, fight against corruption, elections, Judiciary and Constitutional reforms).

Furthermore, the present programme builds on the on-going work of the EU-funded regional project "Strengthening non-State actors' Capacities to Promote Reform and increase Public Accountability",

whose overall purpose is to strengthen the overall capacities of civil society organisations, facilitate their involvement in policy dialogue and increase their contribution to the political and institutional framework of the Eastern Partnership countries.” Special Measure for Ukraine 2014, p. 23-24

“1. Amendment of the EU Regional Trust Fund in response of the Syrian crisis. Following the Joint Statement Declaration made by the EU Home/Foreign Affairs Ministers and counterparts of the Western Balkans countries on 8 October, the European Commission informed the Member states of its intention to propose an amendment to the EU Regional TF to extend both its geographical scope to the Western Balkans and its eligible population to IDP's in, and refugees from Iraq. The amendment will be submitted through written procedure to the ENI, IPA and DCI Committees as the EUTF funding comes from the 3 instruments. However, the use of funds will respect the geographical scope of each instrument. This extension does not apply to the second EU contribution to the TF (EUR 312 million) discussed under point 5 of the agenda, which can be used within the overall current geographical scope of the TF. Consequently, the Chair invited Member States to check with their capitals whether they would agree to be consulted on the amendment through urgent written procedure and to signal possible objection within a week to the Commission. The Commission could then consider the possibility to hold a joint meeting of ENI/IPA/DCI committees.” 10th ENI COMMITTEE\_Draft minutes, p. 5-6

“As previously mentioned, one of the main aims of this action will be to ensure synergies between the various ongoing and planned initiatives. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and Civil Society and Local Authorities (CSO-LA) thematic programmes under the Development Co-operation Instrument have a global coverage and are implemented largely through calls for proposals under which applicants, mainly civil society, have a right of initiative. These calls for proposals are launched at national level by EU Delegations and at regional level by the Commission Headquarters. Under Priority 2 of the CSO-LA thematic programme, the EU aims at strengthening representative, membership-based and actor-based regional, EU and global non-thematic civil society umbrella organisations, in order to maximize the effectiveness of their work as development actors in their own right and contributors to policy-making, on development related topics at global and regional levels (including the EU). The local authorities-focused part of the programme aims to “empower local authorities and national associations of local authorities, to enable them to contribute to the achievement of more effective development objectives while responding to citizens’ demands and promote inclusive and sustainable local development. In the implementation of the present action, complementarity will be ensured with existing support through EIDHR, CSO-LA and other thematic programmes.” COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION on the ENI East Regional Action Programme 2015 Part 2 to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, p. 75

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific and joint survey)

Interviews – NEAR A, B, C; EIDHR, DEVCO; EUDs during field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 5.4.2 I-542. Evidence that programming documents under DCI, EIDHR, IcSP, INSC and ENI are mutually reinforcing {[14]} i.e. sharing similar theory of change and with an operationalized complementarity

#### Global analysis of the indicator

**Regulatory background** – Despite the fact that they have different mandates and are addressing different regions or sectors, all EFIs share a common framework of action (comprised among others by the Better Regulation Guidelines, by the CIR for most of them, the EU development policy, by the shared time period of 2014-2020 and the same institutional logics). This is reminded in Article 5(1): “In the implementation of this Regulation, coherence shall be ensured with all areas of the Union's external action as well as other relevant Union policies. To that end, measures financed under this Regulation, including those managed by

*the European Investment Bank (EIB), shall be based on the cooperation policy documents referred to in Article 3(1)<sup>52</sup> and (2)<sup>53</sup> as well as on the Union's specific interests, policy priorities and strategies.* This common base, in particular the shared policies and strategies, ensures that the underlying theories of change are similar and coherent. EIDHR also explicitly refers to the ENP as one of the core policy documents into which its activities are embedded.

In ENI regulation: *"The Union should seek the most efficient use of available resources in order to optimise the impact of its external action. That should be achieved through coherence and complementarity between the Union's instruments for external action, as well as the creation of synergies between the ENI, other Union instruments for financing external action and other policies of the Union. This should further entail mutual reinforcement of the programmes devised under the instruments for financing external action."* (Whereas 14)

**Complementarity in programming documents** – Issues of complementarity with ENI are addressed in various programming documents (MIP, AAP) of both EIDHR and DCI/CSO-LA. Even more, both have been particularly designed to be complementary to geographic instruments which is considered their added value. An example of this coherence is that EIDHR should focus on civil society action, while geographic instruments should support projects undertaken by national governments.

The main parameters which act (positively/negatively) on the complementarity of EFIs are:

- Historical evolution
- Concept/ scope
- Operational use
- Incentives/ disincentives
- Sequence of use
- Financial size
- Eligible recipients/ beneficiaries
- Interfaces between the EFIs

**Coordination – complementarity with other EFIs** – The internal monitoring system does not provide information on complementarity between EFIs at country level. EAMRs do not report specifically (2015) on this; they rather report on the implementation of each key instruments. The most often quoted are EIDHR, CSO/LA, and IcSP. Only one related evaluation was identified at country level (complementarity in the support to CSOs between ENI bilateral programme and thematic projects). No such evaluation was found at strategic level. Country level evaluations are generally analysing the mix of instruments, but actually not in terms of coherence-complementarity between EFIs<sup>54</sup>. The information basis is weak for assessing the indicator.

From interviews and field visits, the actions of the other EFIs are reported to be complementary to the actions of ENI. This is particularly the case when the context in the country fits with the theory of change underlying the complementarity framework of the EFIs: border disputes, protracted conflicts, political instability, humanitarian crisis, military regimes... (Egypt, Ukraine, and indeed Syria, Libya...). Accordingly, in the joint survey, seven out of eight EUDs have positively assessed the overall complementarity with other EFIs, mostly IcSP and EIDHR, but also DCI/CSO-LA.

The ENI-specific survey (interviews with HoCs) as well as the analysis of EAMRs and the field mission confirm this statement; at least in the sense that complementarity between EFIs was not perceived as an area with major problems. In general, ENI was providing a broad support encompassing all sectors, whereas other EFIs specialized on more specific issues within their focal sector ("niches" in ENI context where ENI funds are overwhelming compared to thematic EFIs). This was for example the case in Georgia, where EIDHR special-

<sup>52</sup> the ENI policy framework.

<sup>53</sup> "action plans or other equivalent jointly agreed documents such as the association agendas between the partner countries and the Union in bilateral and multilateral formats, including, as relevant, within the Eastern Partnership and the southern dimension of the ENP."

<sup>54</sup> Moreover available country level evaluations for the neighbourhood assess ENPI programmes.

ized on several very specific topics (HRBA, domestic violence, health rights ...) whereas ENI delivered a generalist support to human rights and the civil society. In Ukraine, the support to civil society was cited as a good practice example, showing good complementarity between ENI and DCI. Challenges were on the other hand highlighted by Morocco stating that in sector of migration, the number of different instruments involved made EU support appear fragmented in the eyes of partners. Furthermore, in the ENI-specific survey, the complementarity with other EFIs is rarely mentioned as a key area which improved in the past years – in contrary to other complementarities (e.g. between the different types of ENI programmes).

The biggest part of the coordination between ENI and the other EFIs is done at the level of the EUDs which have the mandate to programme the bilateral ENI actions/programmes; in countries where an EFI has its own office the coordination with the EUD is on a day-by-day basis (usually they are in the same building); in countries where there is no representative of the EFI, the EUD is doing all the work for them (programming and implementation management/ monitoring).

EUDs play a key role for coordinating the EFIs. They contribute to the programming of all EFIs at country level, and are facilitating the access to information on other on-going or planned programmes. They however face human resource shortages as many requests from a wide diversity of horizons are converging on them. Some critical EFIs for the Neighbourhood like EIDHR have a country component that allows adjusting to both country needs and ENI portfolio.

ENI and DCI/CSO-LA are sharing a very similar approach to the support to the civil society. In several cases, a joint facility was set up for the two instruments.

ECHO is linked to ENI for the humanitarian response to crises and conflicts. An increasing attention is provided to coordinating EU development portfolio with ECHO projects, first by attempting to have the EUD and the ECHO offices in the same premises. Also ECHO is acting on a wider spectrum of activities along the LRRD chain, with the intention to close the gap with the ENI development priorities. A section of ECHO action proposal is dedicated to coordination with development actors and programmes.

**Overlaps** – There have not been any overlapping projects of the ENI/ EFIs in the region (at least not concerning important actions). Considering the coordination mechanisms among EFIs, problems could be faced only in cases:

(i) implementation of actions by the other EFIs without earlier notification of the competent EUD/ DG NEAR; this is not probable, at least for country specific actions, considering also that in the current period most EFIs are implementing actions on the basis of multi-annual and annual country programmes which have been discussed with the other DGs and the EUDs (except of the emergency actions),

(ii) urgent actions which have to be implemented immediately; considering the type of these actions (usually actions of the IcSP) and the limited available funds, it is not probable that such an action will be implemented if it can be funded under an existing ENI programme/ action (except if there will be no communication between the competent authorities)

(iii) there is no communication or the communication between the competent EC authorities is problematic (for any reason, including under-staffing).

(iv) in case of confidential actions (e.g. of the EIDHR) which are not announced.

(v) in cases of development actions or Technical Assistance actions, managed by the national authorities; not probable if the EUD implements a good monitoring system.

**Synergy / mutually reinforcing** – The lack of reporting on synergy in EAMRs and the unavailability of related evaluations does not allow to answer based on hard evidences. However, from interviews and documentary review, coordination rarely goes beyond more or less formal complementarity and at best co-funding of beneficiaries covered by two instruments (i.e. CSOs by ENI and DCI). Being mutually reinforcing is left to the long term perspective, if and when programmes will have achieved their expected results. Reinforcement is an assumption of EFIs overall theory of change. By lack of evaluation and monitoring, it cannot be really challenged – nor confirmed.

## Presentation of collected proof

**Joint Survey**

<i>Is there any duplication or complementarity between the instruments used in your delegation?</i>
No
ENI, IcSP, EIDHR and DCI have been all working in a coordinated manner.
Yes
No real need for EIDHR.
There is good complementarity in terms of the choice of both intervention sectors and implementing partners.
Delegation strives to ensure complementarity and to avoid duplication.
complementarity between civil society support programmes provided through three instruments: EIDHR, DCI, ENI complementarity between ICSP and humanitarian aid, ICSP and ENI
EIDHR: work on sensitive issues / potential irritants DCI/CSO-LA: Some actions reinforced/repeated with combined use of ENI regional funds – which offer the same scheme of HQ-managed decision (no Financing Agreement with the Government) dispatching funds to EUDs for local contracts. If such ENI regional actions were discontinued, DCI country-based schemes would remain the only available instrument in countries with a shrinking space for civil society. Thanks to recent political opening, the EUD has developed a new project on capacity development at local level targeting Local Authorities (funded from ENI Single Support Framework 2014-17).
The Delegation ensures complementarity of EFIs used in its current and planned activities. Some of the programmes are addressed to the national authorities while others provide funding to civil society. HoOps meets all EU MS and non-EU representatives, as well as other donors for mutual briefings on their respective activities on an annual basis. Regularly, the Operations and Political teams meet donors, relevant consultants, government and civil society representatives to ensure that there is no duplication in activities carried out under the different programmes. However, often it is difficult, both for the Delegation and the local stakeholders, to distinguish between the goals and activities of the different initiatives when the same issues are addressed by different programmes. Thematic programme for the environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy are complementary to regional environment programme/projects. The relevant thematic programmes are Thematic Programme for Environment, MEDEUWI and ENRTP, but only some of parts are open to Israel. The regional programmes are Med Enec II, Horizon 2020, SWIM, SEIS, CIUDAD, PPRD, Integrated Maritime Policy in the Mediterranean, CLIMA South and "Cleaner, energy-saving Mediterranean Cities", CIVITAS. The Local CfPs of Local Authorities is complementary to the SUDEP regional programme.
Complementarity exists between IcSP funds and ENI funds. For instance support to municipalities is given in the country via IcSP funds and through the ENI funds

Please indicate which of the instruments used in your Delegation complement or duplicate actions of other EU external action instruments.

MFA and CFSP actions should be carefully coordinated with ENI support
CFSP is complemented by all instruments in use.
Delegation strives to ensure complementarity. E.g. the IcSP funded a EUR 20m project supporting the Ministry of Health. Upon completion, the Ministry was supported by a similar ENI funded project.
ENI complements MFA; both ENI and ICSP complement humanitarian assistance programme in the country
Humanitarian assistance: Scarce political appetite for linking with longer-term assistance; the context seems to be evolving and more complementarity (with ENI and DCI) may be explored on issues of social inclusion, culture, and youth engagement.
Other EU external action instruments are not applicable to the country.

IcSP and ENI were designed to respond in complementarity to the Syria Crisis taking into consideration the Humanitarian Assistance from ECHO. DCI support mainly under CSO/LA complemented our bilateral programmes (ENI) in support to CSOs and NGOs.

## ENI survey

**What are the key areas where the EU Delegation was able in recent years to improve the coherence and consistency of EU actions within ENI programmes and across EU actions (among EFIs and with Union's sectorial policies/programmes)?**

Not always easy to bring coherence between the regional component and the bilateral component of the ENI. The Association Agreement is more important than the ENI. There is extensive interaction with other EU line DGs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level: they are managed by HQs, we take them into account but we don't have a lot information about projects and their results. 4. For ENI programmes with intervention funded by other EFIs: we are informed and try to avoid overlap.

1. Amount ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border): yes with issues.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral).

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border): there are some problems in some areas but overall it is very good. 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs but there are not many in the country.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country. 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs: EIDHR, CSO/LA. 5. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs: DG EAC, DG Grow. But it was the same in recent years.

1. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 2. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes at regional level (e.g. between bilateral programmes and the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crises – Madad Fund – and Justice). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs (e.g. DG Trade and Customs)

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral): but we are not coherent in the sense that we are in many sectors because Morocco since 2011 has putting in place many reforms. Coordination is overall led by the government but there's not a development policy in the country and everything works at a sector level so it's a bit fragmented. 2. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs: EIDHR.

1. Among ENI programming in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs (DG Trade, DG Home, DG Research and Innovation, DG energy, DG Environment).

*“Other EU external instruments will complement EU support to the region. The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and other thematic instruments like the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) are particularly important. The activities funded under thematic programmes must be fully consistent with the implementation of the present Multiannual Indicative Programme. Within the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the “Global public goods and chal-*

lenges” thematic programme and the “Civil Society and Local Authorities” programme are of particular relevance. Certain measures, particularly in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management and resolution, may also be supported under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which aims at providing an effective, timely, flexible and integrated response to situations of crisis, emerging crisis or continued political instability. The IcSP may also support preventive long-term actions to build capacity both to address specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilizing effect and to ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crises situations. The Partnership Instrument (PI) will also be of relevance to regional cooperation activities under this Strategy involving the Russian Federation. In addition, EU internal instruments and programmes with external cooperation windows will also complement activities supported by this Strategy, namely Home Affairs Funds (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and Internal Security Fund), Connecting Europe, Creative Europe, COSME, Horizon 2020 and Erasmus +, the EU programme for education, training, youth and sport.” 2014 ENI East RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 12

“COORDINATION WITH DEVELOPMENT ACTORS AND PROGRAMMES – In this section, the partner will address the issues of transition, LRRD, exit strategy and resilience. The partner will describe, when relevant, how the Action complements on-going development actions or programmes, how synergies are enhanced and contradictions avoided.

This section will also explain how this coordination with development interventions will increase the sustainability of the results achieved after the end of the ECHO funded action and how the phasing out will be done.

The partner will also explain what are the concrete coordination mechanisms put in place in order to enhance synergies and complementarities between the Action and relevant development interventions.

The partner will further indicate how the current action will contribute to addressing the root causes of vulnerabilities of the target population.” [http://dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/action\\_proposal/fill\\_in\\_the\\_sf/section7](http://dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/action_proposal/fill_in_the_sf/section7)

#### “Support to Civil Society in Azerbaijan

Action Document for Support to Civil Society in Azerbaijan 2.4. Complementary actions The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and Civil Society Organizations-Local Authorities (CSO-LA) thematic programmes also provide support to CSOs in strengthening their role as independent actors in the development context. With respect to EIDHR, since the present action has similar priorities, synergy will be ensured by channelling EIDHR funds towards support to the work of human rights defenders, while the present action will cover basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. On the other hand, CSO-LA programme will cover the social sector, governance, accountability, inclusive growth and sustainable development. [...] In order to reach complementarity with mentioned projects and develop further the capacity at national level, the calls for proposal will include a separate lot to increase the capacity and role as independent development actors of CSOs – whether or not they are EU-funded grant beneficiaries – by delivering more effectively, professionally and independently, notably on advocacy, oversight and public policy development, monitoring and oversight, including in the regions outside of Baku.” Annual Action Programme Azerbaijan, p. 31-32-33

#### “Action Document for ENI support to Civil Society and Independent Media working for Belarus

2.4. Complementary actions. Capacity building of CSOs was so far being done in particular through DCI NSA-LA programme, and through ENPI8 Special Measures and ENPI Civil Society Facility that have been used as top-up for DCI NSA/LA Calls for proposals to extend the programme and thus to further strengthen the impact. Different phases of “Clearing House” have been financed under the previously mentioned instruments. Independent media, such as EuroRadio and Belsat, have been supported through various projects under EIDHR programme. IfS funded “Civil Society Stability in Belarus phase 2” (CSSB 2) strengthens both civil society and independent media through its sub-granting scheme. Oversight functions of CSOs and media are currently not directly supported by any of the EU instruments. It is expected that there will be several complementarities and synergies between this programme and EIDHR and CSO-LA programmes. Among the EU Member States the closest coordination is done with Sweden, Netherlands and Poland (see 2.5). There have been important synergies between Swedish funded activities and EU’s Instrument for Stability project CSSB 2, which is currently EU’s most important project to support both CSOs and independent media. In the framework of CSSB 2 close co-ordination is done also with FIDH9, IREX10 and European Endowment for Democracy (EED) to ensure that EU financed activities in this sector are not overlapping. The nature of Dutch funded projects is very much complementary to EU funded projects, notably due to their size which is



usually less than EUR 50 000 which enables Dutch to reach organisations that do not have necessarily financial or other necessary capacities to apply for EU grants. Poland is notably active in the field of independent media. Co-ordination has taken place in the framework of projects related to Belsat (satellite television) and Euroradio.” Annual Action Programme Belarus 2014, p. 9-10

“The new EIDHR strategy is based on the aforementioned political context and is embedded in following core policy documents: [...] the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy.” EIDHR MIP (2014-2017), p. 2

“The Thematic Programme CSOs Las has its legal base in Regulation 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (Development Cooperation Instrument, DCI). Article 6 of the DCI Regulation defines the main characteristics of Thematic Programmes, which shall add value and be complementary to, and coherent with, actions funded under geographic Programmes.” DCI/CSO-LA MIP (2014-2020), p. 6

“The EIDHR’s added value lies in its complementarity. Therefore, great attention is paid to ensuring coherence and synergy between the EIDHR and geographic and other thematic instruments, in particular the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) [...]” EIDHR MIP (2014-2017), p. 4

“ENP issues have been taken into account in other relevant external-policy documents, for example in the recent Commission Communications on Development Policy and on the Africa Strategy; mutual coherence will continue to be ensured.” SEC (2005) 1521 – Implementing and promoting ENP, p. 4



#### Level of information and confidence

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EFI programming documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – relevant stakeholders (e.g. DG REGIO/01), EIDHR Evaluation TL, DG HOME

#### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 5.4.3 I-543. Degree of synergy between the ENI and the EU macro-financial assistance programmes

#### Global analysis of the indicator

**Macro-Finance Assistance** – The Macro-Finance Assistance (MFA) is an emergency instrument, managed by the DG ECFIN. It was established in the late 90s. It is available to countries close to EU, i.e. IPA and ENI countries. MFA is a balance of payments support instrument, which complements and is conditional on the existence of an adjustment and reform programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It takes the form either of loans, for which the Commission borrows the necessary funds in capital markets and on-lends them to the beneficiary country, or, under certain circumstances, grants financed by the EU budget. MFA is conditional on the respect for human rights and effective democratic mechanisms by the beneficiary country. It is released in tranches strictly tied to the successful implementation of strong reform measures aimed at returning the beneficiary country’s economy to a long-term sustainable path. In this way, MFA complements regular EU cooperation assistance and contributes to the wider goal of preserving stability and promoting prosperity beyond the EU.<sup>55</sup>

An active and disbursing IMF programme is a precondition for granting MFA support and subsequent disbursement. MFA programmes are conceived as mutually reinforcing with IMF programmes).

**MFA recent record and prospects** – The total amount of outstanding MFA loans was

<sup>55</sup> EC 2016, The implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015, COM(2016)376 final, p.3

EUR 3 billion at year-end 2015. This sum is guaranteed by the EU budget via the Guarantee Fund for external actions<sup>56</sup>, which also covers external financing operations by the EIB and Euratom lending. The Guarantee Fund is provisioned from the EU budget at a rate of 9 % of the total outstanding liabilities at the end of each year, although with a two year lag. MFA loan disbursements are expected to reach close to EUR 1.7 billion in 2016, which would correspond to a provisioning of the Guarantee Fund of about EUR 149 million in 2018.<sup>57</sup>

As the geopolitical and economic instability of the region persists, the need for EU macro-financial support is likely to remain at exceptionally high levels for the years to come. This is evidenced by the two follow-up operations currently under preparation for Tunisia and Jordan, and the possibility of an additional large-scale operation in Ukraine. However, currently, the size of potential MFA operations in 2014-2020 is limited to about EUR 500 million per year due to the provisioning mechanism of the Guarantee Fund for External Actions under the current MFF.

The Commission proposes to increase the lending capacity of the MFA from current EUR 500 million to EUR 2 billion per year, by increasing the provisioning of the Guarantee Fund for External Actions by EUR 270 million over the financial years 2019 and 2020.<sup>58</sup>

**Coordination with ENI** – MFA loans are granted against conditions in structural PFM reforms. In Ukraine, conditions related to social safety nets, energy sector, business environment, PAR and governance.

ECFIN cooperates actively with DG NEAR when formulating and programming an operation, within the ISC (Inter Service Consultation) and through daily contacts. ENI strategy framework is taken into consideration, and to the extent allowed by the macroeconomic objectives, conditionalities are worked out to serve also key objectives of sector reform sought by ENI programmes and policy dialogue. In particular, alignment with budget support sector tranche indicators is looked for. Several among the 12 respondents to the ENI survey quoted MFA as a major instrument in EU external action toolbox, with a distinctive leverage potential.

### Presentation of collected proof

*“The European Commission is committed to actively supporting Ukraine in the challenging times it is going through. Since the outbreak of the crisis in early 2014, the European Commission has mobilised a total of EUR 3.4 billion in Macro-Financial Assistance through three consecutive programmes of low-interest loans. This represents the highest amount ever made available by the EU to a third partner in such a short time. Out of these EUR 3.4 billion, 2.2 billion were disbursed in 2014 and 2015. In 2014 and early 2015, a total of EUR 1.61 billion worth of loans was disbursed by the EU to Ukraine under two successive Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) operations. A first MFA package of EUR 610 million, based on decisions from 2002 (EUR 110 million) and 2010 (EUR 500 million), was provided to Ukraine to help support economic reforms in the country and address persistent external financing difficulties. The first tranche of EUR 100 million was disbursed in May 2014, followed by a second disbursement of EUR 260 million in November 2014 and a last disbursement of EUR 250 million in April 2015. MFA I (disbursed in 2014-15) In light of political developments in early 2014 and of the acute balance-of-payments crisis experienced by Ukraine, the Commission proposed on 19 March 2014 a second MFA operation of up to EUR 1 billion. This proposal was accompanied by a detailed evaluation of the economic challenges facing Ukraine and of the objectives pursued through the MFA operation. It was endorsed through a decision adopted by the Council on 14 April 2014. The two tranches of EUR 500 million each were disbursed in June and December 2014. Key documents relating to MFA II (disbursed in 2014): However, faced with a deep economic recession and a severe confidence crisis due to the protracted armed conflict in the Eastern part of the country, Ukraine requested additional financial assistance from the EU and other international partners in late 2014. On 8 January 2015, the Commission issued a proposal for a third MFA programme for Ukraine of up to EUR 1.8 billion, in order to alleviate the country's large external financing needs and to support the ambitious reform programme of the authorities. The European Parliament and the Council officially adopted the Decision*

<sup>56</sup> For more information, see the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guarantees covered by the general budget.

<sup>57</sup> EC 2016, The implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2015, COM(2016)376 final, p.12

<sup>58</sup> EC 2016, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020; An EU budget focused on results (COM(2016) 603 final), SWD(2016) 299 final, p.18

on the third MFA programme for Ukraine on 15 April 2015. On 22 May 2015, Ukraine and the EU jointly signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining the policy programme attached to the MFA operation. This programme largely builds on the reform agenda pursued by the Ukrainian authorities and covers a broad range of areas, including public finance management, governance and transparency, the energy sector, social safety nets, business environment and the financial sector. The Memorandum of Understanding and Loan Facility Agreement related to MFA III were ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament on 18 June 2015. On 22 July 2015, the European Commission disbursed the first tranche of EUR 600 million under the new macrofinancial assistance programme.” [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/international/Neighbourhood\\_policy/ukraine\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/Neighbourhood_policy/ukraine_en.htm)

“Since the beginning of 2011, Jordan has been severely affected by regional economic shocks, notably the conflict in Syria, which resulted in an influx of refugees, and also repeated disruptions to natural gas imports from Egypt. Combined with the hike of the international energy prices in 2013-2014, these factors strained public finances and external accounts and gave rise to significant financing needs. Following Jordan’s request for Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) in December 2012, the European Commission, on 29 April 2013, proposed up to EUR 180 million in medium-term MFA loans for Jordan. An ex-ante evaluation of the MFA programme was also conducted in 2013. The European Parliament and the Council formally approved the programme on 11 December 2013. The negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) listing the economic policy measures to be undertaken by the Jordanian authorities and the Loan Facility Agreement (LFA) related to this MFA operation were concluded in early 2014, and the two documents were signed on 18 March 2014. The assistance supported reforms in the areas of public finance management and taxation; social safety nets and labour markets; investment frameworks and trade; and the energy sector. The first tranche of EUR 100 million was disbursed on 10 February 2015 while the second tranche of EUR 80 was disbursed on 15 October 2015. The intensification of the regional conflicts in 2015 worsened further the economic situation in Jordan by affecting key sectors such as tourism and trade as well as investment inflows. At the same time, the inflow of Syrian refugees which continued in 2015 and 2016 created important financing needs while the balance of payments and fiscal position remained vulnerable. Following Jordan’s request in March 2016, the European Commission proposed on 29 June 2016 an additional Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA-II) to Jordan of up to EUR 200 million in medium-term loans.” [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/international/Neighbourhood\\_policy/jordan\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/Neighbourhood_policy/jordan_en.htm)

“Following an official request by Georgia in May 2010, the European Commission proposed on 13 January 2011 to provide Georgia with EUR 46 million in Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA), a form of financial aid for partner countries experiencing a balance of payments crisis. This proposal was accompanied by a detailed evaluation of Georgia’s needs. Formal approval of the European Commission’s proposal was delayed for more than two years by a procedural disagreement between the Council and European Parliament. A compromise agreement was reached in May 2013, and the decision to provide assistance was adopted on 12 August 2013. Yet, MFA funds could not be released because Georgia did not draw from a previous IMF programme, which is a pre-condition for the MFA assistance. When Georgia agreed on a new disbursing Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF in July 2014, the Commission re-started the negotiations on the MFA. The MFA-related documents, including the Memorandum of Understanding, which lays down a policy programme for the disbursement of the MFA funds, were signed, and where appropriate, ratified by the Georgian Parliament in December 2014.

