Annex 1: Action Fiche for occupied Palestinian territory, Israel, Jordan

1. IDENTIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title/Number</th>
<th>Middle East Peace Projects (MEPP) – EU Partnership for Peace programme 2011 (PfPP) (CRIS number 22875)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>EU contribution: EUR 10 million (EUR 5 million in 2011 + EUR 5 million in 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid method / Method of implementation</td>
<td>Project approach – Centralised management and devolved to EU Representation Office in East Jerusalem, EU Delegations in Israel and Jordan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC-code</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Civil society activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. RATIONALE

2.1. Sector context

The relations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel and the Middle East peace process as a whole are again at a stalemate following the modest optimism which the US-mediated peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority - resumed under the form of indirect talks in mid 2010 - engendered. The indirect talks were upgraded to direct talks in September 2010 but came to yet another impasse soon afterwards, following the end of the 10-month partial settlement moratorium in the West Bank, which the Israeli government has not renewed. Construction has since resumed in West Bank settlements. The Israeli government has reiterated its position in November 2010 that there will never be a freeze of Israeli construction in East Jerusalem. President Mahmoud Abbas has insisted on the refusal to return to negotiations unless Israel halts settlement construction, claiming Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state and recalling Palestinian refugees' right to return. The PA has also urged the international community to recognise a Palestinian state. International efforts, led by the US, have failed to find a way to re-launch direct negotiations including through an additional partial freeze on West Bank settlement construction.

The internal Palestinian political situation continues to be marked by the state of division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. There is no tangible progress to bring about national reconciliation and Egypt's draft agreement of October 2009 cannot therefore be implemented. The divide continues to have direct consequences on state-building in occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). Presidential and legislative elections cannot take place as due. The mandate of the President and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) are extended for an undefined period, in line with a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership decision. The PLC activities continue though to be effectively frozen. More generally, public institutions (ministries, security, judiciary etc) in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank continue to develop separately, despite recent positive signs in the field of social protection.
The Israeli coalition government has remained stable throughout 2010, with only minor fluctuations in the approval ratings of most coalition partners. The only party that has suffered a significant loss in public support is Labour. While the coalition appears stable, there are clear areas of tension, including over the issue of a freeze in settlement construction. On the domestic legislative front, a number of controversial bills have made progress which can restrict civil society in Israel. The divide between religious and secular Jews has gained in prominence. In its international relations, Prime Minister Netanyahu has voiced ever-increasing concern at the Iranian nuclear threat.

Due to its geopolitical position, history and its population mix, Jordan is inevitably implicated in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and considers itself as stakeholder to many final status issues (security, refugees, water, status of Jerusalem). Although Jordanian officials from the King down never tire of underlining that there is no Jordanian solution to the Palestinian question, any Palestinian state created through negotiations with Israel would also depend on close relations with Jordan. More than half of Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin. The rest are from Bedouin tribes and fear that a "Jordanian solution" will mean the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan, throwing out the demographic balance and ending their domination. The King of Jordan has repeatedly warned against a resumption of violence in the Middle East should the stalemate in peace talks continue.

Polls show that popular support for the two-state solution remains rather high amongst both Israelis and Palestinians. On the Palestinian side civil society constituencies which work actively for peace are almost wholly donor driven and financed (though no less sincere for all that). On the Israeli side, the traditional peace movement is beleaguered and perceived as marginal by mainstream Israeli society. The Israeli public remains largely disinterested in the peace process, caring far more about economic and other domestic issues. Grassroots contacts between Israelis and Palestinians are dwindling, and it is now rare that ordinary Palestinians and Israelis meet. The two-state solution is in danger.

In this context, there is an unsurprising resurgence of those seeking other solutions. Extremist voices on both sides are growing louder. Others call for peaceful radical alternatives to a negotiated settlement, whether through the unilateral creation of a Palestinian State or through putting a one-state solution on the agenda.

At the regional level, the Arab Peace Initiative remains the principal option for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict and normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab neighbours; however, though the Initiative has been welcomed anew by the international community including the EU and the US, Israel's response has been lukewarm.

