

**ANNEX 4**

of the Commission implementing Decision on the 2014 special measure for the Syrian population

**Action Document for "Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations"**

**1. IDENTIFICATION**

Title/Number	Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations CRIS number: ENI/2014/351-068		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 4,050,000 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 4,050,000		
Aid method / Management mode and type of financing	Project Approach Indirect Management with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)		
DAC-code	730	73000	Recovery

**2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT**

**2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives**

Currently in its fourth year, the crisis in Syria continues unabated, at a devastating cost for people suffering not only in Syria but in neighbouring countries as well. In addition to loss of lives, debilitating injuries, internal displacement and forced migration, Syrians are being thrust into poverty by the day more than ever before. 75% of the population currently lives in poverty and 54% in extreme poverty. With regard to the Human Development index (HDI), the conflict has rolled back Syria's human development achievements by 35 years. The unemployment rate is estimated to have reached 54% at the end of 2013.

In order to respond to more and more destitution of the Syrian population that could lead to continuation of the conflict featuring also radicalisation, the EU has been funding the UNDP for a livelihood programme that started in January 2014. The programme aims at addressing the immediate needs of affected households and communities while also laying the building blocks for medium and long-term recovery and development. This resilience-based development approach allows a longer-term perspective from the outset, focusing on strengthening the capacity of communities to cope with the crisis through immediate emergency interventions, livelihoods, housing, infrastructure and basic services as well as by recovering from the socio-economic impact of the crisis.

With the increasing destitution and new areas of "relative stability" emerging, UNDP is gearing its field structures and plans to upscale its interventions through expanding the number of beneficiaries.

## 2.2. Context

### 2.2.1. Country context

#### 2.2.1.1. Economic and social situation and poverty analysis

Anti-government "Arab Spring" protests in 2011 were met with brutal crackdowns. By 2012, the uprising against Bashar Al-Assad had spiralled into a dramatic civil war that has killed more than 191,000 by August 2014 and triggered a severe economic recession. After almost four years of crisis, approximately 75% of the population now live in poverty with 54% people living in extreme poverty. Unemployment was estimated to have increased to more than 50% of the labour force by the end of 2013. Estimates based on the latest labour force survey from 2011 suggest that the number of employed people declined by 55% between 2011 and the end of 2013.

The Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) estimates that the Syrian gross domestic product (GDP) has declined by 4% in 2011, 31% in 2012, and 38% in 2013. Accordingly, Syria's GDP in 2013 dropped to 41% of the 2010, i.e. pre-crisis level. The contraction in GDP is concentrated in four key economic sectors: the wholesale and retail trade sector (including hotels and restaurants), transport, mining (primarily petroleum), and the manufacturing sector. Together these sectors accounted for about two thirds of the overall estimated decline in GDP until the end of 2013.

Recent reports<sup>1,2</sup> show that the Syrian economy has experienced massive de-industrialisation as a result of business closure and bankruptcy, capital flight, looting and destruction. Syria's economic loss was USD 103 billion by the second quarter of 2013, equivalent to 174% of its 2010 GDP in constant prices. Damage to capital stock of USD 49 billion accounted for 48% of this loss. This lost capital will have to be replaced from new financing sources in any future rehabilitation and re-industrialisation of the Syrian economy. Private consumption contracted by 40% in the first quarter and 47% in the second quarter of 2013 compared to the same quarters in 2012, reflecting the dire economic and financial circumstances facing Syrian households as the armed conflict intensified in the first half of the year. Further, in 2013 more than 20,000 businesses were estimated to have closed down.

The livestock sector has been seriously depleted by the ongoing conflict. Poultry production is estimated to be down by more than 50% compared to 2011, and sheep and cattle numbers are down approximately 35% and 25% respectively. To cope with the crisis Syrian livestock owners have been selling their animals in neighbouring countries without the usual quarantine controls posing a serious threat to animal health in the region.