The grant part of the first MFA tranche (EUR 13 million) was disbursed to Georgia in January 2015, while the loan part of the first tranche (EUR 10 million) was disbursed on 21 April 2015. The disbursement of the second MFA tranche (a total of EUR 23 million) was foreseen for summer 2015, but was delayed due to the postponement of the second review of the IMF programme. Based on the findings gathered during a review mission conducted in November 2015, the Commission concluded that Georgia fulfilled all MFA policy measures agreed with the EU and listed in the Memorandum of Understanding attached to this operation. Therefore, as soon as the IMF programme gets back on track (through the conclusion of the pending review or of a new disbursing programme), the EU will be able to disburse the second and last tranche of MFA assistance.” [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/international/Neighbourhood\\_policy/georgia\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/Neighbourhood_policy/georgia_en.htm)

“Macro-Financial Assistance. The Moldovan economy was severely affected by the international financial crisis in 2008-2009, which resulted in declining output, a deteriorating fiscal position and rising external financing needs. The EU therefore decided to provide Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA), a form of financial aid for partner countries experiencing a balance of payments crisis. On 20 October 2010, EU lawmakers approved a decisionpdf to provide up to EUR 90 million of grants to Moldova tied

to specific economic and financial reforms, as well as general conditions concerning the respect of human rights and democratic principles. The funds were disbursed in three tranches in December 2010, September 2011 and April 2012. The policy measures attached to each disbursement were jointly agreed by the EU and Moldova, and listed in a Memorandum of Understanding.pdf Choose translations of the previous link An ex-post evaluation was conducted in 2013 to assess the impact of this MFA operation.” [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/international/Neighbourhood\\_policy/moldova\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/Neighbourhood_policy/moldova_en.htm)

“Macro-Financial Assistance. The Armenian economy has been seriously hit by the international financial crisis. Since the second half of 2008, GDP growth has fallen significantly, from above 10% on average in the decade preceding 2008 to around 4% on average since 2010. Fiscal revenues decreased accordingly and external financing needs arose. The seriousness of the situation led the European Commission to propose in October 2009 to provide the country with Macro-Financial Assistance, a form of financial aid for partner countries experiencing a balance of payments crisis. On 30 November 2009, EU lawmakers approved a decision to provide up to EUR 35 million of grants and EUR 65 million of low-interest loans to Armenia, tied to specific economic and financial reforms, as well as general conditions concerning the respect of human rights and democratic principles. The funds were disbursed in two tranches in 2011. Besides being conditional on a satisfactory track record for implementing reforms agreed with the IMF under its programme with Armenia at the time, the disbursement of the second tranche of funds was also subject to the implementation of economic policy measures agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU. These focused on the following areas: debt management, the pension system, public internal financial control, external audit, procurement policy, tax administration, tax policy, and customs policy.” [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/international/Neighbourhood\\_policy/armenia\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/Neighbourhood_policy/armenia_en.htm)

“Macro-Financial Assistance – Following a request by the Egyptian authorities, the European Commission was considering a possible Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) programme to help Egypt meet the external financing needs that emerged in the wake of the country’s revolution in 2011. Preparations were discontinued, however, as negotiations between Egypt and the IMF on a programme were first delayed and then interrupted in late 2012. Since then, Egypt has not formally requested an IMF programme. As a result, and in light of the August 2013 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions (which call for EU assistance to be focused on socio-economic sectors and civil society), no MFA is currently being considered.” [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/international/Neighbourhood\\_policy/egypt\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/Neighbourhood_policy/egypt_en.htm)

“Macro-Financial Assistance – Following the International Conference for Support to Lebanon (“Paris III”) in 2007, the EU provided Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) to Lebanon comprising of EUR 50 million in loans and a grant of EUR 30 million. The primary objectives of the MFA operation in Lebanon were to (i) support Lebanon’s post-war reconstruction and sustainable economic recovery; (ii) help finance the government’s economic programme; and (iii) support Lebanon’s efforts to reduce public debt to a sustainable level. The MFA was divided into two tranches tied to successful implementation of an IMF programme and specific structural conditions. The MFA complemented support from international financial institutions, bilateral donors, and other EU assistance provided under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). As the conditions for the release of the first instalment were met, the first grant (EUR 15 million) and loan (EUR 25 million) tranches were disbursed in December 2008 and May 2009, respectively. Due to slow progress in implementing structural reforms and following the expiration of the IMF arrangement in June 2009, the second tranche was cancelled. An evaluation of the MFA programme is available.” [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/international/Neighbourhood\\_policy/lebanon\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/Neighbourhood_policy/lebanon_en.htm)

“Macro-Financial Assistance – The EU’s macro-financial assistance (MFA) to Tunisia is part of a wider effort by the EU and other international donors to help Tunisia overcome the severe economic difficulties it has faced since its economic and political transition process began following the 2011 revolution. Terrorist attacks in 2015 worsened the situation further by affecting key economic sectors such as tourism and transport. Upon Tunisia’s request and following an ex-ante evaluation Choose translations of the previous link , the European Commission proposed in December 2013 up to EUR 250 million in macro-financial assistance (MFA) loans. Choose translations of the previous link ). The aim of the MFA loans was to help Tunisia cover its external financing needs in 2014 and 2015, as well as encourage reforms aimed at improving the investment climate and fostering trade and regulatory convergence with the EU, thereby supporting the ultimate objective of creating the conditions for sustainable and inclusive economic growth. The European Parliament and Council approved the MFA on 15

May 2014 and increased the amount to EUR 300 million (read the Decision here). The Loan Facility Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding. Choose translations of the previous link were signed between July and September 2014, and ratified by the Tunisian Parliament in March 2015. The Commission approved the disbursement of the first tranche (EUR 100 million in loans) on 14 April 2015, and the disbursement of the second tranche (EUR 100 million in loans) on 16 November 2015. The final tranche is expected to be disbursed in the second half of 2016, subject to the agreed conditions being met. During 2015, the Tunisian economy was strongly affected by the terrorist attacks and other security developments, which harmed its tourism inflows, investment and growth. In this context, and following a request by the Tunisian authorities and the evaluation of the country's external financing needs (see the ex-ante evaluation. Choose translations of the previous link), the Commission proposed additional macro-financial assistance. Choose translations of the previous link(MFA) to Tunisia in the amount of up to EUR 500 million in loans. The decision was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 6 July 2016. The MFA assistance is meant to complement a new comprehensive economic adjustment and reform programme between Tunisia and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as a follow up to the Stand-by Arrangement approved by the IMF in June 2013.



The new MFA programme is intended to help cover Tunisia's external financing needs in 2016 and 2017, while supporting reform measures aimed at achieving a more sustainable balance of payments and budgetary situation, improving the investment climate, and fostering economic integration and regulatory convergence with the EU. The ultimate aim is to help Tunisia lay the conditions for sustainable, inclusive and employment-generating economic growth.”  
[http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/international/Neighbourhood\\_policy/tunisia\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/Neighbourhood_policy/tunisia_en.htm)

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – NEAR, EEAS, ECFIN

### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Satisfactory
Degree of confidence		Satisfactory

#### 5.4.4 I-544. Evidences in agreements and programming documents of the coherence of ENI and EIB actions {Art. 5}

##### Global analysis of the indicator

**Programmatic complementarity** – Complementarity with EIB (and EBRD) was indicated as an important dimension of ENI programming instructions (2013): “*Innovative financing (blending): Co-ordination with EIB, EBRD and other financial institutions should be pursued where possible. In countries with conditions conducive to mobilizing private sector investments and loan financing, grants can be used in different ways and combinations (including for equity participation, direct investment grants, insurance premia, guarantee and risk sharing schemes) to leverage such investments. This will be done primarily through the financing of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). Delegations should consider how the NIF could be used to support or complement bilateral priorities.*”<sup>59</sup> The principle was acted in regional strategies: “*Regional cooperation, notably through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, has acted as a catalyst for the mobilisation of other financial resources (e.g. European Investment Banks – EIB). Finally, significant improvements have occurred in terms of foreign investment attraction, notably in the South, and expansion of trade with the EU.*”<sup>60</sup> Blending of EU funding with IFIs plays an increasing role, through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF).<sup>61</sup> An example of blending operation is the Gulf of El Zayt Wind Farm Project (see below).

**EIB projects** – The European Investment Bank EIB operates extensively in the ENI region, mainly in the sectors of private sector/business development, transport infrastructure and environment. Coordination with the EIB is mentioned in the ENI programming instructions mainly in reference to innovative financing (blending), especially through the NIF. Delegations are

<sup>59</sup> DEVCO 2013, Instructions for the Programming of the ENI - 2014-2020, p.8

<sup>60</sup> 2014 ENI South RSP & MIP 2014-2017, p. 7-8

<sup>61</sup> 2015 Joint communication on 2014 progress reports, p. 13

prompted to identify ways and sectors where the NIF (and as such subsequently the EIB) could be used to support or complement bilateral priorities during their programming. This is taken up in the individual programming documents (SSFs, APs), where reference is made to the need to seek complementarities and synergies with EIB actions.

On EIB side, complementarity with ENI programmes are guiding actions: *“The Bank’s activities in the region aim at supporting the goals set up by the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy. This is done by financing projects that promote prosperity and increased regional integration, which contributes to the stability of these regions and helps forging stronger intraregional partnerships. The Bank’s activities in the region promote growth and employment, intraregional trade, and help to protect our common environment and to mitigate climate change by supporting low carbon and climate resilient growth.”*<sup>62</sup>

In many cases, these EIB actions are explicitly mentioned especially in the East (e.g. Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), whereas in the South reference is made in a more general manner to the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), a major support fund managed by the EIB. Maintaining close contacts with the EIB (and other donors) is identified as an important measure to ensure complementarity in most programming documents.

**Coordination-complementarity** – In a lot of cases, complementarity between bilateral programmes and EIB actions appears to be ensured chiefly by their different orientation. The Bank’s activities mainly focus on large-scale infrastructure projects, e.g. the modernisation of railways in Moldova or the support to the reconstruction and upgrading of highways in Georgia, or other financially demanding projects (e.g. related to energy efficiency and climate change) which contribute to the overall stability and prosperity of the region. The NIF, which allows leveraging even larger funds, is a useful tool often utilised by EIB to that regard. Bilateral programmes on the other hand focus rather on supporting the partner government’s agenda or on increasing the capacity of stakeholders in a particular sector.

The EIB is also coordinating policy dialogue with EUDs; in principle, EIB/EUD are asked to share their premises to facilitate the coordination. Joint seminars can be organized to facilitate joint undertaking (Georgia). EIB have a distinctive contribution to EU visibility by financing infrastructure projects, and share the same guidelines than the EC.

The same coordination mechanisms apply to EBRD.

### Presentation of collected proof

*“The EU also provided substantial resources via the international financial institutions, in particular the EIB and EBRD, notably to small and medium-sized enterprises.”* EC 2014, JOIN(2014)12 final, Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, p.12

*“The Gulf of El Zayt Wind Farm Project – his project is a 'blending operation', combining EU grant funding with local funds and loans provided by European Financing Institutions (KfW and EIB). The total budget of the project amounts to €340 million, including an EU grant contribution of €30 million and loans of €191 million and €50 million from KfW and EIB respectively.*

*The EU grant, managed by DG NEAR, acted as a catalyst to attract funding from European finance institutions, enabling bringing generation cost of wind energy down in order to compete with thermal generation energy. Moreover, the grant helped the realisation of a project that show case efficient large scale renewable energy generation and contributes to Egypt’s goal to cover 20% of the electricity produced from green energy sources by 2020 according to the Government’s agenda.*

*The project has a total installed capacity of 200 MW with 100 turbines of two MW capacities each, making it the largest windfarm on the African continent. The project generates up to 800 GW per year, which is sufficient to supply approx. 500,000 people with electricity and contributes to preventing about 400,000 tons of Carbon Dioxide CO2 emissions per year. The project increases the overall installed capacity from wind energy sources in Egypt by 36%.”* 2015 DG NEAR Annual Activity Report, p. 15

*“Annual Action Programme 2015 for Egypt – The overlap of NIF related actions in the programme and in the NIF initiatives is avoided by the difference of focus between the programme and the NIF initia-*

<sup>62</sup> <http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/eastern-neighbours/index.htm>

tives. Indeed whilst this programme focuses on SMEs' better internal management, the NIF initiatives focus on having credit lines available to SMEs." 8th ENI Draft minutes, p. 4

"The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is the main vehicle for supporting EU political priorities in the Neighbourhood. The ENI has a budget of EUR 15.4 billion for 2014-20. The ENI provides a predictable, long-term envelope to support the reform priorities agreed in each country. Countries where substantial democratic reforms are being introduced may also receive additional funding under an umbrella programme worth up to 10 % of the value of the ENI. Substantial support for regional and cross-border initiatives is also provided through the ENI." 2015 Joint communication on 2014 progress reports, p. 13

"The NIF supports projects in the areas of energy and transport interconnections, climate change and environment and for SMEs. A DCFTA Facility has been prepared in order to support the adaptation and reorientation of businesses, so as to increase the access to benefits foreseen by the agreements. With this facility, the EU aims to mobilise EUR 150 million of grants from 2015 to 2017 through the NIF to leverage up to EUR 1.5 billion of investment from IFIs in the three countries, i.e. Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine." 2015 Joint communication on 2014 reports, p. 14

"Increased financial support: EU financial assistance for Armenia will be available to support the actions identified in the present document. The Commission is furthermore proposing a new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose, which will cover the main part of EU financial assistance and will include aspects of cross-border and trans-national cooperation. The Commission will also propose an extension of the EIB mandate to Armenia as of 2007;" AP – Armenia, p. 3

"The European Bank for reconstruction and Development (EBRD) finances private sector operations (with privately-owned enterprises and commercial banks), whilst other International Financial Institutions (KfW, World Bank, International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank and Eurasian Development Bank) have multi-year programmes with the central government, municipalities and state institutions. EBRD implements about 20 investment operations per year in Armenia. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is providing financial support mainly through loans to modernise infrastructure (road construction, border crossings, water supply and sewage). In terms of support to regional specialisation and competitiveness, GIZ is working with the wine and brandy production sector, USAID provides support to tourism, fruit and vegetable processing, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and ICT, and the World Bank is planning to support rural development." 2014 Armenia SSF 2014-2017, p. 8

"Leading international financial institutions have limited mandates in Belarus due to poor human rights record and inconsistent economic policies. The main precondition for the intensification of the cooperation with the authorities is a clear commitment to stability and reform, as well as proved respect of human rights. The EIB has no mandate in Belarus, the EBRD engagement with Belarus is constrained but prioritises projects which support ordinary Belarusian people, promote private sector development, and strengthen environmental standards. The World Bank and the IMF also have limited mandates for Belarus." 2014 Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 13

"Complementarities and coherence will be sought with all other EU instruments, in particular with the thematic and regional programmes such as research and innovation, energy, transport, education, youth, culture and media (in particular Erasmus+ Plus and Creative Europe), facilities, loan operations of the European Investment Bank (EIB) as well as with interventions funded by other development partners, in particular with EU Member States. The EU will work with the Egyptian authorities to ensure ownership and reinforce donor coordination." 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 7-8

"In this context, complementarity and coordination should be ensured with the EU regional Initiative Horizon 2020 to de-pollute the Mediterranean Sea, in particular the Pollution Reduction component, and its EIB investment facility MeHSIP II (Mediterranean Hotspot Investment Programme), and its Capacity Building component. Complementarity and coordination should also be ensured with the EU-funded SWIM (Sustainable Water Integrated Management) and the SWITCH programmes (promoting the transition towards more sustainable production and consumption patterns)." 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 10

*“Main donor coordination in the wastewater sector is as well done through the DPG, with a specific sub-DPG on Water, in which wastewater is included. The sub-DPG is co-chaired by the EU Delegation and KfW. In addition close contacts are in place with key donors active in the water sector namely KfW, AFD, EIB, the WB and Swiss Development Cooperation. Policy dialogue with the two water-related ministries namely Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and Ministry of Water and Wastewater Utilities together with the Ministry of Finance has been on-going since 2005 and continues through the on-going EU Water Sector Reform Programme.”* 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 16

*“The Sub – DPG on Energy and Environment is co-chaired by KfW and AFD. An important and active policy dialogue is generated in the framework of this sub DPG with the Ministries of Electricity and Energy, Petroleum and Environment. The EU is already co-funding a number of projects in the field of energy and renewables with KfW, AFD and EIB such as the Gabal El Zeit Wind Farm Projects, which creates de facto close ties and exchanges between the different European donors.”* 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 16

*“Jordan's development strategy is based on the National Agenda 2006-2015, which remains the framework for further progress in poverty reduction, sustainable growth, social inclusion and democratic governance, although the economic and in particular energy crisis is affecting the government's capacity to plan and prioritise over the longer term. Jordan depends on its international partners to achieve its development goals in particular EU, US, Japan, Germany, WB and the Gulf countries as well as new players such as EBRD and EIB. In tune with popular expectations towards further steps to consolidate democratic practices, the international donor community is supportive of the Jordanian efforts to keep the pace of domestic reforms on the political, economic and social fronts. It is also conscious of the high risk associated to the overspill of neighbouring crisis that may affect the course of reforms in the country and the achievement of Millennium Developments Goals (MDGs).”* 2014 Jordan SSF 2014-2017, p. 3

*“Complementarities and coherence will be sought with all other EU instruments, in particular with the Instrument for Stability (IfS), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and other thematic programmes under Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), humanitarian aid, regional programmes and facilities and loan operations of the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EU will work with the Lebanese authorities to ensure ownership and reinforce donor coordination, taking into account also the national and international response to the Syrian refugee crisis.”* 2014 Lebanon SSF 2014-2016, p. 6

*“The actions planned in the above-mentioned three priority sectors are complementary with the priority areas of intervention for regional co-operation, notably energy, transport, environment, water and waste management. These correspond with the priorities and actions planned within the Policy Framework for Regional Cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the objectives of the Neighbourhood Investment Fund (NIF), and synergise with on-going or planned loan and grant support provided by the EIB, EBRD, the World Bank and the Millennium Challenge Account in particular.”* 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017, p. 6

*“In order to increase concentration and coherence, seven EU Member States (CZ, ET, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK) have been combining resources to assist Moldova in areas related to regional development (institutional capacity development, regional civil society development, improving regional statistics) since 2012. The World Bank, EIB, EBRD, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Romanian Government are providing a range of loans and grants to upgrade the social and technical infrastructure in the rural areas.”* 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017, p. 10

*“The MeHSIP-PPIF (EUR 7.2 million, 2010-2014) was led by the EIB, financed by the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) (Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership – FEMIP – support fund), with the prime aim to develop bankable projects. Four priority investment projects have been fully prepared and a project pipeline established and maintained. In addition, MeHSIPPPIF screened the status of about 50 investment projects with secured funding and drew useful lessons on challenges hindering the effectiveness of investment projects, pointing in particular to the importance of a solid preparation phase.”* Action Document for Strengthening democratic reforms in the Southern Mediterranean (South Programme II), p. 10



*“EU Eastern neighbours – The current EUR 4.8bn mandate runs from 2014 to 2020 and covers Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. How do we help? local private sector development, in particular support to SMEs, development of social and economic infrastructure, and climate change mitigation and adaptation. In 2014 the EIB also set up a Neighbourhood Finance Facility (NFF), a EUR 3bn facility under which financing will be extended at the EIB's own risk (i.e. without EU guarantee) in the Eastern Neighbourhood region, including Russia, and the Southern Neighbourhood (FEMIP) region. The facility enables the Bank to support EU Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as well as infrastructure projects such as transport, telecommunications and energy in the region.”*  
<http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/eastern-neighbours/index.htm>

*“The European Investment Bank (EIB) is providing two loans in Moldova:*

*EUR 75 million to finance the increase of the quality (not the capacity) of the Moldovan wine industry and EUR 75 million to support the rehabilitation and upgrade of priority roads in Moldova* Eva Srejber, EIB Vice-President responsible for financing operations in the Eastern Neighbour countries including Moldova, who signed the loan contract with Mr. Vladimir Filat, commented: *“EIB funds will help to increase the competitiveness of Moldova in several ways: through improving the performance and export possibilities of the key sector of the Moldova's economy, the wine industry, and the rehabilitation, capacity and safety increase of the key roads in the country.”*

*The first loan will address the structural weaknesses of the Moldovan wine industry, from vineyard to final packaging and dispatch of wine. This loan will finance projects of small and medium sized enterprises that are active in this sector, including local growers, winemakers and associated industries such as bottle production. The EIB funds will be exclusively available for investments related to the production of bottled quality wines of "Protected Designation of Origin" or "Protected Geographical Indication and will not to be used for any expansion of the Moldova's wine growing area. This project will be implemented between the beginning of 2011 and the end of 2014.*

*The other loan is focused on the rehabilitation and upgrade of road sections between Chisinau – Orhei – Sarateni – Balti, the Chisinau – Calarasi – Ungheni – Sculeni and the Comrat – Ciunai. These road sections represent the Moldova's Government's priorities for the road sector. This project is co-financed with a loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and grants from the European Commission through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and it will be implemented from 2011 to 2013.*

*Background:*

*The EIB started to finance projects in Moldova in 2007, after getting the EU political go ahead at the end of October 2006. Including the current loans, the Bank's commitments in Moldova total EUR 215 million so far, following the four previous EIB loans in this country for the rehabilitation of roads linking Chisinau with the Romanian border (EUR 30 million), the rehabilitation and capacity increase of Chisinau airport (EUR 20 million), the rehabilitation and extension of water supply and sanitation systems (EUR 10 million) and EUR 5 million to improve public transport in Moldova's Capital Chisinau.*

*Under the current mandate, the EIB can lend up to EUR 3.7 billion to projects in Russia, Eastern European and Southern Caucasus countries within the period 2007 – 2013. In this context, the EIB is prepared to consider support to sound projects in the areas of transport, energy, telecommunications and environmental infrastructure, as well as for lending via banks to SMEs.*

*To complement the mandate, EIB has set up the Eastern Partners Facility (EPF) at its own risk for an amount of EUR 1.5 billion, with EUR 500 million ceiling for projects in Russia. This facility enables the Bank to support investment grade projects, notably EU Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the region.”*  
<http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/releases/all/2010/2010-206-eib-supports-with-eur-150-million-wine-industry-and-road-infrastructure-in-moldova.htm>

*“EU Eastern neighbours. Since the first EIB loan signed in 2003 and until the end-December 2014, the EIB has signed 77 operations totalling EUR 6,039 million in the region for major investment projects (including 18 operations for EUR 1,175 m in 2014).”* <http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/eastern-neighbours/index.htm>

*“Strengthen efforts and co-operation in the fight against money laundering*

*Strengthen co-operation between the Central Bank, financial institutions, international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, the IFC and the EBRD, and law enforcement agencies in order to make the financial institutions and other relevant entities, including casinos, aware of the obligations*

*and responsibilities arising from the new legislation on money-laundering, in particular by paying attention to know your customer (KYC) principles;” AP – Armenia, p. 29*

*“Increased financial support: EU financial assistance for Azerbaijan will be available to support the actions identified in the present document. The Commission is furthermore proposing a new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose, which will cover the main part of EU financial assistance and will include aspects of cross-border and transnational cooperation. The Commission also intends to propose an extension of the EIB mandate to Azerbaijan as of 2007;” AP – Azerbaijan, p. 2*

*“Strengthen co-operation between the Central Bank, financial institutions, International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank, the IFC and the EBRD, and law enforcement agencies;” AP – Azerbaijan, p. 17*

*“Increased financial support: EU financial assistance for Georgia will be available to support the actions identified in the present document. The Commission is furthermore proposing a new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose which will cover the main part of EU financial assistance and will include aspects of cross-border and transnational cooperation. The Commission also intends to propose an extension of the EIB mandate to Georgia as of 2007;” AP – Georgia, p. 3*

*“Strengthen co-operation between the Financial Monitoring Service of Georgia, the Central Bank, financial institutions, international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, the IFC and the EBRD, and law enforcement agencies;” AP – Georgia, p. 21*

*“• Increased financial support: EU financial assistance for Lebanon will be better targeted to support the actions identified in the present document, mainly to support the political and economic reform agenda of the Lebanese Government. The Commission has furthermore proposed a new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose, also covering the very important aspect of cross-border cooperation. The EIB will also help support infrastructure investment and private sector development and partnership through the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). Possibilities of gradual opening of or reinforced participation in relevant Community programmes, promoting i.a. cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links.” AP – Lebanon, p. 2*

*“(21) Implementation of privatisation programme, covering in particular outstanding large-scale privatisation as a priority and the energy sector.*

*– Continue to improve the interface between Public and Private sector in line with WB recommendation”AP – Moldova, p. 15*

*“– Address issues of infrastructure financing (e.g. Public/Private Partnerships, tolls, shadow-tolling, user charges etc.) Possibly, EIB mandate extension.” AP – Moldova, p. 35*

## Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – EIB, EBRD during field mission (Georgia)

## Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 5.5 JC55: ENI programmes complement and stimulate synergies with interventions of EU MS and other donors

### 5.5.1 I-551. Evidence (nature and scope) of coordination with EU MS and donors at HQ and country levels during the different phases of the support cycle. Indicatively:

- Degree of regularity and timeliness of consultations
- Frequency of exchanges of information

o Degree of relevance and quality of the information shared (both ways)

### Global analysis of the indicator

The EU member states are very active in supporting the implementation of the policy objective of the EU in the ENI region; they provide funds (as per their financial capabilities and their foreign affairs focus) but also political and “technical” support to the competent EU Services DG NEAR, EEAS and EUDs.