2.2. Lessons learnt

In the absence of a dynamic peace process and the deepening internal divides on both sides peace building activities are confronted with increased scepticism in the whole region. In order to adapt to the deterioration of the situation, the programme will continue to support "national" projects in addition to the cross border projects. Internal divisions should be addressed as well as segments of the population who
support peace but have lost hope. In this context, political leaders and opinion formers need to be targeted in order to renew and keep alive the ideas and visionary leadership which could result in a peace deal. Activities aiming at revitalising the dialogue, exposing them to studies and international experiences will also be supported by the programme.

Analyse of results of previous EU Partnership for Peace programmes have been conducted both externally and in house, and were used as a basis to define the priorities for the past Call for Proposals.

The last external evaluation of the programme was conducted from April to September 2009. The evaluation highlighted some important features of the programme which makes it highly relevant to building peace in the region. Meanwhile, it recommended a number of both strategic and logistical adjustments that could enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the effort.

In order to address these recommendations the Call for Proposals 2011 will reinforce, in continuity with 2010 call, the following approaches:

(1) Connect peace building and education for peace with tangible results likely to impact people everyday's life;

(2) Promoting conflict transformation and nonviolent resistance among marginalised groups and new constituencies as alternatives to passive acceptance of the conflict or of armed struggle against it.

(3) Opening the political space for political discussion among conflicting parties and support national and intergovernmental leadership to foster the peace process;

(4) Develop communication strategies to reinforce the image and effectiveness of the programme and for building capacity of the civil society organisations.

2.3. Complementary actions

The European Council of December 2009 called for the urgent resumption of negotiations that lead, within an agreed time-frame, to a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security with Israel. It recalled that the European Union would not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties.

The involvement of the European Union in the Middle East peace process is driven by the basic principles and objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The relationship between the European Union and its Mediterranean Partner Countries aims at “turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” through “strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership
Such a partnership in the Mediterranean area is concretely implemented through the ENP and the relevant Action Plans, offering the countries covered an increasingly close relationship with the EU, and aiming to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The Middle East Peace Projects – Partnership for Peace is therefore situated in the context of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) Regional Strategy 2007-2013 and ENPI Regional Indicative Programme 2011-2013.

Complementarities will be sought with the Instrument for Stability (IfS), more specifically with the Peace-Building Partnerships programme, recently set up within the IfS. The scope of IfS is very wide since it is one of the EU tools which provides for rapid responses in contexts of crisis and emerging crisis. Contrary to the PfP, the IfS has global reach and is deployed worldwide. Conversely, PfP has a definite objective of promoting and supporting the Middle East Peace Process. Complementarities will be drawn from the respective added value of the two programmes mainly in the area of mere political dimension. Since IfS is quite flexible, it will be available to respond and accompany any possible political development at short notice when no other EU instrument is available, while the PfP programme priorities and award decisions are fixed once a year within the scope of the annual Call for Proposals. Moreover, PfP is the unique instrument that can be geared in line with the local context and promote coordination within the peace building sector in the region. For these reasons, any IfS proposals in the Middle East will be checked for complementarities with actions and priorities under the PfP. IfS beneficiaries will be invited to networking and other relevant events organised in the peace building sector.

PfP programme will also take into account and seek complementarities with bilateral and regional actions under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

Finally, PfP programme will be coherent with the comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security encouraging applicants to mainstreaming gender in their proposals thus ensuring full involvement of women in the search for peace.

2.4. Donor coordination

Donors respective strategies and involvement in peace building actions are quite fragmented. In the past, though attempts were made at donor co-ordination, there were no tangible results. It is expected that such co-ordination will be promoted more firmly during the current project phase where a mapping of the donors’ policies and programmes in peace-building area will be carried out in oPt, Israel and Jordan. The objective of this mapping is twofold: on the one hand, it will help to get a first contact with the donors involved in peace-building in the region with a view to creating a platform for coordination; on the other hand, it will be disseminated among civil society organisations in order for them to increase their capacities to leverage funds. In addition, as in the past, the EU will continue inviting the donors to some of the events targeting PfP beneficiary and non beneficiary organisations.