It is worth noting that in 2013/14 at least 1.47 million tons of wheat would need to be imported to meet the demand of the country (estimated to be at 4 million tons in 2010/11). This may further increase wheat flour price volatility. The projected drought in Syria will also affect crop production in rain-fed areas potentially leading to further reliance on imports.

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<sup>1</sup> Syrian Center for Policy Research (Oct 2013): War on Development, Impact of the Crisis report.

<sup>2</sup> UN-ESCWA report (Sep 2014): The Conflict in Syria: implications on the macro-economy and MDGs

Available data suggests that Syria's economy is drifting towards hyperinflation. Data issued by the Central Bureau of Statistics shows that the Consumer Price Index in 2013 had increased by about 90% compared to the beginning of the conflict in 2011. Despite the sharp official increase, the actual figure may be substantially higher, and is likely to vary widely across the country, reflecting the fragmentation of Syria's economic space. The sharp increase in prices might reflect the substantial fiscal pressure which is potentially leading to a monetisation of the fiscal deficit contributing to acceleration of inflation in order to curb recurrent expenditures. Poor and vulnerable households are likely to have been worst hit as the highest price increases were for essential items such as electricity and gas, basic food, and clothing.

The economic decline has left many Syrians exposed to high food and fuel prices which have increased food insecurity and other forms of vulnerability. Purchasing power has declined in the face of rising food, fuel and medicine prices. The prices for food, clothes, electricity and gas have almost doubled by the first quarter of 2013<sup>3</sup>. The official price of fuel increased dramatically by at least 185% during the year. Economic and financial sanctions (discussed further below) have placed additional pressure on trade, including on the import of essential goods and services, upon which Syria has come to increasingly rely on. In addition to the higher prices, food access is compromised by the low quality of food available on the markets, the insecurity, the transport constraints, the credit for suppliers, and the foreign currency shortage.

The formal economy has imploded. There has been a growth in informality, rent-seeking activities, criminal enterprise and economies of violence that pose risks to post-conflict economic regulation, reform and equity. Failing a radical reversal of fortunes on the ground, the economic outlook for 2014 and beyond appears equally grim. As the crisis is in its 4<sup>th</sup> year, the spectrum of a "lost generation" of youth, with very little access to education or work, looms over Syria. Around half of school-aged children are no longer going to school on a regular basis. In addition to the 2.9 million increase in the number of unemployed at the end of 2013, part of the population, particularly the youth, has joined conflict-related livelihood activities to make a living. Sustained social and economic pressures will continue to erode the resilience of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and local communities, and the requirements for humanitarian assistance will remain high. If these trends continue, there will be enormous long term development impacts.

Sanctions and financial regulations contribute to overall economic decline which in turn exacerbates hardship, through commodity shortages, high prices and deteriorating public services. In such a crisis-ridden economy even "humanitarian goods" such as medical supplies that are nominally exempt from sanctions are immediately subject to price inflation once they arrive on the Syrian market. Sanctions impact the lives of ordinary people, and have contributed to the slide in the value of the Syrian Pound (SYP), causing major hardship across all affected groups.

In an effort to minimise the effect of sanctions, the Central Bank of Syria imposed a series of tight restrictions on foreign currency transactions at the end of 2013.

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<sup>3</sup> Syria Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) 'Syria War on Development - socioeconomic monitoring report of Syria', October 2013, for UNRWA and UNDP.

Although some exemptions for UN agencies and international staff have been accepted the result has been a more constricted and challenging trading environment. For example, foreign exchange payments to local suppliers are now forbidden with few exceptions. This makes food procurement extremely difficult, especially in places like north and central Syria (Aleppo in particular) where agencies must continue to use local suppliers to make timely deliveries to refugees.

Additional factors are increasing the number of Syrians' in need. Not only the international sanctions and the ongoing drought, but the reinforcement of the Islamic State (IS) as an international force within territories in Syria's governorates (Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor) is causing further constraints on civilian population with serious limitations for the access of humanitarian aid.