The EU MS are participating in the relevant phases of the implementation of the ENI both at the level of EC and EEAS headquarters (policy making and programming of the ENI actions/programmes in the sub-regions) and at the level of the countries, in cooperation with the EUDs, in the frame of the existing political and economic fora/ cooperation platforms.

At the level of the HQ they participate with their Ambassadors (EEAS) and their representatives (in the ENI Committee, DG NEAR); at the regional/ country level they participate with many officials: Ministers (e.g. in the Ministerial committee of UfM) or representatives (high level Ministerial officers, members of their Embassies in the partner countries); many EU member states have special Agencies attached to their State which are used to promote specific development aspects of their external policy as well as for the management of the funds they may make available through bilateral/ multilateral cooperation (such as: GIZ, SIDA, DFID, ADA, et al); a number of them are quite active in the region (Germany, Sweden, Italy, UK, France).

The exchanges between DG NEAR/ EEAS and EU MS are both organised (at least every six months there is a contact at the political level) and ad hoc (whenever required); the ENI Committee meets rather frequently (around 6 times a year); in the partner countries they meet with the EUD quite often (at least on a fortnightly basis).

The extended cooperation of the EU MS with the EC/EEAS has been decided and ratified at both levels of the European Parliament and the Council. With their participation in the strategic programming process, the EU MS are both offering their cooperation and financial services to the ENI but at the same time they exert their mandate for political and technical control of the EC and EEAS based on their acquired relevant knowledge. Although the EU MS and the EC/EEAS are all part of EU as a bigger actor, they have frequently been found to act incoherently for many reasons; the principal one being that in many countries (usually in those which have weak a government and public administration) the coordination between donors is limited. This results in a “competition” among them, especially on the financing of subjects that are relevant for their own strategic goals (e.g. Ukraine).

### Presentation of collected proof

*“The choice of sectors has also been informed by the EU’s international commitment to the principles on aid effectiveness set out in the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda (2008), the Busan Outcome Declaration(2011) and by its own Development Policy (EU Agenda for Change). Although the EU is by far the largest donor, the choice of priority sectors has also been guided by a desire to complement and reinforce the interventions financed by other donors.”* 2014 Armenia SSF 2014-2017, p. 4

*“The European Bank for reconstruction and Development (EBRD) finances private sector operations (with privately-owned enterprises and commercial banks), whilst other International Financial Institutions (KfW, World Bank, International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank and Eurasian Development Bank) have multi-year programmes with the central government, municipalities and state institutions. EBRD implements about 20 investment operations per year in Armenia. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is providing financial support mainly through loans to modernise infrastructure (road construction, border crossings, water supply and sewage). In terms of support to regional specialisation and competitiveness, GIZ is working with the wine and brandy production sector, USAID provides support to tourism, fruit and vegetable processing, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and ICT, and the World Bank is planning to support rural development.”* 2014 Armenia SSF 2014-2017, p. 8

### “3.2 Public Administration Reform

#### 3.2.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue

*The EU has been supporting public administration reform in Armenia through various tools such as capacity building activities (e.g. SIGMA, Twinnings, TAIEX) and through budget support (on PFM, civil*

service reform, anticorruption). In addition to the EU, the most active donors involved in improvement of public administration and PFM include the World Bank (PFM, civil service reform, revenue) and GIZ (PFM, revenue, external audit). EBRD has been leading in supporting reforms in the procurement area. USAID and the Council of Europe are involved in decentralisation operations, while the WB, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) support the improvement of service delivery at municipal level with the introduction of integrated social services and territorial social plans. The WB, UNDP and USAID are also involved in e-governance projects. UNDP and UNICEF support the promotion and institutionalization of administrative registers at local and regional levels through community database initiatives.

Donor coordination and dialogue in this sector takes place regularly. For policy dialogue, broad involvement of the government, CSO's, parliament, donors, member states and local authorities is essential. CSO's and parliament should also play a crucial role in devising and monitoring the implementation of the reform agenda. Specific funds will be set aside to strengthen their capacity." 2014 Armenia SSF 2014-2017, p. 10

#### "Justice sector reform

##### 3.3.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue

Support by other donors in the justice area is mainly targeted at institutional and technical capacity building. A WB project has provided extensive aid in judicial reform, support to renovation of court-houses, consultancy on judicial governance (including information technologies management systems), legal information, raising public awareness of reforms, and alternative dispute resolution. GIZ is providing assistance in the field of administrative justice, penitentiary reforms and criminal justice, civil law and civil procedure law and a functional judiciary. The German Foundation for International Legal Cooperation is focused on notary law, penitentiary law and training of judiciary personnel. The Council of Europe (CoE) is fostering human rights by supporting penitentiary reforms. OSCE has supported court monitoring in criminal justice, and capacity building of judges, prosecutors, and advocates. USAID focuses on issues of judicial independence with on-going projects with the Association of Judges, as well as on supporting the Chamber of Advocates. UNICEF supports reforms in the juvenile justice system in Armenia. Donor coordination is set to be realised by permanent coordination, led by the Ministry of Justice and with the participation of main national stakeholders, as proposed in the Justice Strategy for 2012-2016." 2014 Armenia SSF 2014-2017, p. 12

#### "3.1 Regional and Rural Development

##### 3.1.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:

In the field of rural and regional development, the most active donors are: the EU which is funding a dedicated sector budget support programme in agriculture and one on regional development; USAID with the ACT (Agriculture Competitiveness and Trade) Project and the Socio-Economic Development Activity (SEDA) project; the World Bank with the ACDP Programme (Agriculture Development and Credit Programme) and the Rural Infrastructure Programme (AzRIP); The German cooperation, through GIZ is also involved in regional development mainly in the area of local-self-governance reform, capacity building of local authorities and participatory land-use planning as well as in private sector development in the non-oil sector covering the agro-food processing industry and related services. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is working on a new agricultural finance facility. Switzerland's development cooperation focuses on enhancing economic development through strengthening the framework conditions for entrepreneurs, supporting the creation of sustainable business partnerships in selected agricultural value chains, promoting rural finance instruments and developing opportunities for enhanced vocational skills for farmers." 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 10

#### "3.2 Justice Sector reform

##### 3.2.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:

The most active donors in the justice sector, besides the EU are the World Bank, the German cooperation through GIZ, OSCE, and the Council of Europe, with each focusing on a different subsector. Specifically, the OSCE and the Council of Europe focus on trial and penitentiary monitoring, offering various practical training activities for specific target groups, such as judges, bailiffs or penitentiary staff. GIZ's activities have focussed on development of the administrative court system in Azerbaijan. World Bank activities have focussed on loans for construction of modern court facilities in the regions and limited capacity building for judges and further work is planned for 2014 onwards. Policy dialogue by all donors is limited, although recent progress in the framework of the EU funded Justice Reform Support Programme Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) and development of IRP2 under the

*CIB provides positive starting points, which are expected to be expanded further.*” 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 12-13

### “3.3 Education and skills development

#### 3.3.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:

*The main donors involved in the Education sectors are the World Bank, UNICEF, German cooperation, and the Council of Europe. In particular, since 2009 the World Bank has been supporting the "Education Sector Development Project" with the aim of improving the quality and learning results, mainly in secondary education. The project aimed to re-train of teachers, develop curricula and improve schools governance and infrastructure. UNICEF is providing policy advice for the set-up of a modern pre-school system. The German cooperation implemented by GIZ focusses on vocational qualification as well as on the development of the VET system through leadership training and policy advice.*” 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 15

### “3.1 Social Inclusion (indicative 30%)

#### 3.1.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:

*Social inclusion features prominently in the agenda of international donors, including development agencies of EU Member States and UN family. This creates opportunities for additional synergies and complementarity. In particular, further harmonisation can be pursued in agreeing on common conceptual approaches and indicators of achievement to bring about a more significant impact. Donor coordination meetings focusing on social inclusion organised in Belarus will be one of the main venues for these efforts.*” 2014 Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 19

### “3.2 Environment (indicative 25%)

#### 3.2.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue

*Belarus on a regular basis co-operates with different international organisations on environmental issues with the EU, United Nations Development Program, World Bank, SIDA etc. There is regular dialogue and cooperation between major donors, as well as between donors and the Ministry of Nature. There is also a bilateral Commission-Belarus environmental dialogue.*” 2014 Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 21

### “3.3 Local / Regional economic development (indicative 25%)

#### 3.3.3. Donor co-ordination and policy dialogue are:

*WB, IMF, EBRD are strongly involved in providing technical assistance on structural and market reforms to the Government of Belarus. Donor coordination is ensured by permanent working cooperation on the level of country offices as well and through dedicated coordination sessions locally and on the HQ level. WB is mainly involved in providing assistance in the area of privatisation, financial sector reform and public finance. IMF is oriented on the improvement of the overall macro-economic framework. EBRD is focused on supporting private sector development. There is also a bilateral Commission-Belarus economic dialogue on the economic and financial issues with all the relevant authorities: Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance and the National Bank.*” 2014 Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 22

### “3.1 Poverty Alleviation, Local Socio-Economic Development and Social Protection

#### 3.1.4 Donor coordination and policy dialogue

*In Egypt the donor community has not yet established a coordination mechanism in the social protection or local socio-economic development field. For this sector, areas of work are broad and touch upon many developmental issues tackled by many other coordination mechanisms in sectors such as education, health, employment, rural development. In the field of social protection and safety nets, a number of donors and agencies such as the World Bank, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) or the EU have been active and are implementing activities. The EU sees potential scope to build upon existing coordination platforms and/or to initiate new platforms for cross-sectorial donor discussions on a topical basis. These fora could be set up on a needs basis to respond to new emerging issues and/or to facilitate follow-up throughout the programme management cycle. For these activities there has been a close coordination of donors during formulation stages of programmes (shared meetings, shared formulation reports and documents).*” 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 11

### “3.2 Governance, Transparency and Business Environment

### 3.2.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue

The main donor coordination in the governance sector is done through the Development Partners Group (DPG), with specific sub-groups on Democratic Governance and fight against corruption. Both sub-groups are co-chaired by the EU Delegation (EUD) with others partners and have significant participation. In addition close contacts are in place with UN specialised agencies on women and child rights (United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP)) and fight against corruption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)). Important links have been established with WB with regard to legislative reforms and monitoring the constitutional framework. A close policy dialogue is ongoing with relevant line Ministries as well as NCCM, NCW and NCHR in light of their role as agents of democratic change. The EU has also established close links to Member States development agencies active in the field of service delivery to the most vulnerable. As regards the dialogue on business environment, the EU Delegation jointly with EU MS Embassies and Agencies is in regular dialogue with relevant government authorities, local think tanks and business associations on issues relevant to business and investment climate. Donor co-ordination in this field is led by the DPG sub-group on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises development, chaired by the German Embassy and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The EUD is an active member of the group.” 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 14

### “3.3 Improved quality of life and the environment

#### 3.3.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:

Main donor coordination in the SWM sector is done through the Development Partners Group (DPG), with a specific sub group on environment and energy. Close links are maintained with KfW, GIZ with a view to launch a joint support to National SWM Programme (NSWMP). The NSWMP, in its function to catalyse necessary policy, legal and institutional reform is important to establishing the framework for future coordinated interventions of different development partners. Policy dialogue is conducted regularly with the Minister for State of Environment and Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency.

In April 2013, a decree was issued to establish an Integrated Solid Waste Management Sector (ISWMS) under the authority of the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA). The ISWMS will constitute the nucleus of a future General Executive Agency for Integrated Solid Waste Management (ESWA). Once established, ESWA will take over the role of the national centre for solid waste management in Egypt from ISWMS.

Main donor coordination in the wastewater sector is as well done through the DPG, with a specific sub-DPG on Water, in which wastewater is included. The sub-DPG is co-chaired by the EU Delegation and KfW. In addition close contacts are in place with key donors active in the water sector namely KfW, AFD, EIB, the WB and Swiss Development Cooperation. Policy dialogue with the two water-related ministries namely Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and Ministry of Water and Wastewater Utilities together with the Ministry of Finance has been on-going since 2005 and continues through the on-going EU Water Sector Reform Programme.

The Sub – DPG on Energy and Environment is co-chaired by KfW and AFD. An important and active policy dialogue is generated in the framework of this sub DPG with the Ministries of Electricity and Energy, Petroleum and Environment. The EU is already co-funding a number of projects in the field of energy and renewables with KfW, AFD and EIB such as the Gabal El Zeit Wind Farm Projects, which creates de facto close ties and exchanges between the different European donors.” 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 16

### “Choice of sectors of intervention

Following comprehensive EU consultation with the Government, Civil Society Organisations, multilateral and bilateral donors, International Financial Institutions and International Organisations, a consensus has been reached regarding three priority sectors of intervention to be financed through the national envelope:

Public Administration Reform; Agriculture and Rural Development; Justice Sector Reform” 2014 Georgia SSF 2014-2017, p. 5

### “3.1. Public Administration Reform

#### Donor coordination and policy dialogue:

There are as yet no formal mechanisms to coordinate donor support to public administration reform, although it is understood that the Government has asked the Ministry of Justice to assume the lead role in the public administration reform process. In 2009 and 2010, coordination bodies were established in the Ministry of Finance and Parliament respectively to coordinate public finance management

reforms. The EU Delegation, together with the World Bank, Sweden and the Netherlands, are active in the Sector. The existing and planned Public Finance Management Sector Policy Support Programmes have helped to establish a platform for policy dialogue. The Government has shown interest in the elaboration of a national public administration reform strategy and a public investment programme.” 2014 Georgia SSF 2014-2017, p. 11

### “3.2. Agriculture and Rural development

#### Donor coordination and policy dialogue:

Donor coordination in the agriculture and rural development sectors has been based upon a regional perspective, with one donor/bank taking the lead in a particular part of the country, (e.g. the World Bank in Kakheti, the EU in Imereti). All major donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (EBRD, WB, KfW, GiZ, Sweden, USAID and the EU) actively collaborate to ensure a regular exchange of information and operational complementarity. For example, NIF supported projects in agriculture are coordinated with the EBRD and KfW and will reinforce the impact of the planned ENPARD-SPSP (2013-2015); donors are focusing on specific territorial units (e.g. GiZ and USAID work mainly with municipalities) or sectors (e.g. capacity building for UNDP, policy framework for the EU). Working Groups have been established in the agriculture and rural development sectors comprising Georgian authorities, bilateral and multilateral donors and IFIs, and Civil Society Organisations. The Working Groups meet regularly, use dedicated websites to support their activities, and provide platforms for policy dialogue. An ENPARD Steering Committee will be established in the context of the Agriculture and Rural Development SPSP, which will provide a further opportunity for policy dialogue.” 2014 Georgia SSF 2014-2017, p. 13

### “3.3. Justice Sector Reform

Donor coordination and policy dialogue: Sector coordination is ensured by the Criminal Justice Inter-Agency Coordinating Council (ICC) and its active Secretariat, which has contributed to the advancement of reforms and coordination of 11 working groups. Donor coordination was enhanced with the signature of the Justice Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Accordingly, since 2009 the Government has hosted at least annual coordination meetings with all donors and civil society to report on progress and plan actions for the subsequent year. In addition, an Anti-Ill-treatment Council and an Anti-Corruption Council (hosted in the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) as well as a separate Advisory Board on Penitentiary Health Care are in place. An EU-Georgia policy dialogue with the Government and Civil Society Organisations on justice issues takes place primarily around the current Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP). The EU-Georgia Human Rights Dialogue was established in 2009 and provides a regular channel of dialogue on human rights and democracy issues.” 2014 Georgia SSF 2014-2017, p. 15

### “3.1. Reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery

#### 3.1.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:

Donor coordination is set under the auspices of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC); closer harmonisation of donors' approaches is being sought, with a view to streamlining policy dialogue and making it more effective in addressing policy implementation challenges. Policy dialogue in these areas is smooth. Another risk may be the limited capacity of Parliament to enact needed legislation accepted and perceived by the public as legitimate. government stability is paramount to the implementation of wide ranging

reforms.” 2014 Jordan SSF 2014-2017, p. 10

### “3.2 Employment and private sector development policies

#### 3.2.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:

Sub sector coordination on employment, vocational training, SME support exists but is part of the push towards more streamlined assistance under MOPIC's auspices. Donor coordination and joint approaches on policy dialogue are moreover of particular relevance under priority 2 in view of the potential for blending of instruments.

In the context of promoting green and low carbon markets and business, coordination should be ensured with EU-funded regional initiatives promoting the transition towards sustainable consumption and production patterns, in line with Jordan's regional commitments.” 2014 Jordan SSF 2014-2017, p. 12

### *“3.3. Renewable energies and energy efficiency*

#### *3.3.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:*

*A donor-government working group on energy is chaired by the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (MoPIC); as in other sectors, donor coordination under MOPIC auspices needs to be reinforced and policy dialogue streamlined. This is of particular importance given the potential for blending of aid modalities under this priority 3, and the interest of new actors in contributing such as EBRD. Currently, EU Donors lead the support to RE & EE, along harmonised approaches and priorities; policy dialogue in these areas is smooth.*

*In this context, coordination should be ensured with EU-funded regional initiatives promoting the transition towards sustainable consumption and production patterns, in line with Jordan's regional commitments.” 2014 Jordan SSF 2014-2017, p. 14*

### *“I) Justice and Security System Reform (15 %)*

#### *3.1.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:*

*The EU is the principal donor in justice and therefore takes a leading role in donor coordination. In the absence of a strong central authority, policy dialogue and donor coordination remains a challenge. Efforts should be carried out to improve coordination mechanisms. International donors active on security issues in Lebanon have set up a regular mechanism for information sharing and coordination purposes albeit without the involvement of the Lebanese counterparts. This mechanism has three sub-groups, on borders, on internal security and rule of law, and on assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces.” 2014 Lebanon SSF 2014-2016, p. 10*

### *“3.2 Reinforcing social cohesion, promoting sustainable economic development and protecting vulnerable groups (40%)*

#### *3.2.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue:*

*For education and Vocational Training, the major donors have established a donor coordination group on education which has a rotating presidency. Meetings take place on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, there is close coordination of donors during formulation stages of programmes (shared meetings, shared formulation reports and documents). In the field of social protection, a number of donors and agencies such as the World Bank, the ILO or the EU (through the launching of intra-Lebanese fora and the formulation of the programme “promotion of social justice in Lebanon”) have been active and implemented activities. Nevertheless, donor coordination and a mechanism for genuine policy dialogue remains to be developed. In the field of rural development through land use planning, there has been no formal coordination among donors. The EU has funded a number of projects in this area and remains the major donor in local development and cooperation with municipalities.” 2014 Lebanon SSF 2014-2016, p. 13*

### *“3.3 Promotion of sustainable and transparent management of energy and natural resources (20%)*

*3.3.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue: A donor coordination group has been put in place (e.g. water, environment). For the agriculture sector the EU and the USA, the principal donors, ensure complementarity at the operational level. Nevertheless, for this sector of intervention, genuine policy dialogue with the national authorities and an effective donor coordination mechanism led by the Government remains to be put in place.” 2014 Lebanon SSF 2014-2016, p. 15*

### *“3.1 Public administration reform (indicative 30%)*

*3.1.3 Donor coordination and policy dialogue are: Government Decision no. 12 of 19 January 2010 established a more efficient mechanism for donor coordination and required the creation of sector committees to manage external assistance. In April 2011, a Joint Partnership Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, was established. The Council is designed to facilitate consultation with respect to the development agenda, monitor the implementation of national development documents and foreign assistance contribution, thereby developing and promoting the strategic partnership between the public authorities, the external development partners, civil society and the private sector. In addition, Sector Councils have been established for Public Administration Reform and Public Finance Management in which the donors participate. The Government has been assisted primarily through the Sweden- and Netherlands-funded World Bank Donor Trust Fund, which supported the elaboration of Strategic Development Programmes (SDPs) as tools for identifying gaps in institutional capacity in line Ministries and State Agencies, formulating a series of interventions to address these gaps and indicating which resources (finance, equipment, technical assistance and training) would be required. The UNDP is also implementing the Transitional Capacity Building Support for the Public Administration of Moldova*



project. The “Modernisation of local public services in the Republic of Moldova” project, financed by the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has as objective to improve public services in rural communities. USAID has launched a project focused on local service delivery by ‘rayon’ centres. The World Bank has provided a loan to support the Governance e-Transformation Project. The EU Delegation is engaged in a wide-ranging policy dialogue with the Government assisted by EU high-level policy advisers.” 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017, p. 8

### “3.2 Agriculture and rural development (indicative 30%)

3.2.3 Donor coordination and policy dialogue are: In order to increase concentration and coherence, seven EU Member States (CZ, ET, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK) have been combining resources to assist Moldova in areas related to regional development (institutional capacity development, regional civil society development, improving regional statistics) since 2012. The World Bank, EIB, EBRD, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Romanian Government are providing a range of loans and grants to upgrade the social and technical infrastructure in the rural areas. Donor coordination meetings on Transnistria are organised once every 3 months and are chaired by the EU Delegation. There is an extensive policy dialogue with the Government through the Joint Partnership Council, which feeds into policy-making and decision-taking at the level of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning. Transnistria projects are discussed on a very regular basis with the Government of Moldova and the Tiraspol de facto authorities. Contacts with Gagauzia have also been established.” 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017, p. 10-11

### “3.3 Police reform and border management (indicative 20%)

#### 3.3.3 Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:

In May 2011, the President of the Parliament set up a National Council for the Reform of Law Enforcement Bodies (NCLEBR), which includes high level public officials from all law institutions in Moldova and representatives from civil society. The role of the Council is to ensure coordination between the various law enforcement agencies in order to achieve consensus on the nature of the reforms and the manner and timetable of their implementation. Seven Working Groups are being established, one for each of the key pillars of the Justice Sector Reform Strategy. Pillar VII of the JSRS addresses the issue of coordination directly and will form the core of the Group for the Coordination of the Implementation of the Strategy, which reports to the NCLEBR. EU assistance has been provided under AAP 2011 to support the work of the Group and the Strategic Planning and Monitoring Department within the MoJ, which acts as Secretariat to the Group. There has been a continuous dialogue with the MoJ, the MoIA, the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Centre for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption. High-level policy advisors have been assigned to each of these institutions and have been instrumental in the drafting of the Sector Strategies and Action Plans. Under this sector, it will be important to ensure coordination and synergies with such activities, in particular those implemented to reform the prosecution.” 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017, p. 12-13

### “3.1 Accès équitable aux services de base

#### 3.1.4. Coordination des donateurs et le dialogue stratégique

La coordination avec les bailleurs de fonds impliqués a lieu d’abord au niveau des groupes thématiques “Développement social, protection sociale et genre”, “Santé”, “Education”, “Eau”. La coordination se réalise également dans le cadre des réunions annuelles de coordination des bailleurs de fonds, qui sont organisées avec un niveau d’appropriation variable selon les secteurs. Ces réunions deviennent de plus en plus un mécanisme de gouvernance sectorielle et permettent un dialogue sectoriel approfondi et continu. Dans le secteur de l’assainissement, la coordination avec les groupes de travail de l’Initiative Horizon 2020 pour la dépollution de la Méditerranée, ainsi que les autres initiatives régionales financées par l’UE, permettront d’assurer la complémentarité de l’action de l’UE et celle des autres bailleurs des fonds. Les thématiques couvertes par ce secteur connaissent également une forme de coordination plus poussée dans la mise en œuvre des appuis budgétaires multi-bailleurs. C’est le cas pour la santé, avec des appuis conjoints entre la France, l’Espagne, le Fonds des Nations Unies pour la Population, la Banque Européenne d’Investissement et la Banque Africaine de Développement; pour l’éducation, avec la France, l’Espagne, la Banque Mondiale, la Banque Européenne d’Investissement, la Banque Africaine de Développement, le Japon ; pour l’Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain (INDH) avec la Banque Mondiale.

Les réunions tenues à l’occasion des missions de suivi conjointes des stratégies appuyées permettent une coordination efficace et garantissent un poids politique adéquat pour les bailleurs, dont la valeur

ajoutée s'exprime également dans la pertinence des expertises techniques indépendantes mises à disposition des partenaires gouvernementaux." 2014 Morocco SSF 2014-2017, p. 10

"3.2 Soutenir la gouvernance démocratique, l'Etat de droit et la mobilité. 3.2.4. Coordination des donateurs et le dialogue stratégique La coordination sur les questions de gouvernance s'effectue au sein d'un groupe thématique de bailleurs de fonds impliqués par le thème de la "gouvernance", qui fait régulièrement le point sur les questions de gouvernance "horizontale" à savoir l'appui au bon fonctionnement des institutions marocaines, à la transparence et à la reddition des comptes, ainsi qu'aux différentes composantes "verticales" de la bonne gouvernance, à savoir la promotion des droits de l'homme, de la démocratie, la déconcentration/décentralisation et la migration." 2014 Morocco SSF 2014-2017, p. 13

"3.3 Emploi et croissance durable et inclusive

3.3.4. Coordination des donateurs et le dialogue stratégique L'Union européenne dispose au Maroc d'une expérience de longue date en matière d'accompagnement des réformes économiques et des politiques publiques liées à la formation, à l'emploi et à l'entreprise. Certains bailleurs présents au Maroc mènent également des programmes sur ces thématiques et la complémentarité est assurée lors de consultations régulières. Comme pour les programmes antérieurs, la coordination des donateurs s'effectuera dans le cadre des dialogues sectoriels existants ou à créer, dans l'hypothèse où les priorités du programme ne seraient pas couvertes par des mécanismes de dialogue existants. En vue d'une future potentielle régionalisation et selon le degré d'avancement de celle-ci, il s'agira d'intégrer les différents niveaux de pouvoirs politiques (centraux et régionaux) responsables de la politique de développement économique du Maroc. Un dialogue approfondi devra être maintenu avec le Ministère des Finances, ainsi qu'avec le Ministère de l'Intérieur, le Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie et des Nouvelles Technologies, le Ministère des Affaires Générales et de la Gouvernance, le Ministère de l'Emploi et la Formation professionnelle et les Agences sous sa tutelle, les différents départements sectoriels, les collectivités locales et les acteurs locaux (société civile, secteur privé, etc.). Dans les domaines du développement des filières vertes, de l'appui au développement du secteur privé ou encore de la politique maritime, la complémentarité avec les initiatives et projets régionaux financées par l'UE sera assurée afin de renforcer les interactions et les synergies pour une efficacité accrue." 2014 Morocco SSF 2014-2017, p. 15

"Compte tenu de la grande centralisation de la gouvernance en Algérie et des difficultés soulevés par le Ministère de l'Intérieur à ce sujet, les relations avec les autorités locales sont très réduites actuellement. La Délégation essaye depuis quelques mois d'intensifier les contacts avec des administrations communales et de démarrer quelques actions initiales. Au contraire, les organisations de la société civile (OSC) sont consultées tout au long de l'année et sur plusieurs questions. En ce qui concerne la programmation des lignes thématiques, elles sont consultées notamment pour la préparation des lignes directrices des appels à propositions lancés par la Délégation (IEDDH et ANE). Suite aux sollicitations des OSC et afin de soutenir le renforcement des capacités des associations, la Délégation a adopté une approche sectorielle en faveur de la société civile algérienne. Cette approche, tout en s'inscrivant dans la continuité des objectifs poursuivis par ONG I et II, se concrétise ainsi à travers, d'une part par les allocations sur les lignes thématiques "Acteurs non-étatiques" (500.000 Euros sur Budget 2013) et IEDDH (900.000 Euros Budget 2013), et d'autre part par des volets de subvention et d'accompagnement des associations dans les programmes bilatéraux figurant dans le PIN 2011-2013. Le partenariat établi entre l'UE et les OSC a eu jusqu'en 2011 un impact marginal sur les programmes bilatéraux (hormis le programme ONG II), car les volets destinés à la société civile dans les différents programmes bilatéraux restaient très limités. À partir de 2011, par contre, les volets destinés à la société civile à l'intérieur de chaque programme bilatéral sont devenus beaucoup plus importants et c'est l'intention claire de la Délégation de renforcer davantage ce genre d'instrument à l'intérieur des programmes pour la nouvelle période de programmation à partir de 2014.