1 From the ‘Barcelona Declaration’, see http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm
3. DESCRIPTION

3.1. Objectives

The **overall objective** of the EU Partnership for Peace Programme is to help support the conditions for re-launching the peace process and provide a solid foundation at civil society and intergovernmental level for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East by strengthening and increasing direct civil society relationships and inter-agency/inter-governmental co-operation based on equality and reciprocity between Palestinians and Israelis, including the Arab / Palestinian minority in Israel. To this end, initiatives under this programme can be undertaken by each country or jointly within and between Mediterranean Partner Countries\(^2\) or EU Member States or countries that are beneficiaries of Pre-Accession Assistance\(^3\) or Member States of the EEA\(^4\).

The **specific objective** is to strengthen civil society peace building actions and conflict transformation, focusing on initiatives which are likely to have an impact on people’s everyday lives. In particular, the programme intends to support practical actions aiming at rebuilding mutual trust through reconciliation, building capacity for non violent approaches to conflict resolution, empowering marginalized parties and launching joint development policies and strategies.

3.2. Expected results and main activities

Expected results would include:

1. Confidence in the peace process is restored amongst key constituencies.
2. Marginalised parties are empowered and new constituencies persuaded to adopt non violent approaches to conflict resolution.
3. Shared development of policies and strategies is renewed and awareness about existing and possible new peace solutions is raised.
4. Commitment to the peace process is strengthened by leaders/decision makers; for example through broadening support for particular initiatives.
5. The capacities of civil society organisations implicated in the process (including community based organisations) are improved.
6. The outcomes of the PfP projects are disseminated widely and the image of the programme is reinforced.

Results 1 to 4 will be achieved through support for projects under a Call for Proposals. Expected results 5 and 6 will be achieved via service contracts, managed by the EU, which provide training, conferences, networking, communication and media capacity building for NGOs. These services will be funded under the current

---

\(^2\) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and West Bank & Gaza.

\(^3\) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

\(^4\) Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and EU-27.
MEPP 2010 (component 2) and will be carried out along two years starting in early 2011.

The following priorities will be considered for the Call for Proposals:

(1) **Cross community co-operation: Joint concrete actions for socio-economic development**

For 2011, the programme will maintain its support to practical actions responding to local concrete needs (such as environment, health, municipality issues, community development, technical disputes or the like) likely to produce tangible results in terms of development, quality of life and co-operation between conflicting communities.

(2) **Peace building education, communication and empowerment**

The actions under this priority could include conflict management work such as capacity building for non violent approaches to conflict resolution, expose the target groups to both their own and the other narratives as well as to their respective rights; peace building educational activities; educational programmes designed to introduce long term changes in attitudes, stereotypes, prejudices and to increase tolerance and understanding both within each of the societies and of the other side; lessons learnt from other conflicts in the world.

(3) **Awareness raising of leaders and opinion-formers, public opinion and media**

Actions under this priority will explore political options in the framework of the two state solution, as agreed upon by all involved parties, as well as put into operation the existing visions of a future peaceful relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours, through increasing knowledge and awareness of possible solutions to the conflict based on justice and rights. These actions are intended to support leaders and opinion formers to work toward the resolution of the conflict.

All actions, regardless of the priority, must be implemented mainly in the occupied Palestinian territory and/or Israel and/or Jordan. Specific activities, within the scope of the action and for its benefit, can be implemented also in Mediterranean Partner Countries\(^5\) or EU Member States or countries that are beneficiaries of Pre-Accession Assistance\(^6\) or Member States of the EEA\(^7\).

**Target groups:** Pioneer projects, targeting 'veto' and 'blocking' groups (those communities considered hostile to the peace process) will be welcomed. Projects aiming at expanding the constituencies through the involvement of marginalised groups such as youth, women and children and/or targeting sceptical or not committed groups are encouraged. Projects involving local communities as a whole, thus producing a multilevel and long term impact, will be particularly encouraged.

---

\(^5\) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and West Bank & Gaza.

\(^6\) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

\(^7\) Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and EU-27.
Working through media for increasing awareness or targeting media for changing attitudes and stereotypes will be welcomed as well.