#### 2.2.1.2. National development policy

Syria's national development objectives have normally been laid out in a series of 5-year plans. The 10th five-year plan covered the period 2006-2010 and while the 11th five-year plan for 2011-2015 was drafted, it was not officially adopted. Due to the violence and unacceptable human rights situation, the Council of the European Union suspended EU bilateral cooperation with the Government of Syria in May 2011. Since then EU's economic and development assistance to address the Syrian crisis under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) has been channelled mainly through UN organisations and NGOs. UN organisations, as well as a number of NGOs, are currently working from Damascus (although a number of organisations also have offices in various governorates) and serve both Government-held and opposition-held areas (through cross-line operations). Meanwhile, a number of other NGOs are working from either southern Turkey or Lebanon and serve predominately opposition-held areas (through cross-border operations). The main priorities with regard to both humanitarian and early recovery (development) actions inside Syria are outlined in the "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) January to December 2014, prepared in coordination between the United Nations System, the Government of Syria, and humanitarian actors in Syria.

This action supports a number of the activities foreseen under the SHARP, in particular those linked to livelihood.

#### 2.2.2. *Sector context: policies and challenges*

The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis has already resulted in massive efforts from governmental and non-governmental organisations both national and international as well as donors and United Nations (UN) agencies. Thus far, a robust humanitarian response has been organised around the "Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) inside Syria and Regional Response Plans (RRPs) in neighbouring countries affected. Funding needs are extremely high and there is consensus among the international community that the response to the crisis needs to be revisited. Considering that the crisis is affecting the broad spectrum of human development indicators<sup>4</sup>, there is a clear need to switch from a purely humanitarian response to a

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<sup>4</sup> The indicators are: poverty, spatial and gender inequalities, employment, livelihood and housing, education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation and the environment.

more sustainable and resilience-based development response that will build on and complement the ongoing humanitarian response.

For actions inside Syria, UNDP is implementing actions in livelihoods, early recovery and for building resilience in line with its development mandate. As the response to protracted conflict has a high risk of perpetuating dependency and exacerbating horizontal inequality and intergroup polarisation, the programme is informed with conflict analysis in a two-fold approach: (1) It is important to avoid the people in need to recur to negative coping mechanisms such as removing children from school, reducing the quality and quantity of food consumed, residing in crowded and unsanitary shelters, begging, using child labour or forced marriage as income sources, engaging with armed groups and other high-risk income-generating activities; (2) the resilience-based development response is guided by a deeper understanding of power dynamics integrating conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms.

The scaling up of the activities is justified by the assumption that the most likely scenario is a continuation of the current political stalemate with serious consequences on the fragile economic and security situation of the country described above.

Indeed the challenges are immense. More than 6.5 million people are estimated to be internally displaced (including Palestine refugees in Syria), many located on border areas attempting to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Many internally displaced households have resorted to negative coping mechanisms to survive. Food insecurity is likely to remain dire for the foreseeable future as the conflict in Syria continues. Livelihood loss, deepening poverty, inflation and steep depreciation of the SYP will continue to erode the capacity of families to meet basic needs and cope with the crisis. The most vulnerable affected groups will remain unable to produce or access adequate food to meet basic needs, necessitating a continued and expanded provision of multiple forms of emergency food and agricultural assistance. Where the situation allows, emphasis will be placed on restoring and stabilising people's livelihoods and strengthening community resilience through providing emergency employment opportunities for the restoration of basic community services such as solid waste management and revival of small businesses in affected areas. This will help the beneficiaries to satisfy their basic needs, improve their living conditions and pave the way for restoring basic community services.

In addition, the increasing fragmentation and multiplicity of armed groups, coupled with rising rhetoric and targeting violence on ethnic and religious grounds has added a new dangerous dimension to the conflict and is spilling over into neighbouring countries.