Concernant les lignes thématiques, l'UE soutient des actions proposées par des ONG européennes et algériennes spécialisées dans la coopération au développement. Les objectifs sont la réduction de la pauvreté ainsi que le développement économique et social durable. Dans le cadre des Programmes thématiques "Cofinancement-ONG", "Développement social et humain", "Migration et asile" et "Acteurs non étatiques et Autorités locales", l'UE soutient 39 projets en Algérie. A travers ces projets la Délégation de l'Union européenne en Algérie vise à renforcer la capacité de la société civile d'assumer son rôle de plaidoyer vis-à-vis l'État, d'impliquer les jeunes algérien/nes dans des actions sociales et politiques, de les éduquer à la citoyenneté et de fournir des services sociaux pour les groupes les plus vulnérables. Etant donné que beaucoup d'associations opèrent presque en isolation et n'ont pas les moyens financiers et humains de se fédérer au niveau local, régional ou national, la Délégation met

*un accent accru sur le renforcement des réseaux associatifs. La DUE a aussi commencé en 2012 un programme systématique de formation des ONGs dédié à la gestion des projets, programme qui s'est poursuivi en 2013 et va continuer en 2014. Par contre, la situation actuelle des ONGs en général et des ONGs internationales en particulier est incertaine. La nouvelle loi des associations de janvier 2012 a institué l'obligation d'avoir l'autorisation des autorités pour l'existence et l'activité des ONGs. L'obtention de cette autorisation s'est révélée très difficile pour la généralité des ONGs et pratiquement impossible pour celles de droit international. Au moment de la clôture, en janvier 2014, de la période transitoire de deux années donnée par la loi pour que les ONGs procèdent à leur régularisation, la situation de la plupart des ONGs financées par la DUE est incertaine et leur futur semble dépendre de l'évolution de cette situation dans les mois à venir. Cette thématique sera à accompagner de près pendant les premiers mois de 2014.” EMAR Algeria 2013, p. 8-9*

*“The Delegation continues to support increased involvement of CSOs in its development assistance and programming cycle. In June 2013, the Delegation inaugurated a mechanism of regular consultative meetings with representatives of civil society, including National Platform members, at the level of Head of Delegation/Head of Cooperation. The meetings aim at discussing EU sectoral assistance and cooperation priorities and involving CSOs at different stages of the programming. The meeting on Budget Support in Good Governance (20.06.13) provided CSOs with detailed knowledge on the EU BS and encouraged their possible involvement in monitoring of reforms supported by BS operations. The meeting on Regional Development (9.07.2013) involved CSOs working in this field and helped assess CSOs capacities and identify their needs. The consultations on CSO/LA and EIDHR programmes (1.10.2013, with participation of intercommunity unions' representatives) provided the EUD with useful comments on priorities for the new CSO/LA and EIDHR programmes, later included in the concept note (CSO/LA) and used in development of the guidelines (EIDHR CBSS). During the meetings, the Delegation also tries to address issues of acute importance to the CSOs. The meeting on Gender issues and Gender Equality Law (11.11.2013), with the presence of other international organizations representatives, discussed CSO-donor cooperation for influencing policy dialogue and against gender stereotypes in public debate. In August 2013, the consultative online tool for CSOs was launched to enhance dialogue and create a platform enabling civil society actors to exchange their views on issues relevant for the future development of EU-Armenia relations. The website gives an opportunity to reach out to the regions and create a comprehensive database of CSOs in various sectors. Over fifty organizations have already registered, although they are not so active in making contributions to the published consultations. The Delegation will continue promoting the new interactive tool for consultations aiming at receiving numerous and high quality contributions from civil society. Armenian civil society representatives are invited to contribute to ENP Progress Reports on an annual basis. In 2013, thematic consultations were held. First sessions focused on issues relating to Human Rights, Justice, Freedoms and Security, including migration, and revealed CSOs dissatisfaction with the lack of significant progress in areas of independent media, freedom of religion, LGBT rights and freedom of elections. Relevant CSOs were also consulted on social-economic and environmental issues.” EAMR Armenia 2013, p. 14*

*“CSOs have been a key partner in development of EU strategies and programmes, as well as general policy. Think tanks and NGOs working in the fields of rural and regional development, justice and education were consulted in the development of the Single Strategic Framework (SSF), and feedback from CSOs was also collected for the ENI Regional East Strategy (2014-20). In addition, the Delegation organized eight other consultation meetings with civil society on issues such as: internet freedom, the overall CSO environment, gender, the pre/post-election situation and the human rights situation in the country. In regards to Government strategies, getting the Government to see CSOs as partners is challenging, but progress has been made. One of the underlying objectives common to all our CS projects is fostering dialogue between the Government and CSOs in regards to advocacy, public policy development and monitoring implementation of reforms, and there have been success stories in the areas of social inclusion and local economic development. In addition, in 2013, for the first time in a bilateral programme, the Government has agreed to earmark a specific allocation for projects to be implemented by civil society in the field of rural and regional development following a participatory and bottom-up approach.” EAMR Azerbaijan, 2013, p. 8*

*“Support to civil society is a key component of the EU – Belarus co-operation and the financial allocation for such activities has increased sixfold since 2011. An estimated 40% of the 2014-2020 budget allocation for Belarus will be in favour of civil society. However, this 40% will not be part of the Financing agreements signed between the EU and Belarusian authorities. The Delegation has consulted CSOs on several occasions during the year. For example, in May it organised two consultations on the*

NSA-LA and EIDHR Calls for proposals. In September the Delegation organised two consultations on the future design of the CSO-LA programme. In October, in the context of the programming mission, the Delegation organised a consultation with CSOs concerning the identification of the 2014 allocation.” EAMR Belarus, 2013, p. 7

“On general EU programming, during 2013 three formal consultations involving Civil Society Organisations have taken place: in January, CSOs were consulted on priorities of the Single Support Framework 2014-2015; written contributions were received from CSOs on the ENI Regional Southern Mediterranean Strategy (2014-2020); CSOs were consulted on the design of the Civil Society Component of the SPRING package. For the preparation of the EU Joint Rural Development Programme (AAP 2013), extensive consultations with local authorities and local civil society stakeholders were carried out.” EAMR Egypt, 2013, p. 10

“Over the course of 2013, Georgian Government consultation with civil society in general has continued to be active. A number of ministries have set up public councils, where they consult with civil society. In the specific case of the local government reform, the responsible ministry set up a number of working groups on various aspects of the reform, all of the with the active participation of civil society representatives. The Electoral Reform was also a relatively open and inclusive process, with both civil society and extra-parliamentary parties free to participate in discussions. Civil society recommendations on a number of key areas, such as campaign financing, were accepted. In September, a Communication Strategy for the ENP was adopted by the government after it had been jointly developed with the National Platform of the Civil Society Forum. In December, more than 150 CSOs signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Parliament which sets out processes for parliamentary consultation of civil society on key policy processes. Following the Vilnius summit, the National Platform hosted a conference, attended by high level government representatives, which discussed more than 15 policy areas and recommendations for progress in the context of the AA and DCFTA. The Delegation has continued to consult with civil society, both on political and operational issues. Information sessions were held for the thematic programmes managed by the Delegation, consultation also took place regarding the policy matrix for the VET budget support operation, the new CSO/LA thematic programme priorities for 2014-20 were discussed with representatives of local and international civil society, as well as with local authorities, while active inclusion of civil society in the areas of agriculture and rule of law continued through regular meetings throughout the year.” EAMR Georgia, 2013, p. 9

“\*As Israel is not a recipient of ODA, the EU aid programme in Israel does not fund national development activities and there is no specific dialogue with regard to national development activities and priorities.

\*With regard to EIDHR CSF, the conclusions of the consultation process with NGOs on EIDHR/CSF local calls for proposals organised in December 2012 were incorporated in the 2013 Call. The main changes proposed by NGOs and taken on-board, also in line with HQ comments on the EAMR 2012, were the change of procedures, the call being restricted instead of open, higher allocation thresholds and the submission of a draft logical framework at concept stage. An evaluation of EIDHR will be launched in 2014.

\*An evaluation of the EUPfP programme for 2007-2012 was launched, alongside a consultation for future programming, the outcomes of this evaluation/consultation is expected in mid-2014.

\*A report commissioned by Delegation to map Civil Society in Israel consulted widely with CSO from various fields of activities. The consultation will form the base for the report's recommendations on the implementation of EU programmes in Israel.

\*The report on Local Authorities and consultations with civil society organisations in 2012 have informed the NSA-LA call for proposal in 2013 which encouraged LA ? CSO cooperation. As a result, all of the 5 selected projects feature cooperation between a LA as the main applicant and a CSO as a partner.

\*A report commissioned by Delegation to map Civil Society in Israel consulted widely with CSO from various fields of activities. The consultation will form the base for the report's recommendations on the implementation of EU programmes in Israel.

\*Increasing efforts have been made to reach out to CSOs in the implementation of Twinning projects. As an example, external stakeholders are taking part in the steering committee of the Twinning project on veterinary services and NGOs are often consulted in the implementation of all twinning projects.

\*In addition, two consultations with civil society were arranged by the political, trade and scientific sections on the ENP progress report.” EAMR Israel, 2013, p. 9

“-Briefing and debriefing at the occasion of the Association Sub-committee on Human Rights

- Consultation on the Single Support Framework 2014-2017.
- Consultation during the visit of the management of the European Endowment for Democracy.
- Consultation for the inception phase under the Jordan Country Level Evaluation.
- Involvement in the donor coordination under the Host Community Support Platform and the design of the National Resilience Plan.

*In light of the extension of the EuroMed Youth programme, meetings have been held with the Ministry of Parliamentary and Political Affairs with the objective to strengthen youth participation in the programme and the involvement of organisations outside the capital Amman. In the next phase a discussion is foreseen to strengthen the youth sector policy through a capacity development programme.”* EAMR Israel, 2013, p. 9

*“Des consultations dans le cadre du dialogue structuré ont été organisés avec la société civile et les autorités locales sur l'exercice de programmation, perspectives financières, la réponse aux conséquences du conflit syrien et les relations entre l'UE et le Liban (sur le plan politique comme en ce qui concerne l'assistance financière). La tenue de ces dialogues est fortement appréciée par nos partenaires non-étatiques. Par ailleurs, le dialogue avec la société civile en matière de droits de l'homme est assuré de manière continue. De plus, la société civile est consultée sur plusieurs sujets (programmation, nouvelles perspectives financières..) soit lors de réunions, soit via consultation et information en ligne (site Internet de la Délégation, Facebook, Twitter). La dernière consultation avec des organisations de la société civile a été organisée fin décembre 2013 pour discuter le nouveau draft de Single Support Framework revue notamment suite au feedback reçu de la part de la société civile et des autorités locales suite au dialogue tenu en décembre 2012. Par ailleurs la société civile est consultée dans d'autres forums avant la lancée d'appels à propositions ou pour l'identification de projet de réhabilitation d'infrastructures de base, notamment en réponse aux conséquences du conflit syrien. De plus, la Délégation maintient un dialogue avec la société civile quasi constant à travers les médias sociaux.”* EAMR Lebanon, 2013, p. 9

*“Dialogue with civil society continued in 2013 through a number of regular bilateral/group meetings as well as round table discussions. On the one hand, several official consultations were organised in Tripoli on 11-12 March, 24-25 September and 4-5/8-9 November. These served various purposes, namely: i) identification of the three focal sectors for the CSP/MIP 2014-15 (joint EEAS/DEVCO programming exercise); ii) identification of potential areas of intervention for Libya under the EIDHR for the period 2014-17; iii) identification of the objectives and priority actions to be covered under the joint EIDHR/NSA-LAs CfP; iv) identification of support needs in the audiovisual sector (film making); and v) preparation of the Concept Note for country programme on CSOs-LAs in Libya. On the other hand, the EUD continued to hold meetings with Libyan CSOs/LAs representatives, and participated in a number of round tables -local and national authorities were often represented- which allowed the collection of valuable inputs on support needs as well as feedback on ongoing EU interventions. This proved to be particularly useful for the EUD for the identification, preparation and the contracting of new programmes in 2013. As a result, a total of 3 grants in support of civil society and local authorities were signed in December 2013 to work in relevant areas such as civil society and local authorities' capacity building, constitutional and peace building policy dialogue, and culture. Funds were made available under the Civil Society Facility 2012-13, the ENPI Global Allocation, and the ENPI-SPRING Instrument.”* EAMR Libya, 2013, p. 8

*“In 2013 was held EaP Civil Society Forum, being the landmark of cooperation with CSO's. CSO's are consulted on regular basis on new initiatives and on the progress of reforms supported by the EU. CSO's also got around 20% of the new contracts concluded in 2013. NSA-LA, EIDHR and Civil Society Facility have been the major sources used to fund CSO's.”* EAMR Moldova, 2013, p. 6

*“La nature et la qualité du dialogue avec les OSC se sont renforcées, élargies et améliorées lors de l'année 2013. Plusieurs rencontres de dialogue et de consultations ont été organisées. Celles-ci portent sur des enjeux stratégiques pour le pays, comme les réformes politiques et économiques, la mise en oeuvre de la Constitution, la lutte contre la corruption, la démocratisation et l'Etat de droit, ainsi que sur la programmation et la mise en oeuvre des programmes géographiques et thématiques. Ce dialogue, de plus en plus structuré, associé à l'implication de plus en plus importante des OSC dans la mise en oeuvre et le monitoring des programmes géographiques, alimente le dialogue politique entre la Délégation et les autorités marocaines et permet de suivre l'impact des programmes sur les populations cibles et la bonne exécution sur le terrain des programmes géographiques, y compris dans le domaine des appuis budgétaires. De plus en plus dans la formulation de ce type d'appuis et dans leur*

suivi, les acteurs de la société civile sont consultés. A titre d'exemple en 2013: l'identification des programmes santé et justice, la formulation du programme éducation II et le suivi du programme éducation I et du programme genre. Pour ce dernier, l'atelier de consultation mené dans le cadre du suivi externe a fait suite aux ateliers menés dans le cadre de l'identification et de la formulation du programme. Les mêmes organisations ont été invitées à participer à cet atelier de dialogue sur la mise en oeuvre de la réforme, liste qui a été complétée par les nouveaux partenaires du MSFFDS suite au changement de gouvernement depuis la formulation du programme. Les thèmes et les programmes ayant fait l'objet du dialogue régulier avec les OSC en 2013 comprennent : la mise en oeuvre de la Plan d'action Voisinage, la mise en oeuvre de la nouvelle constitution et la promotion des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie, le Partenariat pour la mobilité, le suivi du programme Genre, l'identification du programme Justice, le suivi du programme forêts, la programmation 2014-2017 du programme thématique "Société civile/autorités locales", le nouveau cadre stratégique d'appui pour la coopération UE-Maroc 2014-2017, la programmation régionale 2014-2017, l'ALECA. Dans la période en question, la Délégation a démarré la mise en oeuvre d'un programme d'accompagnement de son partenariat avec la société civile (financé dans le cadre de la Facilité Société Civile) qui a démarré début 2013 et qui a pour objectif de renforcer et multiplier le dialogue avec les OSC et de renforcer en même temps leurs capacités de monitoring des politiques publiques et de plaidoyer." EAMR Morocco, 2013, p. 12-13

"The Council conclusions of May 2011 suspend all preparations for new bilateral cooperation programs. As a result no specific consultations have taken place on EC programming in 2013 with CSOs or LAs. The mainstay of EU support has been through humanitarian aid (ECHO). This has been complemented by a series of Special Measures under the ENPI. Special Measures which are not bound to the normally programming and are to address unforeseen needs or circumstances. However, 17 bilateral meetings were held with CSOs during 2013 which assisted with the programming. International NGOs remain an important channel for delivering EU assistance in Syria, especially in opposition held areas through 'cross border' operations that the UN cannot support. However, most Syrian CSOs are embryonic and are yet to fully realise their potential role in society. It is for this reason that capacity building of Syrian CSOs was a central aim (objective 3) of the Call for Proposals (133-773) launched at the end of 2012 and which has led to the signature of 11 grant contracts amounting to EUR 10.8 million in 2013." EAMR Syria, 2013, p. 9

"La révolte populaire de 2011 a ouvert une fenêtre pour les organisations de la société civile, jusqu'alors largement contrôlées par l'ancien régime. L'adoption d'un nouveau cadre légal a permis la création de nombreuses associations et la restructuration de beaucoup d'autres. Dans cette phase de transition, la consultation des OSC et des AL a été quasi systématique que ce soit lors des exercices de programmation ou formulation/identification de programmes, ainsi qu'à l'occasion de visites de personnalités de l'Union européenne. Cependant et malgré les consultations régulières avec la société civile ainsi que les efforts d'information de la DUE, les capacités de la société civile à participer efficacement aux débats restent limitées et les discussions souvent peu constructives, se heurtant au manque d'expérience de beaucoup d'organisations de la société civile, créées après 14 janvier 2011. Il est nécessaire d'améliorer leur capacité d'analyse et de les familiariser avec les conventions de partenariat, traités internationaux, documents de programmation ou appuis budgétaires. De même, ces organisations doivent pouvoir se préparer aux discussions et rencontres sectorielles ou politiques avec la communauté internationale, dont l'UE, ainsi qu'avec des responsables tunisiens. Dans ce contexte, la DUE a mis en place un mécanisme de dialogue structuré visant à améliorer l'implication de la société civile tunisienne dans la mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action du Partenariat Privilégié, ainsi que dans le processus de transition démocratique. A cette fin, la DUE a mobilisé le Réseau euro-méditerranéen pour les Droits de l'Homme (REMDH). Ce dispositif répond à une attente exprimée par les organisations de la société civile, afin qu'elles puissent contribuer effectivement à la transition démocratique. Par ailleurs le Programme appui à la société civile (PASC) se propose de renforcer la contribution effective des organisations de la société civile au dialogue politique, à la consolidation de l'Etat de droit et au développement socio-économique de la Tunisie. A cet effet, le programme vise entre autres à renforcer la structuration des organisations de la société civile tunisienne et des cadres de concertation et de communication entre organisations de la société civile tunisienne, ainsi qu'à mettre en place des cadres pérennes de concertation et de coopération au niveau local, régional ou national entre les départements techniques et collectivités territoriales, d'une part et OSC, d'autre part. On rappelle que le PASC est le résultat d'une consultation élargie et d'une identification conjointe avec 150 partenaires de la société civile et 60 partenaires techniques et financiers, y compris organisations internationales et autorités tunisiennes, qui se sont déroulées dans 20 gouvernorats pendant l'année 2012. Autre originalité de ce programme, outre Tunis, 5 bureaux régionaux d'appui à la société civile ont été créés, qui permettront un développement harmonieux et équilibré des capacités de la société civile sur l'ensemble du territoire, et non dans la seule capitale." EAMR Tunisia, 2013, p. 7

*“Civil society organisations have been invited for both planned and ad hoc meetings on EU-Ukraine policies and relations. Local civil society organisations were consulted on priorities and objectives of the EIDHR and Civil Society Facility/Non-State Actors and Local Authorities calls for proposals. Consultation with civil society actors for 2014-2020 programming has also taken place, highlighting the specific roles they can play in each of the focal sectors. The Civil Society Facility call for proposals focused on involving civil society actors in policy dialogue with government authorities on implementation of such sector strategies as energy, environment, public finance management, migration and regional development. The environmental NGOs have maintained their "observer" status and regularly participated in the Joint Monitoring Group meetings of the ENV SBS at the managerial and technical levels. In March, the environmental civil society has presented a Report "On the citizens' opinion on the implementation of the National Environmental Policy in 2012". The Report contains over 200 recommendations and covers all spheres of environmental policy. A number of recommendations, namely, on legal approximation issues, were used by the Delegation during the preparation of the AAP 2013 for following up of the support to the environmental policy. Despite publication of the Report at the MinENV web-site no follow-up was conducted by the Ministry to establish the dialogue with civil society on the proposed conclusions and recommendations. In the course of preparation of the AAP 2012 sector budget support in energy (EUR 45 mln) the Delegation had meetings with civil society representatives active in the sector to inform about forthcoming programme as well as to discuss state of play in the sector. As the programme is to support the implementation of Ukraine's revised Energy strategy until 2030, it is important that the Beneficiary takes the leading role in maintaining the dialogue with civil society in the process of implementation of the revised energy strategy, including on the preparation of the relevant action plan on its implementation. So far, the strategy preparation process was not sufficiently transparent and neither donor community nor civil society had been consulted on the later versions of the document further to the official public consultation process in June 2012. Involvement of civil society in monitoring the energy strategy implementation was the main issue in the discussions with the government on the draft Financing Agreement for the AAP 2012 sector budget support in energy and will continue to be in course of the its implementation (FA was signed in December 2013). In parallel, and considering that the budget support programme has an EnCT focus, in December 2013 the Delegation signed a two-year grant contract to monitor the implementation of Ukraine's EnCT commitments and develop policy dialogue with the government. Another grant contract was signed to enhance transparency of financial flows of public revenues from hydrocarbon production. Civil society organisations are in the lead in the EU funded Migreco project, carrying out a gaps and needs analysis on the Ukrainian/Moldovan/Belarusian Migration Policy. Overall, the involvement of civil society by the government was limited to general public consultations with no feedback mechanisms in place. The Delegations carried out consultations with civil society in all ongoing and planned sectorial operations.” EAMR Ukraine, 2013, p. 8-9*

*“During the year EUREP has organised two double consultations on the rule of law, governance and Human rights (April and November, both in Ramallah and Gaza) and one double consultation on social issues focusing in particular on gender violence, youth empowerment and social protection (Ramallah and Gaza). The consultations were organised within the ENP framework and helped prepare three EU/PA sub committees. They feed the discussions with the Palestinian Authority on sectoral policies and contribute at the ENP progress report. Civil Society participation in national policy-making was promoted in EU relations with the Ministry of Planning (MoPAD), especially regarding the development and monitoring of the new Palestinian National Development Plan 2014-2016. Four Joint EU HoCs meetings with the MoPAD and the MoF on the PNDP 2014-2016 and the need to include civil society not only in the consultations, but also on the follow-up of their feedbacks, were organised in 2013. Support under the Civil Society Facility "Strengthening the Palestinian NGO Sector capacity and involvement in governance and democratic process" is enhancing the capacities of the main four national platforms to play an active role in domestic politics in order to meet the needs of marginalised groups during the next years. The EU programming mission (June 2013), met with representatives of the 4 NGOs platforms to present and discuss the choice of the 3 retained focal sectors under the SSF. Relevant processes relating to EU assistance to Palestine were shared through the four NGO platforms for inputs (e.g. global evaluation of the EU assistance to Palestine, contribution to the post-MDGs). The CfPs on 'Land & Water Development' was intensively prepared based on consultations with the MoA, other donors involved in the sector and other stakeholders, including the civil society and the private sector. Local communities have been closely involved in the decision making process for the definition of planning priorities in the Area C development programme.” EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2013, p. 15*

«La coordination avec les bailleurs de fonds a connu une nette amélioration depuis 2009. Dans le cadre de la Déclaration de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'aide, la Délégation a initié un processus de coordination poussé avec les Etats membres et les organisations internationales (PNUD, BIT, Banque Mondiale, BAD...) présentes en Algérie et ayant un portefeuille de coopération. A partir de 2011, un dispositif complet de coordination a été mis en place: la "coordination locale" avec tous les Etats membres présents dans le pays, le Groupe "efficacité de l'aide" avec tous les bailleurs de fonds actifs en Algérie, et cinq "groupes thématiques" (société civile, enseignement supérieur, secteur privé, eau et environnement, culture) responsables pour les coordinations sectorielles. En ce qui concerne spécifiquement le Système des Nations Unies (SNU) et la BAD, les relations sont devenues beaucoup plus étroites en 2013, par le biais de l'intérêt renouvelé dans la coopération avec la DUE montré par la nouvelle Représentante Résidente du SNU et la nouvelle chef du PNUD. Dans ce cadre, des consultations étroites ont été réalisées avec le SNU et la BAD sur le document de programmation 2014-2017 "Cadre Unique d'Appui", la gestion du groupe de l'Efficacité de l'Aide est à nouveau partagée entre la DUE et le PNUD, et la BAD a démarré à la fin 2013 un nouveau sous-groupe thématique "Gouvernance" dans le cadre de l'Efficacité de l'Aide". Cogestion: La DUE n'a pas actuellement dans son portefeuille des programmes gérés conjointement avec des organisations internationales. Peu d'agences de l'ONU sont présentes effectivement en Algérie, et encore moins ont un portefeuille de coopération. L'Algérie poursuit en outre une politique de non-endettement vis-à-vis de la communauté internationale, ce qui se traduit par une présence non-significative des institutions financières internationales. Néanmoins, des possibilités de collaboration entre la DUE et le SNU, dans le cadre de la nouvelle programmation et en profitant des synergies et des points forts des différents partenaires, sont explorées actuellement entre les deux parties." EAMR Algeria 2013, p. 9