3.3. Risks and assumptions

As previous experience shows, there is a high risk of disruption of activities linked to the instability of the political situation. A political crisis, similarly to what happened in December 2008/January 2009 due to the war on Gaza, is likely to provoke a freezing of the activities and a temporary suspension of the peace non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engagement. In this case and depending on the moment when it might occurred during the calls for proposals/implementation process, the following options will be considered: to stand-by the launch of the call for proposals; to delay the evaluation process; freeze the actions implementation and grant a time extension to the contracts. These measures should allow the civil society to get back to action once the situation is calmed down and the first astonishment is overcome.

A deterioration of the situation in terms of movement and access could lead to delays in the implementation of the projects. It could also affect the monitoring of the activities. Increased political tensions could jeopardise the willingness/ability of the stakeholders to carry on the project, or even to apply in the first place. Visibility could also be affected due to security reasons. In these cases, as learned in previous experience, it is suitable to delay some activities and/or adopt a low profile approach. In addition, each proposal submitted under the call for proposals will need to assess the risks and propose mitigation measures

3.4. Crosscutting Issues

Cross-cutting issues, such as environmental sustainability, gender equality, good governance and human rights, are taken into due consideration in the context of the programme. In the context of the 2010 programme component 2, special trainings on integration of environment issue and gender mainstreaming will be delivered to grant Beneficiaries. These trainings will be also an opportunity for EU staff to increase knowledge and skill on those issues so as EU staff will be enabled to follow up more competently in the future.

3.5. Stakeholders

The main stakeholders of the programme are civil society organisations, including Community Based Organisations (CBOs), and leaders and opinion-formers in the region as well as their European partners. In the last years, several consultation seminars with stakeholders have been undertaken, specifically in December 2007 and February 2009, as well as in September 2009 in the context of the external evaluation of the programme, in addition to the regular contact between the EU local services and the grant Beneficiaries for the managing of their respective contracts and project monitoring.

Among the main outcomes of these meetings it is worth highlighting that there is no symbiotic relation between the political peace process and civil society. However, the work of civil society is extremely important for contributing to building a sustainable peace. Working on common interests can maximize prospects for sustainability, and objectives need to be gradual and realistically achievable. Moreover, as recommended also by the external evaluation, the work of peace NGOs
has to meet the very basic needs of the targeted local communities and ensure their mode of operation is relevant, thus ensuring higher impact and sustainability of the actions. In addition, given the existing internal political divisions which create barriers to the peace process, a broad range of communities and actors need to be targeted, and sometimes actions in only one country will be more sustainable. For this reason, PfP, notwithstanding its specific peace-building overall objective, it is not restricted to peace NGOs, but is open to all kind of civil society organisations which are able, through their action, to connect peace building with tangible results that change lives and create long-term impact and consolidation.

In this regard, the involvement of the communities as a whole is key to ensure that the civil society organisations agenda is relevant to the targeted communities. NGOs consulted in the above mentioned meetings went also further ahead proposing that, where possible, special attention could be paid to those communities opposed to the peace process (commonly called 'veto' or 'blocking' communities).

Local Authorities have a significant task in socio-economic development and community representation. They have an important role in ensuring social cohesion among their constituents and are therefore among the potential stakeholders of the programme.

The final beneficiaries are the peoples of the Middle East and the Mediterranean Partner Countries.

4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

4.1. Method of implementation

Direct centralised management devolved to EU Technical Assistance Office (EUTAO) in East Jerusalem (name of EU Delegations in non sovereign territories) and the EU Delegations in Israel and Jordan.

The distribution between the different Delegations in terms of Project Management is made on the grounds of the nationality of the applicant. As a general principle, Palestinian and European applicants are processed by the EUTAO whereas Israeli ones are processed by the EU Delegation in Tel Aviv. Projects which have mainly activities in Jordan or Jordanian applicants are managed by the EU Delegation in Amman.

The call for proposal shall be launched by EUTAO in East Jerusalem. Delegation services will work jointly for the preparation and evaluation of the Call for Proposals and organisation of training and communications events. They will also attend events, meetings and monitoring visits together when relevant and keep each other regularly informed on the projects progress.