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

Over the past three years, UNDP gained valuable experience in developing and implementing area based interventions to enhance the resilience of the affected population and their ability to cope with the impact of the crisis. UNDP extracted several lessons learnt from the above mentioned experience which fed into its ongoing programme and interventions at the field level.

The bottom up approach in identifying the needs and priorities of the affected communities ensures an early engagement with the concerned people allowing them

to be involved in the implementation of the response programmes and directly benefiting from the rendered services. In this regard, the importance of following an area based planning approach which relies on needs expressed from the field is one of the lessons learnt. While UNDP is working under the umbrella of the SHARP document with already established objectives, the importance of the involvement of local communities (affected population, host communities, internally displaced and other key representatives) in planning and designing activities is crucial to ensure success of interventions and create ownership of the projects at the community level.

The deteriorating security situation and the difficult accessibility to critical areas in need of support and assistance enforced the importance of the role of local partners (non-governmental organisations - NGOs, community based organisations - CBOs, local committees, etc.). Working through local partners, building their capacities, acknowledging and enhancing their role as service providers are key factors in achieving tangible results and reaching desirable impact. This highlights the importance of conducting capacity development for local NGOs who proved over the past three years to be key players in reaching out to the people in need, addressing the impact of the crisis and enhancing their coping mechanism. Relying on local partners and assigning local staff at the field level whether directly through UNDP or through local recruitment agencies are additional factors of success ensuring accessibility, addressing sensitivity and allowing for better monitoring of implemented activities.

Following principles such as the do no harm principle and ensuring conflict sensitive planning are other key elements in ensuring successful end result. Conflict sensitive planning is notably adopted when devising the area-response plans mainly to examine the dynamics between host communities and IDPs or among the IDPs themselves. Such analysis is constantly updated by UNDP field and technical teams in Damascus for urgent actions and shift in the programme design. UNDP promotes for an engagement of local host communities in activities targeting IDPs by factoring a minimum of 30% of services and opportunities targeting the host communities. This enables both groups to get together and enjoy a better understanding of the other, particularly when IDPs come from different social and religious backgrounds than the host communities.

At another level, while mass procurement of non-food items needed by the affected population is much easier and cheaper from international resources, it became evident that taking the effort to map local disrupted industrial facilities, explore their capacities and conduct local procurements through those small facilities is an effective element in reviving local businesses and economy and in restoring disrupted livelihoods. This approach helps maintaining and creating longer term jobs and economic opportunities, providing demand to disrupted industries, encouraging return of IDPs to relatively secure areas and discouraging displacement which is in many cases triggered by economic factors and not only security issues. Furthermore, establishing a link between international organisations, international NGOs and local sewing workshops supported by UNDP in partnership with local NGOs proved very effective in providing a market and creating demand for those facilities thus ensuring durability and continuity of activities beyond the project duration.

## **2.4. Complementary actions**

This action is integrated in the “Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan” (SHARP) and is conceived to complete humanitarian activities. UNDP notably ensures cooperation and coordination with other UN agencies operating in the humanitarian field in Syria for harmonised interventions and complementarities. Cross-border operations as authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 2165 have notably started at the end of July 2014 and a ‘Whole-of Syria’ planning is currently being developed to ensure that cross-lines operations and cross-border operations are complementary.

The action will capitalise on previous UNDP’s interventions in the context of the Syrian crisis and on the partnerships built over time by UNDP in Syria with local partners and stakeholders, in particular local associations, NGOs and CBOs in addition to various think tanks and faith based organisations (mainly churches) and private sector. UNDP, through its previous work on development in Syria and the current recovery and resilience interventions has gained a thorough understanding of the diversity in Syria and the needed spectrum of interventions as a response to the crisis mainly under the changing priorities and dynamics in the social fabric and economic conditions in the country. UNDP incorporates humanitarian and recovery principles in the design, planning and implementation of sub-initiatives foreseen in the project.