"Coordination with international organisations is improving. A number of bilateral meetings were organised throughout the year, and IOs are recently taking the initiative to invite each other to important events, such as technical discussions about new or ongoing programmes, feedback into new strategy setting, etc. In addition, the UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative launched a donor coordination initiative at the Head of Mission level in 2013, that met twice in the year, sub-divided into six sub-groupings to discuss specific thematic areas. The EUD shares the lead, with the World Bank, of the Economic Development sub-group." EAMR Armenia 2013, p. 15

"In the absence of a proper Government led donor coordination mechanism, the Delegation has continued to proactively organize donor coordination meetings in the socio-economic cluster. At the same time, GIZ has provided a seconded expert to the Ministry of Economy to support the Government in donor coordination and talks have been undertaken between the expert, the MEI and the Delegation on how to strengthen the Government's role in the process. Towards the end of the year decision was taken to hand-over the general coordination role to UNDP. In addition, the Delegation has continued to organize quarterly coordination meetings with EU Member States to keep them informed about ongoing cooperation activities and to consult them whenever required. Special consultations were held, for instance, in the occasion of the development of AAP 2013 and the SSF 2014-2017. A number of joint visibility events have also been organized together with the EU MS (Twinning events, joint visit to the regions, Eurovillage). The Delegation has also liaised closely with the WB, UNDP, SECO, GIZ, FAO, EBRD and other donors at the sector level (Education, Justice, PFM, and Agriculture). A two day regional seminar was organized in Tbilisi between the EU and the WB (EU-WB South Caucasus days) in order to exchange views on cooperation approaches and priorities for the South Caucasus as well as to have a better understanding of on-going operations and cooperation modalities. A concrete result of this donor coordination effort has been the common front initiated by the Delegation, WB and SECO, which eventually led to the decision of MoF to carry out a PEFA in 2014. In addition, two contracts were signed, respectively with GIZ and UNDP, for the implementation of CIB/IRP3. GIZ was also identified as potential implementing partner for one of the component of the AAP 2013 on regional development. Discussions are on-going with IOM for the design of a new project to be funded under CIB-IRP2 in the field of readmission, visa facilitation and migration. Lastly, intensive consultations were held during the development of the first draft of the SSF 2014-2017 and will be continued in the framework of the identification of the future programmes in Education and Justice." EAMR Azerbaijan, 2013, p. 9

"UNDP is the principle UN agency in Belarus which under the 'Deliver as One' (DAO) initiative assumes its role as 'primus inter pares' under the authority of the Resident Representative. The other UN agencies which are present in Belarus (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNAIDS, etc) tend to have limited staff and capacity, although they do also implement EU funded activities. UNDP has established a good working relationship with the Government of Belarus and the line Ministries, for whom UNDP is a



*partner of choice. The Delegation participated in one meeting of the United Nations Country Team and most of the country team was invited, alongside with WB and EBRD, for a meeting in the framework of the project identification mission for AP 2014. Furthermore, IOM is also an important implementer of EU-funded assistance in the sector of customs and border guards (Belarus-Ukraine) and is involved in the early stage. Although there are some minor issues, appropriate visibility in general is guaranteed and the UN agencies make sure that its donor receives appropriate credit for its efforts." EAMR Belarus, 2013, p. 8*

*"The coordination with International Organisations and IFIs further intensified during 2013. Cooperation with the World Bank has gained a new dimension with concrete joint projects such as the Employment Emergency programme. Cooperation with European Development Banks remained at a high level with new joint programmes (IWSP II with KfW, EIB, AFD,; National Solid Waste programme with KfW; and Agricultural SME's with AFD). Cooperation remained good with OECD in particular at policy level as regards business climate where there is also a small common project. The cooperation with the UN family proves relevant too. In the specific Egyptian context, the impartiality of UN bodies, together with their experience and credibility make them valuable interlocutors for the Egyptian Authorities, allowing the EU to implement projects in sensitive areas.*

*However, the EU Delegation also met challenges during the preparation and implementation of some projects with UN and IFIs. Monitoring and quality control mechanisms are sometimes lacking and, in some cases, it is felt that the EU's policy input to projects and EU visibility are being neglected. The IO and IFI are also regularly consulted on thematic and general issues. This was the case in particular for the programming of the ENI 2014-2015. Good coordination and cooperation continuously developed with UNHABITAT, UNDCF, UNIDO, UNICEF, ILO, are the basis of the possibility to significantly accelerate the process for the finalisation of the AAP 2014." EAMR Egypt, 2013, p. 11*

*"Co-operation with UN agencies, in particular, remains productive. In the areas of electoral support and media monitoring, projects jointly developed between the EU and UNDP project managers have are showing a sustained impact. The Central Election Commission, which has been the recipient of continuous support over the last five years proved its resilience as an institution this year and is the only Georgian institution which has been consistently praised for its professionalism and efficiency by the OSCE. Upon completion of the current project, it is unlikely that the CEC will require further broad support from donors in future. The media monitoring project has just been extended to cover also the period leading up to the municipal elections in 2014. Real progress has been noted this year in the capacities of the monitoring organisations trained under the previous project, as well as in the attitude of the media outlets, which has matured and become more open to debating the issues linked to professional and ethical media coverage as highlighted by the monitoring reports. Both the election and media programmes would tend to indicate, that in order to archive real and sustainable results and impact, activities sustained cover a period of at least five years are necessary. Building on this experience, the EU is currently jointly designing with UNDP, a parliamentary support project which will be implemented over a 4-5 year period. The project is based on the findings of a needs assessment commissioned by the Delegation in 2013. All of the EU-UNDP projects foresee six-monthly steering committees at which decisions are taken jointly by the beneficiary, the EU and UNDP, with the consultation of other stakeholders as required. Visibility on these projects is carried out in accordance with the Guidelines on EU Visibility.\nCooperation with the Council of Europe is very satisfactory, generally at policy level on justice issues, and particularly after the start in April 2013 of the project 'Human Rights in prisons and other closed institutions' (funded under the More for More 2012) focused on penitentiary healthcare, mental health and fight against ill-treatment. EU visibility is ensured." EAMR Georgia, 2013, p. 9*

*"As per the nature of the country funding there are very limited contacts with international organizations. The UNHCR, IOM and ICRC office in Tel Aviv had a series of exchanges with the Delegation on the issues of refugees and asylum seekers, migrant workers, as they are partner on a migration thematic project." EAMR Israel, 2013, p. 9*

*"Interaction with UN agencies has been particularly intense from June 2013, as the impact of the Syrian refugees started to draw international political attention. With the sudden increase of development financing, a number of UN agencies have flocked into Jordan. If interaction at policy level is often good, large UN agencies rarely interact at identification stage (UNICEF, UNDP) as they are often in a position to kick-start their operations either through funds provided by their traditional-less demanding donors (e.g. Japan) or funds advanced by HQs (often sourced from non-earmarked funds). They would provide primary information only when EU funding has been pledged. Our leverage is in this*

case limited. In Education, the support to the Syrian refugee education needs is done through BS (30 Million) as well as extra support through UNESCO (4,5 Million) and through, UNICEF (around 30 million). Donor coordination in the field of education is at the heart of the implementation, whereby UNICEF is playing a leading role, both under RRP 5 and now for RRP6. The National Resilience Plan has been formulated by the Government of Jordan with support of UNDP and in consultation with donors, though in the field of education many questions remain unanswered about the relevance and the aid effectiveness of the instruments chosen by the Jordanian Government to support Syrian refugees in the (basic) education system. As far as concerns the IOs implementing IfS Crisis Response projects they are under joint management and the programme design was made jointly. Visibility could indeed be increased in certain cases, but may also be reduced when not recommended (eg EU stickers on cars operated by Border Guards)." EAMR Jordan, 2013, p. 9

*"- Bretton Woods Institutions:*

*With the World Bank the Delegation mainly exchanges on policy dialogue, notably in the areas of Education and Public Finance Management. The EU has also regular contacts with IMF. Views on the reform process and policy Issues with the Bretton Woods institutions are generally coherent, especially regarding the necessity to be cautious regarding the transition towards budget support.*

*An Administration Agreement with International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group) has been signed to Improve investment climate in Lebanon (Private Sector project, 19621).*

*-UN Organisations:*

*The Delegation has a strong partnership with UNRWA. The latter operates in a complex political environment, yet manages to obtain concrete results In the camps through EU-funded projects. The EU Delegation and UNRWA also work closely together on political developments regarding Palestinians, a policy dialogue that notably focuses on the implementation on the right to work. Following the outbreak of the Syrian crisis joint management with UNHCR and UNICEF has increased to respond to the needs in the Education sector, mainly, but as well in WATSAN, local development and support to strengthen the capacities of the Government in responding to the crisis. UNRWA, UNHCR and UNICEF are the main UN agencies working with the UE in Lebanon. A strong partnership has been built with these agencies, and the tasks managers are closely involved in the design and monitoring of the programmes. Some activities are on-going with UNODC and ILO. The Delegation has frequent contacts with UNIDO (as well as with IFC) on private sector development and business environment and with ILO on social dialogue. UNDP's performance on the EU-funded projects remains challenging despite joint efforts for improving dialogue and cooperation. Visibility with some UN agencies, in particular UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF remains sometimes challenging. The EUD ensures a very close monitoring on visibility issues notably concerning the response to the consequences of the Syrian crisis." EAMR Lebanon, 2013, p. 9-10*

*"UN (UNSMIL) has the overall responsibility for donor coordination in Libya. The coordination has proved difficult. Ad hoc working groups have been set up by the UN (elections, police...) but the mechanism needs to be broadened and improved. So far the meeting are just information sharing but not real coordination of based on an in depth analysis and needs request of the sector. EU Delegation is organising regular EU/MS's cooperation meetings during which EU and MS programmes are presented and debated. When relevant National Authorities are invited to join (planning, Mol, etc.). EU is supporting donor coordination at the technical level (with the Ministry of Planning and key Line Ministries such as, Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs). Increased ownership from the Libyan side could foster a more balanced approach. Several efforts have been made to set up steering mechanisms around key projects and programmes, particularly when they are multi-sectoral. In response to a request to the EU from the High National Electoral Commission (HNEC) for support for the development of permanent institutional capacities for election management, the EU has prepared a contract for ?2,000,000 to be signed with UNDP to provide support in the context of the UN multi-donor Libya Electoral Assistance Project (LEAP). An EU-funded programme worth ?3,124,400 and implemented through UNICEF aims to increase access to quality education for all children with a special focus on the most vulnerable children, including children affected by the conflict. One steering committee has been held since February 2013. The EUD is working closely with UNICEF towards developing and regularly adjusting the visibility plan which should ensure increased participation of the EUD in press conferences and field visits and towards enhancing project deliverables. In 2013 IOM country office performance improved, to the benefit of EU funded migration portfolio. IOM ensures a good level of EU visibility and beneficiaries are aware of the source of funding. EU visibility is less evident within UNHCR implemented projects." EAMR Libya, 2013, p. 8-9*

*“The closest coordination of cooperation in Moldova takes place with UNDP and with the WB. Both organisations implement also a few EU funded projects. However, in general, projects implemented by other International Organisations do not provide much visibility. Often the administrative procedures and reporting requirement differ between EU and International Organisations making the cooperation challenging. Projects which have been managed from IO Headquarters (for example WB Trust Fund, projects with Council of Europe) resulted in many difficulties. Such practices should be avoided in the future.” EAMR Moldova, 2013, p. 6*

*“La coordination avec les organisations internationales est particulièrement bien développée, tant sur le plan du dialogue politique que pour ce qui concerne la conception et mise en oeuvre de programmes de coopération. On peut aussi signaler la coopération dans la préparation et tenue des réunions des Groupes Thématiques entre partenaires techniques et financiers et l'intégration des agences des NU dans le système des Groupes Thématiques initiés par l'UE. Le dialogue sectoriel donne lieu, dans certains secteurs, à des efforts d'action conjointe, comme dans le cas de la préparation et du suivi du programme d'appui à la Réforme de l'Action Publique (Hakama) avec la Banque Mondiale et la Banque Africaine de Développement, coopération qui s'est poursuivie dans la formulation et la mise en oeuvre de la nouvelle phase du soutien. Dans le cas de la santé, Les missions de suivi ont continué à être organisées de manière conjointe avec l'AECID, l'AFD et l'UNFPA. L'identification du nouveau programme d'appui au secteur de la santé se fait de manière conjointe avec la BM en consultant et tenant informé l'ensemble des PTFs actifs dans le secteur. Dans le secteur de l'éducation, la dernière mission de suivi du programme d'appui à la mise en oeuvre de la stratégie d'éducation a été menée conjointement avec l'AECID, l'AFD, la BAD, la BEI, la BM et la JICA. L'UE était, en 2013, le chef de file de ce groupe multi-bailleurs de fonds qui appuie conjointement le secteur depuis 2007. La formulation du programme Education II a été ouverte à l'ensemble de ces partenaires. Bien qu'en absence d'un programme spécifique, la Délégation est un partenaire actif de l'UNICEF dans le cadre du groupe thématique jeunesse. En matière de gouvernance, il faut en particulier mentionner la coopération avec le Conseil de l'Europe dans le cadre du programme "Renforcer la réforme démocratique dans les pays du Voisinage méridional" qui se déroule de façon satisfaisante. La visibilité du financement de l'UE est également satisfaisante.*

*La préparation de l'appui de l'UE à la phase II de l'INDH a fait l'objet d'une concertation étroite avec la Banque Mondiale (l'évaluation finale de l'appui de l'UE et de la BM à la phase I de l'INDH avait fait l'objet d'une mission réalisée en partie conjointement). Des missions de suivi conjointes des appuis sont prévues annuellement.*

*La formulation du nouveau programme CMB III a été menée de manière conjointe avec la BAD et en tenant des réunions régulières de partage et échange d'informations avec les autres PTF concernés par cette réforme (OMS et BM). Dans le secteur agricole un mécanisme de coordination avec- entre les autres intervenants du secteur- la FAO, l'IFAD, la BM complète les échanges réguliers avec ces organismes. La Délégation UE a été impliquée dans les activités au niveau national dans le cadre de projets régionaux du secteur de l'environnement (agences UN, etc.): l'importance d'assurer la visibilité de l'appui de l'UE a toujours été rappelée. L'identification du programme Formation professionnelle a été coordonnée avec ETF.” EAMR Morocco, 2013, p. 13-14*

*“As predicted in the previous EAMR the percentage of funding under Contribution Agreements has increased from approx. 26.5 % to 48 %, highlighting the key role of international organisations, particular the UN agencies, in responding to the crisis in Syria. Note only is the UN responsible for co-drafting the 'Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan' (SHARP), which outlines the needs within Syria, but the various UN Agencies and international organisations are key implementers in responding to those needs. There was consensus at the end of 2013 that the response to the Syrian crisis must include both humanitarian and development actors. However greater clarity is needed at both a planning level (i.e. the links between the Lost Generation Strategy, the SHARP and the RRP (Syria Regional Response Strategy Plan)) and a clearer division of labour at operational level between the various UN agencies. Furthermore, while the Delegation has worked closely with a number of international organisations in HQ during 2013 (UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR etc) there is a need to have greater dialogue with UN project staff in the field. Given the importance of the UN and international organisations in post conflict planning, and due to the fact that the UN and international organisations cannot take part in the FoSP 'platform 1' on donor coordination, in September 2012 the EU created the 'core donor' group in order that they the UN and international organisations be included (in line with the tripartite agreement between WB-UN-EU). Visibility of the EU's contribution to the UN has on the whole been poor, with some exceptions, and must be improved. This message has been given by HQ and echoed by the Delegation. All existing and new UN Contribution Agreements require the UN agencies*

*to draft an implement a communication and visibility action plan (a copy of which needs to be submitted to the Delegation)."* EAMR Syria, 2013, p. 10

*"La coordination avec la Banque Mondiale, la BAD, le FMI, la BERD, la BEI et les autres institutions financières des Etats membres est excellente, notamment dans le cadre des programmes de réforme cofinancés, mais pas seulement. La coordination avec les Organisations Internationales (OI) a lieu notamment au sein des groupes de coordination thématique. La contribution à des actions proposées par certaines agences UN sur des sujets précis se poursuit: appui à l'Assemblée Constituante avec le PNUD, composante "justice juvénile" du projet de réforme de la justice avec l'UNICEF et rénovation des tribunaux et prisons avec l'UNOPS. La Délégation veille à ce que la visibilité de l'UE soit systématiquement assurée par les OI lors de la mise en oeuvre des projets. Par ailleurs, les OI participent aux réunions de coordinations sectorielles organisées chaque trimestre environ sous l'égide du Ministère bénéficiaire ou du bailleur de fonds principal."* EAMR Tunisia, 2013, p. 8

*"There is generally good cooperation with international organisations and other donors on coordination of ongoing and aligning for the future programmes, for example on civil society support initiatives, energy efficiency, regional development and other programmes. Visibility of EU-funded projects implemented by international organisations is compliant with the visibility guidelines. 1. There is good cooperation and coordination with UN agencies. In particular, Financing Agreement was signed to extend Community Based Approach programme implemented by UNDP to the third phase (€23,000,000). A new contribution agreement was signed with UNICEF on social services for children and families (€500,000). 2. A new agreement was signed in 2013 with the Council of Europe to support media and information society (€2,500,000). A contribution agreement in the justice sector under the project "Support to Justice Sector Reforms in Ukraine" will be signed in spring 2014 for the "standard setting" and monitoring progress of sector reforms (€1,000,000). There are also ongoing projects and cooperation with UNIDO, UNHCR, UNEP, FAO in the respective sectors. 3. A Contribution Agreement was signed with OECD on 1 March 2013 for the implementation of the project "Sector Competitiveness Strategy for Ukraine – Phase 3 – Sustaining Reforms" (€2,000,000) aimed at building institutional capacity in policy making and co-ordination and contributing to the Ukrainian Economic Reforms Programme for 2010-14. The project started implementation and already established sector specific policy working groups to constantly address any policy and administrative barriers with the specific aim of integrating local SMEs in the global value chains. 4. IOM was awarded with a two-year contract to manage EU Border Assistance Mission – phase 10 (€19,800,000) taking up from UNDP which had managed the previous phases. IOM also implements MIGRECO project supporting capacity building of the State Migration Service. 5. EU has contributed €40,000,000 to the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership supported also by other EU Member States, EEA Countries and USA. This fund of €93,000,000 is managed by the EBRD. The cooperation among the contributors and the IFIs is good. 6. Co-operation with NATO/NSPA for the design of the Landmines destruction contract has been good, with firm commitment and clarity of results to be achieved. The project is foreseen under in AAP 2013."* EAMR Ukraine, 2013, p. 9

*"As regards UNRWA: Since 2007, the EU has relied on external independent consultants to assess the performance of UNRWA's main operations. In 2010, the Agency embarked on an initiative to create a unified reporting framework aligned with UNRWA's Medium Term Strategy (2010-2015). This harmonised reporting approach has improved significantly and is systemically adjusted in close coordination with UNRWA's major donors including Australian Aid, Sweden, the EU, the United Kingdom and the United States. Within the forum of the UNRWA Advisory Commission (AdCom), members have regularly commended UNRWA's efforts to consolidate and improve the quality and consistency of monitoring and external reporting as well as the Agency's commitment to results-based management, including its commitment to greater efficiency and effectiveness in health and education service delivery. In 2013, a significant number of UNRWA's top donors (United States, Norway, the United Kingdom, Australian Aid, Switzerland, Denmark, and the EU) have aligned UNRWA's reporting obligations in line with this performance report (UNRWA's Results report). EUREP has also engaged in parallel regular bilateral meetings with UNRWA regarding the new contractual modality for the EU's 2014 contribution to UNRWA's Regular Budget as per the new Financial Regulations. Discussions on this matter continue. Adequate communication and visibility is ensured by the EU Delegation's monitoring of the adherence to the EU-UNRWA annual Communications and Visibility Plan. This jointly-designed plan has thus far been successful at drawing attention to the on-going partnership between the EU and UNRWA and the EU's support for Palestine refugees.*

*As regards the UN: In the course of 2013 the good cooperation between EUREP and both UNDP and UN Women was consolidated. With UNDP coordination and visibility of EU funding has been in-*

creased on East Jerusalem matters and on rehabilitation/housing activities, especially on areas of difficult intervention due to Israel Occupation (East Jerusalem, Nabi Musa surrounded by Area C). Policy dialogue collaboration has been particularly strengthened with UN Women during all the year and request have been done to highlight EU funding visibility of actions provided in Palestine under regional programmes. Collaboration with the WHO continues to be good. Concerning Water and Sanitation, EUREP has developed a very good degree of coordination with World Bank, UNICEF, KfW, AFD and UNDP. For Land development coordination with FAO is very effective and made under the livestock support program and it is mainly on food and feed safety issues.

Although constant coordination has taken place with UN Habitat during our work in Area C a problem emerged due to conflicting implementation modalities between UN Habitat and UNDP. UN Habitat promotes and the EU supports a planning approach, which involves the Palestinian local communities in Area C and which benefits hence from a strong ownership. UNDP is unfortunately working outside any planning interventions and undermines the planning approach undertaken by UN Habitat. This lack of coordination between UN agencies needs to be addressed and solved to avoid possible negative repercussions on the EU programme. In the area of governance, UNDP remains a main actor, and the EU REP collaborates with UNDP in monitoring sector reforms and participation in joint policy dialogue. Operationally, two CAs with UNDP in this area (institutional support to MoPAD and PLC Secretariat) finished, however no new initiatives are in the pipeline, despite a proposal made from the EU REP to UNDP and PLC Secretariat for potential renewal of support. Some contacts were established with UNODC in the specific area of Juvenile Justice and Prisons. The year 2013 saw the signature of a CA with UNOPS for the construction of the Jenin Prison, trusting the capacities of the agency in this type of specialized buildings. In the framework of 2011 IfS Decision "Gaza recovery Program", UNICEF and UNRWA continue to be implementers of two main projects (desalinization, employment)." EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2013, p. 15-16

*"De manière générale, dans le cadre des groupes thématique d'efficacité de l'aide, les échanges sur la programmation et les activités en cours sont continus, ce qui permet une bonne coordination au niveau sectoriel, voire même un partage de tâches entre différents bailleurs dans un même secteur." (EAMR Algeria 2015, 19); "Coordination with international organisations (IOs) was adequate in 2015." (EAMR Armenia 2015, 17); "The EU Delegation maintains a close coordination with a number of IOs and in particular UN agencies that are implementing several EU projects." (EAMR Jordan 2015, 14); "Une bonne coopération existe avec les organisations internationales présentes en Tunisie, ce qui permet une bonne coordination depuis la conception à la mise en oeuvre des programmes." (EAMR Tunisia 2015, 12-13).*

The primary partners are UN Agencies (e.g.: UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, UNAIDS, UNFPA), international and European financial institutions (e.g.: WB, IMF, EIB, EBRD) and MS. In many cases IOs, notably the UN family, are the main implementing partners of EU-funded projects (e.g.: Algeria, Belarus, Egypt, Moldova, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine). The EU ensures coordination through different means such as sector working groups, formal/informal meetings or in some cases through more formal platforms, yet the general feeling is that there is room for improvement. Examples of structured or at least more organised coordination are found in e.g.: Georgia "In line with the strong and sustained efforts to promote donor coordination by the Government of Georgia through its Donor Coordination Unit (DCU), and by a number of line ministries at sectorial level there is good and extended coordination with IOs in Georgia" (EAMR Georgia 2015, 19); Jordan "The Delegation is also very active in the donor coordination for the response to the Syria Crisis where UN agencies are systematically represented in all established Task Forces." (EAMR Jordan 2015, 14); Algeria "De manière générale, dans le cadre des groupes thématique d'efficacité de l'aide, les échanges sur la programmation et les activités en cours sont continus, ce qui permet une bonne coordination au niveau sectoriel, voire même un partage de tâches entre différents bailleurs dans un même secteur." (EAMR Algeria 2015, 19); Azerbaijan "Regular donor coordination meetings which also include international organisations present in Azerbaijan take place on a quarterly basis to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication." (EAMR Azerbaijan 2015, 14); Egypt "The main vehicle for coordination and retro-alimentation with them remains the Development Partner Group (DPG)." (EAMR Egypt 2015, 18).

In the cases of Armenia and Lebanon, attempts have been made to achieve greater coordination but have yet to achieve desired results: "Still, one could not argue that there is a government-led donor coordination structure yet." (EAMR Armenia 2015, 17); "Attendance at informal Donor Coordination Group as well as the UN's Lebanon Development Forum which facilitates common positions among international partners as a basis for dialogue with the Government of Lebanon [...] The Government still was not able to set up a government-led donor coordination scheme." (EAMR Lebanon 2015, 10)

Suite à l'adoption de la Convention de Financement du Programme AFEQ, en Septembre 2015, trois réunions de coordination ont été organisées avec représentants de UNICEF, organisation qui est identifiée dans la Convention pour la mise en place d'une composante du programme en gestion déléguée. Représentants de UNICEF sont couramment en train de rédiger la description détaillée de l'action, qui servira de base pour la préparation d'un contrat sur le format PAGODA. L'Organisation Internationale du Travail a été sélectionnée comme bénéficiaire d'une subvention au cours d'un Appel à Propositions lancé en Juin 2015 dans le cadre du programme PAJE. Bien qu'il s'agissait d'un appel en gestion décentralisée, la finalisation du contrat (sur la base du modèle Pagoda) a demandé un suivi direct de la part du gestionnaire du programme dans la Délégation, ainsi que le maintien de contacts presque quotidiens avec représentants de l'Organisation. Bien entendu, les règles de visibilité de l'UE devront être respectées.

Le projet "Capdel" devra être délégué au PNUD: la coopération est bonne et la DUE est systématiquement consultée à toutes les étapes de la formulation. L'élaboration d'un plan de communication et de visibilité conditionnera l'octroi final du contrat en 2016.