4.2. Procurement and grant award procedures

1) Contracts

All contracts implementing the action must be awarded and implemented in accordance with the procedures and standard documents laid down and published by
the Commission for the implementation of external operations, in force at the time of
the launch of the procedure in question.

Participation in the award of contracts for the present action shall be open to all
natural and legal persons covered by the ENPI Regulation applicable to the general
budget of the European Union.

2) Specific rules for grants

Grants will be awarded to actions targeting local constituencies in the area of peace
education, media, and joint concrete actions for socio economic development
(priorities 1 and 2). A dedicated amount (minimum 25% of the total amount of the
Call for Proposals) will be allocated to actions focusing on political issues,
researches, studies, etc. to promote dialogue and awareness at the political level both
in Europe and in the Middle East (priority 3).

The essential selection and award criteria for the award of grants are laid down in the
Practical Guide to contract procedures for EU external actions. They are established
in accordance with the principles set out in Title VI 'Grants' of the Financial
Regulation applicable to the general budget. When derogations to these principles are
applied, they shall be justified, in particular in the following cases:

– Financing in full (derogation to the principle of co-financing): the maximum
possible rate of co-financing for grants is 80%. Full financing may only be applied
in the cases provided for in Article 253 of the Commission Regulation (EC,
Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the
European Union.

– Derogation to the principle of non-retroactivity: a grant may be awarded for an
action which has already begun only if the applicant can demonstrate the need to
start the action before the grant is awarded, in accordance with Article 112 of the
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Union.

4.3. Indicative budget and calendar

The total indicative financial contribution of the European Union to the programme
is of EUR 10 million. EUR 5 million will be committed in 2011 and a further EUR
5 million in 2012, subject to funds availability.

A Call for Proposals for an amount of EUR 5 million will be launched in the second
semester of 2011. Another Call for Proposals is expected to be organised by the end
of 2012.

4.4. Performance monitoring

Performance monitoring, in order to measure progress of projects implementation,
will be ensured by the European Commission (through e.g. the EU Representative
Office in East Jerusalem, EU Delegations in Israel and Jordan, as well as EU
Delegations in relevant ENPI countries). A number of actions under PfP will be
included also in the annual results oriented monitoring (ROM) exercise.
Objectively Verifiable Indicators have been set (see Logical Framework here attached) for the whole programme. Applicants will be requested to thoroughly identity Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVI) for their respective action. A series of training courses in Project Cycle Management (PCM), Logical Framework, and Monitoring & Evaluation held in the current MEPP 2010-component 2 will provide potential applicants and new Beneficiaries with the necessary knowledge and practise for improving the quality of their log-frame and therefore efficiently implementing their actions.

4.5. Evaluation and audit

Final external evaluations of each project are encouraged and the relevant cost must be included in the project's budget. EU staff will facilitate the dissemination of these reports, upon authorisation of the grant Beneficiaries, so as to favour exchange of best practises.

An external evaluation of the whole programme is envisaged in 2012. This evaluation will be financed on another source other than the budget of the project.

Although not mandatory, Beneficiaries will be encouraged to submit a certification of expenditure in support of every request for payment. The relevant cost must be included in the project's budget. This point will be duly highlighted in the Guidelines for Applicants in order for them to include it in the proposed budget.

Some PfPP projects will be included in the Annual Audit exercise, if deemed necessary.

4.6. Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the whole programme is expected to be increased through the services provided by a specialised company in the context of the current MEPP 2010-component 2. A dedicated link to PfP has been already created in each web site of the three delegations in charge of the programme where a brief presentation of the programme, including the list of the awarded grant, is uploaded. The three EU Delegations will take due care to always communicate identical messages and provide identical information.

EU visibility guidelines are to be respected by all Beneficiaries. Services on the ground will check the visibility component of the actions through field visits and will increase public visibility of the actions when possible. Is it worth mentioning, however, that given the sensitiveness of this programme, grant Beneficiaries are not always keen to disclose information on their activities and on the participating people. Visibility issue will be then treated with the utmost care.