The EU also supports the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) through the programme "Education for vulnerable and displaced children in Syria" in Syria as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for the programme "Enhancing the Protection of Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Syria". In addition the EU Delegation Syria is in the process of evaluating proposals from international NGOs on livelihood projects that would complement the UNDP action. Finally, a scoping mission of the Department for International Development (DFID) for livelihood activities in opposition held areas in Syria is currently undergoing, with EU Delegation Syria participation and its outcome could identify further complementary actions in the livelihood sector that could be interesting to support.

The Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF), which has been established in 2013 and is currently funded by a number of EU Member States and non EU-countries aims at funding larger scale rehabilitation projects inside Syria. There are gaps in addressing smaller scale actions that can respond to dynamically evolving need.

The projects will – where appropriate and operationally necessary – be coordinated with other actions implemented by other donors, in support of – or directly by - the Interim Government or any other structure of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

## **2.5. Donor coordination**

Concerning Syria, due to the fact that assistance is using different delivery mechanisms ("cross-line" and "cross-border"), donor coordination is taking place in a number of different fora at different levels. These include:

- The informal "core group" on donor coordination for recovery, resilience, and development response to the Syria crisis which is chaired by the EU and

includes key bilateral and multilateral donors. This group aims at improving the effectiveness of development assistance provided in response to the Syrian crisis, both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries, but does not include humanitarian activities which are coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

- In addition, coordination is also conducted in the frame of the Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of Syrian People. Here the focus is on coordination of donor support to the opposition held areas of Syria which is mainly supported from southern Turkey (cross-border), although there is also cross line support.
- The UN also co-chairs a number of sectoral coordination meetings based in Damascus.

There is very close and regular internal coordination within the European Commission between the various services involved in the response and with the European External Action Service. The Joint Communication "Towards a Comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis"<sup>5</sup> helps provide the framework for coordinating all aspects of the EU response to the crisis.

In addition, the revised "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) provides a coordinated response strategy for all UN agencies and humanitarian actors.

### **3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

#### **3.1. Objectives**

The overall objective of the proposed project is to strengthen the resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the protracted crisis and enable those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives.

The project's specific objectives are:

- a) Ensuring a well-coordinated livelihoods and early recovery response that provides IDPs and their host communities with rapid employment opportunities to enhance service delivery and rehabilitate basic community infrastructure;
- b) The creation and stabilisation of basic livelihoods in view of supporting spontaneous recovery efforts or coping mechanisms. Special attention will be given to creating such opportunities to youths, women headed household and persons with disability.

For the planning and implementation of this project, UNDP refers to the United Nations policy on "Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration" and relies on the pertinent guiding principles set for the three track support to employment:

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<sup>5</sup> JOIN (2013) 22 final of 24.06.2013.



- Track A: Stabilising income generation and emergency employment.
- Track B: Local economic recovery for employment opportunities and reintegration.
- Track C: Sustainable employment creation and decent work.

While all three tracks promote employment their focus is different: livelihoods stabilisation (Track A) such as emergency employment schemes, targeted self-employment support (especially livelihood start-up grants and packages) and infrastructure rehabilitation; medium- to long-term local economic recovery including interventions that aim at boosting sustainable employment, income generation, and reintegration (Track B); long-term employment creation and inclusive economic growth (Track C). All three tracks are observed in any phase of the recovery but their intensity generally peaks at different times.

### **3.2. Expected results and main activities**

The expected results are:

1. Emergency employment for improved service delivery and restoration and repair of basic services and social infrastructure.

Activities will consist in cash-for-work wages for at least 4,000 people, agreements with NGOs and CBOs, covering costs of materials, costs of money transfer companies/money vendors, rehabilitation of water networks, schools, health centres and other community priority infrastructure.

2. Emergency support for restoration of disrupted livelihoods.

Activities will consist in responding to the urgent needs of  $\pm$  1,500 displaced families and their host families, to cope with the consequences of the crisis. Direct support will be offered to provide grants to revive small businesses and distribution of tool kits and productive assets. Vocational training will be considered as a main element in this component in order to equip the unemployed and affected persons with the necessary skills for the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase.