Le Programme d'appui à l'amélioration de la diversification industrielle et du climat des affaires en Algérie "PADICA" 38416 a retenu dans sa formulation la possibilité d'un recours à la collaboration avec la Banque Mondiale au titre de l'action relative à l'amélioration du climat des affaires, notamment le "Doing Business", afin d'améliorer les performances et le classement de l'Algérie. Un montant de 2 millions d'euros pourrait être consacré dès finalisation des consultations entre les autorités algériennes (Ministère de l'industrie) et la Banque Mondiale. De manière générale, dans le cadre des groupes thématique d'efficacité de l'aide, les échanges sur la programmation et les activités en cours sont continus, ce qui permet une bonne coordination au niveau sectoriel, voire même un partage de tâches entre différents bailleurs dans un même secteur." EAMR Algeria 2015, p. 19

"Coordination with international organisations (IOs) was adequate in 2015. Naturally, various technical bilateral meetings were organised throughout the year, and IOs now systematically invite each other to important events, such as technical discussions about new or ongoing programmes, feedback into new strategies setting, etc. In addition, the UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative-led donor coordination meetings continued in 2015, to which participated in a few occasions the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of International Economic Integration and Reforms. Still, one could not argue that there is a government-led donor coordination structure yet. In this forum, the EU shares the lead, with the IMF and the World Bank of the economic development sub-group, having established a formal mechanism for operation as of 2015." EAMR Armenia, 2015, p. 17

"At the identification phase of the AAP 2016 action on justice, the Delegation met with all international stakeholders to discuss their past, present and future plans for engagement in the justice sector (World Bank, CoE, Unicef, GiZ, UNOHCHR and USAID). Regular donor coordination meetings which also include international organisations present in Azerbaijan take place on a quarterly basis to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication. Coordination with the CoE in the field of PCF implementation has eventually reached a satisfactory level. In the regional development sector, discussions continue with GIZ for the grant component on regional development foreseen under AAP 2013 planned to start in March of 2016. Coordination in the agricultural sector is functioning well, including with the WB and FAO, the main IOs active in the sector. The EU has been leading the donor coordination group until second semester 2015, when the Ministry of Agriculture organised the first donor coordination meeting on their initiative. This is the only government-led sector coordination. As for visibility on EU funding, specific Annexes on communication and visibility plans are attached to all projects implemented by IOs. EUD is monitoring the implementation of these visibility plans." EAMR Azerbaijan, 2015, p. 14

"UNDP is the principle UN agency in Belarus which under the 'Deliver as One' (DAO) initiative assumes its role as 'primus inter pares' under the authority of the Resident Representative. The other UN agencies which are present in Belarus (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNAIDS, etc) tend to have limited staff and capacity, although they do also implement EU funded activities. UNDP has established a good working relationship with the Government of Belarus and the line Ministries, for whom UNDP is a partner of choice. The Delegation is sometimes invited to meetings of the United Nations Country Team (at milestones in their work) and part of the country team was invited, alongside with WB and EBRD, for a meeting in the framework of the identification mission for AP 2016. Furthermore, IOM is also an important implementer of EU-funded assistance in the sector of customs and border guards (Belarus-Ukraine). Although there are some minor issues, appropriate visibility in general is guaranteed and the UN agencies make sure that its donor receives appropriate credit for its efforts." EAMR Belarus, 2015, p. 9

“Cooperation with the UN family continues but new engagements are limited to the actual proven added value of these organisations in specific interventions. Accordingly, a contract with Unicef from the AAP 2014 denominated “Expanding Access to Education and Protection for at Risk Children in Egypt” was signed in 2015 taking into account the former’s privileged position of leading development partner and technical advisor to the GoE in this strategic policy area. For similar reasons, the “Enhancing access of children to education and fighting child labour” programme had been contracted with the World Food Programme in 2014, making significant progress during the reporting period. Joint initiatives with International and mainly European Financial Institutions (EIB, EBRD, KfW, AFD) have been consolidated during the past years. Several new strategic projects with the before mentioned entities were developed in the framework of the AAP 2014 and AAP 2015. Further operations are expected to form part of the AAP 2016. An “Emergency Employment programme” with the World Bank was contracted in 2014 and is currently under full implementation. IO and IFI are also consulted by the Delegation on a number of horizontal and thematic issues. They proved to be a valuable asset to contribute to the coordination of EU aid with Egypt’s donor community during the reporting year. The main vehicle for coordination and retro-alimentation with them remains the Development Partner Group (DPG). Cooperation also remained good with the OECD, in particular at policy level, in areas such as business climate where there is also a small common project. Ensuring the visibility of the – very substantial and often critical – EU funding provided to joint programmes with international organisations and IFI/EFI was a priority of the Delegation during the reporting period. Particular emphasis was put on internal monitoring missions and high-level visits to project sites and events, and on very close coordination with partner organisations as concerned all communication or press-related as well as visibility materials and other publications generated by the programmes during 2015. The results of these efforts were very positive and significantly strengthened EU visibility. In order to continue this trend in the future, the Delegation will have to maintain and ideally further increase efforts and resources for visibility-related follow-up and control activities with these programmes.” EAMR Egypt, 2015, p. 18

“In line with the strong and sustained efforts to promote donor coordination by the Government of Georgia through its Donor Coordination Unit (DCU), and by a number of line ministries at sectorial level there is good and extended coordination with IOs in Georgia. Towards identification and formulation IOs are consistently included in the programme design and this yielded for instance at the level of UN family IOs a strong degree of representation, notably under ENPARD I, IDP IV, but also the programme under EaPIC 2012 and in the field of the IcSP. Communication and visibility remain an issue that is being tackled through concerted actions leading to a standing working relationship as in the case of the UN, the CoE and other IOs. The same applies to NIF operations. Coordination with the World Bank develops in line with the above reasoning.” EAMR Georgia, 2015, p. 19

“The EU Delegation maintains a close coordination with a number of IOs and in particular UN agencies that are implementing several EU projects. Currently the Delegation has a strong partnership with UNICEF (education), UNESCO (education, media), UNHCR (Refugees), UNCDF (decentralisation), IOM (Syrian refugees), UNWRA (Palestinian Refugees), UNDP (elections, local economic development), Council of Europe (Justice), INTERPOL (security) and PRI (Justice). The Delegation is also very active in the donor coordination for the response to the Syria Crisis where UN agencies are systematically represented in all established Task Forces. Although visibility remains a challenge, some progress has been made. These OIs are encouraged to participate in the visibility process and to ask for EUD’s approval before launching any communication activity, plan or strategy. They start to understand that we are stricter in making sure projects abide by the Communication and Visibility Manual for external actions. The communication responsibility is mostly assigned to our partners through the obligation to implement communication activities – for each project partners have to provide a communication plan – yet this approach doesn’t ensure Streamlining of messages and the global coherence of our communication, as each project implements its communication activities separately. the Delegation is considering the utilisation of SSF funds to design a Communication/Visibility facility that can be used by all actions and programmes funded under the SSF.” EAMR Jordan, 2015, p. 14

“The Delegation participates in donor coordination on several levels: – Cooperation Section chairs EU Member States Cooperation Counsellors meetings; – Attendance at informal Donor Coordination Group as well as the UN’s Lebanon Development Forum which facilitates common positions among international partners as a basis for dialogue with the Government of Lebanon. The Delegation also participates at other UN meetings, and at events of the World Bank group, among others; – Delegation maintains dialogue with the Council for Reconstruction and Development and other Government of Lebanon contacts. The Government still was not able to set up a government-led donor coordination

scheme. EU visibility is assured in all EU funding that is implemented through International Organizations. The extent to which the EU Delegation is consulted and involved on communication and visibility related matters however varies greatly from one International Organization to another. In this context it can be highlighted that the work relations between the EU Delegation's communication team and the communication teams of UNRWA, UNHCR and UNICEF have greatly improved with generally good visibility for EU funding. Regular meetings between the communication units are being held for coordination purposes and communication content for the press and social media accounts are regularly discussed and shared. Events and other publicity actions organized under the respective contracts are prepared in time and the responsiveness on both sides is high." EAMR Lebanon, 2015, p. 10

"The Delegation builds on its strong co-operation with other donors to ensure both leverage of its assistance and co-ordinated policy dialogue. This included active participate in Development Partners meetings and in sectoral co-ordination meetings with the Moldovan authorities, the Delegation initiated specific co-ordination meetings with International Financing Institutions (EIB, EBRD, WB, IFC, CEB and KfW), made possible by an enhanced presence in country. In addition, in preparation of the AAP 2015 and 2016, close co-ordination was deepened further with the US Embassy, IOM, WHO, OSCE, UNDP, World Bank and the IMF. The EU has ensured inclusive participation of major international organisation stakeholders in preparation of the AAP 2015 and AAP 2016 through sector consultations. Key inputs were taken into account and outcomes of discussions reflected in Identification/Action fiches presented in relevant sector donor coordination and development partners meetings. The Delegation participated in key steering committees related to its assistance activities and ensured the strategic positioning of the EU in policy dialogue. In this regard the Delegation in cooperation with UNDP, WB and other partners has prepared a set of co-ordinated briefing notes (30) in Q1 to focus attention on the new Government on key challenges identified by development partners. Strategic communication cooperation and coordination was set-up with key international organisations, namely EBRD and EIB, especially in the framework of NIF projects and DCFTA Facility, as well as major communication events for SMEs support. Increased and improved coordination of visibility of EU funding was registered for co-funded projects with the Council of Europe, especially in the framework of PCF and bilateral projects. Coordination of EU visibility with UNDP has improved, especially in light of Confidence Building Measures Project, EU High Level Advisors and other projects co-funded and implemented by UNDP. In the framework of regular meetings with the EU Development Counsellors, focus was placed on communication and visibility aspects, with a regular platform for coordination envisaged as of 2016. Overall we observe a significant improvement in visibility of EU funding, though some partners still do not fully respect the EU visibility guidelines. We are pursuing this in bilateral follow up." EAMR Moldova, 2015, p. 16-17

"La coordination avec le Conseil de l'Europe s'est renforcée en fin d'année 2015 autour du comité de pilotage local du programme Sud II, du séminaire sur la ratification par le Maroc de certaines conventions clefs du CdE en matière de droits de l'homme et de la définition de l'appui au renforcement de l'efficacité du système judiciaire marocain cofinancé par le programme d'appui à la réforme de la justice de l'UE. Dans le domaine de la migration, malgré des performances inégales de l'OIM dans la mise en oeuvre de certaines de nos opérations, la Délégation entretient d'excellents rapports de travail avec l'OIM et le HCR. En matière d'égalité hommes/femmes, une relation et coopération soutenues existent avec l'ONU-Femmes. Ainsi, à l'occasion de la journée nationale de la Femme, le 10 octobre, une déclaration conjointe a été publiée et envoyée à la presse. Cette déclaration reprenait les principaux défis en matière de promotion de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes au Maroc. A l'occasion du 25 novembre (journée internationale de lutte contre toutes formes de violence à l'égard des femmes), la Délégation a organisé une journée d'information et de sensibilisation, avec des visites de terrain, pour les Ambassadeurs des Etats membres de l'UE. Elle a invité l'ONU-Femmes et l'UNFPA à participer. Il y a lieu toutefois de signaler une difficulté importante. Un contrat d'assistance technique à la mise en oeuvre du Plan gouvernemental de l'égalité, de plus de 4 millions d'EUR, a été signé. Le démarrage de la mise en oeuvre a démontré que l'ONU-Femmes à qui, par soucis de coordination, les Termes de référence avaient été présentés en amont (une fois envoyés aux soumissionnaires), a profité de cette information pour prendre à son compte certaines actions prévues dans le cadre du contrat d'assistance technique. Cette manoeuvre s'est avérée faisable dans la mesure où nos délais de passation de marché et contractualisation pour les marchés internationaux sont longs, ce qui a laissé le temps à l'ONU-Femmes d'engager rapidement des négociations avec certains partenaires clés de cette assistance technique (notamment le Ministère de la Justice et le Ministère de l'Intérieur). Les programmes d'énergie renouvelable bénéficient d'un financement de la BM/BAD, en plus de l'UE. La coopération avec ces deux institutions et les Institutions financières européennes se déroulent d'une manière très satisfaisante pendant la conception des programmes et la représentation dans les structures de gouvernance des programmes." EAMR Morocco, 2015, p. 20-21



*“The cooperation with IOs is limited to the UN family: The panorama of reliable implementing partners inside Syria remains limited. The largest part of our funding since 2011 remains with the UN agencies through delegation agreements and a grant with ±60% of the funding. ±32% of our funding goes to INGOs through grants. ±7% is with Member states agencies through a delegation agreement. This situation is largely due to the fact that very few actors except the UN are Damascus based and intervening in regime controlled areas. However things were rebalanced in 2015 through funding INGOs and consortia of INGOs (the share of funding going to the UN was reduced by ± 20%). In 2015 direct dialogue between the delegation and the UN representations in Damascus was further enhanced through phone conferences, video conferences and mission. In particular, 3 missions to Beirut allowed very fruitful meetings with the UN Damascus teams. This permitted to: ? Improve the coordination between already EU ongoing projects contracted with the UN (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNhabitat, UNRWA). A formal coordination has been introduced between programmes with UNICEF and WFP. ? Improve the visibility and communication plans so that EU funding is better acknowledged. This was especially the case for what UNDP and UNICEF are concerned. Next EAMR should report on progress on the ground. ? Prepare the ground for a more integrated approach from the UN family with an integrated programme between UNhabitat, FAO, WFP, UNDP and UNICEF which would meet our requirements (and more importantly the identified needs on the ground) : target specific areas with needs based multipronged interventions.” EAMR Syria, 2015, p. 13*

*“Une bonne coopération existe avec les organisations internationales présentes en Tunisie, ce qui permet une bonne coordination depuis la conception à la mise en ?uvre des programmes. Une coopération se fait en particulier avec les organisations avec lesquelles un certain nombre d'opérations conjointes sont en cours, ainsi qu'avec plusieurs agences UN. La BEI, la BERD, la KfW et l'AFD participent aux réunions de coopération UE-EM, ainsi qu'aux groupes thématiques entre partenaires techniques et financiers. Les OI participent également aux comités de pilotage des programmes (par exemple PARJ) dans le cadre desquels elles bénéficient d'un financement. En termes généraux, la coopération déléguée aux agences des États membres ou des organisations internationales, qui ont une expertise de longue date ou d'autres interventions en cours dans le domaine concerné, assure un démarrage rapide des activités suite à la signature des conventions de délégation, une bonne coordination et cohérence entre différents programmes de coopération qui partagent objectifs, résultats et approches (programme PAFIP et IRADA dans le même domaine de la formation professionnelle ou programme Quartiers Populaires, cofinancé par l'AFD et la BEI). La communication et l'échange d'information se font sur une base régulière. La visibilité des financements UE est assurée de manière adéquate, la Délégation étant particulièrement vigilante sur cet aspect. Dans la mesure où la coordination du gouvernement tunisien dans le secteur de la justice et de la réforme pénitentiaire reste insuffisante (1 à 2 réunions générales par an), une coordination thématique s'est organisée entre la DUE et le CoE, PNUD, HCDH, UNODC sur tout ce qui touche à l'indépendance de la justice, plus particulièrement la loi sur le CSM et celle sur la Cour constitutionnelle. La DUE a aussi initié des réunions de coordination dans le domaine pénitentiaire, impliquant les contractants du PARJ ainsi que les ONG tunisiennes et internationale actives sur le terrain. La DUE prend part régulièrement aux réunions de coordination organisées par le PNUD sur la bonne gouvernance et lutte contre la corruption. Une coordination a également été mise en place à l'initiative de la Délégation (coprésidée par la Banque mondiale) dans le domaine du développement régional, de la décentralisation et des collectivités locales.” EAMR Tunisia, 2015, p. 12-13*

*“Implementation of assistance through International Organisations remains important in the Ukraine programme. Main partners measured according to budget at present are EBRD, UNDP and IOM and to a lesser extend OSCE, Council of Europe and World Bank. Mostly the programmes are designed by the implementing partner or at least they have a dominant say given their expertise in the respective areas. For the World Bank and Council of Europe the EU has a clear say in the steering and is also exercising this. As for UNDP such contribution appears to be expected, but given the non-policy/political nature of the community development programmes there is less need felt to do so. Close contact exist with EBRD, but there is often limited margin to manoeuvre in directing interventions. The joint country team meeting in Jan 2016, is expected to have helped in clearing the EU interest in this regard and should enable both side to further evolve their mutual partnership. Important to mention as example is also the protracted negotiations with EBRD on the € 40 million indirect management contract for the establishment of a country wide network of business development centres. Initially very reluctant, EBRD has compromised, even though a very close scrutiny of implementation is required to ensure adherence. In all case it is important that from EU side initiatives are taken to actively involve and make the maximum use of the programmes especially in order to pursue our policy goals. Visibility is provided in the sense of placement of EU logos besides the respective organisations*

logos and regular invitations to participate in public events are made. However, without exception all programmes clearly have the identity of the respective implementing agencies. In this regard there is much scope on the side of the EU to work more with the organisations and own up better the work delivered as being funded by the EU.” EAMR Ukraine, 2015, p. 20

“A long term partnership has been established under the framework of the EU Civil Society Road Map which was adopted in July 2014. In addition, direct support is provided to the 3 main civil platforms in the West bank and Gaza Strip in addition to 9 thematic/sectoral committees. These platforms have funded the Coordination Council of Palestinian NGOs in order to achieve better outcomes and results at both operational and policy levels. Based on these mechanisms the EUREP enjoys a close relationship with civil society, which allows for a direct and frank exchange of views on topical issues which feeds it with valuable information concerning their situation as well as Human Rights in a broader sense. This strengthens EUREP's understanding and knowledge and provides input into future programming. Some consultations with CSO could become more effective, which would need to be addressed by setting clearer objectives and by synthesizing better the main outcomes of such consultations. To note as well that, notwithstanding the extensive consultations, the role of the Palestinian civil society in the development process has remained weak and fragmented. The increased involvement in policy dialogue and governance, capacities for EUREP to establish an effective partnership with civil society throughout all the different sectors of cooperation and temporary measures are still at an initial stage in certain sectors (PEGASE DFS, UNRWA, and Private Sector).” EAMR West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2015, p. 33-34

#### “6. JORDAN AAP

DE welcomed the support sectors selected by COM and noted that they are the continuation of what the EU has been done in the past, thus setting out a coherent and sustainable approach.” 2nd ENI Committee meeting (24.06.2014) – Final minutes, p. 4

“The Chair underlined that the EU has increased its cooperation with the CoE also in bilateral programmes when it has a clear added value and comparative advantage.” 2nd ENI Committee meeting (24.06.2014) – Final minutes, p. 6

#### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – Field missions

#### Level of information and confidence

Level of information		Satisfactory
Degree of confidence		Satisfactory

#### 5.5.2 I-552. Evidence (nature, scope, progress, limits) of on-going joint programming exercises engaged at country level with EU MS {[16]}

##### Global analysis of the indicator

All 12 EUDs that responded to the telephone survey share the view that the coordination with EU MS was strengthened in recent years. The same applies – though to a lesser degree of consensus – to complementarity for policy dialogue and joint programming. As for Division of labour (JC42), EU MS are reluctant to go much further: programme complementarity is ranked low and synergies even lower. The findings of the field missions are fully consistent with this ranking: improvements in overall coordination and a slow increase in Joint Programming but on the other hand difficulties in translating coordination in operational complementarity and search for concrete synergies at country and project levels.

The EUD survey indicates that progress in coordination is uneven across Neighbourhood countries, even if the assessment of a positive trend is shared by almost all EUDs. Joint programming has started to become a reality in many areas, but is still at an initial stage and not yet present in all countries.

From field visits, EU MS welcome joint assessment and programming exercises – provided the leadership of the EU does not lead to a ‘top-down’ approach. They participate to the meetings and to the consultations. Their main concern is the timeframe imposed to the pro-

cess, particularly the time left to contribute and comment on notes and reports: their human resources on the ground are limited and often structured and informed contributions would require exchanges with the expertise only available in their ministry – implying longer timeframes than allowed by the process and EU internal deadlines.

A quality review of the available joint programming assessment/programming documents concludes that the quality of the result of such a long and time consuming process is often poor. In some cases weaknesses are linked to poor inputs from external expertise. In most cases, it is the capacity for strategic analysis and programming that is unevenly shared among participants (notably local stakeholders); the EU expertise in elaborating documents based on EU templates and EU jargon is so overwhelming that it is difficult for participants to contribute meaningfully; this applies to 'small' EU MS that do not have a cooperation agency to mobilise appropriate expertise. Another factor limiting quality is again the timeframe, as indicated above. Joint programming although it is promoted it is not implemented effectively in all countries (e.g. in Ukraine); this has to do with the wider issue of the organisation of donors' coordination.

## Presentation of collected proof

### ENI survey

*What are the key areas where the EU Delegation was able in recent years to improve the coherence and consistency of EU actions within ENI programmes and across EU actions (among EFIs and with Union's sectorial policies/programmes)? (n=12/12)*

Not always easy to bring coherence between the regional component and the bilateral component of the ENI. The Association Agreement is more important than the ENI. There is extensive interaction with other EU line DGs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level: they are managed by HQs, we take them into account but we don't have a lot information about projects and their results. 4. For ENI programmes with intervention funded by other EFIs: we are informed and try to avoid overlap.

1. Amount ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border): yes with issues.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral).

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border): there are some problems in some areas but overall it is very good. 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs but there are not many in the country.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country. 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs: EIDHR, CSO/LA. 5. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs: DG EAC, DG Grow. But it was the same in recent years.

1. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 2. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes at regional level (e.g. between bilateral programmes and the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crises – Madad Fund – and Justice). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs (e.g. DG Trade and Customs)

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral): but we are not coherent in the sense that we are in many sectors because Morocco since 2011 has putting in place many reforms. Coordination is overall led by the government but there's not a development policy in the country and everything works at a sector level so it's a bit fragmented. 2. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. For ENI programmes with interventions

funded by other EFIs: EIDHR.
1. Among ENI programming in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs (DG Trade, DG Home, DG Research and Innovation, DG energy, DG Environment).
<b><i>If yes, please specify main areas of improvement or worsening (n=12/12)</i></b>
Improvement: 1. Donor coordination (bringing the government in certain sectors e.g. Education and agriculture). 2. Complementarity with other donors. 3. Joint programming.
Improvement: 1. Policy dialogue. 2. joint programming.
Improvement: Aid coordination because many donors came back or engaged further with the Syrian crisis.
Improvement: Better coordination/understanding among donors since 2014-2015. It has to do with the ENI but also with the development in the country.
Improvement: coordination with EU MS and other donors.
Improvement: joint programming but not linked to the ENI.
Improvement: Project with Home Office implemented by UN on local governance.
Improvement: We have strengthened the areas mentioned but we could do more, that's the objective of joint programming. Need to improve: coordination with other donors. We have good relations with WB and EU like-minded donors (e.g. Norway and Switzerland). We would like to work more closely with the UN family.
More focused and concrete interest. More leading role in the coordination with EU MS and other donors.
NA
Need to improve: coordination with other donors and complementarity for policy dialogue with other donors.
Need to improve: encourage government to do more coordination.

*“The EU added value has demonstrated all its potential when co-ordination and complementarities with EU-MS and other donors have been high. This has improved a lot in the last decade, but joint programming is still at an initial stage. There are also areas where the EU could better draw on its own diversified and advanced experience (stronger co-ordination among the Commission’s DGs), and areas where it provides the bulk of the development assistance, but its political role is not proportional to the level of its support (e.g. Palestine). [...] The EU added value has demonstrated all its potential when co-ordination and complementarities with EU-MS and other donors have been high. This has improved a lot in the last decade. Joint programming with the MS has started to become a reality in many areas, and there are a number of examples of successful co-ordination and complementarities (e.g. some BS programmes in ACP, some CPPB interventions).”* 2016 Review of strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO to assess the European Consensus on Development, p12.