3. Emergency support for women headed households.

Activities will consist in emergency employment for women to generate quick earnings to support their families even if it is for a short period of time. It is foreseen that  $\pm$ 2,800 women in affected communities and/or public shelters will benefit from rapid cash for work schemes in addition to vocational training and start-up kits.

4. Emergency support and rehabilitation for persons with disabilities.

Activities will consist in a comprehensive rehabilitation programme for at least 3,000 persons starting with provision of disability and medical aids (such as prosthetics, artificial limbs, crutches, wheelchairs, medical pillows and mattresses, among other needed items), physiotherapy sessions, vocational training and start-up kits for quick income generating activities and finally psychosocial support.

5. Support to social cohesion and community resilience.

Activities will consist in empowering people and institutions to cope with the consequences of the on-going crisis. Focus will be put on developing the capacities of 70 NGOs/CBOs to engage in emergency responses with particular focus on livelihoods and early recovery initiatives and promote social cohesion and reconciliation through community based activities, including 25 small grants. Thus, a significant emphasis on local level interventions will be considered. This can be promoted through the establishment of local community groups (in four governorates) to facilitate the implementation of coordinated humanitarian and livelihoods activities and paving the way for more reconciliatory actions among various community groups.

### **3.3. Risks and assumptions**

Assumptions:

- The security situation remains stable.
- Active coordination among the main stakeholders remains.
- No-double funding between the ongoing programme and the scaling up.

Risks:

- The risks of operating in Syria during the conflict are clearly significant. Projects will have to include a high degree of flexibility in order to ensure that they can adapt to the changing situation on the ground. The main risk is the deterioration of the already grave security situation in Syria.
- Intense increase in number of Syrian IDPs jeopardises the capacity of the host communities and partners to respond.
- Compromised in-country peace and stability.

Mitigating measures:

The abovementioned risks underlie all projects attempting to operate inside Syria. Increasing strategic coordination and timely exchange of information between key stakeholders and taking stock of lessons learnt may mitigate the risks. The organisation entrusted with the project will make full use of its experience and response mechanisms to ensure risk mitigation. Finally, the necessary flexibility will be used to cope with changes or deterioration of circumstances.

### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

- *Gender equality promotion:* girls and women from both the Syrian IDPs and host communities face significant barriers in accessing economic empowerment, being also most of the time head of households. The programme intends to address the unequal access to job creation and ensure an equal balance between male and female workers.
- *Fighting against extremism:* Livelihood is a driver of inclusive growth and poverty reduction. Providing youth with quality vocational training and job

opportunities is essential to integrate well in the society and to become less vulnerable and less inclined to fall into the trap of extremism.

- *Human rights:* Access to decent and safe work are fundamental rights; offering safe environment for workers and prevent exploitation and exposure to hazardous labour are among the most important International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Furthermore, by providing income generating activities to adults' head of households, child labour will be strongly reduced as it happens regularly in conflict situations. Therefore this action aims to ensure that vulnerable and displaced youth can continue accessing education.

### **3.5. Stakeholders**

The main stakeholders are the UNDP and the NGOs and CBOs that are implementing the programme in the field.

The direct beneficiaries of the programme are Syrian IDPs and host communities. The scaling up of the ongoing livelihood programme will increase the number of beneficiaries according to the following criteria: IDPs and host communities, people with disrupted livelihoods (housing, source of income, assets etc.), women-headed households (families who lost their primary income earner), people with disabilities and youth.

From a geographical point of view the scaling up of the project will adapt to the highly diverse situations in affected communities, UNDP resorted to an area-based response approach with different implementation modalities and with different types of local and international partners. UNDP is now actively operating in twelve governorates (Aleppo, Damascus, Dara'a, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Hassakeh, Homs, Idleb, Latakia, Raqqa, Rural Damascus, and Tartous) either through field presence, outsourced personnel, private service providers and/or partner NGOs. The extended network of partners and various implementation modalities are essential to overcome operational and access challenges, and ensure higher flexibility in response and resilience to security and other shocks in the target areas.

The choice of the area and target groups is guided by regularly updated governorate profiles, including a situation analysis of different socio-economic and vital sectors in the target governorate to update needs, priorities, local partnerships and risks. An area-based response plan is then developed and updated in close consultation with local stakeholders under the framework of UNDP's mandate in livelihoods, early recovery and resilience.

## **4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

### **4.1. Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

**4.2. Indicative operational implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2. and 4.3. will be carried out is 48 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement or, where none is concluded, from the adoption of this Action Document, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements. The European Parliament and the relevant Committee shall be informed of the extension of the operational implementation period within one month of that extension.

**4.3. Implementation components and modules**

*4.3.1. Indirect management with an international organisation*

This action, with the objective of strengthening the resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the protracted crisis and enabling those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives, may be implemented in indirect management with UNDP in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. This implementation is justified because: i) bilateral aid is currently suspended and; ii) This organisation has an international mandate to implement some activities foreseen in the project.

The entrusted entity would be responsible for the award, signing and management of contracts (grants and procurement) and for making payments.

This entrusted entity is currently undergoing the ex-ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. In anticipation of the results of this review, the responsible authorising officer deems that, based on a preliminary evaluation and on the long-standing and problem-free cooperation with this entity, it can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

**4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

Subject to the following, the geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement procedures and in terms of origin of supplies and materials purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

In accordance with Article 9(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014; the Commission decides that natural and legal persons from the following countries having traditional economic, trade or geographical links with neighbouring partner countries shall be eligible for participating in procurement and grant award procedures: Turkey, Iraq. The supplies originating there shall also be eligible.

The responsible authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

**4.5. Indicative budget**

Module	Amount in	Third party
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	<b>EUR thousands</b>	<b>contribution</b>
4.1 Indirect Management with UNDP	4,050	N.A.
Totals	4,050	N.A.

#### **4.6. Performance monitoring**

UNDP will regularly report to the Commission on the use of committed funds and programme implementation and provide ad hoc information on this additional funding for the Syria programme through joint financial expenditure verification under the special measure for the Syrian population. The report on programme implementation shall also focus on project results, obstacles, lessons learnt and any useful information for improving the programming and identification.

#### **4.7. Evaluation and audit**

The contract will include a final end of term review as part of the contract. Annual reviews are also foreseen. These will be paid for under the respective contract.

Evaluations (mid-term, final, ex post) and audit arrangements are integral part of the contractual arrangements with the selected delegatee.

The contract shall be subject to the auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules and directives of that organisation.

The EU may undertake an ad hoc overall final audit at the end of the implementation if considered necessary. Any such audit would be contracted by the EU financed from a separate financing decision.

#### **4.8. Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated before the start of implementation and supported with the budget of the project.

The measures shall be implemented either (a) by the Commission, and/or (b) by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

To date the visibility of the EU's support to the Syrian crisis has been insufficient.

The public perception is that the EU is not addressing the Syrian crisis, when in fact it is the largest donor. The lack of visibility to the EU's actions weakens the EU's political traction in the region and its standing in Europe. While EU visibility within

Syria should be judged on a case-by-case basis, as it could jeopardise the safety and security of an implementing organisation's staff, any reduction in the visibility should be compensated by an increase in other means, for example by ensuring that beneficiaries are regularly informed by word-to-mouth that the support they are receiving is from the EU. In addition, visibility actions by implementing partners outside the area of conflict should be stepped up. Each implementer will have to draw up a comprehensive visibility and communication plan and submit a copy to the EU Delegation. The related costs will be covered by the budgets of the two contracts.