*“Proposed way ahead of AMICI*

*EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack A southern Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative (AMICI):*

*An enhanced EU coordinated approach to the region.*

*1. Objective*

*In the Southern Neighbourhood, against the background of regional developments in the past few years, substantial efforts have been made by the EU, International Financial Institutions and the international community to identify, prioritize and finance investments for socioeconomic development in the Southern Mediterranean partner countries. The drive towards reform and democratic consolidation could be jeopardized by political instability coupled with serious socio-economic challenges that many of these countries currently face. It is therefore crucial to help the countries of the Mediterranean achieve inclusive economic growth, job creation and social stability, thus paving the way for democratic transition. In view of this need, the AMICI initiative (Italian/Greek Presidency sponsored coordination*

*mechanism developed in cooperation with the Commission and EEAS ) has been proposed to foster strategic co-ordination in the region by the EU, Member States and other donors and frameworks, in relation to investment facilitation, private sector development, and creating a favourable enabling environment for business and direct foreign investments. The objective of the initiative is to enhance coordination and efficient use of available resources, as well as improving partners' capacities and ownership and regional cooperation to attract needed investment, with a view to enhance its development impact, in particular for job creation. This coordination initiative is fully in line with the EU Neighbourhood Policy and takes into account an improved international aid effectiveness agenda, in particular as defined in Busan (Korea) which covers inter alia Joint Programming. Any AMICI mechanism will be implemented taking full advantage of the existing institutional framework, without establishing new instruments or facilities, neither duplicating, nor substituting existing structures." AMICI Mapping – EC key findings – 17 Nov 2014, p. 1-2*

### *"3.2 Justice Sector reform*

#### *3.2.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:*

*The most active donors in the justice sector, besides the EU are the World Bank, the German cooperation through GIZ, OSCE, and the Council of Europe, with each focusing on a different subsector. Specifically, the OSCE and the Council of Europe focus on trial and penitentiary monitoring, offering various practical training activities for specific target groups, such as judges, bailiffs or penitentiary staff. GIZ's activities have focussed on development of the administrative court system in Azerbaijan. World Bank activities have focussed on loans for construction of modern court facilities in the regions and limited capacity building for judges and further work is planned for 2014 onwards. Policy dialogue by all donors is limited, although recent progress in the framework of the EU funded Justice Reform Support Programme Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) and development of IRP2 under the CIB provides positive starting points, which are expected to be expanded further." 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 12-13*

#### *"3.3.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:*

*The main donors involved in the Education sectors are the World Bank, UNICEF, German cooperation, and the Council of Europe. In particular, since 2009 the World Bank has been supporting the "Education Sector Development Project" with the aim of improving the quality and learning results, mainly in secondary education. The project aimed to re-train of teachers, develop curricula and improve schools governance and infrastructure. UNICEF is providing policy advice for the set-up of a modern pre-school system. The German cooperation implemented by GIZ focusses on vocational qualification as well as on the development of the VET system through leadership training and policy advice." 2014 Azerbaijan SSF 2014-2017, p. 15*

### *"3.1 Social Inclusion (indicative 30%)*

#### *3.1.3. Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:*

*Social inclusion features prominently in the agenda of international donors, including development agencies of EU Member States and UN family. This creates opportunities for additional synergies and complementarity. In particular, further harmonisation can be pursued in agreeing on common conceptual approaches and indicators of achievement to bring about a more significant impact. Donor coordination meetings focusing on social inclusion organised in Belarus will be one of the main venues for these efforts." 2014 Belarus SSF 2014-2017, p. 19*

#### *"3.2.4. Donor coordination and policy dialogue*

*The main donor coordination in the governance sector is done through the Development Partners Group (DPG), with specific sub-groups on Democratic Governance and fight against corruption. Both sub-groups are co-chaired by the EU Delegation (EUD) with others partners and have significant participation. In addition close contacts are in place with UN specialised agencies on women and child rights (United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP)) and fight against corruption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)). Important links have been established with WB with regard to legislative reforms and monitoring the constitutional framework. A close policy dialogue is ongoing with relevant line Ministries as well as NCCM, NCW and NCHR in light of their role as agents of democratic change. The EU has also established close links to Member States development agencies active in the field of service delivery to the most vulnerable. As regards the dialogue on business environment, the EU Delegation jointly with EU MS Embassies and Agencies is in regular dialogue with relevant government authorities, local think tanks and business associations on issues*

relevant to business and investment climate. Donor co-ordination in this field is led by the DPG subgroup on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises development, chaired by the German Embassy and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The EUD is an active member of the group.” 2014 Egypt SSF 2014-2015, p. 14

“3.2 Agriculture and rural development (indicative 30%)

3.2.3 Donor coordination and policy dialogue are:

*In order to increase concentration and coherence, seven EU Member States (CZ, ET, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK) have been combining resources to assist Moldova in areas related to regional development (institutional capacity development, regional civil society development, improving regional statistics) since 2012. The World Bank, EIB, EBRD, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Romanian Government are providing a range of loans and grants to upgrade the social and technical infrastructure in the rural areas.*

*Donor coordination meetings on Transnistria are organised once every 3 months and are chaired by the EU Delegation. There is an extensive policy dialogue with the Government through the Joint Partnership Council, which feeds into policy-making and decision-taking at the level of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning. Transnistria projects are discussed on a very regular basis with the Government of Moldova and the Tiraspol de facto authorities. Contacts with Gagauzia have also been established.” 2014 Moldova SSF 2014-2017, p. 10-11*

“Special Measure in Lebanon

*Action Document for Upgrading Solid Waste Management capacities in Bekaa and Akkar Regions in Lebanon (SWAM)*

2.4. Complementary actions

*This action is complementary to the support already provided by the EU, certain EU Member States, other donor countries, international organisations and NGOs, to address the humanitarian and non-humanitarian needs caused by the conflict in Syria and the substantial influx of refugees to Lebanon as set forth in the RRP5. In addition, the EU has been closely involved in the preparation of the World Bank's Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). Hence, coordination with interventions of the other donors will be ensured.*

*On the other hand, a tight collaboration with ECHO has also been established to ensure complementarity with the emergency humanitarian response which ECHO provides.”*

Special Measure for Lebanon 2014, p. 6

*“Increased financial support: EU financial assistance for Armenia will be available to support the actions identified in the present document. The Commission is furthermore proposing a new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose, which will cover the main part of EU financial assistance and will include aspects of cross-border and transnational cooperation. The Commission will also propose an extension of the EIB mandate to Armenia as of 2007;” AP – Armenia, p. 3*

*“On women's rights, even though there is a degree of opening and other donors are also working on the topic, the need to work on strengthening the role of women in Egypt still remains. The EC added that the programme is designed to ensure coordination and avoid duplications with existing programmes by other development partners.” 8th ENI Draft minutes, p. 3*

“4.3 Other donors

*A number of Member States have provided support for CBC activities, including support for cooperation and capacity-building among regional and local authorities. The Council of Europe also has a long tradition of support to CBC, in particular through providing a possible legal framework for CBC actions (developed with the agreement of all its members), as well as supporting local and regional networks.” 2014 ENI East Programming for Cross-border Coop 2014-2020, p. 10*

*“In April 2014 and in the face of the crisis unfolding there, the European Commission decided to establish the Support Group for Ukraine, the first time such an arrangement had been made for a non- EU member country. The objective of the Support Group, coordinated by the Commissioner in charge of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, is to provide a focal point, structure, overview and guidance for the Commission's work to support Ukraine, through the initial and crucial early phases of its transition. The Support Group would also help mobilise Member States' exper-*

tise and further enhance coordination with other donors and the International Financial Institutions. Throughout 2015, the Support Group for Ukraine will advise and assist Ukraine in meeting its commitments under the Association Agreement, including their engagement to implement sound public financial management.” 2015 DG NEAR Management Plan 2015, p. 9



“Fragmentation and proliferation of aid is still widespread and even increasing, despite considerable recent efforts to coordinate and harmonise donor activities. The EU must take a more active leadership role, as mandated by the Lisbon Treaty, and put forward proposals to make European aid more effective. Joint programming of EU and Member States’ aid would reduce fragmentation and increase its impact proportionally to commitment levels. The aim is for a simplified and faster programming process, to be largely carried out on the ground. Where the partner country has formulated its own strategy, the EU should support it by developing, wherever possible, joint multi-annual programming documents with the Member States. Where the partner country has not done so, the EU will endeavour to develop a joint strategy with the Member States. This process would result in a single joint programming document, which should indicate the sectoral division of labour and financial allocations per sector and donor. The EU and Member States should follow the document when devising their bilateral implementation plans. Participation should be open to non-EU donors committed to the process in a given country. To boost country ownership, joint programming should be synchronised with the strategy cycles of partner countries where possible. Operationally, the EU and Member States should make use of aid modalities that facilitate joint action such as budget support (under a ‘single EU contract’), EU trust funds and delegated cooperation.” 2011 – EU – Agenda for Change\_COM 2011-637, p. 10-11

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 5.5.3 I-553. Evidence in agreements and programming documents of the coordination of ENI and EU MS/donors actions {Art. 5}

### Global analysis of the indicator

As per their respective templates, all EU programming documents under ENI are required to follow-up on complementarity and coordination related issues. In several different sections they cover EU MS and other donors and present briefly key actions that are to be considered for coordination, complementarity and synergy.

EU agreements passed with partner countries do not need a similar section as their objective is to identify the agreed priorities and related mutual commitments.

### Presentation of collected proof

See I-512 and I-552

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – EU MS (ENI Committee, field visits)

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 5.5.4 I-554. Level of involvement of EU MS in preparing Joint Programmes {7(8)}

### Global analysis of the indicator

**Joint programming background** – Coordination is organised by the EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack aiming at less aid fragmentation as EU development partners plan together, cutting out gaps and overlaps. This allows individual actors to focus on the sectors where

they can add the most value while ensuring that all bases are covered under the joint strategy.

In Joint Programming, EU development partners develop together a joint strategy which responds to the partner country's national development plan and sets out the overall rationale and direction for their support. It also coordinates which sectors/areas each of them will work in, what the overall objectives for these sectors are, and gives provisional figures for their financing over the joint strategy period. The individual more detailed objectives, projects and programmes that each EU development partner will carry out in order to implement their contribution to the joint strategy are detailed in their own in-house programming and implementation plans.

EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy (2007) provides guidance on how to increase complementarity among projects/ programmes and managing EU Services; it is noted that this document concerns all units of the EU.

As per the overall framework of their involvement in the implementation of the overall ENI life cycle, the EU member states are very much involved in the programming of the interventions of the Instrument. Their participation is implemented either by officials of their embassies or by members of their Development Cooperation Agencies. The main forum where the ENI programmes are elaborated are the EU Delegation (other regional fora like the UfM are contributing to the regional programming, which is implemented at central EC HQ level).

**Assessment by stakeholders** – The results of the ENI-specific survey show that joint programming with EU MS has been increased and its quality improved over the past years in most of the partner countries. Generally, however, the HoCs felt that more could be done and that joint programming is mainly limited to specific areas, for example VET.

From the field missions it also became apparent in the field visits that the EU is the largest donor in most ENI partner countries and therefore usually leads the efforts for the overall coordination of all donor activities in the country (Georgia, Egypt, Tunisia), either by supporting the partner country's competent authority to do it or by implementing this coordination by itself; in cases where the EUD has not undertaken either role (e.g. Ukraine), the activities of the donors (including the EU and the member states) become competitive with high risk for overall low effectiveness and for overlapping activities.

See I-552. For the assessment of joint programming as a process.

### Presentation of collected proof

*What are the key areas where the EU Delegation was able in recent years to improve the coherence and consistency of EU actions within ENI programmes and across EU actions (among EFIs and with Union's sectorial policies/programmes)?*

Not always easy to bring coherence between the regional component and the bilateral component of the ENI. The Association Agreement is more important than the ENI. There is extensive interaction with other EU line DGs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level: they are managed by HQs, we take them into account but we don't have a lot information about projects and their results. 4. For ENI programmes with intervention funded by other EFIs: we are informed and try to avoid overlap.

1. Amount ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border): yes with issues.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral).

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border): there are some problems in some areas but overall it is very good. 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs but there are not many in the country.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country. 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. Among ENI programmes at regional level. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs: EIDHR, CSO/LA. 5. For ENI programmes



**What are the key areas where the EU Delegation was able in recent years to improve the coherence and consistency of EU actions within ENI programmes and across EU actions (among EFIs and with Union's sectorial policies/programmes)?**

with interventions supported by EU line DGs: DG EAC, DG Grow. But it was the same in recent years.

1. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 2. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes at regional level (e.g. between bilateral programmes and the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crises – Madad Fund – and Justice). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs (e.g. DG Trade and Customs)

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral): but we are not coherent in the sense that we are in many sectors because Morocco since 2011 has putting in place many reforms. Coordination is overall led by the government but there's not a development policy in the country and everything works at a sector level so it's a bit fragmented. 2. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs.

1. Among ENI programmes in the same country (bilateral). 2. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs: EIDHR.

1. Among ENI programming in the same country (bilateral). 2. Among ENI programmes targeting the same country (bilateral, regional, multi-country, cross-border). 3. For ENI programmes with interventions funded by other EFIs. 4. For ENI programmes with interventions supported by EU line DGs (DG Trade, DG Home, DG Research and Innovation, DG energy, DG Environment).

**If yes, please specify main areas of improvement or worsening (n=12/12)**

Improvement: 1. Donor coordination (bringing the government in certain sectors e.g. Education and agriculture). 2. Complementarity with other donors. 3. Joint programming.

Improvement: 1. Policy dialogue. 2. joint programming.

Improvement: Aid coordination because many donors came back or engaged further with the Syrian crisis.

Improvement: Better coordination/understanding among donors since 2014-2015. It has to do with the ENI but also with the development in the country.

Improvement: coordination with EU MS and other donors.

Improvement: joint programming but not linked to the ENI.

Improvement: Project with Home Office implemented by UN on local governance.

Improvement: We have strengthened the areas mentioned but we could do more, that's the objective of joint programming. Need to improve: coordination with other donors. We have good relations with WB and EU like-minded donors (e.g. Norway and Switzerland). We would like to work more closely with the UN family.

More focused and concrete interest. More leading role in the coordination with EU MS and other donors.

NA

Need to improve: coordination with other donors and complementarity for policy dialogue with other donors.

Need to improve: encourage government to do more coordination.

**Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – NEAR B, C; EU MS (ENI Committee); Field missions (see annex)

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 6 EQ 6 on leverage

### 6.1 JC61: Under ENI/ENPI interventions, the EU makes a strategic use of policy and political dialogue to leverage political and policy engagement/reforms in the partner countries and implementation by the partners of jointly agreed objectives

#### 6.1.1 I-611. Evidence that ENI regulation induced a more strategic use of policy and political dialogue under ENI.

#### Global analysis of the indicator

**Policy background** – Political and policy dialogue is an important part of ENP. The COM 2011 “A new response” introduced – or at least emphasized – the involvement of the national counterparts in the dialogue (“*In applying this more differentiated approach, the EU will keep channels of dialogue open with governments, civil society and other stakeholders*”, p.3), in particular on human rights (ibid, p.4). There is a whole section in the communication on ‘intensifying our political and security cooperation’ which is indeed focused only on political issues. Also section 4 of the Communication demonstrates the importance attached to political dialogue: “*There is a consensus among partner countries and Member States that more substantive Association Councils would allow for more in-depth discussion at political level. But political dialogue need not be reduced to a yearly discussion in the Association Council: more frequent and more ad hoc opportunities should be envisaged when conditions so require. A more continuous and more intimate political dialogue is key to establish the confidence and trust required to tackle our common challenges. In addition, the Commission intends to enhance dialogue on sectoral policies (such as energy, education, youth, migration and transport) with their Ministerial counterparts in partner countries*”.

ENI policy framework changed (2015) mostly by adjusting the level of priority of pre-existing areas of cooperation, giving an increased prominence to security, migration and private sector development. Compared to its predecessor, the ENP Review gives some more priority to political dialogue (not explicit in 2011) but generally keeps the same approach to policy dialogue, e.g. an extensive and systematic mention that policy dialogues have to be engaged in all areas (security, mobility, economic governance...) and with all stakeholders.

**ENI regulation framework** – The ENI regulation (2014) reminds the key role of dialogue, as combined to cooperation: “The Union promotes, develops and consolidates the values of liberty, democracy, the universality and indivisibility of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the principles of equality and the rule of law, on which it is founded, through dialogue and cooperation (...), preamble). Apart from one further statement, clarifying that policy dialogue has to be coordinated with EU MS (Article 5), the ENI regulation makes no further mention of policy dialogue.

The EUDs are instrumental to bringing partner countries’ governments and civil society together in a structured dialogue on key areas of ENI programmes: macroeconomic governance, employment policies, human rights... and, already, migration, mobility and security (COM(2011) 292/3). Regional programmes are also sources of policy dialogue (with an implicit expectation that it could move towards political dialogue between countries engaged in protracted crises) (“*Building on the positive results of experiences under MEDA25, support to reforms via the budget has significantly increased since the introduction of ENPI and has delivered tangible results, promoted reforms and helped strengthen policy dialogue with partner countries. However the approach should be further refined to incorporate the increased focus on fundamental values and democratic governance*” (ibid, p.29).

**Strategic use of policy and political dialogue under ENI** – From the above, the regulation

in itself therefore cannot be said to have induced a more strategic use of policy and political dialogue but the management of the instrument by EEAS and NEAR give a key role to political and policy dialogue in achieving the objectives of the regulation.

The situation in the region is such that, although the funds of the Instrument are important for most of the countries whose economies have been damaged by the recent political and social developments, the political dialogue is maybe more important for achieving EU objectives with its neighbours and the stabilization of the region.

This is exactly what the Regulation is promoting by combining the incentive-based approach, mutual accountability and a differentiated, tailor-made approach. This strategy implies, to be effective and leverage sustainable changes:

- Deeper analysis and understanding of each country separately,
- Addressing the real basic needs of the people,
- Coordination of the EU and EU member states' policies, endeavours in the region (joint programming),
- elaboration of strategic plans for action per country,
- discussions and negotiations with each country and all of them in the frame of regional fora, and
- promotion of the required reforms through actions/ programmes with ownership of the country and through the approach of "more for more", with its associated criteria.

This new approach is based on the use of policy and political dialogue with the partner countries for the determination of the best "mix", so that the ENI funds can maximise the expected effects in the country and, more widely, in the region. Political and policy dialogue are therefore used in a strategic way under ENI.

In the case of Ukraine the political and policy dialogue with the new Government has even more weight and importance, considering that following the geo-political re-orientation of the country the objectives of the country (resulting from the "Maidan legacy") have completely changed but cannot be elaborated in detail and in a coordinated way by the still weak Ukrainian Government; on the other hand the needs resulting from the multi-dimensional dissolving of the State structures as well as from the collapse of the economy dictated the implementation of immediate measures and programmes financed by the ENI; under this situation the original programming of ENI became obsolete and special measures were decided based rather on emergency needs satisfaction than on a stabilisation or development framework; three years after the revolution the EU in cooperation with the Government has started to elaborate a new multi-annual strategy and a programme of ENI interventions covering the period 2018 -2020; the policy guidelines of the revised ENP are foreseen to be implemented for the structuring of this 2018-2020 programme.

### **Presentation of collected proof**

*"3.4.Main activities. The main activities to implement the state building contract budget support are: Policy dialogue with government and civil society inter alia in the structures foreseen in title VII of the AA/DCFTA (PCA structures prior to entry in force of the AA/DCFTA);" C(2014) 2907 – Decision on Special Measures for Ukraine, p. 14*

*"Regular dialogue will take place between the EU services and the Government of Ukraine in the context of the Joint Budget Support Monitoring Group for budget support as well as in meetings with civil society participation. Payment will be split into a first fixed tranche to be transferred to the Government of Ukraine upon signature of the Financing Agreement, subject to compliance with the general conditions, and a second variable tranche that will be released after the agreed conditions are met<sup>11</sup>. The EU Delegation to Ukraine, possibly with the support of independent experts, will verify the extent to which conditions are met for the disbursement of the second tranche." C(2014) 2907 – Decision on Special Measures for Ukraine, p. 14*

*"The EU should support moving towards a post-2015 overarching framework. Discussion on the basis of the orientations set out above should make it possible for the EU to come to a common position on how the SDGs and the MDG review processes should best be converged and integrated into a single process to better deliver such a comprehensive framework. In this respect, the EU should also actively*

seek a constructive dialogue with all partners and stakeholders, in order to build common ground, including through political dialogues with third countries.” 2013 – EU – Decent Life for All\_Ending poverty\_COM 2013-92, p. 14

“Where a partner wishes to pursue deeper relations with the EU based on shared values, work will develop on the existing basis. Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine have chosen the path of political association and economic integration with the EU through new generation Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTA); Morocco benefits from an advanced status in its relations with the EU and Tunisia has a privileged partnership. The EU will work with those partners to further develop their relations and to maximise the benefits for both parties to those agreements. To underpin these partnerships, the EU should increase opportunities for political dialogue at ministerial level with these partners.” 151118\_joint-communication\_review-of-the-enp\_en, p. 4

“The EU will engage with all partners in an inclusive dialogue on human rights and democracy issues, including on areas where experiences may differ. Human rights and democracy will continue to be an agenda item in our political dialogue with all partners in mutually agreed formats. Support will be provided to civil society fora.” 151118\_joint-communication\_review-of-the-enp\_en, p. 6



“It is therefore essential to maximise the impact and leverage of EU funding – being more innovative in the type of actions supported, seeking synergies between ENPI and other EU funds as well as with Member States and their financing institutions, with IFIs and other donors.” COM(2006) 726 – On strengthening the ENP, p. 12

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – EEAS, NEAR B, C, and SGUA, Field missions.

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 6.1.2 I-612. Evidence that policy dialogue under ENI/ENPI, complemented by political dialogue, has given impetus to policy reforms in the partner countries.

### Global analysis of the indicator

**Progress in policy reforms** – The Progress reports evidence uneven advancement of policy reforms across the Neighbourhood. The latest issue of the global report covers 2014 (JOIN(2015) 9 Final). For each area of cooperation, the assessment of policy reforms is negative overall but one or two countries can be presented as the way ahead. Typically for democratic governance, the report indicates that “While the EU remains convinced that work in this important area is key for its foreign policy, the realities in the Neighbourhood paint a very nuanced picture of developments in democratisation and good governance. On a positive note, Tunisia demonstrated that (...). Other parts of the Neighbourhood were characterised by stagnation in terms of democratisation.” It can be said that 2014 was some sort of ‘annus horribilis’ for the Neighbourhood. Country progress reports for 2015 convey a more nuanced picture, at least for countries left out from Ukraine, Syrian and Libyan crises: Georgia, Armenia, Tunisia, and Morocco. This new impetus for policy reforms is however too limited in regional scope and too recent to analyse if EU dialogue can be evidenced as a driving factor.

EAMRs are another source to assess progress in the agreed reform agendas. EUD interviews paint a mixed picture, with several positive assessments (Ukraine, Jordan, Morocco) and some clearly negative ones as in Algeria (with a poor ratio of EU aid/GDP) and Egypt (by lack of budget support programmes). The countries where policy dialogue is said to be ‘limited’ are the majority. On the other hand the perception of the local stakeholders (Central Government, Civil Society and international organisations) in the visited countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Egypt and Tunisia) is mostly positive: they consider that policy dialogue has been important for the identification of the development priorities of the country and of the best way to address them (Interviews), while it is also key for fine-tuning the EU approximation

path, especially when negotiating a Budget Support matrix; this is true even in the cases with turn-over of Ministries' heads (Tunisia), or with a very weak Administration (Ukraine), or with limited dialogue scope (Egypt).

**Role of policy dialogue in policy reforms** – However, the role of political/policy dialogue in these achievements is not documented as such. A specific question was included in the telephone survey (12 EUDs responded): “*How would you rate the leverage effect of political/policy dialogues conveyed by ENI programming and implementation?*” Most of the responses (see below) acknowledge a limited leverage effect of the dialogue with the partner country; only 3 out of the 12 respondent are clearly positive about leverage. Among the EUDs that witness only limited effects, several see improvements in some sectors but not an overall progress on all cooperation areas.

The field missions brought the same kind of mixed achievements in terms of reforms, against an extensive use of dialogue by EUDs, with a high level of expertise on their side, and the participation of HQ staff and top management. Achievements should however not be limited to sector reforms. Several interviewees emphasized that objectives pursued by the EU through ENI programmes/policy dialogue are broader, with notably geostrategic and political interest to defend.

Budget support has a distinctive added value in policy dialogue for EUDs as for national authorities (field visits). Most significant achievements regarding policy reforms were conveyed by budget support preparation and implementation. BS (state building contracts and sector budget support) tranche indicators provide a sound framework for assessing progress in the reform agenda. EUDs without a BS have less opportunities to engage in policy dialogue – mainly during preparation and signature of multi-annual programming or financing agreements.

## Presentation of collected proof

### *Responses to the ENI-specific survey (telephone)*

#### *How would you rate the leverage effect of political/policy dialogues conveyed by ENI programming and implementation? (n=12/12)*

A lot of reforms have been achieved in the country thanks to ENI programming

Difficult to say because we don't have BS which limits our capacity to measure our impact. But we closely monitor the implementation of programmes.

Limited because the government is dysfunctional. We do a lot and have a lot of programmes but the effect is limited but it has to do with the government.

Limited, we could do more though it's very dependent on the political context: 1) the country does not have the same level of control of its development path compared to other countries. One recommendation of one of our evaluations is that we should do more triangulation with a neighbouring country to ensure common understanding. 2) there has been no elections for the last 10 years so there's an issue of legitimacy of the government at large. 3) the areas where the EU intervene are controlled by a neighbouring country. 4) in general terms there is a deterioration of the situation. But we are contributing to state building, the EU has a kind of stabilising function by keeping the perspective of a sustainable solution alive.

Modest/limited taking into account the EU resources (ENI allocation as % of the budget is 0,1% compared to 3% and 2.2% in neighbouring countries). The country is not moving towards EU integration so resources are limited and leverage is limited as well. Our leverage comes from good experts, good expertise and providing useful and relevant advice. But the EU is a respected partner and we have good policy dialogue in PFM, rural and regional development and education.

Overall it is positive. In certain sectors it is promising because for 2015 and 2016 many programmes are at the starting phase or they are not yet started (only 2 or 3 programmes have started). But if you take into consideration the engagement of the national authorities in general it is good.

The budget is very limited to have an impact. The country is an oil country with high revenues.

There's a leverage effect.

There's an outstanding and strong policy dialogue between the EU and the country (Association

**How would you rate the leverage effect of political/policy dialogues conveyed by ENI programming and implementation? (n=12/12)**

Agreement, our involvement in the reforms).

There's policy and political dialogue but only in some sectors: economy, trade, transport. It depends on sectors. For example, in sectors of environment and energy the leverage is higher.

Very high e.g. Our work on gender has been key to maintain gender on the agenda.

We have worked with our partners in order to have joint policy dialogue and that has been effective in some areas

**Any outstanding achievement on this respect at sector level? Please specify (n=12/12)**

Environment and climate change have proven to be successful for the past five years with two large programmes implemented and a third one about to start.

1. Human Rights Action Plan. 2. Agriculture: rural development. 3. Public Administration Reform Roadmap.

E.g.: new strategy for the energy sector and rural development.

E.g.: we have conditioned the BS programmes on macro-economic stability.

Economic governance by a combination of expertise, support and pressure that accelerated the implementation of reforms.

In education the government is working in a plan "Reaching all Children with Education" and the EU is very much part of building this strategy and it's an achievement but there are also other donors. In agriculture the EU has supported the Ministry in the creation of a strategy (that was only us).

NA

Policy dialogue in e.g. the judiciary sector, PAR, public procurement, energy. Without us it would have been worse.

Positive achievements can be found in e.g.: Solid waste management and renewable energy and energy efficiency where we have a good level of dialogue with national authorities.

Social cohesion: Support to the vulnerable and poorest people in the country.

Some achievements with Ministry of Finances. In the energy sector: Algeria is very interested in renewable energy programme.

Yes. In agriculture: subsidize system more aligned with the EU system. In education we have reached an agreement with authorities where they see the EU as a model for moving reforms forward and we are able to provide the right experts that help us to push the country in the right direction.



**Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EAMR

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews –NEAR, EEAS, Field missions

**Level of information and confidence**

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

**6.1.3 I-613. Evidence that jointly agreed objectives were implemented by the partners**

**Global analysis of the indicator**

The progress of the implementation of the ENI funded country programmes can be evidenced in the published documentation for several partner countries. The analysis of the EAMRs reflects however a more balanced assessment. Two countries are 'performers', mainly because a reasonable level of ownership or alignment on national priorities has developed: Morocco and Georgia (though for the later objectives have become more demand-

ing so there are cases of non-delivery). Ukraine is improving but it will not become a performer until the capacity of the Public Administration is strengthened (with new staff and extensive capacity building) and the central Government is effectively supported to become able to design strategies, develop policies, plan axes of interventions and coordinate the activities of the donors. A few governments are too reluctant or too weak to implement reforms (Algeria, Lebanon, Ukraine). In other countries, the progress is uneven among sectors or sections of the economy,

Progress is not seen only in politically “easy” interventions and policy areas (transport, energy et al), but also in “difficult” ones (anti-corruption, rule of law, human rights, civil society etc). Evidence of the implementation of the agreed actions/ programmes are many, as reported by the EUDs in each country, indicatively:

- Armenia: Justice reform programme
- Georgia: Development of DCFTA and SMEs
- Ukraine: Justice and anti-corruption reform (legal framework), SMEs
- Moldova: Legislation on: anti-discrimination, Visa Liberalisation, SMEs, Trade, natural gas and electricity
- Morocco: Healthcare for migrants, students and independents
- Tunisia: Civil Society, Justice reform.

Important progress was also reported in the regional level, for example: electricity interconnectivity in the Caucasus, electricity transmission network in the South, Environmental protection et al.

The question “*To what extent jointly agreed objectives were implemented by the beneficiary country (national budget allocations and administrative enforcement)?*” was asked to the 12 EUDs that were surveyed by telephone. Answers are overall positive (see below). The key enabling factor as seen by several HoOP is the alignment of ENI programmes on partner country’s priorities, i.e. the differentiation principle.

## Presentation of collected proof

### *Responses to the ENI-specific survey (telephone)*

#### ***To what extent jointly agreed objectives were implemented by the beneficiary country (national budget allocations and administrative enforcement)? (n=12/12)***

All projects are aligned with PC needs. But it's too early to assess.

All the time. It's pushing for their own set of objectives to be achieved.

The country has demonstrated a stable willingness to improve its environmental status, in particular through adoption of various regulations largely approximated to EU legislation.

Difficult to say because just a few programmes have started. But there is a positive and negative example.

1. Positive example: support to PFM and PAR where a number of reforms we agreed were implemented.

2. Negative example: skills for employment and social inclusion due to the fact the strategy that we used has been challenged by the creation of a royal and national committee to review the strategy of the country in terms of human resources development that disrupted what we tried to achieve.

In some cases, reforms were implemented in others not. It all depends on the level of ambition of the reforms and the capacity and willingness of the Ministry to implement reforms.

No national budget allocations but we work a lot through the PC in indirect management with ex-ante approval and EU objectives are implemented by PC so overall the rating is good.

Objectives have become more demanding so there are cases of non-delivery but overall is positive.

Overall, the situation could be better. The country has weak public administration and weak budget management system. Many commitments have not been met.

Significant improvement. E.g.: Energy: 86% of agreed objectives; health 66%, transport 50%, water 83%.

**To what extent jointly agreed objectives were implemented by the beneficiary country (national budget allocations and administrative enforcement)? (n=12/12)**

This is a work in progress. Good examples in the areas of anticorruption, energy and transport.

We are at the tendering stage but a lot of activities are being undertaken in focal sectors (education and rural and regional development). So yes but mainly related to the ongoing ENPI support.

We are implementing a result-oriented framework in a number of areas and some indicators have been met but in some areas.

**Sources of information used**

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents; EAMR

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews –NEAR; EEAS, Field missions

**Level of information and confidence**

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

**6.2 JC62: The incentive-based approach within the ENI (umbrella funding, indicative financial allocations expressed in 20% ranges) leverages political and policy engagement/reforms in the partner countries and implementation by the partners of jointly agreed objectives**

**6.2.1 I-621. Evidence in ENI programming documents of differentiation in modality of intervention according to the pre-determined set of criteria of Art. 4**

**Global analysis of the indicator**

Overall the programming process, as assessed in interviews at HQ and EUDs, takes into account the five elements listed in ENI regulation (Article 4(1)). They are the key areas of the policy and political dialogue. Country programming documents do not reflect as clearly the above five elements. They are rather spelling agreed priorities in politically acceptable wording for the two parties of the agreement. The full reasoning underlying EU response is not disclosed and is generally stated in notes to file and internal correspondences between EC services. Of particular importance in the programming decisions under the ENI is the absorption capacity; thus the almost systematic recourse to institutional support.

The updated programming instructions for the 2017-2020 period are not extremely helpful in this respect. The ENI regulation is indicated as an overarching reference but the five elements under Article 4 are neither reminded nor made explicit.

**Presentation of collected proof**

*“Article 4 – 1. Union support under this Regulation provided to each partner country in accordance with point (a) of Article 6(1) shall be incentive-based and differentiated in form and amounts, taking into account all the elements listed below, reflecting the partner country's:*

- (a) needs, using indicators such as population and level of development;*
- (b) commitment to and progress in implementing mutually agreed political, economic and social reform objectives;*
- (c) commitment to and progress in building deep and sustainable democracy;*
- (d) partnership with the Union, including the level of ambition for that partnership;*
- (e) absorption capacity and the potential impact of Union support under this Regulation.”* ENI regulation

*“In general, programming documents should foresee:*

- no more than three sectors of intervention, derived, in principle, from the ENP Action Plans or their equivalents;*
- A complementary support for capacity development and institution building, to address the implementation of priority commitments deriving from EU agreements and the dialogue on mobility*



that are not already covered under the three priority sectors. This agreement-driven provision will be especially focused on approximation to EU legislation and technical standards, where relevant. This may also support the participation of the country in EU Programmes and cooperation with EU Agencies, where relevant;

- A complementary support in favour of civil society where such a separate/stand-alone facility is required. Civil Society Roadmaps will be a useful point of reference. Support to civil society should, as much as possible, be integrated in cooperation programmes by a combination/mix of modalities.” EEAS/EC 2016, Programming Instruction 2107-2020, p.8

“A **results-based approach** shall be applied to all ENI assistance and built into the programming from the beginning. Results indicators suitable for demonstrating the added value of EU assistance to the partner country or to a specific sector are to be defined and designed from the start of the programming process in order to allow results reporting of financial assistance at corporate as well as region/country levels.

This approach will contribute to the monitoring and assessment of the broader results of the ENP.

For this, attachment 1 of the programming document template needs very careful consideration by delegation.” EEAS/EC 2016, Programming Instruction 2107-2020, p.9

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

## 6.2.2 I-622. %age of the ENI budget available to answer to crises, emergencies, and unexpected events

### Global analysis of the indicator

There is no pre-fixed reserved amount within the budget of ENI for answering to crises, emergencies and unexpected events. Adjustments are made by using procedural flexibilities (special measures and ranges) and differences in use of the annual appropriations among instruments (lengthy IPA programming in 2014-2016 allowed a temporary increase in ENI appropriations to face crises in Ukraine and launching of Madad). This kind of financial engineering is not sustainable, does not provide enough resources to face major financial needs (reconstruction after the war in Syria), and implies that ENI resources will be depleted some years before the end of the MFF period.

Several initiatives are under consideration by EEAS and DG NEAR, notably the so-called “flexibility cushion”, a reserve of 10% of ENI annual appropriations kept aside to be used to respond to crises and emergencies. If unused by the end of the year, the amount would be re-injected in the programming process or carried over to the next period.

In addition but linked to ENI, the EU can resort – in the Neighbourhood as elsewhere – to EFIs dedicated to emergencies, political, financial, or humanitarian crises, tensions, etc. (IcSP, MFA, ECHO – see EQ5). Potential financial commitments are however assessed at HQ as widely insufficient nowadays, and likely even more so in the near future – particularly in the Neighbourhood. Depending on evolutions on the ground, financial needs to which the EU will be called to contribute are way higher than resources availed by the MFF: deradicalisation, reconstruction, stabilisation, treating root causes, etc. In principle, other EFIs’ human and financial resources can implement a first partial short-term response to an emergency need so that there is enough time for the ENI to get organised and implement more permanent measures. A plan B is however desirable, based on geostrategic anticipation for a region that is key for EU interests and EU’s own security in the future.

### Presentation of collected proof

“Create two reserves within the ENI (one for the East and one for the South) to be used for response to urgent and unplanned needs, including crisis and post-crisis response actions. In practice, funds

would be 'earmarked' and set aside from the annual allocation of each country and multi-country programme at the beginning of the budget year. They would then be used for response actions to urgent and unplanned needs. In the Neighbourhood region, recurrent urgent needs seem a likely scenario for the coming years. However, in case no such actions were needed in a given year, funds could be re-allocated to the country/multi-country programmes for which they were originally planned. Risk of the annual approach: late budget execution.



*This option (similar to DCI) is feasible within the existing legal and budgetary framework: in fact, it is a matter of annual planning/programming. It does not contradict nor replaces the ENI incentive-based mechanisms (which react to performance and progress). However, it requires a different approach in the mention of indicative figures in the next round of SSFs/MIPs.*” EC 2015, Working group of flexibility

### Sources of information used

Documentary analysis – see above (extracts) for key documents

Interviews – NEAR B; Field missions

### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		Satisfactory
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		Satisfactory

### 6.2.3 I-623. Share (where relevant) of additional umbrella funds in annual commitment and degree of correspondence with progress reports.

#### Global analysis of the indicator

The assessment by EUDs (ENI survey; 12 respondents to the question “*What is the most effective financial incentive for the specific beneficiary country (umbrella programmes, ranges, others)?*”) of the effectiveness of umbrella programmes for the incentive-based approach instructed by the ENI regulation is overall negative. All EUDs that had to manage an umbrella programme witness at best a limited effect linked to i) the limited amount, ii) the absence of criteria for its allocation, iii) the availability of other EU extra fundings (EUTFs), and iv) inability for beneficiaries to overcome their internal issues.

The limiting factors of ENI incentive-based approach were explored through the question “*Any factors limiting the effect of ENI incentive-based approach? Please specify*”. The response are the following:

- The country is taking umbrella programmes for granted
- Lack of awareness
- Lack of ownership
- Political factors, dysfunctional government
- Size and timing (too late).
- Lack of alignment with EU MS

The eight responses to the Joint Survey corroborate the above, as did all interviews during field visits (with EUDs and national authorities). Only in HQ some defenders of the incentive-based approach are still emphasizing on a reputational effect of the umbrella programmes; the view is hardly shared in operational directorates.

Even though the umbrella programme is technically open to all partner countries in the Neighbourhood, as a matter of fact only countries showing significant progress in the fields of democracy and human rights can hope to be eligible. These countries are increasingly rare in the Neighbourhood since 2010/11, when the incentive scheme was designed. In most ‘failing’ countries, this negative trend is rather linked to security issues, terrorism, and spread of radicalism than to deep societal regressions. If the principle of incentives is universally relevant, it seems somehow outdated for nowadays Neighbourhood and EU mutual interests. This key feature of ENI regulation does de facto not apply to at least 3/4<sup>th</sup> of the partner countries, by lack of partner countries’ will or capacity; in other words, 3/4<sup>th</sup> of the beneficiaries are left with only one working principle: differentiation, which is hardly a programming guidance or an operative principle to apply Article 4 of ENI regulation.

In HQ, a more comprehensive view of the incentive-based approach is presented, joining to the minimal financial incentive more attractive features like visa action plans, mobility, and a set of other potentially incentive non-financial measures (political influence, geostrategic in-

terests, additional financial leverage through blending, etc.). This approach is far more convincing for partner countries than umbrella programmes but is not foreseen as such in the ENI regulation.

On the other hand there are specific difficulties related to the implementation of the measure, indicatively: (i) the timing of implementation is one year later than the period when the progress of the country was assessed; under the very fluid situation of many partner countries there is a high risk that a highly assessed country, candidate to receive the extra funds, may have had in the meantime a severe worsening of its status (political, social) and thus should not receive the “prize” (case of Moldova); (ii) Funds available under umbrella programmes are part of the ENI-wide programme. According to the ENI Regulation to facilitate the implementation of the incentive-based approach an amount in the range of 10 % of the financial envelope is allocated to multi-country umbrella programmes which supplement the country financial allocations<sup>63</sup>; ; (iii) the justification (narrative report) of the selection of the country to receive the extra funds every year is another difficulty, since in many cases political reasons for or against a country also play a role (e.g. supporting positive trends, like for Tunisia); (iv) for a number of countries (e.g. Algeria, Azerbaijan) the “prize” is not making any real difference (which in some cases may also be true for the volume of EU assistance in general) and the incentive is therefore rather limited.

### Presentation of collected proof

#### *Responses to the ENI-specific survey (telephone)*

#### ***What is the most effective financial incentive for the specific beneficiary country (umbrella programmes, ranges, others)? (n=12/12)***

The country benefited from Spring funds and umbrella programmes they invested the funds mostly in response to crisis. Now they are finished but the country got the Madad Fund, this is not an incentive-based approach but it's a huge fund for crisis in the region and the country benefits from it.

But the incentive-based approach doesn't reinforce the country willingness to improve and get more funding. They are happy to get extra funds but it's not going to change their governance. A better incentive might be introducing more conditionalities.

Not applicable

None of them because they don't feel it.

Not applicable

Political exposure and political recognition and we are not using it enough. We don't have the right tools for that. The financial incentive is not enough.

Prospect of SBS funding combined with good TA. The umbrella programme in the country is taken for granted, so not a real incentive.

The amount of resources does not matter. It's the expertise what matters.

The incentive-based approach does not really influence the government (no leverage effect). Though it's better than the "more for more" principle. A frank and targeted dialogue could be more effective.

The most effective financial incentive is the macro financial assistance. The ENI has to be more change-management oriented

The only thing they express interest in is BS. Umbrella programmes: they don't notice the difference when we change the amount of the envelop.

To improve the incentive-based approach, it would be beneficial for countries to know in advance what potential support they could have against what set of reforms. The incentive is stronger when the additional support is high of the Government agenda and know in advance.

We don't have Incentive-based approach yet. We hope to implement it in the next programming period.

<sup>63</sup> . There is a specific budget line 22 04 03 03 Support to other multi-country cooperation in the neighbourhood - Umbrella programme

<b><i>Any factors limiting the effect of ENI incentive-based approach? Please specify: (n=12/12)</i></b>
The country do not comply with requirements.
The country is getting umbrella programmes for granted so it is not a credible incentive.
Lack of alignment with EU MS (do things different of what we say as EU). That limits our ability to influence.
Lack of awareness even if we have explained to them many times and the existence of other financial resources in the country (e.g. USAID and money coming for the Syrian crisis). The security of the country is more important for the country than trying to cope with the requirements of the EU to unblock extra money. We had a case but it is an ENPI programme where the resuming of the death penalty in 2014 has impacted negatively the absorption of the umbrella programme. By breaking the moratorium on death penalty we could not inject the money that was promised.
Lack of ownership. We are assuming that there's interest in funds. There's interest from beneficiaries but not from the government, only with BS.
NA
No
Political factors.
Size and timing (too late). Need: more ambitious and additional targets and funds and flexibility to use them.
The dysfunctional government: very hard to pinpoint an interlocutor to interact with the donor community. You have to speak to many people in the government and this limits the effect of any incentive.
We don't have umbrella programmes because the human rights situation is worsening. The incentive-based approach does not work in the country.

### *Responses to the joint survey*


<b><i>In what ways do the umbrella programmes provide incentives to partner countries for more structural reforms and more democracy?</i></b>
The country does not really qualify for support under the UP + it is expected to receive a cumulative envelope (2014-2017) below the indicative lower-limit of the range pledged in the Single Support Framework. In any case, the country allocation is too small to create significant incentives.
The country is an unusual case in this regard as the instruments do not provide such an incentive for a OECD member
provides more funds which can be used to support reforms; works to support the country determined to do reforms. the exact source of funding (ranges) is often unnoticed by the partner countries as it is not stressed which funding source is used
So far, it was not possible to use umbrella programmes for the country.
The umbrella programme was welcomed by the beneficiary. But in parallel Members of Parliament extended their own mandate without elections, so the ongoing umbrella programme didn't contribute to this failure in democracy. Also, structural reforms are notoriously difficult with its delicate confessional balance with which the country is governed. Umbrella programme could not change this.
Umbrella programmes (former "more for more") have been used in order to complement the main sectors of intervention whenever there was a need. The lack of progress in the context of the Public Administration Reform and the Justice sector have certainly generated the need to formulate a specific programme under 2015 for promoting more structural reforms through CSOs (EUR 8 million). Since 2014, additional CSO component was added to the budget support operations in order to improve the monitoring mechanisms of the structural reforms to be made by the Government.
Not really as the UP is not embedded in the thinking of the national authorities and therefore don't consider it as a significant incentive to pursue or to design more political/structural reforms.

### **Sources of information used**

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific and joint survey)

Interviews – DG NEAR, EEAS; Field missions

#### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

#### 6.2.4 I-624. Evidence that annual commitments are in line with pluri-annual programming documents {Art. 7}.

##### Global analysis of the indicator

The commitments of ENI in the first two years of its implementation (2014, 2015) amount to 4,791.53 mio €. This is ~31% of the total ENI allocations (15,432.64 mio €). Considering that the programming period is 7 years (2014-2020) and that by the end of 2015 ~29% of the overall time has elapsed, it could be said that the progress of commitments is good.

##### Presentation of collected proof


EU Budget

##### Sources of information used

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific and joint survey)

Interviews – DG NEAR, EEAS, Field missions

#### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

#### 6.2.5 I-625. Evidence from partner countries that they are linking their engagement to the variable amounts in pluriannual programmes and annual commitments (survey).

##### Global analysis of the indicator

EUDs indicate that the financial incentive is negligible at best. They do not insist on the presumed regional competition to be acknowledged as the best performer. Moreover for best performers, the umbrella programmes are taken for granted, thus with limited incentive effect whether for more or deeper reforms or further implementation of the jointly agreed objectives. See I-623 for a detailed analysis.



##### Presentation of collected proof

See I-623

##### Sources of information used

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

#### Level of information and confidence

<b>Level of information</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Degree of confidence</b>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

### 6.3 JC63: ENI co-operation leverages additional resources – from other Union’s instruments, partner countries, other donors, diaspora remittances, private sector

#### 6.3.1 I-631. Existence of a strategy to develop a leverage effect

##### Global analysis of the indicator

The search for financial leverage is evoked in the preamble of the ENI regulation: “*The Commission should seek the most efficient use of available resources by using financial instruments with leverage effect. Such effect could be increased by enabling funds invested*”

*and generated by financial instruments to be used and re-used.”* The leverage is nowhere further detailed in the text.

**Neighbourhood Investment Facility** – The 2015 ENP review elaborates a bit more: “*To further maximise impact, the EU will seek to leverage considerable additional funding by further enhancing its cooperation with major International Financial institutions and through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF).*” The NIF potential for financial leverage was identified in the Global progress report on ENI implementation in 2014: “*The NIF supports projects in the areas of energy and transport interconnections, climate change and environment and for SMEs. A DCFTA Facility has been prepared in order to support the adaptation and reorientation of businesses, so as to increase the access to benefits foreseen by the agreements. With this facility, the EU aims to mobilise EUR 150 million of grants from 2015 to 2017 through the NIF to leverage up to EUR 1.5 billion of investment from IFIs in the three countries, i.e. Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.*”

According to NEAR B3 (Finance, Contracts and Audit), most of the potential of financial leeway of blending is tapped by the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) since 2009, in association with EIB and EBRD. In 2014, 16 new projects and two additional contributions for ongoing projects in the Neighbourhood region received final approval from the NIF Board for a total NIF contribution of EUR 294.46 million. These grants leverage over EUR 2.53 billion of loans from European Financial Institutions – in other words for every Euro provided by the NIF, EUR 8.60 of lending or investment was mobilised. In 2015, the situation was comparable with NIF contributions of EUR 367 million leveraging an estimated EUR 2.17 billion of loans (financial leverage effect 1:6.9).

**Blending with IFIs** – EUDs develop partnerships with IFIs on specific projects. Typical example is the SME’s development programme active in three countries Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova: the ENI provides in total of EUR 19 million and EBRD a total of EUR 100 million; SMEs can take a loan from EBRD and at the same time an ENI grant of 10% of the loan amount. IFIs find an interest in the mechanism as it make their loans more concessional, thus increasing their respective portfolios.

**Financial contributions by national budgets** – Co-financing by national budgets is requested, in particular for budget support programmes. The data available in CRIS or MIS does not allow to size the amounts leveraged that way.

**Joint programmes with EU MS** – Only few of the ENI-survey respondents are mentioning an additional leverage through joint programmes. The process is on-going but has not yet been attractive for EU MS (field missions).

**EUTFs** – The strategy was revised in 2015 to answer to the prioritization by the 2015 ENP Review of swift response to crisis and resilience. Two EUTFs were established and pooled significant amounts from EU MS and other EFIs (for the moment).

The ENI resources were used to fund two trust funds, i) the Madad TF for answering to the needs of displaced persons induced by the Syrian conflict (and reconstruction challenges at a later stage); ii) the North Africa component of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, with a focus on the EU migration strategy. The financial leverage effect introduced by the EUTFs is, at this stage, found to be not significant (10% of the total). Madad Funds pledges and contributions as on September 2016 are shown below:

*Table 31 EU and MS contributions and pledges to the Madad Fund*

<b>EU and Member States' contributions and pledges to the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund'</b>	
In € million, last updated on May 20th, 2016	
<b>Austria*</b>	<b>11,50</b>
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>3,00</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	0,10
Croatia	
Cyprus	
<b>Czech Republic*</b>	<b>5,00</b>
<b>Denmark*</b>	<b>10,00</b>
<b>Estonia*</b>	0,25
<b>Finland*</b>	<b>3,00</b>
<b>France*</b>	<b>3,00</b>
<b>Germany*</b>	<b>5,00</b>
Greece	
<b>Hungary*</b>	<b>3,00</b>
Ireland	
<b>Italy**</b>	<b>8,00</b>
<b>Latvia*</b>	0,05
<b>Lithuania*</b>	0,10
Luxembourg	
<b>Malta*</b>	0,02
<b>Netherlands*</b>	<b>5,00</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>3,00</b>
<b>Portugal*</b>	0,20
<b>Romania*</b>	0,08
<b>Slovakia*</b>	<b>3,00</b>
Slovenia	
Spain	
<b>Sweden*</b>	<b>3,00</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>3,00</b>
<b>Total contributed &amp; pledged from MS</b>	<b>69,30</b>
Contribution from the EU budget	<b>639,23</b>
<b>Total EU</b>	<b>708,53</b>
Turkish co-financing for IPA I package*	24,65
<b>Total overall</b>	<b>733,18</b>
Target	1000,00
<b>Shortfall</b>	<b>266,82</b>
* Already paid in	
** Already paid in €3 million and pledged €5 million for 2016	

Source: Madad Fund Info note: EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund' State of Play and outlook 2016

**PPP** – The use of private funds under public- private partnership schemes has not been realised due to many reasons, including high sovereign risk, security purposes, low income of the potential users of the concessioned services, et al).

## Presentation of collected proof

*Responses to the ENI-specific survey (telephone)*

**Did ENI actions leveraged additional financial resources? Pls. give us examples of specific projects. (n=12/12)**

3 examples where we have leveraged additional funds from EU MS:

1. An operation in the northern Jordan funded by EU MS (AFD and KfW) (EUR 140 millions). They were able to ask for approx. EUR 35 million from the Madad Fund (Trust Fund) and from the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) so we doubled the amount.
2. New governance programme that will be adopted in the coming days. We have asked AECID to implement the CS component and they have committed to add EUR 2 million.
3. Solid waste management: AFD is going to implement one of the components and they are currently negotiating with the national government in order to extend and additional loan. It's not yet secured but it has positive prospects.

No

No, limited. Only funds from EU MS but it's rather joint implementation than leverage.

No. ENI programmes haven't started yet.

Not yet. We do not have BS but the WB has a new programme "Concessional financing" where donors such as the EU have pledged money that will subsidize loans for the country. In future the country will be able to catch these concessional loans and pay almost no interest because donors would have subsidized a large portion of the interest. That's an example of leveraging funds from donors and translating into bigger loans.

Only in very few cases, mainly because of the declining of the economic situation.

The macro financial assistance is an important aspect.

We are leveraging funding from the EIB.

Yes

Yes.

Yes. Blending with EFIs.

Yes. For some projects we made a condition that national resources are being put in place. E.g.: road project that we've leveraged EUR 160 million from EFIs and we have provided EUR 20 million for TA. Also regional projects with EU MS (Sweden, Romania, Germany). We have many examples: in the water and energy sectors for example.

In BS we're asking the country to pre-finance expenses and we reimburse when they achieve some targets.



**Can you please indicate the main sources of additional resources (national budget, remittances, trust funds, private funds in PPP, etc.)? (n=12/12)**

Blending EFIs (e.g. With EUR 400 millions the EU has leveraged EUR 6.000 millions) and national budget.

Donors.

EFIs and to a lesser extent national budget.

EIB.

EU MS and trust funds. National budget is difficult because of the situation in the country. But for example in the case of solid waste management it is under discussion.

EU MS.

National budget in a few cases.

National budget, other donors contribution and loans through blending facilities.

National resources, co-financing through EFIs and co-financing with EU MS.

No concrete examples at the present.

Through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) and the Trust Fund for Migration. From MSs but at limited level. We are trying to leverage national funds through financing decentralization and local development. We are trying to use our funds to leverage national funding. To some extent there's some increase of national resources in BS.

We ask government to commit national resources in all programmes but it's difficult to control this aspect. To be seen in the future.

There was a programme in the sector of education before 2014 where they committed to contribute EUR 17 millions and they did not comply with their obligation.

In the new programming period, the government has committed to contribute 25m to the project with the Ministry of Finances to implement the computer system.

**Sources of information used**

Surveys – EUDs (ENI-specific survey)

Interviews – NEAR B, C; Field missions

**Level of information and confidence**

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

**6.3.2 I-632. Extent to which ENI resources mobilised additional funding, notably with trust funds, blending and public-private partnerships. {[18]}**

**Global analysis of the indicator**

See I-631

**Presentation of collected proof**

See I-631

**Sources of information used**

See I-631

**Level of information and confidence**

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>

**6.3.3 I-633. Existence of a strategy to develop financial instruments the use and re-use of ENI resources.**

**Global analysis of the indicator**

No information was possible to be collected about the existence of a strategy for the development of financial instruments which would use and re-use ENI resources. It was learned through interviews with NEAR A that this strategy was not allowed by the EU financial regulations.

**Presentation of collected proof**

NA

**Sources of information used**

Interviews – DG NEAR

**Level of information and confidence**

<i>Level of information</i>		<i>Poor</i>
<i>Degree of confidence</i>		<i>Satisfactory</i>